Robert C. Murphy

In Yoswick v. State, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempted first degree murder and kidnapping pursuant to a plea agreement and later sought post-conviction relief, claiming that the court and his counsel failed to advise him about the parole consequences of his life sentence with a portion suspended, rendering his plea involuntary. The court decided that the trial court's failure to inform the defendant of parole ramifications did not invalidate the guilty plea because such consequences are collateral rather than direct. The court further held that the defendant did not establish ineffective assistance of counsel under the Hill v. Lockhart standard because he failed to show prejudice from any misinformation by counsel regarding parole eligibility.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether Anne Arundel County was obligated to remit one-seventh of its state tobacco tax revenue allocations to the City of Annapolis under a 1945 public local law (Ch. 1041), after the County adopted a home rule charter in 1964 and repealed the law via Bill No. 85 in 1965. The City filed for a writ of mandamus seeking over $9 million in unremitted revenues and interest from 1970 to 1992, but the circuit court dismissed the complaint on laches grounds despite the County not raising that defense. On appeal, the court examined the continuing validity of the 1945 law under Article XI-A home rule powers, the County's authority to repeal it and redirect funds to a general fund, and procedural questions including whether laches could be applied sua sponte in a mandamus action against a governmental entity asserting a tax revenue claim.

taxesprocedure

The case concerned a 1988 marital settlement agreement incorporated into the Shapiros' divorce decree, under which Mr. Shapiro paid Ms. Shapiro alimony that the agreement stated could be modified by a court only if he became disabled. After the divorce, Mr. Shapiro sought court modification of the alimony despite not being disabled; the circuit court ruled the payments modifiable, relying on prior precedent. The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed, holding that the agreement's language satisfied the exception in Maryland Code, Family Law Article § 8-103(c)(2) by specifically stating that alimony provisions were not subject to court modification except under the listed condition. The court reasoned that the statute permits parties to limit modifiability through clear contractual terms, and the disability-only clause was a valid, enforceable restriction rather than an invalid partial waiver.

family law

This case involved John Flansburg, who pled guilty to a sex offense, received a suspended sentence with probation, and later had his probation revoked after new convictions, resulting in reimposition of the suspended portion of his sentence. Flansburg twice requested his public defender file a motion under Maryland Rule 4-345(b) to modify the reimposed sentence, but counsel failed to do so, leading Flansburg to petition for post-conviction relief on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that Flansburg had a right to effective assistance of counsel for the modification motion and that his claim was cognizable under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act. The decision rested on Maryland statutory law, including the Public Defender Act, and rules extending the right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings to the period when the court could entertain a modification motion, without relying on federal constitutional protections.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved whether a patient's claim that a doctor committed assault and battery during a hernia examination was subject to Maryland's Health Care Malpractice Claims Act, which requires filing with the Health Claims Arbitration Office and a certificate of merit from a qualified expert. The Court of Appeals held that the claim was covered by the Act because it alleged an injury occurring during the provision of medical services by a health care provider. Therefore, the circuit court properly dismissed the action after the HCAO had dismissed the related malpractice claim for failure to file the required certificate, reversing the intermediate appellate court's decision that such intentional tort claims were exempt from the Act.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

This case involved Carroll County's attempt to use eminent domain to condemn a 750-square-foot strip of privately owned land used as a pedestrian path, in order to extend a public road and provide access to adjacent property owned by the Greens for their planned residential development. The circuit court upheld the condemnation as serving a public use and being necessary, but the Court of Special Appeals reversed, finding that the action primarily benefited private interests rather than a public purpose. The Court of Appeals reviewed the matter on certiorari, examining whether the taking satisfied the public-use requirement under the Maryland Constitution and statutory necessity standards. The court concluded that the condemnation was not for a public use because the County's decision was made solely to benefit the Greens' private development, with no genuine public objectives or evidence of necessity presented in the record.

property

The case concerned Ocean City's refusal to place a comprehensive rezoning ordinance on the ballot after determining that a referendum petition lacked the required signatures from 20% of the city's qualified voters. Petitioner Gisriel argued that the city's registered voter list improperly included unqualified individuals, and the circuit court agreed, ordering the Board to purge the list before verifying signatures. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the registered voter list is presumed accurate absent fraud or misconduct. The Court of Appeals examined appealability, the distinction between registered and qualified voters under the city charter, and the inapplicability of certain state election code procedures to municipal elections unless specifically incorporated.

