Donald H. Hunter

In Alfaro v. State, defendant George Alfaro was convicted by a jury of murder and sentenced to thirty years after confessing to killing Robert Marcinkovitch by striking him with a baseball bat following an argument. Alfaro appealed, claiming error in the admission of his oral and written statements to police and challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a murder conviction rather than a lesser offense. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the initial oral statement was voluntary and not the product of custodial interrogation, while the subsequent written statement was given after a valid Miranda waiver with no evidence of coercion or improper influence. On sufficiency, the court found that conflicting evidence about self-defense and sudden heat was properly resolved by the jury, which could infer intent to kill from the use of a deadly weapon, and that the verdict was supported by substantial evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Frank R. Davis, who pled guilty to two counts of murder and two counts of attempted murder arising from three separate incidents in which he sexually assaulted and attacked teenage boys, resulting in two deaths. Under a plea agreement, the state dismissed other charges but sought the death penalty on the murder counts. The trial court imposed death sentences after a sentencing hearing, finding multiple statutory aggravating circumstances including that the murders occurred during child molesting and while lying in wait, along with one uncharged aggravating circumstance. On direct appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court erred in finding those aggravating circumstances and in weighing them against mitigating factors, concluding that the trial court's process deviated from the statutory requirements for death penalty sentencing and required remand for resentencing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Dean Marsh, who was convicted by a jury of robbery, confinement, and theft after two masked men robbed a restaurant at gunpoint in 1983; he appealed his consecutive prison sentences, challenging the legality of a police officer's stop of the vehicle in which he was a passenger and the admission of evidence found inside. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the stop was constitutional and that the evidence was properly admitted. The court reasoned that the officer had reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio to stop the vehicle based on the recent crime by two white men, the vehicle's proximity to the reported possible destination at 1:45 a.m. on empty streets, and the occupants' unusual behavior. It further held that the gun, ski masks, and money bag were in plain view when illuminated by flashlight and thus not the product of an unlawful search. The accomplice's testimony also independently supported the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Richard Dean Smith, who was convicted by a jury of burglary of a dwelling and attempted theft after being found inside a residence with items prepared for removal, and was also adjudicated a habitual offender, resulting in concurrent sentences plus an additional term. Smith appealed on multiple grounds, including denial of his motion for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(B)(1) for exceeding the 70-day speedy trial limit, refusal of consent and mistake-of-fact jury instructions, admission of certain exhibits and fingerprint records in the habitual offender proceeding, and imposition of separate sentences for burglary and attempted theft in alleged violation of double jeopardy. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in full, reasoning that Smith had waived the speedy trial claim by agreeing to the trial date without objection, that the challenged evidence qualified under the business records exception, that the tendered instructions were unsupported, and that the two offenses each required proof of an element the other did not.

criminal lawprocedure

In Murphy v. State, the petitioner appealed the denial of his post-conviction relief petition after pleading guilty in 1982 to rape and criminal deviate conduct under a plea agreement resulting in a twenty-year sentence. He argued that his plea was involuntary due to threats of a habitual offender charge, that there was an improper lineup and insufficient evidence, and that he received ineffective assistance from both trial and post-conviction counsel; he also challenged the trial court's appointment of local pauper counsel instead of the state public defender's office. The court held that the appointment of local counsel was error under Indiana post-conviction rules but did not constitute reversible error because the petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice or ineffective assistance. Applying the Strickland standard, the court found no reasonable probability that different counsel actions would have changed the outcome, that the guilty plea record showed the plea was knowing and voluntary, and that the state's use of a potential habitual offender charge was a legitimate bargaining tool. The judgment denying post-conviction relief was therefore affirmed.

criminal lawprocedure

In Williams v. State, the defendant was convicted of criminal deviate conduct, three counts of rape, and three counts of robbery after a jury trial and appealed his convictions directly to the Indiana Supreme Court. The court addressed two issues: whether the victims' in-court and out-of-court identifications were tainted by unduly suggestive pretrial procedures and whether evidence of the defendant's flight following an investigatory stop in Missouri should have been excluded as the product of an unconstitutional detention. The court held that the identifications were properly admitted because each victim had an independent basis for her identification arising from her extended observation of the defendant during the crimes under adequate lighting. Although the Missouri investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment under Terry v. Ohio and Brown v. Texas because the officer lacked specific and articulable facts suggesting criminal activity, the admission of evidence of the defendant's flight was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt given the strength of the identification testimony and evidence of his failure to appear for trial. The court therefore affirmed the convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a witness's false testimony in a marriage dissolution hearing amounted to direct contempt of court. The witness testified that he had taken certain photographs entered as exhibits, but a rebuttal witness later revealed that she had taken them; the trial court then summarily found the witness in direct contempt without notice or a hearing and imposed a 90-day jail sentence. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the conduct did not constitute direct contempt under the relevant statutes because the allegedly false testimony was not personally observed by the court in a manner that immediately disrupted proceedings. The court reasoned that direct contempt requires conduct whose contemptuous nature is known to the judge at the time, whereas perjury discovered after the fact does not threaten court order sufficiently to justify summary punishment without due process protections such as notice and an opportunity to be heard.

