Lynne A. Battaglia

In Fowlkes v. Choudhry, a mother sued a doctor for medical malpractice after her adult daughter’s death, seeking economic damages under Maryland’s Wrongful Death Act for the household services she expected her daughter to provide in the future. A jury awarded $500,000, but the Court of Special Appeals vacated the award, and the Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling. The court held that a parent may recover pecuniary damages for lost household services only by presenting evidence both that the parent reasonably expected the services and that the adult child intended to continue providing them, which can be shown through proof of a legal duty, a promise, or acts reflecting ongoing intent. The court found the evidence here—limited to the daughter’s past habit of helping while living with her mother and the mother’s desire for that arrangement to continue—insufficient to support the claim, as it left the daughter’s future intent to speculation.

torts & liabilityfamily lawhealthcare

The case involved the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland seeking disciplinary action against attorney William Clark Planta, who had been admitted to the bar in 1998, based on complaints from six former clients alleging repeated professional misconduct. The Court of Appeals disbarred Planta after finding that he violated multiple Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct, including rules on competence, communication, fees, safekeeping of property, candor toward tribunals, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The court determined that Planta had severely neglected client matters by missing deadlines and hearings, resulting in sanctions against clients; misappropriated funds by failing to deposit fees in trust accounts or return unearned amounts; and lied to a court about his tardiness. These actions formed a repeated pattern of neglect, mishandling of money, and dishonesty, compounded by Planta’s failure to respond to the disciplinary proceedings or offer mitigation, which the court held required disbarment to protect the public.

business & regulatory

The case was an attorney disciplinary proceeding in which the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland charged Jason Edward Rheinstein with professional misconduct arising from his representation of clients in civil litigation against Imagine, including misrepresentations to a circuit court judge, unsubstantiated fraud allegations, and efforts to pressure opposing counsel. The Court of Appeals of Maryland disbarred Rheinstein, finding he violated multiple Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, specifically Rules 1.1 (competence), 3.1 (meritorious claims), 3.4 (fairness to opposing parties), 4.4 (respect for third persons), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). The court reasoned that Rheinstein had deliberately misrepresented facts to intimidate opponents and mislead the tribunal about criminal charges facing the opposing party, pursued baseless claims and disqualification motions, and engaged in vexatious litigation tactics, conduct comparable to prior cases warranting disbarment for deceit that undermined judicial integrity.

procedure

In Peter Gang v. Montgomery County, a correctional officer sought to reopen his permanent partial disability compensation award from Montgomery County to retroactively raise the payment rate, claiming entitlement to a higher amount as a public safety employee; the request was filed within five years of his last compensation payment. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the Workers’ Compensation Commission had authority under Section 9-736 of the Labor and Employment Article to reopen the award and correct the rate based on a mistake or error. The Court reasoned that subsection (b) provides continuing jurisdiction to modify prior findings or awards within the five-year limitations period without restriction from subsection (a), that Gang did not waive the right by failing to appeal or seek rehearing, and that minor procedural noncompliance in the filing did not bar relief when the application was timely.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case was an attorney disciplinary proceeding in which the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission charged Scott A. Conwell with multiple violations of the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his representation of three clients in child custody, equal opportunity, and fee-collection matters. The Court of Appeals found that Conwell had failed to communicate with clients, pursue their claims diligently, charge reasonable fees, or file meritorious pleadings; had made false or misleading statements to tribunals; had disobeyed orders from a bankruptcy court; and had engaged in other dishonest conduct. The court disbarred Conwell, holding that his intentionally dishonest and self-serving actions violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), 3.1, 3.3, 3.4(c), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d). It rejected mitigation evidence concerning his wife’s pregnancy complications because that evidence did not address the root cause of the dishonesty or constitute compelling extenuating circumstances that would preclude disbarment.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Scott A. Conwell, the Maryland Court of Appeals considered disciplinary charges against an attorney for his handling of three client matters, including a child custody case and related fee disputes. The court found that Conwell violated multiple rules of professional conduct by failing to keep clients informed or advance their cases, charging an unreasonable fee of $14,060, filing frivolous pleadings without legal purpose, submitting an inflated invoice to seek a jury trial, and repeatedly disobeying bankruptcy court orders to cease litigation and respond to a show-cause order, resulting in a contempt finding. These actions constituted a pattern of incompetence, lack of diligence, unreasonable fees, lack of candor, and intentionally dishonest conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The court ordered disbarment, concluding that the misconduct warranted that sanction and that offered mitigation, such as personal circumstances involving his wife’s pregnancy, did not constitute compelling extenuating circumstances excusing the dishonesty.

