This case involved environmental organizations challenging the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of nationwide permits (NWPs 21, 49, and 50) under the Clean Water Act for mining-related discharges of dredged or fill material in Kentucky and the Appalachian region, alleging violations of the CWA, NEPA, and APA. The court dismissed one plaintiff and certain claims for lack of standing, denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and granted summary judgment to the defendants and intervenors. The core reasoning was that the Corps had adequately evaluated the permits' minimal individual and cumulative environmental effects in accordance with statutory guidelines, properly relied on mitigation measures and protocols like the Eastern Kentucky Stream Assessment, and that its decisions were not arbitrary or capricious under the APA.
This case concerns a dispute over the $400,000 proceeds of a Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance policy after the death of Robert L. Mudd, specifically whether his 2009 handwritten alteration to the beneficiary form—removing his former wife Shelly Ann Yarbrough as a 50% beneficiary—was valid. Plaintiffs, including Mudd’s mother and estate administrators, sought a declaratory judgment that the mother was the sole beneficiary, while Yarbrough filed claims asserting her entitlement to half the proceeds; Prudential interpleaded the funds into court. Defendant Yarbrough moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, to transfer venue, and for leave to file an amended answer. The court denied the motions, holding that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Kentucky under the federal interpleader statute because the disputed funds had been deposited in the court’s registry there and that it could exercise jurisdiction over the parties in this interpleader action.
This case arose from a fatal boating accident on Lake Williamstown in Kentucky, in which plaintiff Ann Griffith's husband was struck and killed by a motorboat owned jointly by defendants Donald and Cathleen Kuester and operated by Mrs. Kuester. The plaintiff brought claims of common-law and statutory negligence against both defendants, asserting vicarious liability against Mr. Kuester under the family purpose doctrine and a local ordinance. The court granted Mr. Kuester's motions for partial summary judgment, holding that the family purpose doctrine and the ordinance were inapplicable because he was not present and had not exercised control over the boat's use at the time. The court denied the plaintiff's cross-motion on the same issues and also denied her motion for partial summary judgment against Mrs. Kuester, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether any statutory or regulatory violations by Mrs. Kuester proximately caused the collision.
This case is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action brought by the estate and family of Robert Bradford against Bracken and Campbell counties and multiple police officers after Bradford was fatally shot by officers during a standoff at his Kentucky property on May 31, 2009. Plaintiffs asserted claims including constitutional violations, excessive force, battery, negligence, and loss of consortium. The court considered motions to dismiss by Kentucky State Police officers Beighle, Robb, and McDonald, which focused on whether these defendants were properly and timely served under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) after being added in an amended complaint. The court granted McDonald's motion in full, granted Beighle and Robb's motions in part, and denied Beighle and Robb's motions in part, primarily due to lack of timely service and absence of good cause for an extension.
This case involves plaintiff Gerald Gresh's claims that defendants, including Waste Services of America, Inc. and its executives, fraudulently induced him to delay exercising a stock option until after company assets were sold, asserting fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing under state law. On remand from the Sixth Circuit, the district court addressed pretrial motions to exclude evidence and expert testimony. The court granted in part and denied in part the motions in limine, excluding evidence that contradicts the stock-option agreement under the parol evidence rule, certain damages calculations related to landfill valuations and prejudgment interest, and some expert opinions on assumed interests and profits, while allowing evidence of a non-binding letter of intent, a December 1998 statement by defendant Dalton, and expert testimony on the value of a 5% interest in a specific distribution. The court reasoned that admissibility turns on relevance to the remaining claims, consistency with prior appellate rulings, and compliance with evidentiary standards for expert opinions.
This case involved plaintiff Eddie Merida's action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, based on claims of chronic bilateral knee pain, osteoarthritis, antisocial traits, and a history of substance abuse. The district court affirmed the ALJ's decision that Merida was not disabled, finding it supported by substantial evidence after applying the five-step sequential evaluation process. At steps one through three, the ALJ determined Merida had not engaged in substantial gainful activity, had severe impairments that did not meet a listing, and at step four assessed a residual functional capacity for a limited range of light work with sit/stand options, postural limitations, and mental restrictions that precluded his past work. At step five, the ALJ concluded other jobs existed in the national economy that Merida could perform given his age, education, and RFC. The court rejected challenges to the ALJ's weighing of medical evidence and RFC findings as insufficiently specific and held that new evidence submitted after the decision did not warrant remand due to lack of good cause.
