David L. Baker

The case involved claims by Jeremy Brokaw and his parents against Andrew McSorley, a high school basketball player, for assault and battery after McSorley struck Brokaw during a game, and against the Winfield-Mt. Union Community School District for negligent supervision. The trial court awarded the Brokaws $23,000 in compensatory damages against McSorley but denied punitive damages and dismissed the claim against the school district; the court of appeals affirmed, and the Iowa Supreme Court granted further review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the compensatory damages award despite disputes over causation and mitigation. It further concluded that the school district could not reasonably foresee McSorley's intentional act, precluding liability for negligent supervision. Finally, the court determined that punitive damages were not mandatory because McSorley's split-second action during the game did not demonstrate the requisite level of willful disregard.

torts & liability

The case involved Emmanuel Fountain's conviction for domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury after an alleged incident with his former girlfriend, where he appealed claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request a specific intent jury instruction. The Iowa Supreme Court held that assault under Iowa Code section 708.1 requires specific intent rather than general intent, so the trial court erred in submitting only a general intent instruction. However, because the record lacked transcripts of opening statements and closing arguments, the court could not determine whether counsel's omission constituted ineffective assistance or caused prejudice to Fountain, and thus preserved that claim for postconviction relief while affirming the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board charging attorney Ivan J. Ackerman with ethical violations in two probate matters, including prolonged delays that generated numerous delinquency notices, misrepresentations about the status of tax requirements and estate closure, and premature collection of fees. The parties stipulated to the facts, violations of multiple rules under the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility and Rules of Professional Conduct, and a recommended sanction. After de novo review, the court found the misconduct proven by a convincing preponderance of the evidence and suspended Ackerman's license to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of reinstatement for ninety days, while taking into account mitigating factors such as his health issues and community service.

procedure

This case concerned whether the Iowa Department of Revenue could assess and collect state estate taxes, interest, and penalties from the minor beneficiaries of a life insurance policy after the probate estate itself had no assets to pay the taxes. The Director of the IDOR upheld the assessment against the beneficiaries, the district court affirmed that decision on judicial review, and the court of appeals reversed. The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision and affirmed the district court, holding that Iowa Code section 451.12 incorporates the assessment and collection procedures of chapter 450, making the life-insurance beneficiaries “persons entitled to property subject to the tax” even though the proceeds were not part of the probate estate. The court reasoned that any inheritance-tax exemptions for life insurance payable to named beneficiaries conflict with chapter 451 and therefore are not incorporated, allowing the department to levy on the conservatorship funds held for the children.

taxesprocedure

This case involves the prosecution of Victor Serrato for first-degree murder of Mimi Carmona and nonconsensual termination of her pregnancy, stemming from events that began in Muscatine, Iowa, with the victim's body later found in Illinois. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Serrato's convictions, reversing the court of appeals' decision that had found insufficient evidence of territorial jurisdiction. The court held that substantial evidence supported the jury's findings that Serrato was the perpetrator and that conduct establishing the mens rea elements occurred in Iowa, satisfying Iowa Code section 803.1 for jurisdiction. It also concluded the district court properly denied motions for acquittal and new trial based on the weight and sufficiency of the evidence.

criminal law

The case involved Alan Fowler's appeal from his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A following his prior criminal convictions. Fowler moved to dismiss the petition because the State failed to bring the case to trial within the ninety-day period after the probable cause hearing as required by section 229A.7(3). The district court denied the motion, treating the deadline as directory rather than mandatory and finding good cause for the delay based on scheduling and Fowler's failure to demand a speedy trial. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the statutory time limit is mandatory, the State neither requested a continuance nor showed good cause, and therefore the petition must be dismissed with Fowler released from custody.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Braggs, the defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary, willful injury, and simple assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted murder after he broke into an apartment and stabbed the victim. Braggs appealed, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the assault instruction because assault should not be considered a lesser-included offense of attempted murder under Iowa law, and he urged the court to overrule prior precedents. The Iowa Supreme Court held that assault under Iowa Code section 708.1(1) is a lesser-included offense of attempted murder because the elements of attempted murder necessarily include the elements of assault. The court therefore concluded that counsel had no duty to object to a correct instruction and affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case arose after a 2001 warehouse fire destroyed property stored by Deere & Company; primary insurers Royal Indemnity and Federal sued excess insurer Factory Mutual (FM) for breach of a separate contract under which FM provided loss-prevention engineering services, alleging FM’s inadequate inspection of the facility’s sprinkler system caused the loss. The district court entered a $39.5 million judgment for Royal after a jury trial, but the Iowa Supreme Court reversed and ordered dismissal of all claims. The court held that the massive fire damages were not within the contemplation of the parties at the time they contracted for limited inspection services and were therefore outside the scope of liability for breach of contract or any related negligence duty.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