family lawprocedure

In McGeehan v. McGeehan, a divorcing couple disputed whether three properties (Mason Neck, Farside, and Embassy Park) acquired during their 18-year marriage remained marital property subject to equitable division, or were excluded due to an oral postnuptial agreement and related deeds in which the husband conveyed his interests to the wife. The Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals ruled the properties were marital, relying on precedent requiring explicit language classifying property as nonmarital. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under Maryland Family Law Article § 8-201(e)(3)(iii), a valid agreement need not use specific reclassification terms to exclude property from marital property; the deeds and underlying agreement transferring all rights and title were sufficient. The decision distinguished prior cases involving separation agreements and clarified that the statute focuses on the existence of a valid agreement rather than particular phrasing.

family lawproperty

In Johnson v. State of Maryland, the case concerned whether a trial judge could validly grant a motion for judgment of acquittal weeks after declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury in a murder prosecution, and whether that ruling would bar retrial under double jeopardy principles. The Court of Appeals held that the post-mistrial acquittal was invalid and did not implicate double jeopardy, allowing the State to retry the defendant. The court reasoned that Maryland Rule 4-324 limits acquittals to specific points during trial—after the State's evidence or at the close of all evidence—and that a mistrial and jury discharge removed any authority for such a ruling, rendering it an act without legal power rather than a mere procedural flaw. It found support in precedent emphasizing that courts may only act within constitutional, statutory, or common-law bounds, and no exception permitted the delayed acquittal here.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, A Guy Named Moe, LLC, operator of a Moe's Southwest Grill in Annapolis, sued to challenge the local Board of Appeals' approval of a special exception allowing Chipotle to open a competing restaurant about 425 feet away; Chipotle moved to dismiss on the grounds that Moe, a foreign LLC, had forfeited its registration to do business in Maryland and also lacked standing as an aggrieved party. The Court of Appeals held that Moe could cure its registration lapse and maintain the action, but that Moe lacked standing to seek judicial review of the zoning decision. The court reasoned that a foreign LLC's failure to register does not permanently bar it from pursuing a suit once the deficiency is remedied, but that standing for zoning protests requires sufficient proximity plus specific harm; here Moe's distance, lack of direct visibility, and claims centered on increased traffic, neighborhood character, and business competition were insufficient to establish the special aggrievement needed. The court therefore affirmed dismissal of the petition for judicial review.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

Justin Davis executed an affidavit of parentage for twin boys in 2009 and was later ordered to pay child support in a 2011 Wicomico County proceeding. In that case, the circuit court denied his request for genetic testing after finding no evidence of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact in the affidavit, and Davis did not appeal. Two years later, he filed a new complaint seeking to set aside the paternity finding and obtain testing, which the circuit court and Court of Special Appeals rejected. The Court of Appeals held that res judicata barred the second action because the 2011 judgment resolved the parentage issue on the merits. Under Maryland Family Law § 5-1028, an affidavit of parentage creates a conclusive presumption that may be challenged only within 60 days or thereafter upon a showing of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact.

family lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Justin Davis could obtain genetic testing in 2013 to challenge his 2009 affidavits of parentage for twin children and the resulting child-support order, after he had unsuccessfully raised similar claims in a 2011 enforcement proceeding. The Court of Appeals held that res judicata barred the 2013 action. The court reasoned that the 2011 circuit court judgment, which found no fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact and ordered support without granting testing, was a final adjudication on the merits; Davis’s failure to appeal that judgment precluded relitigation of parentage two years later. Under Family Law § 5-1028, the affidavit created a conclusive presumption of paternity challengeable only within 60 days or upon a timely showing of the enumerated grounds.

family lawprocedure

In this case, Daniel Mensah, who had incurred credit card and line-of-credit debts while living in Maryland, challenged writs of garnishment issued by a Maryland district court to collect on default judgments after he moved to Texas; the writs targeted wages he earned solely for work performed in Texas from his employer BASF, which has business operations and a resident agent in Maryland. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed the district court's denial of Mensah's motions to quash the writs, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address whether Maryland law permits garnishment of out-of-state wages under these circumstances. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments, holding that garnishment was valid under Maryland Rule 3-646 and Commercial Law Article §§ 15-601 through 15-606. Its core reasoning was that the Maryland court retained original, continuing, and ancillary jurisdiction over the judgment debtor from the underlying actions, and that the garnishee employer's sufficient contacts with the state supported enforcement of the writs even when served out-of-state and directed at wages earned elsewhere.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In State v. Bircher, the Maryland Court of Appeals reviewed a first-degree murder conviction and related firearm charges stemming from Jacob Bircher firing shots into a crowd that included a person who had threatened him earlier, resulting in the death of David Garrett and injury to Gary Hale. The central issue was whether the trial court abused its discretion by giving a supplemental jury instruction on transferred intent after the jury, during deliberations, asked for clarification on whether “intent” referred to killing any person or a specific person. The Court held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion, ruling that the instruction was properly generated by the evidence, directly responsive to the jury’s question, accurately stated the law, and caused no prejudice because the defense was permitted to address it in supplemental closing argument. The majority emphasized that trial courts have discretion to provide clarifying instructions on issues central to the case without invading the jury’s fact-finding role.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Jacob Bircher’s convictions for first-degree murder of David Garrett and attempted first-degree murder of Gary Hale after Bircher fired a handgun into a crowd that included Hale, whom he had argued with earlier. During jury deliberations, the jurors asked for clarification on the meaning of “intent,” prompting the trial court to give a supplemental instruction explaining the doctrine of transferred intent. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in providing the instruction. The court reasoned that the supplemental instruction accurately stated the law, directly responded to the jury’s question on an issue central to the case, was supported by the evidence, and did not prejudice Bircher because it did not force a concession of his defense theory or render his closing argument ineffective.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Hector Gutierrez and Edgar Perez-Lazaro of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in connection with drug trafficking. Police executing a search warrant found cocaine, drug packaging materials, a grinder, and a loaded handgun in various common areas of a small apartment, along with personal papers and paystubs belonging to the two men; both defendants told officers they lived there. The Court of Appeals held that this evidence supported findings of joint constructive possession and therefore upheld the convictions. The majority reasoned that the items were accessible in shared spaces, the defendants admitted residency, their documents confirmed their connection to the premises, and drug paraphernalia was in plain view.

