This case involved a dispute over a life insurance policy purchased in 1998, where insurance agent Frederick McMenimen misrepresented the death benefits as $500,000 rather than the actual $200,000, leading the plaintiffs (including the trustee and beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust) to sue McMenimen, his employer, and related insurance companies for common-law tort claims and violations of G.L. c. 93A. The court held that the claims were properly pleaded in tort and under c. 93A, making them subject to the limitation periods in G.L. c. 260 that allow for tolling due to fraudulent concealment. It further ruled that tolling applied to claims against McMenimen but not the other defendants, though the longer limitations period for the c. 93A claim meant it was not time-barred against Nationwide. The court also affirmed the trial judge's decisions that the economic loss doctrine did not bar the claims, that reliance on the misrepresentations was not unreasonable as a matter of law, and on the calculation of damages and attorney's fees.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In this case, the defendant was convicted of trafficking in over fourteen grams of cocaine after police found bags of the substance in a car he was driving. He appealed, arguing that his confrontation rights were violated when a substitute chemist testified about drug test results performed by a retired analyst, that hearsay statements from a deceased officer's report were improperly admitted, and that his trial counsel was ineffective. The court held that while some of the substitute analyst's testimony and hearsay evidence were erroneously admitted, these errors did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, and counsel's performance did not fall below constitutional standards. The conviction was therefore affirmed based on the strength of the remaining evidence, including the preserved test data and other trial testimony.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the defendant's appeal from convictions for two counts of rape of a child under sixteen and two counts of indecent assault and battery on a person over fourteen. The defendant challenged the admission at trial of inculpatory statements made during custodial police interrogation after he told officers, "I’d like an attorney present. I mean but I can’t afford one. So I guess I’ll speak to you now. I don’t have an attorney," and then signed a Miranda waiver. The court concluded that this statement was an unambiguous invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, so questioning should have stopped until counsel was provided, and the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any subsequent waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Because the statements' admission was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the convictions were reversed and a new trial ordered.

criminal lawprocedure