Francis X. Spina

In Commonwealth v. Aviles, a jury convicted the defendant of rape of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen based on evidence that he sexually abused an eight-year-old girl living in his apartment. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of testimony about a later complaint made by the victim to her grandmother and a prior consistent statement from her grand jury testimony, arguing violations of the first complaint doctrine established in Commonwealth v. King. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the mother's testimony as the designated first complaint witness was properly admitted and that additional evidence served independent purposes. The court also modified the standard for reviewing trial court decisions on the admissibility of first complaint evidence to allow greater deference while clarifying that the doctrine does not bar otherwise admissible testimony. The ruling distinguished the facts from prior cases involving multiple escalating disclosures over time.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Joseph Limone, who was charged with operating under the influence (seventh or subsequent offense) and related license violations after an off-duty Somerville police officer encountered him in Woburn following a minor car accident. Limone moved to suppress evidence obtained from the encounter, arguing that the off-duty officer's actions—ordering him out of the car, taking his keys, and directing him to wait—amounted to an unlawful extraterritorial arrest for a misdemeanor. The Superior Court denied the motion, Limone was convicted at trial, and the Appeals Court reversed, but the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review. The court affirmed the denial of suppression and the convictions, reasoning that the officer's conduct did not constitute an arrest because he did not investigate, collect evidence, or prevent the defendant from leaving on foot, and instead reasonably waited for local police as a private citizen.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns whether Francis Bevilacqua has standing to bring a try title action under Massachusetts law to compel Pablo Rodriguez to assert any claim to property at 126-128 Summer Street in Haverhill. Bevilacqua's claimed title derived from a quitclaim deed following a foreclosure sale conducted by U.S. Bank at a time when the mortgage had not yet been assigned to it by MERS. The Land Court judge raised the standing issue sua sponte and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that Bevilacqua lacked standing because his chain of title rested on an invalid foreclosure that did not comply with the statutory power of sale requirements, but ordered the dismissal to be without prejudice.

propertyprocedure

The case involved charges against Mark D. Tremblay for malicious burning of personal property, damage to property for intimidation, and a civil rights violation stemming from the intentional burning of a neighbor's boat in 2002. After a jury convicted him on all counts, Tremblay appealed the denial of his motion to suppress statements made during a police interview, arguing that assurances by a state trooper that certain comments were 'off the record' rendered those statements involuntary. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the convictions, holding that the statements were voluntary because the defendant was not in custody, was cooperative throughout the interview, and the circumstances did not show that the deception overrode his ability to make a rational choice about speaking. The court reasoned that the trooper's sympathetic demeanor, the non-coercive setting, and the defendant's relaxed and coherent state supported admissibility, distinguishing the facts from cases where fraud more directly undermined rational decision-making.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jesse Maxwell, a workers’ compensation claimant, suing AIG Domestic Claims, Inc. (AIGDC) for referring his claim to the insurance fraud bureau, communicating with investigators and prosecutors, and allegedly using criminal processes for leverage, asserting claims including malicious prosecution, abuse of process, infliction of emotional distress, and violations of G. L. cc. 93A and 176D. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of AIGDC’s motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that AIGDC possesses qualified immunity only for reporting potentially fraudulent activity under the relevant statute but not for communications with prosecutors or other conduct outside that scope, so the immunity does not bar all of Maxwell’s claims. It further held that while workers’ compensation exclusivity under G. L. c. 152 may bar portions of the claims, it does not entirely eliminate any single count and thus does not divest the court of jurisdiction.

labor & employmentcriminal lawtorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a District Court judge properly admitted a registry of motor vehicles certificate attesting that a notice of license revocation had been mailed to the defendant, in a prosecution for operating a motor vehicle after revocation for operating under the influence. The Commonwealth introduced the certificate without testimony from any registry witness. The court held that the certificate was testimonial evidence created for trial and its admission without cross-examination violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, so the conviction was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned a challenge by lawfully residing noncitizens in Massachusetts who were excluded from the Commonwealth Care health insurance premium assistance program under a 2009 state appropriation that adopted federal eligibility restrictions from the 1996 PRWORA law. The plaintiffs argued that the exclusion based on alienage violated the Massachusetts Constitution, including article 106's prohibition on national origin discrimination and equal protection principles. The Supreme Judicial Court answered three certified questions by holding that national origin discrimination does not encompass alienage, that no other constitutional provision affords special protection to aliens beyond general equal protection, and that state alienage classifications are subject to rational basis review rather than heightened scrutiny. The court did not reach the fourth question on the appropriate level of scrutiny for the program given those answers. The decision turned on the text and history of article 106, the distinction between alienage and national origin, and the absence of any explicit or implied heightened protection for immigration status in the state constitution.

