Jon D. Levy

In Hackett v. Western Express, Inc., a truck driver appealed a Workers’ Compensation Board hearing officer’s award of partial incapacity benefits after he aggravated a preexisting back injury on the job. The hearing officer had calculated average weekly wage by excluding nine cents per mile designated as per diem pay, which the employer stated was meant to cover lodging, meals, and similar road expenses, and the driver argued this exclusion was error under the governing statute. The court affirmed the exclusion, holding that 39-A M.R.S. § 102(4)(F) directs that sums paid to cover special expenses incurred by the nature of employment are not included in average weekly wage, and that the payments here qualified as such even without receipts or spending restrictions. It distinguished prior precedent involving statutorily designated compensation and rejected the alternative argument that the payments were fringe benefits. The court remanded solely for recalculation of the value of the driver’s health and dental insurance fringe benefits using the correct regulatory formula.

labor & employment

This case arose from a long-running property dispute between neighboring landowners over an easement, including issues like a gate and surveillance cameras. After the trial court awarded the J-Lot owners attorney fees under M.R. Civ. P. 37(c) for expenses tied to the appellants' denials of requests for admission, Muther and Woods appealed the fee order while the main case was still pending. The Law Court vacated the fee award, holding that the trial court could consider the Rule 37(c) attorney-fee request during the appeal under M.R. App. P. 3(b) and M.R. Civ. P. 54(b)(3), but that remand of the underlying judgment in the related Flaherty I appeal could alter the factual basis and prevailing-party determination, so the fee request must be reconsidered after final judgment.

propertyprocedure

The case involved Michael Farrell, who owns property in Auburn's Rural Residence zoning district, challenging a Notice of Violation/Order to Correct issued by the city's Code Enforcement Officer for issues like unregistered vehicles, scrap materials, and dilapidated structures on his land. Farrell appealed the NOV to the Auburn Board of Appeals, which affirmed it, and then sought judicial review in Superior Court under M.R. Civ. P. 80B. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court held that the Board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue a binding decision on the NOV under the relevant city ordinances, rendering its ruling advisory in nature and not subject to Rule 80B review. The court vacated the Superior Court's judgment affirming the Board and remanded with instructions to dismiss the 80B claim while allowing other pending independent claims to proceed. The decision turned on statutory and ordinance interpretation regarding the scope of appeals to the Board and the non-binding effect of its determinations on enforcement actions.

propertyprocedure

In this case, Salem Capital Group sought foreclosure on a property and determination of lien priority against Maxwell Eveleth and other mortgagees regarding a promissory note secured by a mortgage that was later increased through unrecorded allonges. The District Court granted summary judgment to Salem Capital, giving it priority over the full debt amount based on inquiry notice from the recorded mortgage. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgment, holding that Salem Capital only has priority for the initial loan amount because the mortgage lacked a future advances clause as required by 33 M.R.S. § 505(2), which mandates explicit statements in the mortgage instrument for such priority.

property

In State v. Murphy, the defendant was convicted by a jury of operating a vehicle while his license was suspended or revoked, a Class E offense under Maine law. He appealed, arguing that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by admitting a certificate from the Secretary of State stating that notice of the suspension had been mailed to him, which he claimed was testimonial hearsay under the Supreme Court's Melendez-Diaz decision. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the certificate was not testimonial because it consisted of routine administrative driving records rather than forensic analysis involving judgment or potential error, and thus did not trigger confrontation rights. The court distinguished the certificate from the lab reports at issue in Melendez-Diaz and reaffirmed its prior precedents allowing such evidence as prima facie proof. The opinion reviewed the background facts of the traffic stop and the trial evidence, concluding that admission of the certificate did not violate the Confrontation Clause.

criminal lawprocedure

In Guardianship of Jewel M., the father appealed a York County Probate Court judgment appointing the maternal grandmother as guardian of his daughter under 18-A M.R.S. § 5-204(c), contending that the court erred in finding a temporarily intolerable living situation as to him and in labeling the guardianship permanent when it was temporary. The Probate Court determined that a temporarily intolerable living situation existed for both parents, citing the mother's substance abuse history and exposure of the child to domestic violence and physical abuse, as well as the father's limited contact with the child, lack of a primary custody order, failure to arrange therapy, and absence of drug testing confirmation. The court granted the guardianship petition but established conditions for termination, including the father's acquisition of primary residential care through District Court, arrangement of qualified therapy for the child, and passage of a hair follicle drug test, along with a graduated visitation schedule. On appeal, the court affirmed the judgment with modifications to clarify the temporary nature of the guardianship and the father's ongoing rights.

family law

The case concerned a dispute over who should receive survivor retirement benefits from the Maine State Retirement System after John McPhee's death: his ex-wife Sharon, named in a 1994 Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) from their divorce, or his second wife Joanne, his surviving spouse under the retirement plan. The MSRS Board determined that benefits should go to Joanne pursuant to the governing statute defining "surviving spouse" as the person married to the retiree at death. The Superior Court had ruled for Sharon based on the QDRO's terms, but the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated that judgment and reinstated the Board's decision. The core reasoning was that a statutory requirement to give QDROs their "plain meaning" does not authorize interpretations that conflict with the definitions and rules in the authorizing retirement statutes, and the QDRO here did not validly override the statutory beneficiary designation.

family lawprocedure