The case involved David Leger, who was convicted by a trial court of five counts of vehicular homicide after his truck collided with another vehicle during a road rage incident on I-10, resulting in five deaths. The First Circuit Court of Appeal modified the convictions to negligent homicide, finding insufficient evidence that Leger's intoxication contributed to the accident as required by statute. The Louisiana Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and determined that the state had presented sufficient proof of intoxication as a contributing factor, leading it to vacate the appellate judgment, reinstate the trial court's convictions, and remand for further proceedings.
This case involved a worker injured on the job who sued a third-party defendant for tort damages after receiving workers' compensation benefits that covered some medical expenses. The plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of the full medical bills, including amounts written off due to workers' compensation fee schedules, arguing it fell under the collateral source rule. The Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed the lower courts' decision to exclude the written-off amounts and allow only evidence of the actual payments made. The court reasoned that the written-off portion was not a collateral source because the plaintiff provided no consideration for it, and thus it should not be presented to the jury.
The case involved defendant Lawrence Clark, who was cited by New Orleans police for displaying and offering his artwork for sale on a public neutral ground in violation of Municipal Code §110-11, which generally prohibits retail sales and displays outside of enclosed buildings except in specifically permitted areas like Jackson Square. Clark moved to quash the citation, arguing that the ordinance unconstitutionally restricted his First Amendment rights to free expression. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and held the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to the sale of art. It reversed the lower courts' denials of the motion and granted the motion to quash. The core reasoning was that the ordinance's restrictions on where artists may sell their work impermissibly burdened protected expressive activity without satisfying constitutional standards for time, place, and manner regulations.
The case concerned whether the St. Tammany Parish District Attorney is legally required to act as general legal adviser and litigation counsel for the Parish Council, Parish President, and other government entities under the Louisiana Constitution, state statutes, and the St. Tammany Parish Home Rule Charter. The District Attorney sued for declaratory and injunctive relief after the Parish began operating an independent legal department and passed ordinances altering legal representation. The trial and appellate courts ruled against the District Attorney, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, granting summary judgment to the District Attorney and holding that the governing documents mandate the District Attorney's role as the Parish's general attorney without genuine issues of material fact.
A landowner sued multiple mineral lessees and the mortgagee of one lessee for breaching obligations under a mineral lease by failing to provide a recordable release after the lease expired and by failing to pay royalties. The lower courts found all defendants solidarily liable for damages. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the liability finding against the mortgagee, holding it was neither an "owner" under Mineral Code article 207 nor a "lessee" under article 140. The Court affirmed solidary liability for one lessee because the obligation to release the lease was indivisible, ruled that article 140 caps damages at double the unpaid royalties rather than allowing both the royalties and a double penalty, and reduced the attorney fee award accordingly.
This case involved a challenge to Louisiana statutes La. R.S. 32:667(H)(3) and (I)(1)(a), which suspend driving privileges for one year and require an ignition interlock device when a driver refuses a chemical test for intoxication following a second or subsequent DWI arrest. Plaintiff David Carver, who had refused testing twice without resulting convictions, sought to have the provisions declared unconstitutional as violations of due process under the U.S. and Louisiana constitutions after the state denied full reinstatement of his license. The district court ruled the statutes unconstitutional, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed that decision on direct appeal. The court held that the provisions are constitutional, reasoning that drivers impliedly consent to such testing and that the penalties for refusal have a rational basis in advancing public safety under the state's police power.
The case involved a former police officer charged with felony carnal knowledge of a juvenile, malfeasance in office, and obstruction of justice after an incident with a 15-year-old at her home while he was on duty. A jury convicted him on all counts, but the court of appeal vacated the attempted felony carnal knowledge conviction on double jeopardy grounds using Louisiana's "same evidence" test. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed that part of the decision, reinstated the conviction and sentence, and held that double jeopardy analysis under both the federal and state constitutions is governed solely by the Blockburger test. The court explained that the two constitutions provide equivalent protections and that Louisiana courts need not apply any additional state-specific standard.
