Robert N. McDonald

The case concerned whether Lee Boyd Malvo, a juvenile offender convicted in Maryland of multiple murders and sentenced before 2012 to several consecutive terms of life without parole, was entitled to resentencing under recent U.S. Supreme Court Eighth Amendment rulings. Those decisions prohibit such sentences for juveniles whose crimes reflect transient immaturity rather than permanent incorrigibility and require a meaningful opportunity for release. The Court of Appeals held that Malvo must be resentenced because his original proceeding occurred before those rulings and the sentencing court may not have made the required determination; it further ruled that Maryland’s Juvenile Restoration Act, while generally providing such an opportunity after 20 years, does not substitute for resentencing in this instance of multiple pre-ruling LWOP terms. The court emphasized that any new sentence remains within the trial court’s discretion so long as it complies with the constitutional standards.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case concerned multiple challenges to Maryland’s 2022 legislative redistricting plan for the General Assembly, alleging violations of Article III, §§ 3 and 4 of the state constitution (equal population, compactness, contiguity, and due regard for natural and political boundaries) as well as related federal requirements. The Court of Appeals upheld the plan. It held that redistricting authority rests with the Governor and General Assembly, that an adopted plan enjoys a presumption of validity, and that challengers must present compelling evidence of noncompliance before the State must justify its choices. The court further ruled that equal population is the dominant criterion, that oddly shaped districts or features such as a river crossing do not by themselves prove violations of compactness or contiguity, that a mix of single- and multi-member subdistricts is permitted, and that reallocating incarcerated persons to their pre-incarceration domiciles is constitutional.

elections

The case concerned multiple challenges to Maryland’s 2022 state legislative redistricting plan, alleging violations of Article III, §4 of the Maryland Constitution (equal population, compactness, contiguity, and due regard for political boundaries) as well as related federal requirements. The Court of Appeals upheld the plan, ruling that it satisfied all constitutional criteria. The court explained that redistricting authority belongs to the Governor and General Assembly, that adopted plans carry a presumption of validity, and that challengers must present compelling evidence of noncompliance before the State must justify its choices. It further held that equal population is the dominant requirement, that oddly shaped districts or minor boundary crossings do not automatically violate compactness or contiguity, that legislative privilege protects internal communications, and that statutes reallocating incarcerated persons for population counts are permissible.

elections

Michael Farmer, who as a 17-year-old pled guilty to two first-degree murders, received two consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole and filed a motion under Maryland Rule 4-345(a) to correct an illegal sentence. He argued that the sentences violated the Eighth Amendment because Maryland parole procedures do not guarantee state-furnished counsel to assist inmates at parole hearings, denying juvenile offenders the “meaningful opportunity” for release based on maturity and rehabilitation required by recent Supreme Court precedent. The Court of Appeals held that the claim was not cognizable under the rule. The court reasoned that a Rule 4-345(a) motion addresses only errors inherent in the sentence itself and cannot be used to litigate future parole-administration procedures or collateral rights that may affect release. On its face, the sentence of life imprisonment with parole eligibility for a juvenile homicide offender is lawful, and any challenge to parole counsel availability must be pursued through other procedural mechanisms at the appropriate time.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned whether Lee Boyd Malvo, who was 17 at the time of the 2002 Beltway sniper murders and received multiple consecutive life-without-parole sentences as an adult, was entitled to resentencing under the Eighth Amendment. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that Malvo must be resentenced because his original proceeding occurred before key Supreme Court decisions requiring that juvenile homicide offenders receive individualized consideration of whether their crimes reflected transient immaturity rather than permanent incorrigibility. The court reasoned that, although the sentencing judge had discretion and considered Malvo’s youth, the absence of an explicit determination on incorrigibility and the existence of multiple consecutive sentences meant that the Juvenile Restoration Act’s opportunity for release after 20 years did not substitute for a new sentencing hearing compliant with current constitutional standards.

criminal law

The case concerned Seth Jedlicka, a juvenile offender convicted of first-degree felony murder and related offenses, who challenged his Maryland sentence of life imprisonment with all but 60 years suspended (along with concurrent term-of-years sentences) as unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals held that the sentence was not a de facto life-without-parole term, was not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment or Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and did not require additional individualized sentencing procedures. It reasoned that, under the test from Carter v. State, the 60-year term with parole eligibility after 25 years was not equivalent to life without parole, that Miller v. Alabama’s heightened protections apply only to actual LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, and that the Maryland Constitution is interpreted coextensively with the federal provision for such sentences. The court further found that the sentencing record showed adequate consideration of Jedlicka’s youth, psychological evaluation, and mitigating circumstances, without improper reliance on codefendant sentences.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case concerned whether Lee Boyd Malvo, who was 17 when he committed six first-degree murders in Maryland as part of the 2002 DC sniper attacks and received multiple consecutive life-without-parole sentences in 2006, was entitled to resentencing. The Court of Appeals held that Malvo must be resentenced. It reasoned that recent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Eighth Amendment require that a juvenile homicide offender receive an individualized sentencing determination distinguishing transient immaturity from permanent incorrigibility before a life-without-parole sentence may be imposed, that those decisions apply retroactively, and that the pre-existing discretionary sentencing proceeding did not satisfy this standard; the court further concluded that the later-enacted Juvenile Restoration Act, while providing a potential opportunity for release after 20 years, does not substitute for resentencing in the specific circumstances of multiple pre-existing life-without-parole terms.

