Brent E. Dickson

The case concerned the consequences of a 60-day suspension from the practice of law imposed on Robert C. Szilagyi, the elected Prosecuting Attorney of LaPorte County, effective August 1, 2012. The court appointed Robert D. Neary, the chief deputy prosecutor, to serve as full-time temporary prosecuting attorney for the duration of the suspension and ordered that Szilagyi’s compensation as prosecutor be discontinued during that period. The court reasoned that the duties of a county prosecutor require active membership in the Indiana bar, so a suspension from practice automatically disqualifies the officeholder and creates a vacancy that must be filled to maintain the orderly administration of justice.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney, initiated by a verified complaint filed in May 2012. The Indiana Supreme Court accepted the respondent's resignation from the bar, effective immediately, and directed that it be recorded on the Roll of Attorneys. All pending disciplinary proceedings were dismissed as moot due to the resignation, though allegations could be revisited if a reinstatement petition is later filed. The respondent is ineligible to seek reinstatement for five years, and any such petition would require clear and convincing evidence of remorse, rehabilitation, and fitness to practice under the court's admission and discipline rules.

criminal law

The case involved Michael Sharp's convictions for two counts of child molesting after he repeatedly molested his stepson over a period of about a year. Following a jury trial, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 40 years for the class A felony and 6 years for the class C felony, designated Sharp as a sexually violent predator and credit restricted felon, and imposed lifetime parole. On appeal, Sharp challenged his convictions on double jeopardy grounds and sought review of his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), arguing that his credit restricted felon status should be factored into the review. The Indiana Supreme Court summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals on the double jeopardy and aggravating/mitigating circumstances issues, held that credit restricted felon status may be considered in appellate sentence review as a penal consequence, but concluded that the sentence was not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the defendant's character.

criminal law

The case concerned Corey Fletcher, who was convicted of methamphetamine conspiracy and habitual offender status after a trial held more than 70 days following his pro se speedy trial motion under Indiana Criminal Rule 4. The trial court had disregarded the motion because Fletcher was represented by appointed counsel at the time it was filed. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the motion should have been honored. Upon review, the Indiana Supreme Court initially granted transfer but later vacated that order as improvidently granted and denied transfer, thereby reinstating the Court of Appeals opinion as precedent without further analysis on the merits.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a tax dispute between the Indiana Department of State Revenue and Garwood that had been decided by the Indiana Tax Court. The Indiana Supreme Court initially granted a petition to review those Tax Court decisions but, after additional review and oral argument, concluded that the grant of review had been improvidently issued. The court therefore vacated its prior order granting review and denied the Department’s petition for review. This action ended the litigation between the parties in the Supreme Court pursuant to the applicable appellate rules.

taxesprocedure

The case involved a class action lawsuit against Indiana's Family and Social Services Administration (FSSA) challenging its automated processing of applications for Medicaid, Food Stamps, and TANF benefits. Plaintiffs alleged that denial notices violated due process by lacking sufficient explanations, that denials based on applicants' 'failure to cooperate' contravened federal Food Stamp law, and that one individual plaintiff was denied reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the notices were constitutionally inadequate because they did not adequately explain adverse eligibility determinations, but ruled that federal law permits denials for failure to cooperate and that the individual plaintiff was entitled only to reasonable accommodations without mandating specific services like a caseworker. The court based these conclusions on interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment, federal statutes and regulations governing the benefit programs, and ADA requirements for meaningful access.

civil rightshealthcarefederal power

This case concerned a challenge to a tax deed issued after a property tax sale in Marion County, Indiana. The trial court set aside the deed to McCord Investments because the Auditor's certified mail notice to the record owner Saw Creek Investments (a misnamed entity related to Sawmill Creek) was returned undelivered, finding the notice constitutionally inadequate under due process. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Auditor's efforts satisfied due process requirements without needing to post notice on the vacant property. The court reasoned that the owner's failure to correct the address or name error contributed to the delivery issue, publication and other notices had been provided, and imposing a posting requirement would be unduly burdensome given the volume of returned notices.

taxespropertyprocedure

This case arose from a lawsuit over liability for environmental cleanup costs at a former gas station property involving leaking underground storage tanks, where plaintiff John Witt, his contractor HydroTech, and attorney Mark Shere were found in contempt for actions taken during remediation. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's contempt ruling against them for violating a temporary restraining order that enjoined UST removal, soil excavation, and related environmental activities. The court determined that the parties had continued backfilling excavation sites and other work after participating in the hearing and receiving notice that the TRO had been granted.

