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Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
Bybee grants qualified immunity to officers in high-speed chases [9] and dissents in favor of the Stolen Valor Act [1], showing consistent deference to government actors. Bingue v. Prunchak ↗ United States v. Alvarez ↗
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
Follows Supreme Court precedent in Lewis and applies it uniformly to all chases without expansion or revisiting [9]. Bingue v. Prunchak ↗
The case arose after Justine Booth, a 33-year-old woman with a severe seizure disorder and cognitive disability who lived in Washington’s State Operated Living Alternatives (SOLA) program, was found unconscious in her bathtub and later died; her mother, Loraine Campbell, sued three SOLA employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming they violated Justine’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights by failing to ensure safe conditions while she was in state custody. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the defendants owed Justine no affirmative constitutional duty of care because her SOLA placement was voluntary—she and her mother had requested it, and she retained the right to leave—creating neither a special relationship based on involuntary custody nor a state-created danger. It further concluded that qualified immunity protected the defendants.
In Trigueros v. Adams, Enrique Trigueros appealed the federal district court's dismissal of his habeas petition challenging his California state conviction for murder and attempted murder, which raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling that the petition was untimely under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the California Supreme Court's request for an informal response on the merits from the state, followed by a denial of the petition, constituted a determination that Trigueros's 2005 state habeas petition was timely. This finding allowed statutory tolling of the AEDPA deadline during the state proceedings, rendering his federal petition, filed shortly after the California Supreme Court's denial, timely. The decision rested on the principle that the California Supreme Court's actions effectively overrode the Superior Court's untimeliness ruling for purposes of AEDPA tolling.
The case concerned Crystal Ammons, a resident at a state-run psychiatric hospital for children, who sued the facility's former and current CEOs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to safe conditions by failing to protect her from sexual abuse or risk by a staff member. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the record supported a claim that one defendant failed to exercise professional judgment regarding the plaintiff's safety but that the other defendant was entitled to qualified immunity.
In United States v. Gonzalez-Melchor, the defendant was convicted of illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 and challenged his prior deportation on grounds that the immigration judge failed to advise him of eligibility for voluntary departure. The district court upheld the conviction after finding that Gonzalez-Melchor had waived his appeal rights, but at sentencing the court itself negotiated a reduced sentence in exchange for an explicit waiver of appellate rights. The Ninth Circuit held that this waiver was invalid and unenforceable because judicial participation in negotiating waivers of legal arguments during sentencing creates an unacceptable risk of coercion, as it contravenes the principles underlying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1). The court vacated the sentence and remanded for further proceedings on whether the defendant was prejudiced by the immigration judge's failure to advise him of voluntary departure.
This case arose when Phoenix New Times executives Michael Lacey and Jim Larkin were arrested at home in the middle of the night after their newspaper published articles critical of Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio and other officials. The plaintiffs sued the sheriff, county attorney, a special prosecutor, and others, alleging violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights as well as state-law claims stemming from the arrests and related prosecution efforts. The district court dismissed many federal claims on immunity grounds and remanded the state claims. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that absolute and qualified immunity shielded most of the officials' conduct but that the special prosecutor's role in directing the arrests stated plausible claims for First and Fourth Amendment violations. The court reasoned that the complaint sufficiently alleged the arrests lacked probable cause and were motivated by retaliation against protected speech.
The case involved Craig and Wendy Humphries, who had sued Los Angeles County and various officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After determining that the Humphries were prevailing parties, the Ninth Circuit had ordered the County to pay 10% of their attorney's fees, calculated at $59,258.09. The Supreme Court later reversed that fee ruling in Los Angeles County v. Humphries. In this order, the Ninth Circuit accordingly reverses its prior fee award and remands the matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision.
