Brent R. Appel

In State v. Jenkins, the defendant was convicted of third-degree kidnapping and assault with intent to commit sexual abuse and was ordered to pay restitution to Iowa's Crime Victim Compensation Program for payments made to the victim for lost wages and other expenses. The district court, relying on precedent, ruled it had no discretion to review the claim and ordered full reimbursement of $946.60 without examining causation. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that while restitution to the program is mandatory, the sentencing court must verify that the compensated losses meet the statutory causation requirements under Iowa Code section 915.86, as the offender was not a party to the program's prior decisions. The case was remanded for a factual determination of whether the crimes proximately caused the specific injuries compensated by the program.

criminal lawprocedure

Iowa Network Services, Inc., a competitive long-distance telephone provider, sought a refund of sales and use taxes paid on computer equipment purchased for its business between 1998 and 2003, claiming an exemption under Iowa Code section 422.45(27)(a)(4) for computers used in data processing by commercial enterprises. The Iowa Department of Revenue denied the claim, and an administrative law judge and the department director upheld the denial on the ground that INS's property was centrally assessed under chapter 433, triggering an exception to the exemption in sections 422.45(27)(c)(3) and 427A.1(1)(b). The district court affirmed, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, concluding that a 1996 amendment in section 476.1D(10) altered only the manner of valuation and did not divest the department of assessment authority under chapter 433, and that a 2006 statutory exemption would have been unnecessary if the equipment had already been exempt.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryproperty

In State v. Taeger, the defendant faced criminal charges for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and filed a motion to suppress evidence based on alleged deficiencies in testing procedures and officer certification. The State moved to voluntarily dismiss the charges with prejudice before the motion was ruled on, stating it lacked sufficient evidence for trial, which would have prevented the defendant from using a favorable suppression ruling to challenge related evidence in a parallel civil proceeding to revoke his driver's license. The district court granted the dismissal over the defendant's objection, finding it complied with the requirement that dismissals be in the furtherance of justice. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that once a suppression motion is pending, a dismissal is not in the furtherance of justice under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(1) unless the State provides grounds independent of those in the motion, to avoid undermining the legislative policy in Iowa Code section 321J.13(6). The case was remanded for adjudication of the suppression motion.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge to Iowa's forfeiture law after a handgun and ammunition were seized from Michael Young during a 2002 traffic stop and DUI arrest. More than five years later, the State filed an in rem forfeiture complaint under Iowa Code chapter 809A, and Young argued that section 809A.13(3) unconstitutionally prevented him from filing an answer, violating his right to procedural due process. The Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the statute's plain language barring answers in verified-complaint proceedings without a prior timely claim is unconstitutional as applied, because it denies property owners notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. However, the district court had properly allowed Young to file an answer anyway, so the default forfeiture order was affirmed when he declined to do so. The court addressed only the constitutional issue on further review.

criminal lawpropertyprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a defendant convicted of second-degree theft after the district court refused to extend the deadline for pretrial motions to permit a diminished responsibility defense, which new counsel sought to raise following appointment after the original deadline had passed. The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision, reversed the district court judgment, and remanded the case, concluding that good cause existed to extend the deadline because new counsel had recently been appointed, the state was not prejudiced, and the proposed defense was legally available for the specific-intent crime at issue. The court further held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the extension and that the error was not harmless, as it prevented development of evidence regarding the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense.

criminal lawprocedure

In Veal v. State, a woman convicted of first-degree murder as a fourteen-year-old in 1995 and sentenced to mandatory life without parole challenged her sentence in a 2008 postconviction relief action, claiming it violated the cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Iowa and U.S. Constitutions. The district court and court of appeals dismissed the action as untimely under the three-year statute of limitations in Iowa Code section 822.3. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claim qualified as a challenge to an illegal sentence under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(5)(a), which can be raised at any time and is not subject to the postconviction relief time limits, following its recent decision in State v. Bruegger. The court remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the constitutional claim.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute over the appropriate route for a private condemnation proceeding under Iowa law to provide access to a landlocked recreational property owned by Wilderness Ridge. The Greens challenged the southern route proposed by Wilderness Ridge through their dairy farm, arguing it was not the nearest feasible route because it ignored an existing public road (Dudley Lane) and the significant costs of acquisition, including devaluation of their farm. The district court selected the southern route after concluding that Dudley Lane was not an existing public roadway and that acquisition costs could not be factored into the route selection. On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's handling of the public road issue but reversed on the costs issue, holding that the value of the land sought to be condemned must be considered in determining the nearest feasible route, and remanded for additional factfinding.