criminal law

In 2010, Seth Jedlicka, then age 16, was convicted of first-degree felony murder and related offenses arising from a burglary. He received a sentence of life imprisonment with all but 60 years suspended, along with concurrent term-of-years sentences for the other crimes. The Court of Appeals held that this sentence was not a de facto life-without-parole term under the test established in Carter v. State, was not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment, and did not require the individualized sentencing hearing mandated by Miller v. Alabama for actual life-without-parole sentences. The court further concluded that Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides no greater protections than the Eighth Amendment in this context and that the sentencing record demonstrated adequate consideration of Jedlicka’s youth and mitigating circumstances. The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Williams v. Dimensions Health Corp., a patient sued a hospital for injuries caused by a surgeon’s negligence while treating him at its designated trauma center following a serious car accident. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the hospital could be held vicariously liable for the surgeon’s conduct under the doctrine of apparent agency, even though the surgeon was an independent contractor rather than an employee. The court reasoned that the hospital’s state designation as a trauma center created an appearance that it employed or controlled the trauma surgeons available there, that emergency medical personnel relied on that designation in transporting the patient, and that no timely or meaningful notice was given to the patient that the treating surgeon was not a hospital employee. The court further concluded that any such notice would have been ineffective in the context of an emergency admission involving a distressed patient.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned whether a hospital could be held vicariously liable under the doctrine of apparent agency for a trauma surgeon’s negligence in treating a patient injured in a car accident at its designated trauma center. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find the hospital liable, reversing the Court of Special Appeals. The court reasoned that the hospital had obtained state designation as a trauma center requiring on-site surgeons, that emergency medical services had relied on that designation to transport the patient there pursuant to state regulations, and that the patient received no timely or meaningful notice that the surgeon was an independent contractor rather than a hospital employee. The court further explained that, in an emergency setting involving a distressed patient, any signage or forms describing the surgeon’s contractual status would not have negated the appearance of agency or the reasonableness of reliance.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned whether the Administrative Office of the Courts must disclose a code key that links alphanumeric codes (used in place of judges’ names in the online Case Search database for District Court proceedings in Baltimore City) to the actual judges’ identities, in response to a request under the Maryland Public Information Act and the Judiciary’s Access to Court Records Rules. The Court of Appeals held that the code key is a disclosable administrative record and is not protected by any exception. It reasoned that longstanding principles of public access to court proceedings and records, reflected in both the PIA’s policy favoring ready disclosure of clearly public information and the Access Rules’ treatment of administrative records, require production of the key, as the identity of presiding judges is itself plainly subject to disclosure. The court rejected arguments that the key qualified for discretionary withholding on security or privacy grounds, noting that such an approach would undermine the rules’ mandatory framework and the goal of consistent, efficient public access.

procedure

The case concerned whether the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) must disclose a code key linking alphanumeric codes to the names of District Court judges in Baltimore City under the Maryland Public Information Act and the Judiciary’s Access to Court Records Rules. The Court of Appeals held that the code key is a disclosable administrative record, as the alphanumeric identifiers appear in the public Case Search database for case events but obscure judge identities only in that court. The court reasoned that judicial records are presumptively open to the public, administrative records are generally treated like executive-branch records under the PIA, and no exemption for sensitive administrative materials applied to this basic identifying information.

free speechprocedure

In June 2017, two teenagers were murdered in a parked car in Montgomery County, leading to the joint trial and convictions of four men, including Rony Galicia, for the killings. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Special Appeals and upheld Galicia’s convictions, ruling that admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s out-of-court statement (that “they” had shot the victims) did not violate Galicia’s Confrontation Clause rights, given his defense that multiple shooters were involved but he was not one of them. The court further held that the trial judge acted within its broad discretion in limiting cross-examination of a witness about that statement to avoid confusing the jury, applied the same admissibility burden under the hearsay exception for statements against interest regardless of which party offered the evidence, and properly allowed a lay witness to testify that a mobile phone user can enable or disable location tracking without needing expert qualification.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether then-Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera had authority to issue an administrative order temporarily tolling statutes of limitations for civil cases during the COVID-19 state of emergency declared by the Governor. The Court of Appeals held that the order was valid and did not violate separation of powers under Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights or the prohibition on suspending laws under Article 9. The court reasoned that the Chief Judge, as administrative head of the Judicial Branch under Article IV, §18 of the Maryland Constitution, may exercise emergency powers consistent with Maryland Rules 16-1001 et seq. and actions taken by the other branches when the Governor declares an emergency under the Public Safety Article. The tolling order aligned with those standards by responding to the pandemic's impact on court operations without improperly encroaching on legislative authority.