electionsprocedure

This case concerned whether the Maryland Insurance Administration could, through administrative enforcement actions under the Insurance Code, prohibit bail bondsmen from accepting installment payments on bond premiums when the relevant sureties' approved rate filings neither allowed nor banned the practice. The Insurance Commissioner had suspended the licenses of respondents Engelman and Wynder for collecting partial premiums and securing balances with promissory notes, citing violations of anti-rebate and related provisions. On judicial review, the circuit court reversed the suspensions, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the cited Code sections did not prohibit installment collections absent explicit rate-filing authorization or prohibition. The court's reasoning centered on statutory interpretation of sections such as 226(a) and 230(b), concluding that the agency lacked authority to create such a prohibition by adjudication rather than through rulemaking or approved filings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned whether a creditor's suit to recover a deficiency balance after repossessing and selling a vehicle under an installment sales contract was subject to Maryland's general three-year statute of limitations or the four-year limitations period in the UCC Sales Article. The Court of Appeals held that the four-year UCC period applied. The court reasoned that the underlying contract was a single document electing coverage under the Commercial Law Article, including its sales provisions, so the deficiency claim constituted an action for breach of a contract for sale governed by the UCC rather than a separate secured transaction. The filing, made more than three but less than four years after the sale and notice of deficiency, was therefore timely.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned whether a defendant waived his challenge to a reasonable doubt jury instruction under Maryland's Post Conviction Procedure Act by failing to object at trial, on direct appeal, or in a prior post-conviction petition. The defendant had been convicted of first-degree murder in 1982 after a trial that included a contested instruction on the burden of proof, and he raised the instruction's constitutionality for the first time in a 1994 post-conviction filing. The Court of Appeals held that the claim was waived, reversing the Court of Special Appeals and affirming the circuit court's denial of relief. It reasoned that challenges to jury instructions are governed by the ordinary rules of procedural default rather than the heightened 'intelligent and knowing' waiver standard, because defense counsel normally controls such trial decisions and defendants are bound by counsel's inaction or tactical choices.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns Flint Gregory Hunt's appeal from the Circuit Court for Baltimore City's denial of his second petition for post-conviction relief in a capital murder prosecution. Hunt was convicted by a jury in 1986 of first-degree murder and handgun offenses for killing a police officer during a traffic stop, and after his initial death sentence was vacated on direct appeal, a second jury again imposed death; multiple prior appeals, habeas petitions, and a first post-conviction petition had all been rejected. The current petition raised claims including ineffective assistance of counsel and errors in the trial court's jury instructions on murder, which allegedly failed to define malice or exclude killings committed with mitigation. The circuit court denied the claims on their merits after an evidentiary hearing, while finding that Hunt had not knowingly and intelligently waived the issues, and the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal that denial while staying execution.

criminal lawprocedure

The case Gardner v. State involved whether a defendant's sentence for a single count of drug possession with intent to distribute could be enhanced under both Maryland Code Article 27 § 286(c), which imposes a mandatory minimum, and § 293, which doubles the maximum sentence, due to prior convictions. The Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals upheld the dual enhancement, resulting in a 25-year sentence with 10 years without parole. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statutes do not clearly indicate legislative intent to allow both enhancements on the same count, as required for imposing enhanced penalties.