This case involved Iowa petitioners seeking to reopen the estate of a deceased German national to obtain information for pursuing breach-of-contract and fraud claims related to a commercial lease; the sole beneficiary resided in Germany, requiring service of process abroad. The district court ruled that the petitioners did not need to comply with the Hague Service Convention because Iowa procedural rules did not expressly mandate transmission of documents to a foreign country. On interlocutory appeal, the court reversed, holding that the Convention applied whenever service requires sending judicial documents to a Convention member state such as Germany. The opinion reasoned that the treaty’s requirements—including use of the foreign central authority and translated documents—therefore governed, and remanded for a determination of whether the attempted mail and personal service satisfied those requirements.

procedure

The case involved Troy Blackford, who won approximately $9,387 at Prairie Meadows Racetrack and Casino but was denied payment because casino records showed he remained subject to a permanent trespass ban from prior incidents of damaging property and re-entering the premises. Blackford sued for conversion after the casino confiscated the winnings and required him to sign a forfeiture form, with the dispute centering on whether the ban had been lifted and whether a valid gambling contract existed. The district court ruled that the casino had authority to withhold the funds because any wager by a banned person was void under Iowa law, and a jury found the ban remained in effect; the court of appeals reversed, but the Iowa Supreme Court vacated that decision and affirmed the district court. The Supreme Court held that no contract arose because the casino extended no offer to a banned individual, so Blackford could not establish the property interest required for conversion.

business & regulatorycriminal lawpropertytorts & liability

This case involves a dispute between former tenant Superior Staffing and landlord Agans Brothers, Inc., over the landlord's refusal to consent to a proposed sublease of commercial property under a lease provision requiring that consent not be unreasonably withheld. After a bench trial, the district court found that Agans Brothers reasonably withheld consent based on factors including the subtenant's intended alterations to the premises for food preparation and other circumstances, and it awarded damages and attorney fees to the landlord. Superior Staffing appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the legal standard applied, and the attorney fees award due to the landlord's failure to file a required affidavit under Iowa Code section 625.24. The Iowa Supreme Court held that substantial evidence supported the district court's findings, that the correct legal standard was applied, and that the objection to the missing affidavit was waived for trial-level fees but not for appellate fees, affirming in part and reversing in part.

propertybusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Schuyler Cole Tripp, who pled guilty to third-degree sexual abuse under Iowa Code section 709.4(2)(c)(4) for a sex act with a 15-year-old when he was 20. He received a suspended sentence with probation, sex offender registration, and a special lifetime parole sentence under Iowa Code section 903B.1. Tripp argued on appeal that the special sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for not raising the issue earlier. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed without reaching the merits of the constitutional challenge, holding that the claim was not ripe for adjudication because Tripp was still on probation, the specific parole terms were unknown, any violations or early discharge were speculative, and administrative decisions had not yet occurred.

criminal lawprocedure

In this juvenile delinquency case, the State petitioned against minor Z.S. for two counts of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse based on incidents involving his half-sister, but the juvenile court dismissed the petition after finding insufficient evidence of intent. The State had not specifically requested a ruling on the lesser-included offense of simple assault during trial, though the court noted in its order that such an assault had occurred, and later refused the State's motion to enlarge findings on that charge, citing lack of authority. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court held that juvenile courts have discretion but no duty to address lesser-included offenses, yet once a dismissal order issues, double jeopardy under the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions bars revisiting the matter even if evidentiary support existed. The court affirmed the dismissal without addressing the lesser charge.

criminal lawfamily lawprocedure

In the case In re the Marriage of Brown, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed a dispute over the division of a former husband's IPERS pension following a 1999 divorce decree that awarded the wife forty percent of the pension and directed the parties to submit a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) for approval. The court determined that the 1999 dissolution decree was final regarding the property division, contrary to the court of appeals' view, but upheld the district court's adoption of a QDRO using the service-factor-percentage method to calculate the wife's share based on the decree's language specifying percentages rather than a fixed amount. The reasoning centered on interpreting the decree's intent to divide the pension proportionally at distribution, accounting for the practical issues with defined-benefit plans, and giving effect to the percentage allocations provided.

family lawproperty

The case involved a landlord seeking to evict a residential tenant for unpaid rent via a forcible entry and detainer action under Iowa Code chapter 648, with the original notice served by certified mail without any requirement for a signed return receipt as permitted by Iowa Code section 562A.29A(2). The tenant, who did not receive timely notice of the hearing and had a default judgment entered against her, challenged the statutory notice scheme on due process grounds under the U.S. and Iowa Constitutions, as well as on equal protection grounds under the Iowa Constitution for applying only to residential tenants. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the notice provisions facially violate the due process clause of the Iowa Constitution because they do not mandate service reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient. The court reversed the district court's order issuing a writ of removal.

propertyprocedure

The case involved unmarried parents disputing a request to change their minor child's surname after paternity was established. The father sought to alter the child's last name from the mother's to his own via a follow-up petition following the initial paternity and custody decree. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the action constituted a name change under Iowa Code chapter 674 rather than an initial name determination under chapter 598, requiring consent from both parents on the birth certificate or satisfaction of statutory exceptions. Because the mother withheld consent and no exceptions applied, the district court's grant of the name change was reversed.

family law