criminal lawguns

The case concerned whether evidence found during a police search of a small Maryland apartment was sufficient to convict Hector Gutierrez and Edgar Perez-Lazaro of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in connection with drug trafficking. The Court of Appeals held that the evidence supported the convictions on a theory of joint constructive possession. The court reasoned that the drugs and loaded handgun were located in readily accessible common areas of the apartment, the defendants both stated they lived there, their personal papers were recovered inside, and drug-packaging materials and a cocaine grinder were in plain view, permitting a reasonable inference that the men knowingly exercised dominion or control over the contraband together.

criminal lawguns

In Sam Yonga v. State of Maryland, the petitioner, who had pled guilty in 2007 to sexual offenses against a minor based on an agreed statement of facts, later sought a writ of actual innocence under Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure § 8-301 after obtaining newly discovered DNA evidence that he claimed undermined the prosecution’s case. The Court of Appeals held that the statutory remedy is unavailable to individuals who previously entered guilty pleas. The court reasoned that a guilty plea constitutes an admission of guilt that is fundamentally incompatible with a claim of actual innocence, and that the statute’s text, legislative history, and implementing rules were designed to address convictions following trials rather than plea-based judgments. It further noted that the writ focuses on whether the petitioner did not commit the crime, not merely on whether the new evidence would have altered the decision to plead guilty.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved disciplinary proceedings against Maryland attorney Charles Stephen Rand for his handling of a single client's employment discrimination matter before the EEOC. Bar Counsel alleged, and the court found after a hearing, that Rand violated multiple professional conduct rules by failing to communicate adequately with the client about fees, costs, and case status; improperly asserting a retaining lien over client files upon termination; mishandling trust account records; and not fully cooperating with Bar Counsel's investigation, among other infractions. The Court of Appeals imposed indefinite suspension as the sanction, reasoning that these lapses—particularly the communication failures, invalid lien, and non-cooperation—warranted that penalty even though the attorney had secured a favorable EEOC result for the client. Dissenting judges argued a shorter, fixed suspension would suffice given the limited harm and single representation involved.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Williams v. State, Deandre Ricardo Williams challenged the admission of his confession to a 2011 homicide, arguing that his remark “I don’t want to say nothing. I don’t know” during custodial questioning invoked his Miranda right to remain silent and that police statements about possible murder verdicts rendered the confession involuntary under Maryland common law. The Court of Appeals held that the statement was ambiguous, so officers were not required to stop the interrogation, and that the confession was voluntary because the detectives’ descriptions of first-degree murder consequences did not constitute improper inducements or promises. The court reasoned that a reasonable officer would not have understood the words, followed immediately by further dialogue, as a clear invocation, and that merely outlining legal consequences of different homicide charges did not overbear the suspect’s will. Williams’s conviction for first-degree murder and related handgun offenses was therefore upheld.

criminal lawprocedure

In 1999, Mario Sibug was charged in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County with multiple counts of assault and related offenses arising from an incident involving his children, and was found incompetent to stand trial due to religious delusions that impaired his ability to assist in his defense. Eight years later, he was tried and convicted without any new judicial determination of his competency under Maryland Criminal Procedure Article § 3-104. The Court of Appeals held that when a defendant has previously been adjudicated incompetent, a court must make an explicit finding of restored competency before proceeding to trial, and that the trial court both failed to do so and clearly erred at sentencing by deeming Sibug competent without supporting evidence or evaluation. The ruling rests on the statutory requirement that competency be determined on the record whenever it appears relevant, which a prior incompetency finding triggers even after a long delay.

criminal lawprocedure