The case involved a lawsuit by Frank Cushenberry and his family against Barber Brothers Contracting Company for injuries from a vehicular accident on Interstate 10, where a Barber Brothers truck was involved. The Louisiana Supreme Court on rehearing affirmed the jury's award of $10,750,000 in general damages to Mr. Cushenberry, finding no abuse of discretion when considering the specific facts of the case, corrected the fault allocation to 80% for Barber Brothers and 20% for Mr. Cushenberry, and addressed prior inconsistent holdings on loss of consortium awards. The core reasoning emphasized reviewing damage awards based on the particular circumstances of the plaintiff rather than solely prior cases, and correcting a scribe error in fault assessment while upholding the trial court's jury instructions.
The case concerned whether Michelle Barnett, a Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals employee, violated the Code of Governmental Ethics (La. R.S. 42:1111(C)(2)(d)) by receiving a thing of economic value from a prohibited source through her husband's employment with Magellan Health Services, which held a contract with her agency. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal and Ethics Adjudicatory Board rulings that had found a violation and imposed penalties. The court held that the Board failed to prove Barnett received compensation for services rendered to a prohibited source, noting that the payments were for her husband's work and neither she nor her husband held an ownership interest in the contracting entity. The decision emphasized strict construction of the penal ethics statutes and application of the rule of lenity, resulting in dismissal of all charges.
This case arose from a 2019 motor vehicle accident in Louisiana involving a tractor-trailer that struck another vehicle, leading to consolidated lawsuits by multiple plaintiffs against the driver, his employer, and the employer's insurer, American Transportation Group Risk Retention Group, Inc., which had a $1,000,000 policy limit. After a jury awarded damages exceeding the policy limit and the trial court entered judgment for over $2.8 million without allocating fault or noting policy limits, the insurer sought a suspensive appeal and requested a bond limited to its remaining policy limits plus interest rather than the full judgment amount. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the insurer could suspensively appeal by posting security equal only to its policy limits, as it was aggrieved under La. Code Civ. P. art. 2124(C) by the trial court's requirement of a larger bond. The court reasoned that Article 2124(B) and (C) must be read together, allowing supervisory review and adjustment of the security amount when the full judgment bond would exceed contractual policy limits established in the record. The matter was rendered as amended and remanded for further proceedings.
The case involved a dispute between the New Orleans City Council and the Mayor, acting as trustee, along with other parties over the Edward Wisner Trust, a charitable trust established by a 1914 land donation that had grown to over $100 million in value; the Council sought declaratory and injunctive relief challenging a 2020 agreement that purported to extend and modify the trust after its original 100-year term. The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed whether the Council had procedural capacity to bring the suit in its own name under the city's Home Rule Charter. The Court reversed the court of appeal and held that the Council does possess such capacity, reasoning that the Charter grants the Council broad legislative and oversight powers, including the authority to initiate litigation to protect city interests in conflicts with the executive branch. The case was remanded for consideration of the remaining issues regarding the preliminary injunction.
This case involved a dispute between Creekstone Juban I, L.L.C., a Louisiana-based property owner, and XL Insurance America, Inc., over a commercial property insurance policy that covered flood damage to a retail complex. Creekstone filed suit in Louisiana state court after XL Insurance partially paid a claim but disputed additional amounts, prompting XL to seek dismissal based on a contractual forum selection clause requiring all disputes to be litigated exclusively in New York courts. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to address whether La. R.S. 22:868(A)(2) barred enforcement of that clause. The court held that the statute does not prohibit enforcement of the parties' agreed-upon forum selection clause, reversed the trial court's ruling, and remanded for further proceedings under La. Code Civ. P. art. 121. The decision turned on the interpretation that the statute's restrictions on certain insurance contract provisions do not extend to the contractual choice of forum in this context.