immigrationhealthcarecivil rights

The case concerned defendant Gunter's convictions for first-degree felony murder (based on armed assault in a dwelling as the predicate felony), armed assault, and illegal firearm possession arising from a 1991 drug-related shooting during a search for stolen cocaine. On direct appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the murder and firearm convictions under G.L. c. 278, § 33E review after raising the merger doctrine sua sponte, vacating the duplicative assault conviction, and upholding the felony-murder verdict based on evidence of assaults against three other victims not named in the indictment. Following denial of federal habeas relief due to procedural default, the defendant sought a new trial in Superior Court on due process and ineffective assistance grounds, which was denied; the court here considers his § 33E application for leave to appeal that denial, noting the absence of a miscarriage of justice given the evidence supporting felony murder on an alternative theory.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the conviction of the defendant for first-degree murder on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty, along with unlawful possession of a firearm, a large capacity feeding device, and ammunition, based on a 2002 shooting in Boston where multiple eyewitnesses identified him as the shooter. The defendant appealed from his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial, claiming errors including improper conduct by the prosecutor during a jury view and opening statement, unreliable expert testimony on a tape fracture match, improper admission of jail phone recordings, and jury instructions that allegedly undermined his third-party culprit defense. The court affirmed the convictions and denial of the new trial motion, finding no error in the challenged aspects of the trial and no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, as the instructions properly required the Commonwealth to prove the defendant's identity beyond a reasonable doubt and other claims lacked merit.

criminal law

In this case, the Kenner family, owners of property across the street from the Hiebs' oceanfront lot in Chatham, challenged a special permit granted by the zoning board of appeals allowing the Hiebs to demolish and rebuild their house seven feet taller in the same footprint. The Land Court ruled that the Kenners lacked standing under G.L. c. 40A, §17 because their asserted harms—such as obstructed ocean views, blocked light or breezes, traffic issues, and diminished property value—were either speculative, generalized to the neighborhood, or de minimis, despite their status as abutters creating a rebuttable presumption of aggrievement. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that conclusion after reviewing the evidence, holding that the Kenners failed to demonstrate particularized injury to legal rights sufficient to qualify as aggrieved persons, and therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the case for dismissal without reaching the merits of the permit challenge.