propertyprocedure

In Botsko v. Davenport Civil Rights Commission, employee Ingelore Nabb filed a complaint with the local civil rights commission alleging that her employer, dentist David Botsko, created a hostile work environment based on sex that led to her constructive discharge. The commission ruled for Nabb after closed deliberations, awarding her compensatory and emotional distress damages plus attorneys' fees, despite an administrative law judge's contrary recommendation. On judicial review, the Iowa Supreme Court addressed challenges to the fee award, the lawfulness of the closed sessions, and a procedural due process claim arising from the commission's executive director assisting Nabb at the hearing before later advising the commission. The court held that the municipal ordinance did not authorize attorneys' fees at the time, that the director's dual role violated due process by compromising impartiality, and therefore vacated the commission's decision and remanded for new proceedings before an untainted panel while allowing the prior record to be reused. The court affirmed the commission's authority to deliberate in closed sessions.

civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

This case arose from a car accident in which another driver ran a stop sign and struck Glen Jahn's Hyundai, allegedly causing enhanced injuries because the driver's airbag failed to deploy. Jahn settled with the other driver and sued Hyundai on products liability theories including strict liability. The federal district court certified questions asking whether Iowa would adopt sections 16 and 17 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability for enhanced-injury claims and whether the fault of the released driver could be compared on those claims. The Iowa Supreme Court answered yes to both questions, holding that the Restatement provisions apply, that Iowa's Comparative Fault Act governs enhanced-injury cases, and that the jury may allocate fault to the released party consistent with the statute's text and legislative intent.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Jordan Bruegger, who was convicted as an adult of third-degree sexual abuse (statutory rape) for having consensual sex with a 15-year-old when he was 21. His sentence was subject to a mandatory enhancement to 25 years in prison with limited parole eligibility because of a prior Minnesota juvenile adjudication for sexual misconduct at age 12, which Iowa law treated as a predicate "conviction" for sentencing purposes. Bruegger challenged the enhanced sentence as cruel and unusual punishment. The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the district court's sentencing order and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the use of the juvenile adjudication to trigger the severe mandatory enhancement raised substantial questions of gross disproportionality under Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution.

criminal law

In State v. Paredes, the Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of Edwin Paredes for child endangerment resulting in serious injury to his infant, which arose after the child was diagnosed with shaken-baby syndrome and Paredes initially confessed but later recanted. The key issue was whether the trial court properly excluded hearsay statements by the child's mother, Cassidy Millard, in which she suggested she might have caused the injuries, including by admitting to spanking the baby and questioning her own memory of events. The court held that these statements qualified as admissible statements against interest under Iowa's hearsay exception because they exposed Millard to potential criminal liability and were supported by corroborating circumstances. It reversed the conviction, vacated the court of appeals decision affirming it, and remanded for a new trial, finding the exclusion was prejudicial error.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the prosecution of Russell Schuler for willful injury causing serious injury under Iowa Code section 708.4(1) following a violent altercation outside a club that left the victim with serious facial injuries. The defendant challenged the jury instruction for the offense, arguing it impermissibly lowered the state's burden by requiring proof only that the victim "sustained" a serious injury rather than that the defendant's actions "caused" it, contrary to the statutory elements. The Iowa Supreme Court agreed, reversed the conviction, and remanded for a new trial, holding that the instruction failed to properly set forth the required elements of the crime.

criminal lawprocedure

In Formaro v. Polk County, a registered sex offender challenged Iowa Code section 692A.2A, the state's 2000-foot residency restriction law, seeking declaratory relief on grounds that it violated his rights to travel and association, due process (as vague or overbroad), and the prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. The district court dismissed the claims after a hearing, and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the law was not punitive, did not constitute banishment under the record presented, and did not infringe the asserted constitutional protections based on prior precedent. The court noted that the plaintiff had secured compliant housing and that no factual basis supported claims of effective punishment or overbreadth, though one justice dissented on ex post facto grounds.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case concerned whether Iowa could impose sales tax on America Online's provision of internet access and related communication services to its Iowa customers between 1995 and 2000. The Iowa Department of Revenue assessed the tax, but an administrative law judge, the district court, and ultimately the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that the services were not taxable. The court held that Iowa Administrative Code rule 701-18.20 requires both the origination and termination of a communication service to occur within Iowa for it to be considered an intrastate service subject to tax, and AOL's system routed all transmissions through data centers in Virginia, making the service interstate. Because the rule's criteria were not met, the department's assessment was invalid.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over access to property in Dubuque County via Kress Lane, where Stew-Mc Development sought to develop land purchased from the Kress estate and claimed the lane was either a public road or supported an unlimited private easement, while the Fischers, owners of the underlying property, asserted only a limited easement existed; the Fischers also filed a counterclaim for abuse of process. The Iowa Supreme Court first held that the parties' cross-appeals challenging the district court's rulings were timely filed. On the merits, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that Kress Lane was a private road based on a limited easement rather than a public roadway by dedication, prescription, or other means, and that the proposed residential use would exceed the easement's scope. The court also affirmed dismissal of the abuse-of-process counterclaim, finding the plaintiffs' primary purpose in the litigation was to establish their easement rights rather than an improper motive, supported by substantial evidence and correct application of the legal standard requiring proof of an unauthorized use of process.