criminal lawprocedurefamily law

In Rust v. State, the defendant pleaded guilty to felony-murder based on an underlying kidnapping in exchange for dismissal of a separate kidnapping count and withdrawal of the death penalty request; he was sentenced to 50 years, consisting of the 40-year presumptive term plus a 10-year enhancement for aggravating circumstances. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly relied on the same facts supporting his guilty plea to enhance the sentence and that using the kidnapping as an aggravator for both the presumptive sentence and the enhancement violated double jeopardy. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that a sentencing court may properly consider the nature and circumstances of the crime, including the kidnapping, car theft, brutal killing, and theft of the victim's purse, to justify an enhanced sentence, and that no double punishment occurred because additional aggravating factors beyond the underlying felony were present.

criminal lawprocedure

In Matthews v. State, the defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted murder and attempted battery with a deadly weapon after firing shots at undercover police officers attempting to arrest him on an unrelated charge. He appealed, arguing insufficient evidence to support the attempted battery conviction because his intent was to escape rather than to batter the officer, and that the trial court denied him a fair jury by privately questioning one juror about potential bias and instructing the juror not to discuss the inquiry with others. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, holding that the evidence of the defendant firing multiple shots in the officer's direction supported the required intent for attempted battery with a deadly weapon and that the trial court's limited admonition to the juror was proper and did not improperly influence deliberations or invade the jury's province. The court reasoned that battery is not a specific intent crime and that the judge's instructions preserved impartiality without referencing disputed issues like race.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant James Pharms, who was convicted by a jury of robbery as a Class B felony after evidence showed he entered a restaurant, pointed a gun at the cashier, and demanded money while ordering two chili dogs and a vanilla shake. Pharms appealed on the ground that the trial court improperly admitted testimony about an uncharged robbery of the same victim three months earlier that featured nearly identical details. The court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that evidence of the prior robbery was admissible for the limited purposes of establishing the perpetrator's identity—bolstered by the victim's prior encounter and the defendant's alibi defense—and demonstrating a common scheme or plan, and that the defendant's challenge amounted only to an attack on witness credibility that would not be reweighed on appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Floyd Little's convictions for two rapes (one Class B and one Class A felony), robbery, and attempted robbery, arising from separate attacks on two victims on October 7 and 24, 1981. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdicts, finding sufficient evidence based on the victims' multiple consistent identifications of the defendant through mug books, a yearbook, lineups, and in court, with no evidence of police suggestion or encouragement. The court also upheld the imposition of consecutive sentences, determining that the commission of the crimes on separate occasions against different victims constituted a valid aggravating circumstance justifying the sentencing structure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Raymond Stewart, who was convicted by a jury of robbery, confinement, and attempted murder after an incident in which he robbed a truck driver at gunpoint, shot the victim multiple times, and forced him into a crawl space. Stewart appealed his convictions, claiming the evidence was insufficient, that the victim's pretrial photographic identification was unduly suggestive, and that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial. The court affirmed the convictions, finding the evidence sufficient to support each charge based on the victim's testimony, that the photographic arrays were not suggestive and the in-court identification was independently reliable, and that any improper remarks or references by the prosecutor had negligible effect on the jury.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved James Johnson, who was convicted by a jury of burglary, confinement, criminal deviate conduct, and attempted rape, and sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling eighty years. On direct appeal, Johnson raised four claims: that the state's use of peremptory challenges to remove all black jurors denied him a fair trial, that an in-court identification should have been suppressed as based on an unduly suggestive photo array, that evidence of "breaking" was insufficient to support the burglary conviction, and that the prosecutor improperly read from a dissenting opinion in closing argument without allowing defense counsel to review it first. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions in full, adhering to precedent that peremptory challenges may exclude jurors without stated reason, finding the identification process not suggestive under the totality of circumstances, determining that the jury could reasonably infer breaking from the photographic and testimonial evidence, and holding that no prejudice resulted from the reading of the passage since it had previously been deemed permissible.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Cole v. State, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of robbery, attempted murder, and resisting law enforcement, and was also found to be a habitual offender. He challenged the voluntariness of his jury trial waiver, which he had signed to pursue plea negotiations, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. The court held that the waiver was knowing and voluntary because the record showed the defendant understood he was relinquishing his right to a jury and did not seek to withdraw it before trial, despite his later affidavit claiming otherwise. The evidence was deemed sufficient to prove each offense, including intent to kill inferred from firing at the officer and the visual command to stop during the pursuit. The court affirmed the convictions but remanded to correct the sentencing error, requiring the habitual offender enhancement to be applied to one of the underlying sentences rather than imposed as a separate consecutive term.