procedure

The case concerned whether then-Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera had authority to issue an administrative order temporarily tolling statutes of limitations for civil cases during the COVID-19 emergency declared by the Governor. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the order was valid and did not violate separation of powers or the prohibition on suspending laws under the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court reasoned that the Chief Judge, as administrative head of the judiciary under Article IV, §18 of the Maryland Constitution, possesses rulemaking power to manage court operations in emergencies, as set out in Maryland Rules 16-1001 et seq., and that the tolling measure was consistent with the Governor’s actions and the other branches’ responses. It further concluded that the order constituted a permissible exercise of administrative authority rather than an improper legislative suspension of statutes.

procedure

This case was an attorney discipline proceeding brought by the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission against Robin K.A. Ficker, who had already been sanctioned eight times in prior proceedings for similar issues such as failing to appear in court, inadequate preparation and supervision, and lack of candor. The charges arose from Ficker’s failure to appear for a scheduled client trial, his false statements to the trial judge about having reviewed and signed a continuance motion (which his office manager had actually prepared, signed, and filed, and which contained a material falsehood about the opposing party’s position), and related misrepresentations regarding client contact. The Court of Appeals found clear and convincing evidence that Ficker violated multiple rules of professional conduct on competence, diligence, candor to the tribunal, supervision of non-lawyer staff, and conduct prejudicial to justice. Given the repeated nature of the misconduct, Ficker’s lengthy disciplinary history, and the aggravating factors of experience and likelihood of repetition, the court held that disbarment was the appropriate sanction.

procedure

This case involved disciplinary charges against Maryland attorney Robin K.A. Ficker by the Attorney Grievance Commission, stemming from his failure to appear at a client's scheduled trial in Prince George's County District Court, false assurances to the judge about contacting the client and reviewing a continuance motion, and misrepresentations regarding a motion containing false statements that his office manager had actually prepared and filed. Ficker had a prior disciplinary record of eight similar violations since 1990, including failures to appear, inadequate preparation and supervision, and lack of candor, resulting in prior reprimands and suspensions. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that disbarment was the appropriate sanction under the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct, citing clear evidence of violations involving competence, diligence, candor to the tribunal, supervision of nonlawyer staff, and conduct prejudicial to justice. The ruling emphasized that the misconduct repeated patterns from Ficker's extensive history, which aggravated the violations and indicated a likelihood of repetition, making disbarment necessary to protect the public and the judicial system.

procedure

The case concerned whether an auto insurer could offset the difference between the full billed amounts for an injured worker’s medical care and the lower amounts actually paid by a workers’ compensation insurer (at Commission-set rates) when calculating underinsured motorist benefits under Maryland Insurance Article §19-513(e). After Michael Gilliam was injured in a work-related car accident, his workers’ compensation insurer paid providers $118,369.15 in full satisfaction of bills totaling over $243,000; he later sought UIM benefits from Westfield Insurance, which sought to reduce those benefits by the full “written-down” difference. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that only the amounts actually recovered by the claimant and capable of reimbursement to the workers’ compensation insurer qualify for the statutory offset; the unpaid difference between billed charges and the Commission rates is not a recovered workers’ compensation benefit. The court reasoned that the statute’s language and purpose—preventing double recovery while placing the claimant in the position of an adequately insured tortfeasor—require that the offset be limited to sums the claimant actually received and for which the compensation insurer could seek reimbursement.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved a mortgage borrower who sued the assignee and servicer of her loan, alleging they violated the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act by charging property inspection fees that are prohibited by the Maryland Usury Law, §12-121. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory ban on such fees applies throughout the life of a residential mortgage to assignees and servicers as well as to the original lender, and that the borrower’s complaint adequately stated a claim under the debt collection statute. The court reasoned that code revision adding a definition of “lender” was not intended to alter existing law or abrogate common-law principles of assignment, so the prohibition on inspection fees extends to those who later hold or service the loan. It further concluded that the debt collection act bars asserting a right to collect amounts known to be unauthorized, not merely improper collection methods, and the allegations sufficiently pleaded knowledge of the prohibition.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether a mortgage servicer (Nationstar, as successor to the loan originator) could lawfully collect property inspection fees from borrower Donna Kemp after the loan had been assigned, or whether doing so violated Maryland’s Usury Law and the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (MCDCA). The Court of Appeals held that the Usury Law’s prohibition on such fees (Commercial Law §12-121) applies throughout the life of a residential mortgage loan and extends to assignees and servicers, not only to the original lender; it further held that Kemp’s complaint adequately stated an MCDCA claim by alleging that the servicer asserted a right to collect fees it knew were unlawful. The court reasoned that the addition of a “lender” definition during code revision was not intended to alter existing substantive law or abrogate common-law assignment principles, and that the MCDCA bars claiming enforcement of a nonexistent right regardless of the collection method used.

business & regulatoryproperty