propertyproceduretorts & liability

This case concerned the enforceability of a reconciliation agreement signed by spouses Bernard and Vergestene Cooper after the wife discovered the husband's extramarital affair; the agreement imposed substantial financial obligations on the husband if his conduct caused a separation or divorce. The district court upheld the agreement and largely followed its terms in dividing the couple's property during dissolution proceedings. The court of appeals reversed that aspect of the ruling. On further review, the Iowa Supreme Court held the agreement void as against public policy because it attempted to regulate intimate marital conduct and reintroduce fault considerations into no-fault divorce proceedings. The court remanded for an equitable property division without reference to the agreement.

family lawproperty

In Baker v. Shields, a farm employee sued his employers in district court after being injured when a horse reared and fell on him during work, claiming negligence and relying on a presumption of negligence under Iowa Code section 87.21 due to the employers' failure to carry workers' compensation insurance. The employers moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity under Iowa Code section 673.2 of the Domesticated Animal Activities Act, which shields persons from liability for injuries from inherent risks of domesticated animal activities like horse riding. The district court granted the motions, finding that riding the horse qualified as a domesticated animal activity, that the employers fell within the broad statutory definition of 'person,' and that section 87.21 did not override this statutory immunity because it only bars common-law defenses. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the immunity provision applies to traditional farming operations and all 'persons' involved, including employers, while noting that workers' compensation claims themselves remain outside the immunity's scope.

labor & employmenttorts & liability

In Koenig v. Koenig, Valerie Koenig sued her son Marc after falling on a carpet cleaner hose in his home while helping with chores, alleging negligence caused her injuries. The trial court instructed the jury using the traditional common-law standard for licensees rather than a general negligence instruction, and the jury found for the defendant. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the common-law distinction between invitees and licensees is outdated, complicates the law, and should be abandoned in favor of a general reasonable-care standard that considers factors like the foreseeability of harm and the burden of precautions. The court found the jury instruction erroneous because it improperly shifted the burden of proof and reversed the judgment, remanding for a new trial. The decision applies only to invitees and licensees and leaves trespasser rules unchanged.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether federal due process required retroactive application of the Iowa Supreme Court’s 2006 Heemstra decision—which held that a felonious assault merges into a murder conviction and cannot serve as the predicate felony for felony-murder purposes—to a defendant whose 1992 first-degree murder conviction (based on a willful-injury predicate) became final on direct appeal in 1994. Goosman filed a postconviction-relief application seeking to vacate his conviction or reduce it to second-degree murder, arguing that the prior Beeman rule allowing such felony-murder convictions was invalid. The court affirmed denial of relief, concluding that Heemstra effected a substantive change in Iowa law rather than a mere clarification of existing law, so the trial instructions were valid when given and due process did not compel retroactivity to cases with final direct appeals. The court also noted that equal-protection and separation-of-powers claims were not preserved.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by eight-year-old Tara Sweeney and her mother against the City of Bettendorf after Tara was struck in the head by a flying baseball bat while attending a minor league game on a field trip organized by the city's Parks and Recreation Department. The district court granted summary judgment to the city, concluding that a signed permission slip constituted an enforceable anticipatory release of liability and that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence of a breach of the city's duty of care in supervising the children or choosing their seating. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case, examining whether the permission slip validly waived claims based on negligence, including issues of public policy regarding releases signed by parents on behalf of minors, and whether evidence supported a finding that the city breached its duty by failing to seat the children in screened areas or provide adequate supervision. The court distinguished between the enforceability of the release and the separate question of whether inherent risks of baseball or premises liability doctrines applied to the duty analysis.

torts & liabilityprocedure