Randall T. Shepard

This case involved certified questions from a federal district court to the Indiana Supreme Court concerning the scope of Indiana's Blacklisting Statute in a dispute between former employees and their ex-employer, Loparex, after the employer had sued the employees for alleged trade secret misappropriation and breach of noncompetition agreements. The court addressed whether a 1904 precedent barring claims by employees who voluntarily left their jobs remained valid, whether attorney fees could be recovered as compensatory damages, and whether an employer's unsuccessful lawsuit to protect trade secrets or enforce noncompetes could itself support a blacklisting claim. The court held that the earlier precedent is no longer good law due to subsequent constitutional revisions and evolving standards of review, allowing individuals who voluntarily left employment to pursue claims under the statute. It further concluded that attorney fees are not an element of compensatory damages and that an employer's trade secret or noncompete lawsuit does not constitute prohibited blacklisting conduct under the statute's terms.

labor & employment

The case involved a Medicaid-certified intermediate care facility for individuals with developmental disabilities that was decertified after an inspection found unsafe conditions, leading it to operate for nine months without state or federal reimbursement until a receiver was appointed. The facility's trustee sued the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration seeking payment for care provided during that period under theories of quantum meruit and breach of contract. The trial court denied the restitution claim but granted relief on the contract claims, then offset the award by the state's costs for the receiver, resulting in no net recovery for either party. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed this outcome, holding that the state had no contractual or equitable duty to pay the facility's costs after decertification and that the offset for receivership expenses was proper under the applicable statutes, which the court viewed as a clarification rather than a change in the law.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory

The case involved whether AOL owed Indiana use tax on promotional CD-ROM packages and printed materials it distributed to state residents, which were assembled by out-of-state vendors and letter shops from raw materials supplied in part by AOL. The Tax Court sided with AOL and held that no taxable retail sale occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the vendors acquired tangible personal property for resale and transferred distinct final products to AOL for consideration, making the transactions retail sales that subjected AOL to use tax when it used the items in Indiana.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Republican Charlie White, who won the 2010 election for Indiana Secretary of State, could be barred from taking office based on a challenge that he was not registered to vote at his residence by the July 2010 candidate certification deadline. The Indiana Democratic Party petitioned the Indiana Recount Commission, which dismissed the challenge, but the Marion Circuit Court reversed that decision. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the petition did not provide a valid basis to prevent White from assuming office after the election. The core reasoning was that the Indiana Constitution sets the qualifications for the office of Secretary of State, and the statutory requirement that a candidate be registered to vote constitutes an impermissible additional substantive qualification that the General Assembly cannot impose.

elections

The case involved a certified question from federal district court asking whether the Town of Fishers could reorganize into a second-class city under Indiana's Government Modernization Act (Ind. Code art. 36-1.5) by adopting a structure with an at-large city council and a mayor appointed by that council, rather than following the standard election requirements in Ind. Code §§ 36-4-5-2 and 36-4-6-3(i). The Indiana Supreme Court answered yes, holding that the reorganization was permissible. The court reasoned that the Act grants local governments full authority to reorganize, must be liberally construed to achieve its purposes, and controls over inconsistent prior statutes unless the Act itself provides otherwise.

electionsprocedure

The case involved the Indiana Department of State Revenue's audit of Rent-A-Center East, Inc., a rent-to-own retailer, which determined that the company's 2003 Indiana tax return did not fairly represent its in-state income and assessed additional tax liability on the grounds that it should have filed a combined return with two affiliated out-of-state entities that owned intellectual property and provided management services. The Indiana Tax Court granted summary judgment to the taxpayer, holding that the Department had not presented sufficient evidence to justify requiring a combined return. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the proposed assessment itself established a prima facie case of tax liability under Trial Rule 56(C) and that the Tax Court had improperly required the Department to produce additional evidence at the summary judgment stage regarding whether separate returns fairly reflected income or whether a combined return was appropriate. The matter was remanded for the Tax Court to evaluate the summary judgment motions based on all designated evidence.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case centered on R.L. Turner Corporation's lawsuit against the Town of Brownsburg alleging tortious interference with a business relationship, based on the Town's alleged role in preventing a settlement agreement between Turner and the Brownsburg Municipal Building Corporation from taking effect. After the trial court dismissed Turner's complaint, it granted the Town's petition for attorneys' fees under Indiana Code § 34-52-1-1. Turner appealed, arguing primarily that the court lacked jurisdiction to award fees once the case had been dismissed. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the fee award, ruling that jurisdiction to impose costs and fees under the statute is not extinguished by dismissal and that the claims met the criteria for being frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

proceduretorts & liability

This case is a criminal appeal in which the Indiana Supreme Court initially granted transfer of jurisdiction from the Court of Appeals on May 13, 2011. After additional review that included oral argument, the Court determined the transfer had been improvidently granted. The Court therefore vacated its transfer order, denied the appellee's transfer petition, reinstated the Court of Appeals opinion reported at 944 N.E.2d 34, and ended the appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

In Adams v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether a passenger in a car could be found to have "used the vehicle" in committing the offense of possessing marijuana, triggering mandatory suspension of his driver's license under state law. The defendant Michael Adams was a passenger when police stopped the vehicle and found a jar containing about 24 grams of marijuana on the floorboard directly in front of him. The trial court convicted Adams of possession and ordered the license suspension, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the evidence showed Adams used the vehicle's floorboard to hold and conceal the jar while seated, which amounted to more than incidental or fortuitous connection to the offense, unlike prior cases involving only residue or pocket-carried drugs. The ruling clarified that the statute requires a showing of active use of the vehicle to facilitate the crime but leaves no discretion once that threshold is met.

criminal law

The case involved Robin Everhart seeking excess damages from the Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund after settling wrongful death claims against a truck driver and an emergency room physician whose negligence contributed to her husband's death from injuries in a motorcycle accident. The Fund argued that damages should be reduced by twenty percent to account for the chance the husband would have died even without the physician's negligence. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award of the statutory maximum one million dollars in excess damages, holding that the Fund was not entitled to such a reduction as it would improperly apply the one-satisfaction doctrine and shift liability away from the other tortfeasor.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case concerned whether employees who accepted Chrysler's Enhanced Voluntary Termination of Employment Program (EVTEP) buyouts during the 2008 economic downturn were eligible for unemployment benefits under Indiana's Unemployment Compensation Act, even without good cause for leaving their jobs. The Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development awarded benefits to the claimants under a narrow statutory provision (Ind. Code § 22-4-14-1(c)) that permitted eligibility if the buyouts helped avert layoffs or plant closures. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision, holding that Chrysler's own statements to employees and the government demonstrated the EVTEP was part of broader restructuring efforts to prevent massive layoffs and facility shutdowns. The Court found the Board's application of the statute reasonable based on the economic context and evidence presented.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff Rickey Whitaker sued defendant Travis Becker for personal injuries after a rear-end car collision. Over the course of a year, Whitaker's lawyer repeatedly ignored discovery requests for medical information, responded only after a court order to compel, and provided false and misleading answers about planned surgery and treatment. The trial court found bad faith by both Whitaker and his lawyer, concluded that dismissal was the only effective remedy due to the damage to Becker's ability to prepare a defense, and dismissed the suit. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the lawyer's failures to timely respond, violation of the court order, and provision of inaccurate information justified the sanction under the trial rules.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved disciplinary proceedings against an attorney who agreed to represent seven criminal defendants in appeals despite lacking experience in appellate law and failing to study the applicable rules. The attorney committed multiple violations of appellate procedures, including in one instance misinforming a client about the reason an appeal was dismissed, and ignored warnings from the Court of Appeals, which caused extra work for the courts. The Indiana Supreme Court approved a conditional agreement finding violations of several Indiana Professional Conduct Rules, including Rules 1.1, 1.4(a), 1.4(b), 3.4(c), and 8.4(d). The court imposed a 180-day suspension from the practice of law with automatic reinstatement, citing aggravating factors such as the attorney's continued noncompliance and mitigating factors including lack of prior discipline and cooperation with the disciplinary commission.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether police violated a defendant's right to counsel by using a recorded conversation to investigate sexual misconduct charges while the defendant had counsel on a separate pending charge of tattooing a minor. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not bar such questioning on a different offense, and that Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits it only when the offenses are inextricably intertwined. The court found the offenses distinct because they involved different time periods, locations, and facts, with no objective foreseeability of overlap at the time of the investigation, and therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the statements. The convictions and forty-year sentence were upheld.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

David Hopper was convicted in 2005 of operating a vehicle while intoxicated after pleading guilty pro se, having signed a waiver of attorney form at his initial hearing that notified him of his right to counsel and the option for appointed counsel if indigent. Four years later, he petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing that his waiver was invalid because he had not received specific advisements about the risks of self-representation during plea negotiations with prosecutors. The trial court denied the petition, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed that denial. On rehearing, the court addressed the Attorney General's challenge to a prior rule requiring additional warnings, determining that such advisements were not mandated by the Sixth Amendment or the Indiana Constitution and that the existing form and colloquy sufficed to validate the waiver.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved Lisa Gray, who was convicted by a trial court of possessing marijuana as a class A misdemeanor after officers conducted a consent search of her apartment and found a bag containing the substance under a coffee table in plain view. The Indiana Court of Appeals had reversed the conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence, but the Indiana Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and reinstated the trial court's judgment. The Court held that the officers' testimony regarding the marijuana's visibility and nature, along with Gray's presence and the trial court's credibility findings discrediting Gray and her son's claims that the son owned and discarded the drugs, constituted substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that Gray knowingly exercised dominion and control over the marijuana.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Town of Avon's 2008 ordinance regulating the withdrawal of water from the White Lick Creek Aquifer for mass distribution, which overlays land owned by Washington Township and the West Central Conservancy District within or near Avon's limits. The plaintiffs challenged the ordinance under Indiana's Home Rule Act, and the trial court granted them summary judgment. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the aquifer is a watercourse under Indiana law, that the Home Rule Act and Watercourse Statutes authorize the Town's regulation of other political units' water withdrawals, and that state DNR statutes do not preempt the local ordinance in areas left unregulated by the state. The core reasoning examined statutory text defining watercourses to include aquifers, the scope of municipal powers, and the absence of field preemption by DNR provisions.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryproperty

Franklin Electric Co. formed two wholly owned subsidiaries, transferred employees and assets to them, and sought new unemployment insurance experience accounts at a lower introductory contribution rate of 2.7%. The Department of Workforce Development investigated the transfers and determined the subsidiaries did not qualify as new employers. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed that ruling, holding that the business acquired by the subsidiaries was not distinct and segregable from Franklin Electric because the same employees performed essentially the same work for the same parent company. The court also upheld waiver of any penalty for late contributions, finding no negligence or fraud, and confirmed the start date for recalculating the merit rate.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytaxes

This case involved two self-represented judgment debtors in small claims court who faced proceedings supplemental after consent judgments for unpaid amounts. The trial court ordered them to pay $50 per month despite their only income being exempt (SSI and low wages) and required one debtor to apply for five jobs weekly. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the payment and job-search orders, holding that ordinary statutory exemptions from execution are not forfeited by unrepresented litigants failing to raise them as affirmative defenses in informal small claims proceedings, and that Trial Rule 69 does not authorize courts to compel debtors to seek employment. The Court found no abuse of discretion in scheduling further hearings but emphasized that debtors cannot be ordered to pay from exempt sources.

procedure

This case arose from small claims proceedings supplemental to execution on a judgment, in which the trial court ordered two unrepresented judgment debtors to pay $50 per week on the judgment despite lacking non-exempt income and required the husband to submit five job applications per week. The Indiana Supreme Court applied three rules from a companion case: unrepresented small claims litigants do not forfeit exemptions under the generic exemption statute or Social Security provisions by failing to plead them; courts may order parties to return for a limited number of status checks without a pending contempt information; and orders to seek or obtain better employment are not permissible in proceedings supplemental. Applying these rules, the Court reversed the payment and job-search orders but affirmed the status-check requirement.

procedure