Sally D. Adkins

The case concerned whether Maryland recognizes a tort claim for intentional interference with an inheritance or gift. Darlene Barclay, the residuary beneficiary of Dr. Peter Castruccio’s estate, alleged that his widow Sadie had maliciously depleted the estate by filing groundless lawsuits and other actions after Peter’s death, forcing the estate to incur substantial attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals held that Maryland does recognize the tort and adopts the elements set forth in Section 19 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm. It further ruled that the tort requires the alleged interference to occur before the testator’s death, because the claim protects the relationship between the testator and a potential beneficiary. The court noted that existing probate remedies, including fee-shifting for bad-faith litigation, provide an alternative avenue for recovery in this situation.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether Michael Quinlan, a paramedic/firefighter employed by Baltimore County for 24 years, could recover workers’ compensation benefits for degenerative meniscal tears in his right knee as an occupational disease under Labor and Employment § 9-502(d). The Court of Appeals held that the tears were compensable and that sufficient evidence supported a jury finding in Quinlan’s favor. The majority reasoned that the nature of paramedic/firefighter work exposed employees to knee-stressing activities—such as repetitive kneeling, squatting, and heavy lifting—at a greater rate than faced by the general public, that Quinlan performed those duties extensively, and that the record showed no concomitant preexisting condition that would disqualify the claim. The decision affirmed that an occupational disease need not be unique to the job if the employment hazards are distinctive in degree and the employee’s duties connect the condition to the work.

labor & employment

The case involved a workers’ compensation claim by Michael Quinlan, a paramedic and firefighter employed by Baltimore County for 24 years, seeking benefits for degenerative meniscal tears in his right knee, which he alleged qualified as an occupational disease under Maryland Labor and Employment Article § 9-502(d). The Court of Appeals held that the condition was compensable as an occupational disease and that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s award. The majority reasoned that the nature of Quinlan’s job exposed him to repetitive knee-stressing activities—such as heavy lifting, squatting, and climbing—that created a greater risk of degenerative knee conditions than faced by the general public, that he performed those activities over a long period, and that no preexisting condition was shown to account for the tears. The court therefore concluded that the statutory requirements were met as a matter of law.

labor & employment

The case concerned whether three individuals running a mortgage lending business had formed a general partnership, even though they had attempted but failed to acquire membership interests in an existing LLC (MAS Associates). The trial court ruled that a partnership existed based on factors including payments made, shared management, and profit distributions. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the record lacked competent material evidence of intent to form a partnership. It found legal errors in treating certain payments as capital contributions rather than loans or wages, in applying a presumption of partnership from profit sharing, and in overlooking the parties’ concurrent and unfulfilled efforts to join the LLC along with one party’s resistance to joint liability. The case was remanded for adjustment of the damages award.

business & regulatory

The case involved whether three individuals working in mortgage lending, including Harry Korotki, had formed a general partnership through their business dealings and payments, even though they had attempted but failed to acquire membership interests in an existing LLC called MAS Associates. The trial court found that a partnership existed, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed that determination. The court held that Korotki failed to meet his burden of producing competent material evidence showing the parties’ intent to create a partnership, as their conduct—including treating payments as wages or loans rather than profit shares or capital contributions, their ongoing efforts to join the LLC instead, and Korotki’s resistance to personal liability—did not support such a conclusion under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. The opinion emphasized that any presumption from profit sharing was rebutted by these facts and the parties’ express intent to form a different entity.

business & regulatory

The case involved whether a heroin distributor could be convicted of gross negligence involuntary manslaughter after selling four bags of heroin to a young buyer who later fatally overdosed. The Maryland Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to support such a conviction. It reasoned that, although the State must prove a grossly negligent mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, the underlying distribution of heroin is inherently dangerous, and the specific facts here—including the buyer’s desperation and youth, the seller’s experience with the drug, and the lack of any safety measures—demonstrated a wanton and reckless disregard for human life. The court further concluded that the sale was both the actual and proximate cause of death because the buyer would not have overdosed but for the heroin supplied and because ingestion was reasonably foreseeable.

criminal law

The case was a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland against attorney Jonathan David Robbins for his handling of estate and related matters for three clients. The Court of Appeals found that Robbins violated multiple Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, including rules on competence, diligence, communication, fees, conflicts of interest, and misconduct, by making false statements to clients about work performed, neglecting case deadlines, retroactively raising his hourly rate without authorization via a power of attorney, failing to provide timely invoices, and engaging in other deceptive practices, often targeting elderly clients. The court adopted most of the hearing judge’s factual findings and legal conclusions after an evidentiary hearing and ordered disbarment as the sanction. Its reasoning centered on the pattern of intentional misrepresentations used to conceal other violations, the absence of any compelling mitigating factors, and the heightened harm caused to vulnerable clients, which together required the most severe sanction to protect the public and maintain professional standards.

business & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Sewell, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed whether text messages between spouses concerning child abuse were protected from disclosure by the confidential marital communications privilege under Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 9-105. The court held that the privilege must be narrowly construed and does not apply to such communications. Although text messages between spouses are presumed confidential, the mandatory reporting duty imposed by Family Law § 5-705 requires any recipient to report suspected child abuse to authorities, eliminating any reasonable expectation that statements on the topic will remain private. The court therefore concluded that the messages could be admitted as evidence.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In George v. Baltimore County, Baltimore County taxpayers sued the county and its officials, alleging waste and mismanagement at the county animal shelter that involved illegal or ultra vires acts, such as over-expenditures on medical care and staffing and under-collection of fees, resulting in unnecessary public costs and personal pecuniary losses. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the taxpayers had standing to pursue their claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under the taxpayer standing doctrine. The court reasoned that standing requires a good-faith allegation of an illegal municipal act plus a showing of specific injury through potential pecuniary loss or increased taxes, and that the plaintiffs met this standard by demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of such harm with a sufficient nexus to the alleged acts and adequate quantification of the injury.

taxesprocedure

The case concerned Karen McDonell’s challenge to the Harford County Housing Agency’s termination of her Housing Choice Voucher after a neighbor dispute that resulted in her assault conviction. The Court of Appeals held that McDonell was not entitled to a formal contested-case hearing under the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, but that the agency’s informal hearing and written decision satisfied constitutional due-process requirements and that substantial evidence supported the termination. The court reasoned that the HCHA is not an “agency” under the APA because it operates in only one county, that the agency provided the notice, hearing, and adequate decision required by Goldberg v. Kelly for termination of a property interest in housing benefits, and that the Hearing Officer could reasonably find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that McDonell had committed a violent act or threatened residents’ safety. The court therefore upheld the voucher termination while clarifying that McDonell had preserved her due-process claim for review.

civil rightsprocedureproperty

The case concerned Karen McDonell's challenge to the Harford County Housing Agency's termination of her Housing Choice Voucher, which she claimed violated procedural due process and Maryland Administrative Procedure Act requirements for a contested-case hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the agency is not an "agency" under the Maryland APA because it operates in only one county, so McDonell had no statutory right to a contested-case hearing. It further held that she received the notice, hearing, and adequate written decision required by the U.S. Constitution before termination of her property interest in the voucher, and that the hearing officer's finding of qualifying criminal activity was supported by substantial evidence, including her conviction and the administrative record of threats and violence. The court therefore affirmed the agency's decision to terminate the voucher.

procedurepropertycriminal law

In State v. Young, the defendant was convicted of possession and possession with intent to distribute controlled dangerous substances after the trial court granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude alleged prescriptions on hearsay grounds. The Court of Appeals held that the State’s objection to authentication of the prescriptions was not preserved because it had referenced only the business records hearsay exception at trial, but that the defendant’s challenge to the motion in limine ruling was preserved because he had no opportunity to object before the court ruled. On the merits, the court concluded that a prescription offered to establish the affirmative defense under Maryland Code §§ 5-601 and 5-602(2) is a non-hearsay “verbal act” admissible to prove the fact of its existence, provided it is properly authenticated. The court therefore affirmed the Court of Special Appeals’ reversal of the conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In Julius Devincentz, Jr. v. State of Maryland, the defendant was convicted of sexual offenses against his former stepdaughter K.C. based primarily on her testimony, and he appealed after the trial court excluded certain evidence offered to impeach her credibility. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by barring a defense witness’s personal opinion that K.C. was untruthful, as Maryland Rule 5-608 and CJP § 9-115 permit such character evidence when it has an adequate basis and bears on a relevant issue. The court further ruled that the trial court erred in excluding an out-of-court statement by another witness indicating K.C. had threatened to get Devincentz in trouble, because the statement was offered under Rule 5-616(b)(3) solely to show bias rather than for its truth and thus was not hearsay. Finally, the court concluded that these exclusions were not harmless error, given that the case turned entirely on witness credibility and the excluded evidence directly undermined the state’s key witness.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a negligence lawsuit by Chauncey Liles, Jr., against property owners Stanley Sugarman and others for cognitive injuries allegedly caused by childhood exposure to lead paint at a Baltimore residence, which the parties stipulated resulted in elevated blood lead levels. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly admitted expert testimony on general and specific causation under Maryland Rule 5-702 and that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury award for impaired earning capacity. The majority reasoned that the experts' opinions rested on epidemiological studies establishing causal links between elevated blood lead levels and attention deficits or IQ loss, combined with an individualized review of Liles's medical, educational, and neuropsychological records, without the analytical gap found in prior precedent. It further concluded that testimony from a vocational rehabilitation expert and an economist provided a nonspeculative basis for the jury to find reduced earning capacity.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a commercial dispute over a 2005 Purchase and Sale Agreement for ownership interests in Maryland real estate, under which Trio Ventures was entitled to an additional $3.5 million payment if specified lease renewals or occupancy levels were met at two properties; after arbitration awarded Trio that sum, WSC sought to vacate the award in circuit court. The Court of Appeals held that “manifest disregard of applicable law” remains a valid common-law ground for vacating an arbitration award under the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act, even though it is not listed among the statutory grounds in CJP § 3-224(b), but concluded that the arbitrator’s decision in this case did not manifestly disregard the law because it rested on a plausible interpretation of the contract’s leasing requirements and WSC’s obligations. The Court further held that an award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party under CJP § 3-228(b) is discretionary rather than mandatory, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award fees where WSC had pursued good-faith challenges to the award.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case In re: Adoption/Guardianship of H.W. concerned whether a juvenile court properly terminated a father's parental rights under Maryland Family Law Article § 5-323, specifically focusing on the standards for finding "exceptional circumstances" that would make continuation of the parental relationship detrimental to the child's best interests. The Court of Appeals held that a juvenile court must evaluate exceptional circumstances exclusively through the statutory factors listed in § 5-323(d), making findings by clear and convincing evidence, and that non-statutory factors (such as those from third-party custody disputes like Ross v. Hoffman) may be considered only if tailored to the TPR inquiry of detriment to the parent-child relationship. The court reasoned that the General Assembly's detailed statutory criteria reflect the distinct nature and heightened stakes of TPR proceedings compared to custody cases, and that exclusive or primary reliance on custody factors risks improperly equating the two. In this instance, the juvenile court's inclusion of the custody factors did not require reversal, as its findings under each required statutory factor were specific and substantively consistent with the custody analysis.

