Shirley M. Watts

In the CINA case In re: K.B., the Baltimore County Department of Social Services petitioned to have an infant declared a child in need of assistance after her mother was arrested for alleged physical abuse and mental health concerns, leading to the child’s out-of-home placement. At the adjudication and disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared K.B. a CINA, committed her to the Department’s custody, and noted a presumptive permanency plan of reunification, while scheduling a later permanency planning hearing; however, at the initial review hearing, the court adopted a magistrate’s recommendation to change the plan to concurrent reunification and adoption by a non-relative. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the reunification plan arising automatically after disposition is not a permanency plan established under CJ § 3-823, so a formal permanency plan hearing complying with that statute and FL § 5-525 must occur within 11 months of out-of-home placement. The Court further ruled that all parties are entitled to advance notice of the specific date, time, and purpose of any hearing at which a permanency plan may be determined or changed, rather than general notice that the plan could be altered in the future. It therefore affirmed the Appellate Court’s reversal of the juvenile court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

family lawprocedure

In Kopp v. State, the Supreme Court of Maryland addressed whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Xavier Kopp’s vehicle after receiving a direct cell-phone tip from a known acquaintance reporting an unfamiliar black sedan parked for an extended time in her neighborhood with cell phones in use and possible illegal activity, which the officer partially corroborated upon arrival in what he described as a high-crime area. After the stop yielded marijuana and a firearm, leading to charges and a conditional guilty plea, the Court held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, reversing the Appellate Court and circuit court rulings that had upheld the stop and denied suppression. The Court reasoned that the tip lacked indicia of reliability because it supplied no basis for the caller’s suspicion beyond innocent conduct, the officer’s limited observations added little, the high-crime-area testimony was insufficiently particularized as to location, specific crimes, and temporal proximity under Washington v. State, and the car’s brief forward movement did not amount to flight.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a strict liability design defect claim brought by the wife of a worker who developed mesothelioma and lung cancer after exposure to asbestos dust carried home on her husband’s clothing from his job; she sued manufacturers including General Electric, alleging the products were defective when they left the seller. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals certified a question to the Supreme Court of Maryland asking whether a household member in her position, who was neither a user nor consumer, must prove an extra element of “duty” beyond the four standard elements of a strict liability action set out in Phipps v. General Motors Corp. The court answered no, holding that such a plaintiff need only show the product was defective when it left the seller’s control, was unreasonably dangerous, caused the injury, and reached the plaintiff without substantial change. It reasoned that the elements of a strict liability design defect claim are distinct from those of failure-to-warn or negligence claims, so precedents requiring proof of duty in those other contexts do not apply here.

torts & liability

In this attorney discipline case, the Attorney Grievance Commission charged Maryland lawyer Spencer Michael Hecht with multiple violations of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his handling of three clients’ family law and related matters. The misconduct included losing a client’s signed post-nuptial agreement and concealing the loss, misrepresenting to clients that he would file motions or obtain expert reports he never pursued, filing a false expert witness designation in court, signing an affidavit harmful to a former client, making an unauthorized credit-card charge on another client’s account, failing to refund unearned fees, and obstructing the disciplinary investigation with inconsistent statements. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that this conduct violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.9, 1.15, 1.16, 8.1, and 8.4, and ordered Hecht’s immediate disbarment. Applying the Vanderlinde standard reaffirmed in Collins, the Court found that the intentional dishonesty, client harm, and absence of compelling extenuating circumstances required disbarment rather than a lesser sanction.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop after observing a driver manipulating or pressing the screen of a mobile phone, which the State argued could indicate a violation of Maryland’s distracted-driving statutes (TR §§ 21-1124, 21-1124.1, and 21-1124.2). The Supreme Court of Maryland held that such observations alone do not justify a stop under the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that, because touching a phone screen is equally consistent with lawful activities such as using GPS navigation, initiating or ending a call, or other permitted functions, an officer must identify additional particularized facts—beyond conduct common to the general public—that reasonably indicate unlawful texting or handheld phone use. Without those specific facts, the limited observations fail to supply the objective basis required for reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio and its progeny.

criminal lawprocedure

In Diandre Goodrich v. State of Maryland, the Supreme Court of Maryland considered whether a circuit court violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment and Article 21 right to self-representation by failing to conduct a further inquiry after being told that Goodrich, who was represented by counsel, wished to represent himself during proceedings on a joint motion to postpone trial. The Court held that the trial court’s inquiry complied with Snead v. State and Maryland Rule 4-215(e), so it was not required to question Goodrich further or grant any relief. The Court reasoned that once a court makes a reasonable inquiry giving the defendant an opportunity to assert a clear and unequivocal desire for self-representation or to discharge counsel, and the defendant responds in a manner that does not reasonably indicate such a request (here, stating he would like an attorney), no additional obligation arises under case law or the Rule. The judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved nuisance complaints about odors and pests from stockpiling and applying biosolids and soil conditioners at Foster Farm in Talbot County, and whether those activities were protected under Maryland’s state Right to Farm statute (CJ § 5-403) or the county’s Right to Farm ordinance (TCC Chapter 128). The Talbot County Agricultural Resolution Board ruled that the practices qualified as generally accepted agricultural practices under the local ordinance. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence, because the record lacked adequate findings on whether the stockpiling and off-site distribution of the materials constituted generally accepted practices or addressed public health, safety, and welfare. The Court also ruled that questions about the state statute’s one-year operation requirement were never decided by the Board and thus were not properly before the lower courts. It therefore reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment upholding the Board’s decision.

environmentpropertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Maryland’s diminution of confinement credits statute, Corr. Servs. § 3-702(c), bars an incarcerated person from earning credits while serving a sentence for third-degree sexual offense (Crim. Law § 3-307) involving a victim under 16 if the person had a prior conviction for the same offense. Dallas Fenton was convicted of multiple such offenses arising from separate incidents; the Department denied him credits on one sentence based on a later conviction stemming from an earlier incident. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the statute precludes credits only when the prior conviction preceded commission of the offense for which the current sentence is being served, so Fenton remained eligible for the credits. The Court reasoned that the phrase “previously convicted” is ambiguous, that legislative history shows the provision was meant to deter repeat offenders, and that traditional tools of statutory construction therefore require the earlier conviction to have occurred before the conduct underlying the sentence at issue.

criminal law

This case concerned whether, under Maryland law, a party in a divorce proceeding could immediately appeal a circuit court’s interlocutory order denying a request for temporary (pendente lite) child support and alimony. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that such denial orders are not appealable under Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 12-303(3)(v), which permits appeals from interlocutory orders for the “payment of money.” The Court reasoned that the statute applies only to orders that affirmatively direct one party to pay money to another, as those create enforceable obligations subject to contempt sanctions, whereas orders denying payment impose no such obligation and therefore fall outside the statute’s scope. It further concluded that this rule covers both complete denials and partial awards that do not grant the full amount requested.

family lawprocedure

In Coyle v. State of Maryland, the Supreme Court of Maryland addressed whether an indigent defendant was entitled to effective assistance from a panel attorney authorized by the Office of the Public Defender under the Maryland Public Defender Act to file a petition for a writ of certiorari after the defendant’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. The Court held that the Act’s plain language requiring effective assistance of counsel applied to the authorized representation, that the attorney’s failure to file the petition constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, and that prejudice was established because the defendant lost the opportunity to have the petition considered by the Court. The Court rejected presuming prejudice in this context but found the defendant had satisfied the Strickland test through the direct link between the attorney’s omission and the lost filing opportunity. As a result, the Court reversed the Appellate Court and permitted the defendant to file a belated petition for a writ of certiorari.

criminal lawprocedure

In Harry Davis, Jr. v. State of Maryland, the case concerned whether a criminal defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to consult with him about filing a motion to modify sentence under Maryland Rule 4-345(e) after his 2013 convictions and 72-year sentence, where the defendant had not specifically requested such a motion. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a defendant can prove ineffective assistance under the Strickland standard by showing both that counsel's failure to consult fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that this deficiency deprived the defendant of a reasonable probability of having the motion considered by the court. The Court overruled prior precedent establishing per se rules on deficiency or prejudice in this context, concluding instead that the reasonableness of counsel's conduct must be assessed case-by-case and that the defendant need not prove he affirmatively asked counsel to file the motion to establish prejudice. The Court reversed the denial of postconviction relief and remanded the case to allow Davis to file a belated motion for sentence modification.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a stepdaughter could inherit from her stepfather, Michael Gerard Schappell, who died intestate without any surviving spouse, registered domestic partner, biological children, parents, siblings, or grandparents, under Maryland’s doctrine of equitable adoption. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that a claimant may establish a right to inherit by satisfying, with clear and convincing evidence, a two-step test showing both the decedent’s intent to adopt and conduct consistent with that intent. The court explained that intent may be proven through an unperformed agreement to adopt, an invalid adoption attempt, or other statements or acts indicating the decedent viewed the claimant as a legally adopted child, while the second element requires evidence that the decedent held the claimant out to the public as a natural or adopted child and treated the claimant accordingly. The court reversed the Appellate Court of Maryland and remanded the case to the Orphans’ Court for Montgomery County to apply this standard in deciding the stepdaughter’s pending petition for a jury trial on the issue.

family lawproperty

The case concerned a citizen-initiated proposed amendment to the Baltimore City Charter, known as the Baby Bonus Amendment, which would have required the City to make a one-time payment of at least $1,000 to eligible residents upon the birth or adoption of a child. The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the circuit court’s ruling that the amendment could not be placed on the ballot. The Court held that the measure was not proper “charter material” under Article XI-A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution because it mandated specific legislative action and thereby encroached on the City’s police and general welfare powers, which must be exercised by ordinance rather than by charter amendment. The Court declined to overrule its precedent in Cheeks v. Cedlair Corp. and found that the mandatory payment provision could not be severed, as it formed the dominant purpose of the amendment.