The case involved defendant Thayer Green, who at age 17 committed a home invasion and was later adjudicated a third felony offender under Louisiana's Habitual Offender Law, resulting in a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Graham v. Florida, barring life without parole for juvenile offenders convicted of non-homicide crimes, applies to enhanced sentences under habitual offender statutes. The court held that Graham does apply in this context, affirmed the underlying convictions, and amended the sentence by removing the parole restriction while directing the Department of Corrections to calculate eligibility under La. R.S. 15:574.4(D). The matter was remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on mitigating factors and possible consecutive sentencing.
This workers' compensation case involved Paula Clavier, who was injured on the job in 2006 and sought to compel her employer, Coburn Supply Company, to pay for a functional capacity evaluation (FCE) performed by a physical therapist of her choice to challenge the results of an earlier FCE ordered by the employer. The Office of Workers' Compensation denied her motion, a decision upheld by the appellate court and affirmed by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The court reasoned that under La. R.S. 23:1203 and related provisions, employers are required to furnish necessary medical treatment but not evaluations chosen by the employee solely to contest prior assessments or prepare litigation, as confirmed by precedents distinguishing such services from curative care. The court remanded for further proceedings while noting dissents from three justices.
The case concerned the validity of a prenuptial agreement executed by Danielle Deon Dickerson Acurio and Dr. Michael Thomas Acurio four days before their 2002 remarriage. The document was signed before a notary and one witness but contained no acknowledgment of the parties' signatures at that time; the first acknowledgment occurred years later during divorce proceedings. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that under La. Civ. Code art. 2331, an act under private signature must be duly acknowledged prior to marriage to be fully effective. The court reversed the court of appeal and reinstated the district court's ruling that the agreement was invalid for lack of timely form, remanding for further proceedings consistent with the community property regime. The decision resolved a split among appellate courts on the timing requirement for acknowledgment.
The case involved the South Lafourche Levee District appropriating a permanent levee servitude on land owned by Chad Jarreau for use in a hurricane protection project following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The Louisiana Supreme Court addressed the measure of compensation due to the property owner under 2006 constitutional and statutory amendments, as well as the applicable statute for attorneys' fees. The court held that the amendments limited compensation to the fair market value of the property at the time of appropriation based on its current use, rather than the full extent of the loss, aligning with Fifth Amendment requirements. It affirmed the court of appeal's judgment in part but reversed the award of attorneys' fees, reducing it significantly and rendering a new judgment for a lower amount under La. R.S. 38:301(C)(2)(f).
This case involved a medical malpractice claim under Louisiana's Medical Malpractice Act, where plaintiffs Darrin and Tess Coulon alleged that Darrin developed a post-surgical infection due to negligence by the West Bank Surgery Center and Dr. Mark Juneau. After a medical review panel found no breach of the standard of care, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit that included specific claims that the Surgery Center failed to train and supervise its nurses. The Surgery Center raised an exception of prematurity, arguing those claims were not included in the initial panel complaint, which only alleged failures to develop, maintain, and enforce policies to prevent infections. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' grant of the exception, holding that the complaint's broad language was sufficient to encompass the training and supervision allegations because enforcing policies inherently includes carrying them out through employee oversight.
The case concerned whether materials, machinery, and equipment used to reconstruct an inland marine drilling barge after a fire in Louisiana qualified for a sales and use tax exemption under La. R.S. 47:305.1(A), which applies to vessels 'built in Louisiana,' and whether a Department of Revenue regulation (LAC 61:I:4403) clarifying that certain reconstructions fall within the exemption was constitutional. The taxpayer paid taxes under protest following an audit and sued for a refund after the local tax collector assessed use taxes on the reconstruction items purchased in-state. Lower courts ruled the regulation exceeded the statute and was unconstitutional, denying the exemption because the vessel was damaged rather than destroyed. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding the regulation constitutional and applicable, and rendered summary judgment for the taxpayer ordering a full refund with interest.
The case involved Vernon Mullins, who was convicted of aggravated rape under Louisiana law because the victim had an IQ of 70 or below, preventing consent due to mental infirmity. The Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the conviction and sentence and remanded for a new trial. The court determined that the trial court erred by permitting an expert psychologist to testify about IQ test results he neither administered nor scored, which violated the Confrontation Clause, and by admitting a letter from the expert that contained hearsay from non-testifying sources. Because the victim's IQ was an essential element of the offense, these evidentiary errors required reversal.
This case concerns a divorced couple's dispute over child support modification after the mother remarried. The father applied for IV-D support enforcement services through the Louisiana Department of Child and Family Services, which allowed payments to route through the agency and led to a hearing officer reducing the monthly obligation from $1,200 to $700 based on a change in circumstances. The mother filed an exception of no right of action, contending that DCFS lacked authority to intervene because she neither received public benefits nor was delinquent in payments. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal, ruling that the father's proper application for services and DCFS's certification satisfied statutory requirements under La. R.S. 46:236.1 et seq., thereby permitting the IV-D hearing process and the reduced support order.
In this case, Ronald Marshall was convicted of armed robbery in 1998 and later filed successive applications for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to advise him on a plea offer and by not obtaining evidence showing the victim was at work during the alleged crime. The trial court denied the claims, but the court of appeal partially granted relief by ordering an evidentiary hearing and a subpoena for the victim's time sheets. The Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and reinstated the trial court's denial. The court reasoned that the claims were untimely and procedurally barred under state law, that Marshall had not shown any exception to the filing deadlines applied, and that he provided no proof that the time sheets existed or were discoverable.
The case involved Lamondre Tucker, who was convicted by a jury in Caddo Parish of the first-degree murder of Tavia Sills, his pregnant girlfriend, based on evidence that he abducted and shot her three times before disposing of her body in a pond. The jury found aggravating circumstances of second-degree kidnapping and creating a risk of death to more than one person, leading to a death sentence. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, the defendant raised 55 assignments of error, but after review, the court found no merit in any of them and affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence, including after conducting a proportionality review.
This case involved a products liability claim under the Louisiana Products Liability Act brought by Richard L. Reynolds against Nissan North America and others following a multi-vehicle accident where the plaintiff alleged that the airbags in his 2003 Infiniti G35S failed to deploy, causing serious injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Nissan after finding insufficient evidence for the plaintiff's claims of defects in construction, design, warnings, or express warranty. The court of appeal affirmed, and the Louisiana Supreme Court also affirmed the judgment, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and no specific express warranty supporting the claims. The reasoning centered on evidentiary rulings excluding certain expert testimony and the absence of factual support for any LPLA theory.
This case arose from a multi-vehicle accident in which plaintiff Richard Reynolds was injured and later sued the other driver, his insurer Automobile Club Inter-Insurance Exchange, vehicle custodian Insurance Auto Auctions Corp., and Nissan under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, alleging that the insurer and custodian failed to preserve his vehicle for inspection despite notice of potential litigation. The trial court sustained exceptions of no cause of action on spoliation claims, but the Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the state recognizes a tort of negligent spoliation of evidence. The court held that no such tort exists, reasoning that public policy precludes any duty to preserve evidence regardless of its source, and that alternative remedies are available through evidentiary, discovery, and contractual rules. It reversed the dismissal only as to the contract claim, finding the petition alleged sufficient facts to support breach of contract, and remanded for further proceedings on that issue alone.
The case involved a dispute between neighboring landowners in Louisiana over whether John Boudreaux had acquired a predial servitude, or right of way, across Paul Cummings' property through thirty years of acquisitive prescription. Boudreaux and his predecessors had used a pathway on the land since at least 1948 for farming and access, and the prior owners had at one point asked for the path to be relocated, which Boudreaux did. The trial court and court of appeal ruled in Boudreaux's favor, finding the use sufficient to establish ownership of the servitude. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that Boudreaux was a precarious possessor who never provided actual notice to the owners that he intended to possess the right of way for himself rather than with their tolerance. Under the Civil Code rules on acquisitive prescription, this meant the prescriptive period could not run in his favor.