family law

In Albert Gustav Givens v. State of Maryland, the petitioner, who was convicted after multiple trials of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole for the 1992 killing of Marlene Kilpatrick, sought post-conviction DNA testing under Maryland Code, Criminal Procedure § 8-201 on items such as a wrench recovered months after the crime. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County’s denial of the petition. The court held that Givens had not met the statutory requirement of showing a reasonable probability that the testing would yield exculpatory or mitigating evidence, noting that prior DNA testing of crime-scene items produced no match to him, the wrench’s location and timing made any foreign DNA inconclusive, and the State’s circumstantial evidence—including witness statements and the absence of forced entry—remained unaffected by potential additional results. The opinion emphasized that DNA testing is not a universal solution when other incriminating evidence exists and explanations account for the lack of forensic links.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a wrongful death and premises liability action brought by the survivors of Sean McLaughlin, who died after falling from a wall at a shopping center while attempting HVAC repairs; the defendants (property owner SVF Riva Annapolis, manager Rappaport, and tenant CEC) moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that Maryland’s statute of repose, CJP § 5-108, barred claims for injuries arising from improvements to real property after the statutory period. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the possession-and-control exception in CJP § 5-108(d)(2)(i) is not limited to asbestos cases and instead applies whenever a defendant was in actual possession or control of the property when the injury occurred, so the statute of repose did not bar the suit. The court reasoned that the statute sets out the possession-and-control exception in a separate subsection from the three asbestos-specific exceptions, and the plain language of subsection (d)(2)(i) contains no restriction to particular types of injury.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedure

The case concerned attorney discipline proceedings brought by the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission against Samuel Sperling, an attorney at a firm owned by his suspended father, and Jonathan Sperling, who was already indefinitely suspended and working there as a paralegal. The Commission alleged trust-account mismanagement, failure to supervise, unauthorized practice of law, and misrepresentations after discovering overdrafts and continued involvement by the suspended lawyers. The Court of Appeals held that Samuel violated MLRPC 1.15(a), 5.3, 5.4(d)(1), and 8.4(a) by failing to safeguard client funds and adequately oversee Jonathan, warranting a 90-day suspension; it further held that Jonathan violated MLRPC 5.3(d)(3), 8.1(a), and 8.4(a), (c), and (d) through improper trust-account activity and false statements during suspension and readmission efforts, warranting continuation of his indefinite suspension. The majority reasoned that the proven violations and aggravating factors justified these sanctions to protect the public, while a dissent would have disbarred Jonathan due to repeated dishonesty.

business & regulatory

In Rina Calvo v. Montgomery County, a bus driver sought workers’ compensation after suffering injuries in a car accident while driving from home to a mandatory annual training session held on a Saturday—her usual day off—at a depot different from her regular work site. The Circuit Court granted summary judgment to the County, ruling that the going-and-coming rule barred recovery and that the special-mission exception did not apply. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment was improper because a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the exception applied. The court explained that the exception turns on three factors—the relative unusualness of the trip in the employee’s normal duties, the onerousness of the journey relative to the work performed, and any element of urgency or suddenness—and that the undisputed facts (mandatory training on a non-work day at an atypical location) permitted an inference that Calvo’s trip qualified. The case was therefore remanded for further proceedings.

labor & employment