electionsprocedurefamily law

The case involved disciplinary proceedings against April T. Ademiluyi, a former Associate Judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, who was charged with sanctionable conduct after her 2020 election. The Supreme Court of Maryland found that she violated multiple provisions of the Maryland Code of Judicial Conduct, including rules on compliance with the law, impartiality and fairness, bias and harassment, ex parte communications, disqualification, decorum with jurors, cooperation with disciplinary authorities, and political conduct. The Court ordered her removal from office, concluding that her wide-ranging misconduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and demonstrated an inability to perform judicial duties fairly and impartially. This outcome was deemed necessary because of the pervasive nature of the violations, her lack of remorse, and the need to preserve public confidence in the judiciary’s integrity and independence.

electionscivil rights

In Christopher Mooney v. State of Maryland, the Supreme Court addressed whether video footage of a shooting and surrounding events could be admitted at trial when a key witness lacked personal knowledge of every depicted portion. The Court held that the “reasonable juror” test governs authentication of videos under Maryland Rule 5-901(a), requiring only enough evidence for a reasonable juror to find by a preponderance that the video is what its proponent claims. It further ruled that the trial court properly admitted the video through a combination of the victim’s direct testimony under Rule 5-901(b)(1) for events the victim saw or participated in and circumstantial evidence under Rule 5-901(b)(4) for the shooting segment the victim did not witness, such as distinctive characteristics supporting its accuracy. The Court concluded that this combined showing satisfied the authentication requirements without abuse of discretion by the trial court.

criminal lawprocedure

In Gonzalez v. State, the Supreme Court of Maryland addressed whether a trial court properly barred cross-examination of an alleged assault victim about her U visa application, which had been submitted based on the charged incident and certified by a prosecutor’s office. The Court held that the trial court erred under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4) by finding insufficient factual foundation for the defense to question the witness about potential bias or motive to testify falsely arising from the visa process. It further concluded that the question of whether the inquiry’s probative value was outweighed by prejudice or confusion had not been decided below and was not properly before it. The Court ultimately ruled the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the defendant admitted committing the acts forming the basis of his convictions, the victim’s account was consistent with another witness’s testimony and initial descriptions, and additional evidence corroborated the assaults.

criminal lawprocedureimmigration

The case concerned whether a trial court in an assault prosecution erred by barring cross-examination of the complaining witness about her application for a U visa, which provides immigration relief to certain crime victims who assist law enforcement. The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the trial court wrongly concluded the defense had failed to lay a sufficient factual foundation for the inquiry under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4), because counsel showed the application was submitted based on the charged incident and had received the required certification from the State’s Attorney’s Office. The Court nevertheless affirmed the convictions, ruling that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: the defendant admitted committing the acts underlying the offenses, the witness’s account was corroborated by another witness and by her initial description of events, and additional evidence supported that both witnesses had been assaulted by the defendant. The Court declined to address whether the probative value of the inquiry was outweighed by risks of prejudice or confusion, as that question had not been decided below or presented in the petition for review.

criminal lawimmigrationprocedure

In Gonzalez v. State of Maryland, the case concerned whether a defendant convicted of assault could cross-examine the victim about her U visa application—submitted based on the alleged crime—to show potential bias or motive to testify falsely under Maryland Rule 5-616(a)(4). The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the trial court erred by barring the inquiry, as defense counsel had laid a sufficient factual foundation by showing that the application had been filed and certified by a member of the State’s Attorney’s Office. The Court further ruled, however, that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant admitted committing the acts underlying the convictions, the victim’s account was corroborated by another witness and by consistent prior descriptions, and additional evidence supported the assault findings. The Court declined to address whether the probative value of the U visa inquiry was outweighed by risks of prejudice or confusion, as that issue had not been decided below or raised in the certiorari petition.

criminal lawimmigrationprocedure

In Re: M.P. concerned whether Maryland’s Juvenile Justice Reform Act (JJRA), effective June 1, 2022, stripped juvenile courts of jurisdiction over pending delinquency cases involving children aged 10–12 charged with non-violent acts. The Supreme Court of Maryland first held that the juvenile court’s denial of M.P.’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. On the merits, the Court ruled that the JJRA’s amendment to Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 3-8A-03 removed juvenile-court jurisdiction over such cases once the petition was still pending adjudication on the effective date, requiring dismissal. The Court reasoned that the statutory text and legislative purpose—to limit system involvement for young children—applied to ongoing proceedings, so the lower court erred in retaining the case.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

In Clark v. State, the Supreme Court of Maryland addressed a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from a murder trial in which the trial court issued a no-communication order barring Damien Gary Clark and his attorney from discussing the case during an overnight recess, and defense counsel failed to object. The Court held that this failure constituted an actual denial of the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, entitling Clark to a presumption of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington without any further showing of harm. It reached the same result independently under Articles 21 and 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Court rejected an “actual deprivation” standard that would have required Clark to prove he would have consulted counsel during the recess, finding that approach inconsistent with Geders v. United States and Perry v. Leeke. The ruling therefore granted post-conviction relief on the basis of presumed prejudice from the unobjected-to order.

criminal lawprocedure