propertyprocedure

In Cavadi v. DeYeso, a creditor holding a 1991 judgment against debtor Stephen Barnes sued to reach three properties (in South Boston, Martha's Vineyard, and New Hampshire) titled in the name of Barnes's partner Christina DeYeso, alleging fraudulent transfers and equitable ownership by Barnes. The plaintiff asserted both claims under the Massachusetts Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act and a common-law reach-and-apply action, but the UFTA count was dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds before trial. After a bench trial, the court entered judgment for the creditor on all properties; on appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed as to the Vineyard and New Hampshire properties but reversed as to the South Boston property. The core reasoning was that a non-statutory creditor's bill in equity to reach and apply assets is a distinct remedy not governed by the four-year limitations period in G. L. c. 109A, § 10, and remains available after that period expires.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the conviction of the defendant for the deliberately premeditated murder of his wife, based on evidence from the crime scene, including DNA analysis and witness accounts of the defendant's actions and statements after reporting the attack. The defendant appealed his conviction and the denial of his motion for a new trial, raising multiple claims including violations of his rights to a public trial and to confront witnesses regarding DNA evidence, improper admission of prior bad acts, prosecutorial misconduct related to his silence, recantation by a witness, jury exposure to extraneous information, and ineffective assistance of counsel concerning DNA challenges and search warrants. After an evidentiary hearing and review of the full record, the court affirmed the conviction and the denial of the amended motion for a new trial, finding no merit in any of the asserted errors under state and federal constitutional standards or Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 278, Section 33E. The court concluded that tactical decisions by counsel were reasonable and that cumulative errors did not warrant reversal.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a probationer whose probation was revoked after a hearing where he was found to have violated conditions by committing an indecent assault and battery on a child, leading to incarceration; he appealed claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing a notice of appeal and insufficient evidence at the hearing, using a motion under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b). The court decided that probationers are entitled to effective assistance of counsel at violation hearings where liberty is at risk or in all District Court cases, that rule 30(b) motions are the proper vehicle for such claims, that the evidence including witness statements and a child's interview was sufficient to support the violation finding despite recantation evidence, and affirmed the denial of the motion. The reasoning centered on due process protections for liberty interests in probation revocation proceedings, drawing analogies to rights in parental termination and sexually dangerous person cases, while applying the Saferian standard for ineffective assistance and upholding the judge's credibility determinations on the evidence presented.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case is a bar discipline proceeding against attorney Stephen Hrones for entering into a business arrangement with nonlawyer Lionel Porter, allowing Porter to operate an independent employment discrimination practice under Hrones' firm name and license with virtually no supervision, including signing Hrones' name on MCAD and EEOC filings. The Board of Bar Overseers recommended a one-year-and-one-day suspension, and the court adopted that sanction after determining that Hrones assisted in the unauthorized practice of law, shared fees improperly, and committed related record-keeping violations. The court reasoned that Hrones knew Porter could only appear under an attorney's authorization yet failed to provide oversight or review, leading to client harm, and found this conduct warranted the recommended suspension based on precedent.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a defendant convicted of first-degree murder on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty after she struck an acquaintance in the head multiple times with a cinder block following a confrontation outside a market, where she had been drinking and exhibited erratic behavior linked to mental illness. The defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instructions on criminal responsibility were flawed because they failed to address the effect of voluntary alcohol use activating her mental disease and were biased toward the Commonwealth, and she sought a new trial or reduction of the verdict under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the instructions created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. The core reasoning was that Massachusetts law recognizes lack of criminal responsibility where intoxication activates an underlying mental illness, and the given instructions did not properly inform the jury of this principle or avoid tilting the analysis in favor of the prosecution.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Global NAPs, Inc. suing its former attorneys and law firms for negligence, breach of contract, and loss of chance after they allegedly failed to file a timely appeal from a jury verdict exceeding $1 million in an underlying employment discrimination action brought under the Massachusetts Maternity Leave Act. A Superior Court judge granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the complaint, later entering a separate final judgment that preserved the defendants' counterclaims. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed that dismissal and remanded for further proceedings, reasoning that unresolved questions regarding the timeliness of the appeal notice under Mass. R. A. P. 4 and the proper application of the MMLA's eight-week leave protections and notice requirements precluded summary disposition of the malpractice claims.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a plaintiff who was severely injured when struck by a vehicle driven by an intoxicated employee of Beverly Enterprises-Massachusetts, Inc., after the employee had consumed alcohol during a work-related discussion at a restaurant with his supervisor. The plaintiff sued Beverly on theories of vicarious liability under respondeat superior and direct negligence for failing to prevent the employee from driving while impaired. A Superior Court judge granted Beverly's motion for summary judgment on both counts, which was affirmed by the Appeals Court and then by the Supreme Judicial Court. The court held that the employee was not acting within the scope of his employment when driving home after work, so respondeat superior did not apply, and that Beverly owed no duty as a social host because it did not furnish or control the service of alcohol. The decision relied on precedents establishing that employers are not liable for third-party injuries caused by employees' off-premises intoxication unless the employer provided the alcohol.

torts & liabilitylabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the conviction of the defendant for the 1999 murders of a fourteen-year-old girl and her eight-month-old fetus on theories of deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty. The defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress a police statement, arguing a violation of his statutory right to a telephone call under G. L. c. 276, § 33A, and the denial of his request for jurors' criminal records after the Commonwealth had obtained some. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the phone right is triggered only by formal arrest and that the defendant failed to show an intentional violation, while also finding no error in the handling of juror background information or selection procedures. The core reasoning centered on accepting the motion judge's factual findings, applying precedents on statutory rights and jury fairness, and determining that any disparity in record access did not prejudice the trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a juvenile charged with statutory rape and indecent assault and battery on a child after turning sixteen, while the younger complainant was not charged, prompting a motion for discovery of Norfolk County prosecution statistics on heterosexual versus homosexual conduct to support a selective prosecution claim based on sexual orientation. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the Juvenile Court judge did not abuse his discretion in granting limited discovery of raw statistical data on similarly situated juveniles under age seventeen. The court reasoned that although prosecutorial decisions are presumed to be in good faith, a defendant may obtain discovery upon presenting evidence raising a reasonable inference of impermissible discrimination under equal protection principles, and the requested data could be produced with minimal burden using first names as gender indicators while protecting privacy. The court noted that sexual orientation discrimination claims could proceed under rational basis review even if not a protected class.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved the defendant's convictions by a jury for kidnapping, rape, and assault and battery arising from a 1996 incident in which he allegedly assaulted a woman in his truck after offering her a ride. The Appeals Court had reversed the convictions due to improper first complaint testimony, but the Supreme Judicial Court granted further review and affirmed the convictions. The court rejected the defendant's claims that the trial judge erred in denying additional peremptory challenges during jury selection, that cumulative first complaint testimony was improperly admitted without limiting instructions, and that the kidnapping and assault convictions were lesser included offenses of the rape charge that should be dismissed. It held that the jury selection process was proper, the evidence rules were correctly applied, and there was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

criminal lawprocedure