The case involved defendant Lee Turner, Jr., who was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder committed during an armed robbery and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed 32 assignments of error and found that the trial court had improperly restricted the defendant's ability to question prospective jurors about their willingness to consider a life sentence rather than automatically imposing the death penalty, known as a reverse-Witherspoon challenge. The court therefore vacated the death sentences while affirming the convictions on all other grounds and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
This case arose from a 2015 car accident in which plaintiff Kerry Maggio was injured by a vehicle driven by James Parker, an employee of The Sandwich Kings, LLC (d/b/a Jimmy John's). Maggio sued Parker, his employer, and their insurers, but separately settled with the vehicle's owner Brenda Parker and her insurer Louisiana Farm Bureau for policy limits via a release that discharged the payors and 'all other persons, firms or corporations who are or might be liable.' The non-settling defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the broad release language barred the claims against them. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on this basis, reversed the court of appeal, and remanded for further proceedings, reasoning that the release did not meet the requirements to bind non-parties absent a solidary obligation or clear stipulation pour autrui.
The case involved Catina Curley, who was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting her husband during an altercation. Curley argued that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to investigate or present a defense based on battered woman’s syndrome, including the use of expert testimony, despite evidence of repeated abuse by the victim. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the defendant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel. It reversed the court of appeal, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
This case involved a disciplinary proceeding by the Judiciary Commission of Louisiana against Justice of the Peace Jeff Sachse for alleged violations of Canons 1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The matter stemmed from Sachse's conduct toward his now ex-wife, including multiple violations of a temporary restraining order issued in connection with domestic abuse allegations, such as installing a GPS tracker on her vehicle and attempting contact, which led to his arrests for stalking. The Louisiana Supreme Court found clear and convincing evidence of the violations based on the record, including admitted acts that violated protective orders, and imposed a six-month suspension without pay along with an order to pay $3,040.02 in costs. The court reasoned that a judge's repeated disregard for court orders and the law undermines the integrity and public confidence in the judiciary, regardless of whether criminal convictions resulted.
In this case, a public port authority in Louisiana expropriated private waterfront property owned by Violet Dock Port to expand its cargo-handling facilities and support maritime commerce. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's holding that the expropriation was constitutional under Article I, § 4 of the state constitution, as it served the public purpose of facilitating the transport of goods in domestic and international commerce and did not violate the business enterprise clause. However, the court reversed the lower courts on the amount of just compensation, finding legal error in the trial court's valuation approach, and remanded solely for the court of appeal to recalculate compensation based on the existing record.
This case is an attorney disciplinary proceeding against Ronald Seastrunk, an assistant district attorney charged with violating Rule 3.8(d) of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence during a homicide prosecution. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the disclosure obligations in Rule 3.8(d) are coextensive with those required by Brady v. Maryland. As a result, the court found that the Office of Disciplinary Counsel failed to meet its burden of proof and dismissed all charges against the respondent.
The case involved Eric Borcik, a former deckhand for Crosby Tugs, who sued his employer for retaliatory termination after he reported orders to dump waste oil and commit other environmental violations, claiming protection under the Louisiana Environmental Whistleblower Act, R.S. 30:2027. The federal district court tried the case and the Fifth Circuit certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court on the meaning of the statutory term "good faith" as used in the Act. The court answered that "good faith" means an employee is acting with an honest belief that a violation of an environmental law, rule, or regulation occurred. The core reasoning was that this interpretation aligns with the statute's purpose of encouraging reports of violations, while the separate "reasonably believes" requirement and explicit exclusions for deliberate employee violations already protect employers from fabricated or self-initiated claims.
The case concerned whether the Louisiana Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (LSPCA), a private nonprofit, is subject to the Louisiana Public Records Law when providing animal control services to the City of New Orleans under a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement (CEA). The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled that the LSPCA qualifies as an instrumentality of the municipal corporation due to its contracted duties and receipt of public funds, and therefore must comply with the Public Records Law for relevant documents. The court reasoned that the public's constitutional right of access to public records cannot be restricted by the terms of a contract. It affirmed the court of appeal but limited disclosure to documents tied to the LSPCA's duties under the CEA and remanded the case to the district court to identify those specific documents.
This medical malpractice case arose when Kimberly Thibodeaux suffered complications during delivery of her child, including placenta previa, an emergency cesarean hysterectomy, a bladder laceration that Dr. Donnell repaired, and subsequent ureter obstruction requiring further surgery; the family sued Dr. Donnell for damages including special damages, general damages, and loss of consortium. The jury awarded special damages but no general damages and no loss-of-consortium damages. The court of appeal found manifest error, awarded general damages under the Coco standard limiting awards to the lowest amount within the jury's discretion, and increased consortium damages. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that once manifest error is found the appellate court must conduct a de novo review of damages under Mart v. Hill rather than Coco, and remanded for reconsideration of the awards.
The case involved Gerald W. Dahlem, who was convicted by a six-person jury of fourth-offense driving while intoxicated in Washington Parish, Louisiana, and then sentenced as a habitual offender to 25 years imprisonment without parole, probation, or suspension. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review to address whether trial by a jury smaller than required by law constituted a non-waivable structural defect, but ultimately declined to resolve that broader constitutional question. The court affirmed both the conviction and sentence, holding that any potential jury composition error was rendered moot by Dahlem's multiple-offender status, which independently triggered a mandatory hard-labor sentence under La. R.S. 15:529.1(G).
This case involved plaintiffs suing a hospital after the patient developed a post-operative infection following spine surgery, alleging the hospital failed to properly maintain and service equipment used to sterilize surgical instruments. The hospital argued the claims were premature because they fell under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act, requiring review by a medical review panel before filing suit. The district court partially granted and denied the exception of prematurity, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims do fall within the MMA. The court reached this conclusion by applying the factors from Coleman v. Deno, determining that the alleged negligence occurred in the context of medical treatment and was directly related to patient care.
This case involved a dispute between the City of Kenner and its firefighters over how to calculate pension contributions under Louisiana statutes La. R.S. 11:233 and 11:2252 after the city's municipal retirement system merged with the statewide Firefighters’ Retirement System. The firefighters sued, arguing that educational incentive pay, seniority incentive pay, holiday pay, and acting pay should be included as “earnable compensation,” while the city maintained its prior practice of excluding them. The trial court granted summary judgment to the city, but the court of appeal reversed and granted summary judgment to the firefighters. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that these four types of pay qualify as “earnable compensation” because they represent the full amount of compensation earned during a regular tour of duty and are neither gratuitous nor irregular under the statutory definitions. The court found no genuine issues of material fact and concluded the firefighters were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In this Louisiana criminal case, defendant Jessie M. Griffin, II, pleaded guilty to first-offense driving while intoxicated and was ordered to pay standard $100 fees for costs of prosecution and costs of investigation as conditions of probation, in addition to a fine and other court costs. Griffin challenged the fees, arguing that state law (La. C.Cr.P. arts. 887(A) and 895.1(B)) allows recovery only of extraordinary or case-specific expenses, not ordinary operating costs of the district attorney and sheriff offices. The district court upheld the fees as fair and reasonable; the court of appeal reversed. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and reinstated the district court ruling, holding that the statutes authorize imposition of reasonable, pre-noticed standard costs without requiring case-by-case evidentiary proof or dollar-for-dollar itemization. The court emphasized that the fees had been publicly established by omnibus motion and en banc order since 2004 and 2006, respectively, and applied uniformly to misdemeanor convictions.
The case involved a retired City of Slidell employee, Dean Born, who had worked for the city for 24 years and retired in 2008 under an ordinance allowing him to continue participating in the city's health insurance plan at no cost. After his retirement, the city enacted Ordinance 3493 requiring retirees to switch to Medicare coverage upon reaching age 65. Born sued to maintain his original coverage, and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the new ordinance could not be applied retroactively to him. The court reasoned that the health insurance provisions in effect at the time of his retirement formed a contract creating vested rights that could not be divested by later amendments, and that his suit was timely.
This case involved a juvenile, K.L.A., who was adjudicated delinquent for aggravated incest and agreed in a plea to register as a sex offender for life, though the law did not mandate registration. The question arose whether he must obtain a driver's license or identification card marked with "sex offender" under Louisiana statutes. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed lower court rulings that K.L.A. is not required to comply with those identification requirements. The court reasoned that the statutes apply only to persons required by law to register as sex offenders under La. R.S. 15:542, not to those who voluntarily agreed to register via plea agreement. The court declined to address the broader issue of whether juveniles required to register must obtain such identification.