criminal lawprocedure

In Wright v. State, the defendant was convicted by a jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter after shooting the victim in the face during a confrontation over an alleged prior burglary attempt, and he appealed raising issues about the charging information, sufficiency of evidence for sudden heat, sentence enhancement, and admission of a pretrial statement. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and fifteen-year sentence. It held that the challenge to the information charging multiple offenses was waived for failure to file a timely pretrial motion to dismiss, that evidence of the defendant's anger supported both the instruction and conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter, that sentence enhancement was proper, and that admission of the officer's testimony about the defendant's statement did not constitute fundamental error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Theodis Prentice, who was convicted by a jury of theft of a vehicle (a Class D felony) and of being a habitual offender, resulting in a 33-year sentence. On direct appeal, Prentice raised issues including insufficient evidence to support the theft conviction, the trial court's refusal of a tendered jury instruction, admission of fingerprint evidence during the habitual offender phase, and whether the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, reasoning that unexplained possession of recently stolen property supported an inference of guilt, the fingerprint cards were relevant to establish identity for the habitual offender determination, and the mandatory sentence enhancement did not violate the Eighth Amendment under established precedents regarding the purpose of the habitual offender statute.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned the Indiana inheritance tax treatment of real property originally held by a married couple as tenants by the entireties and transferred without consideration to their children, while the couple reserved joint and successive life estates. The Indiana Department of State Revenue sought to include the full value of the property in the estate of the surviving spouse for tax purposes, after one-half the value had already been taxed in the first spouse's estate, and the trial court initially agreed before reversing itself. The court held that the full value became subject to tax upon the death of the last surviving grantor under statutes taxing transfers intended to take effect at or after death. It further decided that the doctrine of equitable recoupment applied to allow the estate a credit for the overpayment from the first spouse's estate, as both tax liabilities arose from the same underlying transaction despite the statute of limitations barring a direct refund claim. The matter was remanded to calculate the precise recoupment amount.

taxespropertyprocedure

The case involved Robert Bailey's conviction for burglary after he was seen fleeing a home with stolen items and later confessed during police questioning. Bailey challenged the denial of his motion to suppress the confession, arguing it was involuntary due to alleged coercion involving his friend's release and improper pre-waiver questioning, and also claimed insufficient evidence on the elements of unauthorized entry and felonious intent. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the confession was voluntary based on the totality of circumstances including Bailey's familiarity with the justice system and the lack of improper promises or interrogation. It further found the evidence sufficient, as the unauthorized entry could be inferred and intent established by the nighttime break-in and flight, independent of the confession.

criminal law

In Massey v. State, the defendant was convicted at a bench trial of robbery and kidnapping, both Class A felonies, and resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor, after he and three accomplices robbed a victim at gunpoint, struck him, locked him in his car's trunk, and drove away. Massey appealed on grounds that his signed waiver of rights form and police statement were inadmissible because police comments about cooperation and penalties amounted to coercion, and that the evidence was insufficient to prove his knowing participation since his statement claimed he joined only after the crimes began. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, ruling that the totality of circumstances showed the statement was voluntary with no physical abuse, lengthy interrogation, or specific inducements overcoming his free will, and that the victim's and neighbor's testimony provided substantial evidence of his involvement as one of four participants. The court applied established standards for reviewing voluntariness and sufficiency without reweighing evidence or credibility.

criminal lawprocedure

Larry Taylor was convicted of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to five years plus thirty years under the habitual offender statute; his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. He then sought post-conviction relief, raising claims that he was denied his right to a jury trial and the effective assistance of counsel. The court did not reach those issues, instead remanding the case because the trial court had failed to enter the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented that are required by Ind.R.P.C. 1 § 6, having noted only the procedural history of the case.

criminal lawprocedure