criminal law

The case involved homeowners insured under a personal catastrophe liability policy who sought coverage after being sued by their former au pair for invasion of privacy; the husband had secretly videotaped her showering in their home. The insurer refused to defend or indemnify, leading the homeowners to sue for breach of contract and a declaratory judgment. The court held that the policy covered the claim due to an ambiguity between its express inclusion of invasion of privacy as personal injury and its exclusion of expected or intended personal injuries, which it resolved in favor of coverage for the insured. Although the trial court improperly failed to issue a declaratory judgment, the issue became moot after the underlying suit settled, leaving only the breach of contract damages claim.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether a trial court could order the Office of Public Defender (OPD) to serve as standby counsel for a defendant who had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and elected to proceed pro se in a capital murder case, after OPD attorneys had already withdrawn. The Circuit Court for Frederick County directed OPD to provide standby counsel, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed, citing the trial court's discretion to ensure a fair trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Md. Code Art. 27A does not authorize courts to require OPD to provide standby representation once counsel has been discharged following a valid waiver. The core reasoning was that the statute limits OPD's role to actual representation of eligible defendants, that defendants have no constitutional or statutory right to standby counsel from OPD, and that the office's obligations end when it is relieved by court order after withdrawal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns John Curtis Dortch's petition for admission to the Maryland Bar after his 1975 convictions for second-degree murder, conspiracy, and attempted armed robbery stemming from a 1974 bank robbery plot that resulted in the death of a police officer. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the petition was premature and declined to consider the merits of Dortch's application or his character evidence at that time. The court's core reasoning was that, as a threshold requirement, any candidate convicted of a crime serious enough to warrant disbarment must first complete their full sentence and be released from parole supervision before the court will entertain an application for bar admission.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Tracy Williams's convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and related offenses, where the key dispute at trial concerned the identity of the person from whom drugs were seized. Williams challenged the State's cross-examination of an alibi witness about her pretrial silence regarding exculpatory information and the admission of another witness's prior theft conviction for impeachment under Maryland Rule 1-502, arguing lack of foundation and improper balancing of probative value versus prejudice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the cross-examination of the alibi witness was permissible under the standards set in the companion case Davis v. State and that the impeachment objection was not preserved for review because it was not raised on the specific grounds of the rule's weighing requirement at trial. The court reasoned that information about an alibi witness's knowledge and motive to disclose exculpatory facts is relevant to credibility and that appellate review is limited to issues properly objected to in the trial court.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns the Maryland Department of the Environment's issuance of construction and refuse disposal permits for a solid waste incinerator facility on land near Sugarloaf Mountain, which local landowners, environmental groups, and citizens challenged via judicial review under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals both dismissed the action, ruling that none of the plaintiffs had standing to seek review. The Court of Appeals held that the lower courts erred in their standing analysis under both the Maryland Environmental Standing Act and common-law principles applicable to the APA, and therefore proceeded to review the administrative decision on the merits using the criteria in § 10-222(h)(3). The court examined whether the permit applications complied with federal Clean Air Act requirements, state air quality statutes, and consistency with the county solid waste management plan, ultimately addressing the ALJ's findings that were adopted by the Department.

environmentprocedure

This case involves a direct appeal by James Edward Perry from convictions for three murders and conspiracy to commit murder, resulting in three death sentences and one life sentence. Perry was hired by Lawrence Horn to kill Horn's ex-wife, their disabled son, and the son's nurse in order to collect over $1 million from a trust upon their deaths. The court affirmed the convictions based on the evidence presented at trial, including phone records and witness testimony linking Perry to the crimes, while noting that one issue regarding the admissibility of a recorded telephone conversation could be raised in post-conviction proceedings. The decision rested on the sufficiency of the evidence and procedural handling of evidentiary objections under Maryland's wiretap laws.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved homeowners who sued their real estate broker after an impostor posing as an agent obtained the lock-box combination through a phone call that the broker's employee verified inadequately, resulting in a theft of nearly $40,000 in valuables from the home. The trial court denied the broker's motion for judgment based on exculpatory clauses in the listing agreement and lock-box authorization, and a jury awarded the homeowners $20,000 in damages. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, ruling the clauses enforceable to bar the claim. The Court of Appeals reversed that decision, concluding that the clauses were ambiguous and did not clearly and explicitly release the broker from liability for its own negligence in handling the lock-box access.

propertytorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved a juvenile found delinquent for stealing and damaging a car, after which the juvenile court master ordered the minor and his mother to pay $4,800 in restitution to the insurer GEICO (in addition to a $200 deductible to the owner). The Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court abused its discretion by imposing this restitution. The core reasoning was that the master failed to consider the child's age and circumstances or the ability of the child and parent to pay, as required by statute, and did not afford the mother a meaningful opportunity to be heard before predetermining the maximum statutory award.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure