Loretta H. Rush

This case was an attorney discipline action against Robert James Hardy Jr., who served as DeKalb County’s chief deputy prosecutor and made repeated unfounded accusations that a judge and local attorney were in a sexual relationship and that the judge showed favoritism, along with disparaging remarks about groups based on race, disability, and socioeconomic status. The Indiana Supreme Court found that Hardy violated Professional Conduct Rules 8.4(g), 4.4(a), and 8.2(a) by engaging in this conduct while acting in a professional capacity. The court imposed a 180-day suspension with automatic reinstatement, clarifying that Rule 8.4(g) applies to statements manifesting bias or prejudice in professional settings to preserve public trust in the legal system but does not extend to purely private expression.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved attorney discipline proceedings against Robert James Hardy Jr., a former chief deputy prosecutor in Indiana, for making repeated unfounded accusations about a judge and local attorney having a sexual relationship and showing favoritism in court, along with making disparaging remarks about various groups including Romani people, poor people, autistic individuals, and Native Americans. The Indiana Supreme Court found that Hardy violated Professional Conduct Rules 8.4(g), 4.4(a), and 8.2(a) by engaging in this conduct while acting in a professional capacity. The court clarified that Rule 8.4(g) applies to lawyers' speech or actions manifesting bias or prejudice based on personal characteristics only when undertaken professionally, as opposed to purely private expression, in order to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the legal system. The court imposed a suspension of 180 days with automatic reinstatement.

criminal lawfree speechcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved attorney discipline proceedings against Robert James Hardy Jr., who served as DeKalb County's chief deputy prosecutor and made repeated unfounded accusations that a judge and local attorney were in a sexual relationship and showed favoritism in court, along with disparaging remarks about groups including Romani people, poor people, individuals with autism, and Native Americans. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Hardy violated Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(g) by manifesting bias or prejudice while acting in a professional capacity, in addition to violating Rules 4.4(a) and 8.2(a), and imposed a 180-day suspension from practice with automatic reinstatement. The court reasoned that Rule 8.4(g) applies to conduct in a professional capacity to preserve public confidence in the legal system's impartiality, while clarifying that it does not extend to purely private expression or lawful public debate. The decision followed review of the hearing officer's findings and the Disciplinary Commission's petition for a harsher sanction.

free speechcivil rightscriminal law

The case involved Tervarus L. Gary, who was arrested and placed in a jail cell where he later discovered a small canister of pepper spray in his pocket. After alerting officers to its presence, Gary did not immediately surrender the item and instead attempted to negotiate for a phone call and transfer to a different cell, resulting in his conviction under a statute prohibiting incarcerated individuals from possessing materials capable of causing bodily injury. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that even if an arrestee involuntarily brings such an item into a facility, the failure to relinquish it at the earliest reasonable opportunity constitutes a voluntary act that can support criminal liability, as shown by sufficient evidence of Gary's non-cooperation.

criminal law

The case involved Tervarus L. Gary, who was arrested and placed in a jail cell while unknowingly carrying a small canister of pepper spray in his pocket. Upon discovering it hours later, Gary alerted officers but refused their initial demands to surrender the item, instead attempting to negotiate for a phone call and a different cell; he was charged and convicted under an Indiana statute that prohibits incarcerated individuals from possessing materials capable of causing bodily injury. On appeal, Gary argued that his possession was involuntary because he had been brought into the facility against his will. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that even involuntary entry with prohibited material can result in liability if the individual fails to relinquish it at the earliest reasonable opportunity, and that sufficient evidence supported the jury's finding that Gary had not done so here.

criminal law

The case involved Marvin Moyers, who was convicted of both Level 3 and Level 4 felony criminal confinement based on a single incident where he confined a victim using a deadly weapon and inflicting moderate bodily injury. The Indiana Supreme Court held that these convictions violated substantive double jeopardy principles under state law because the criminal confinement statute defines a single offense with varying enhancements. Applying the Powell test for multiple violations of the same statute, the court determined that the record supported only one continuous act of confinement, leading to the reversal of the lesser conviction and remand for an amended sentencing order.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a 2014 divorce settlement in which Jennifer Norris was required to pay a joint furnace loan, with Steven Norris entitled to pursue her for any resulting credit damages if she failed to do so. After Jennifer stopped payments and her bankruptcy discharged the debt, Steven petitioned for contempt and sought over $228,000 in damages for alleged credit harm, including higher interest on a truck loan and a lost home-construction opportunity. The trial court found Jennifer in contempt but awarded no damages, deeming Steven's claims speculative based on limited evidence like credit screenshots and his own testimony. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not clearly err in assessing the evidence and credibility, and that a later revised order was void for lack of jurisdiction while the appeal was pending under appellate rules on certification. The court emphasized deference to trial courts on factual findings and the requirement that parties wait for certification before acting on appellate opinions.

family lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant convicted of murder who challenged the trial court's decision to allow a key witness, who was incarcerated, to testify remotely via video. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the State failed to demonstrate good cause under Interim Administrative Rule 14(C) for remote testimony in a criminal trial, which requires case-specific evidence that remote testimony is necessary to prevent a concrete and substantial harm that could not be addressed if the witness testified in person. The court reasoned that the mere fact of incarceration and lack of transport resources was insufficient without more detailed justification. However, because other overwhelming evidence supported the conviction, including eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence, the error in admitting the remote testimony was deemed harmless, and the conviction was affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Ricky Taylor was convicted after a bench trial of a Level 1 felony for aiding in dealing a controlled substance resulting in death, based in part on a police officer's testimony about an out-of-court statement from drug dealer Jaxon Engle identifying Taylor as the supplier of the fatal pills. Taylor appealed, arguing that admission of Engle's statement violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witness, as Engle was unavailable and had not been subject to prior cross-examination. The Indiana Supreme Court vacated the Level 1 felony conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the State conceded the constitutional violation occurred and failed to prove the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court reasoned that Engle's statement was vital, non-cumulative direct evidence linking Taylor to the pills, uncorroborated by other evidence, and untested for reliability or bias through cross-examination. The topics selected reflect the case's focus on criminal prosecution and constitutional procedural protections in a drug-related death case.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the estate of Michael Fergerson against Indianapolis Public Transportation Corporation (IndyGo) after Fergerson fell into the road while trying to board a bus at a curbside stop, was run over, and died. IndyGo defended by asserting contributory negligence based on evidence including video footage and Fergerson's high blood-alcohol content. The jury returned a verdict for the estate, and the trial court denied IndyGo's motions for judgment and to correct error. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding after de novo review that the evidence did not establish contributory negligence as a matter of law and thus the verdict was not clearly erroneous as contrary to or unsupported by the evidence.

torts & liabilityprocedure