This case involved a dispute over whether an ex-wife's relationship with a male friend constituted "cohabitation" under a divorce settlement agreement, which would end the ex-husband's maintenance payments. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed that the relationship did not qualify as cohabitation, as the couple maintained separate residences, paid their own expenses, and did not assume marital rights and duties like living together as husband and wife. The court interpreted the term based on its dictionary definition and the parties' intent in the agreement, which linked termination to living in the same house rather than just a sexual relationship. It distinguished this from a prior case about modifying maintenance due to changed circumstances.
The case arose after an employee of Dix & Associates Pipeline Contractors was killed at work by a vehicle driven by an employee of Bardstown Mills; the employee's estate received workers' compensation benefits from Dix and later settled its tort claim against Bardstown Mills for $250,000. Bardstown Mills then pursued a third-party claim for contribution against Dix, while Dix sought to recover the compensation benefits it had paid under KRS 342.700. The trial court instructed the jury on comparative fault, which apportioned 95 percent to Bardstown Mills and 5 percent to Dix, but ultimately entered offsetting judgments that awarded Bardstown Mills 50 percent contribution (capped at the amount of benefits paid) and allowed Dix to recoup its payments. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgments, holding that prior precedent required equal division of contribution liability between the parties and that the settlement structure prevented further adjustment of the subrogation rights.
This case concerned whether a deceased husband's deposits into joint bank accounts with his children could prevent his widow from claiming her statutory dower interest in one-half of his personal property under Kentucky law. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the widow was entitled to her dower share in the funds, reversing the Court of Appeals. The court reasoned that a spouse's dower rights cannot be defeated by lifetime transfers intended to reduce the estate, and that KRS 391.315 regarding joint accounts does not impliedly repeal or override the dower statute, as the husband lacked the legal power to dispose of the property in a manner that defeated those rights.
In Stratton v. Parker, a personal injury case arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants, one of whom settled before trial while the other proceeded to trial. The jury apportioned 25% fault to the non-settling defendant, 75% to the plaintiff, and 0% to the settling defendant, leading the trial court to enter judgment for 25% of damages against the non-settling defendant and allow credit for the settlement amount. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, holding that under KRS 454.040 and precedents like Orr v. Coleman, liability is several according to the jury's apportionment of causation, so no credit is due when the settling party is found to have zero percent fault.
This case concerned a pedestrian who was injured after falling on a defective, snow-covered sidewalk abutting a store in Newport, Kentucky, and who sued the property owner and its tenant after failing to provide the city with the required 90-day notice under KRS 411.110. The trial court granted summary judgment to the owner and tenant, ruling that a city ordinance requiring abutting landowners to maintain sidewalks did not create liability to injured pedestrians, and denied the plaintiff's attempt to add the city as a defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ordinance issue, but the Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's ruling, holding that the ordinance did not impose such liability. The court's reasoning relied on longstanding precedent that these ordinances shift primary responsibility to the landowner but do not alter the city's underlying duty or create a private right of action for damages against abutting owners.
The case involved appellants who were convicted of second-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, and assault after forcing entry into an elderly couple's home, beating one victim with a pistol, and stealing $8,000. The court affirmed the burglary and robbery convictions and consecutive sentences but reversed the assault convictions. It held that the assault merged into the first-degree robbery because the indictment and jury instructions relied on the same elements of physical force and injury to elevate the theft to first-degree robbery under K.R.S. 515.020(1)(a), rather than mere possession of a weapon. The court found the Blockburger test inapplicable here due to the specific charging and instructions used.
The case concerned whether a trial court could award attorney's fees under K.R.S. 403.220 to an attorney who had represented an indigent wife pro bono in a divorce action and post-judgment proceedings. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that such an award is permitted even when services were provided without charge to the client. The court reasoned that the statute authorizes fees based on the financial imbalance between the parties rather than on whether the client actually incurred expenses, and that denying fees in pro bono cases would allow the financially stronger spouse to avoid liability while creating conflicts of interest for attorneys. The decision overruled Sullivan v. Levin to the extent it barred fees when the client had not paid or objected to payment.
In Mozee v. Commonwealth, the defendant faced charges of complicity to commit murder and first-degree robbery in two consolidated appeals. A jury convicted him of robbery in the first case, and he entered a conditional guilty plea to murder and additional robberies in the second; both cases raised questions about his competency to stand trial, to be sentenced, and to enter a plea due to mild mental retardation, as well as the admissibility of his statements to police under Miranda. The trial court found him competent based on lay observations, his conduct in disciplinary hearings, coherent police statements, and prior expert findings, despite later medical testimony suggesting impairment, and the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed the judgments. The court reasoned that competency determinations are not bound solely by expert testimony, that the evidence as a whole supported the findings, and that no new hearings were required absent demonstrated change in the defendant's condition. The topics are criminal law and procedure.
The case concerned disputes among Johnson, Lawrence, Magoffin, and Martin Counties over a proposed regional jail under KRS 441.800, including whether a regional jail authority could employ staff to operate the facility or whether that power belonged exclusively to the county jailer where the jail was located, and whether one county could unilaterally withdraw from the authority. The Kentucky Supreme Court addressed the statutory questions presented, holding that a validly formed regional jail authority possesses independent authority to manage and operate the jail through its own personnel, distinct from the duties of a county jailer under KRS 71.020. The court reasoned from the statutory definitions separating "jail" and "regional jail," the language of KRS 441.800 granting operational powers to the authority, and the absence of any conflict with county jailer statutes, while also considering the validity of the authority's formation and membership.
In this tort case, William Floyd sued Carlisle Construction Company and its employee Steven Wood for injuries from a vehicle collision, after settling separately with the driver of the other vehicle, Steven Whittamore, who was never joined as a defendant or third-party defendant. The defendants requested a jury instruction allowing apportionment of fault and damages to Whittamore under Kentucky law, but the trial court denied it and the jury awarded Floyd full damages. The Court of Appeals reversed for a new trial on apportionment. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that apportionment is not available against a joint tortfeasor who settled but was never made a party to the action, because KRS 454.040 permits apportionment only among defendants and the precedents require an active claim against the nonparty. The Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court's judgment.
The case involved George Combs suing Corbin Motor Lodge after he slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk outside their restaurant during severe winter weather on December 27, 1983; Combs knew the conditions were extremely slick when he entered. The trial court granted summary judgment to the lodge, which the Court of Appeals reversed. The Kentucky Supreme Court reinstated the summary judgment for the defendant, holding that under the precedent of Standard Oil Company v. Manis, a business owner owes no duty to remove or warn about obvious natural outdoor hazards such as ice and snow because the risk is equally apparent to the invitee, resulting in no negligence by the defendant. The court declined to overturn that rule despite the later abolition of contributory negligence as a complete bar in Hilen v. Hays, citing the need for stability in the law absent a compelling reason for change.
The case involved the appellant's conviction for wanton murder and 25-year sentence after he shot and killed Bill Dupin under a bridge, as described in his and a witness's statements to police, though both later repudiated them at trial. The appellant argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence of wantonness to support the jury instruction given and that the trial court should have also instructed on first-degree manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance. The court affirmed the conviction, finding no reasonable evidentiary basis for a manslaughter instruction because the facts did not meet the legal definition of extreme emotional disturbance as a temporary state overcoming judgment with a reasonable explanation from the defendant's viewpoint. The court reasoned that the evidence supported the wanton murder instruction without requiring additional options on mental states.