environmentprocedure

This case was a wrongful death action brought by Maria Rosales against LaPorte Community School Corporation after her son choked to death on food during lunch at a public elementary school. A jury awarded $5 million to the plaintiff, later reduced to the $500,000 statutory cap under the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of liability. The majority held that Final Instruction 22 could have misled the jury by listing the plaintiff's factual allegations in a manner that permitted a finding of liability without also requiring proof that the school breached the duty of ordinary and reasonable care.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerns whether, under Indiana law, the federal conversion of abandoned railroad easements into public recreational trails via railbanking and interim trail use under the National Trails System Act falls within the scope of those easements or qualifies as a permissible shifting public use. The Indiana Supreme Court answered both certified questions in the negative, holding that such uses are outside the easements and do not constitute shifting public uses. The court reasoned that railroad easements are limited to transportation purposes, while public trails serve a recreational purpose distinct from transportation, thereby imposing a different burden on the servient land, unlike prior cases involving alternate means of transport such as pipelines.

propertyfederal power

The case involved a defendant convicted by jury of nonsupport of his two dependent children, charged with two class C felonies and two class D felonies due to an arrearage exceeding $15,000 under an in-gross support order from a prior dissolution. The trial court entered judgment only on the two class C felonies. The Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana Code Section 35-46-1-5 permits separate class D felony convictions for nonsupport of each child but allows enhancement to only one class C felony based on the total aggregate unpaid support of $15,000 or more for one or more children. The court vacated one class C conviction, remanded for entry of one class C and one class D felony judgment on the verdicts, and summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals on other issues.

criminal lawfamily law

The case involved Kevin Hampton's post-conviction claim that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge on direct appeal the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that proof of guilt by circumstantial evidence alone must exclude every reasonable theory of innocence. Hampton had been convicted of murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct based in part on DNA evidence linking him to the victim. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, holding that the DNA evidence was circumstantial as to the defendant's conduct constituting the offenses and that the law at the time of the direct appeal was unclear or unfavorable regarding the need for the instruction when any element was supported by direct evidence, so counsel's choice of issues was not constitutionally deficient.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Diane Recker's appeal from the denial of unemployment insurance benefits after she was terminated from her position at FedEx Trade Networks for failing to pass a required driving skills test during training. The Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development found she was discharged for just cause, and the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed that determination. The court reasoned that Recker's repeated inability to complete the serpentine backing maneuver was a matter over which she exercised some control, distinguishing it from prior cases involving medical conditions beyond the claimant's control, and that no statutory exception applied to excuse the breach of duty owed to the employer. The opinion clarified that unemployment benefits are not available when a discharge results from an employee's volitional failure to meet job requirements, consistent with the Act's purpose of aiding only those unemployed through no fault of their own.

labor & employment

The case involved parents Steven Spangler and Heidi Brown suing nurse-midwife Barbara Bechtel, her employer Expectations Women's Health and Childbearing Center, and St. Vincent Randolph Hospital for negligent infliction of emotional distress after their full-term baby was stillborn during labor due to alleged medical negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed those rulings. The court held that the parents' claims for emotional distress damages from experiencing the stillbirth were not barred by the Indiana Child Wrongful Death Act, as that statute did not preclude separate actions for such distress at the time. It further held that the claims against the hospital were valid under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act because the parents qualified as patients whose emotional distress resulted from alleged malpractice, independent of any derivative claim on behalf of the child.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a will contest filed by Trina Avery against her brothers Rod and Marshall Avery challenging their mother's 2008 will on grounds of undue influence, fraud, and duress, and asserting a later will. The brothers failed to file an answer or responsive pleading after being served with summons, leading the trial court to enter a default judgment against them when they argued that answers are not required in statutory will contests. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the default judgment, holding that the Indiana Trial Rules apply to will contest actions and require the filing of an answer under Trial Rule 7, with failure to do so permitting default under Trial Rule 55.

procedurefamily law

The case concerned a medical negligence wrongful death claim brought by Jeffery McCabe as personal representative of his mother's estate against the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS), Ind. Code § 34-23-1-2. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the Fund, ruling that the AWDS does not permit recovery of attorney fees, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. On transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court held that attorney fees are recoverable under the AWDS. The court reasoned that the statute's provision for damages "including but not limited to" enumerated items, when read in context with the General Wrongful Death Statute and the Child Wrongful Death Statute, authorizes such fees even though they are not explicitly listed.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a medical malpractice claim brought under Indiana's Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS) and Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) by the estate of a deceased patient against a healthcare provider. The Indiana Supreme Court held that reasonable attorney fees and litigation expenses are recoverable as damages under the AWDS. It further ruled that the provider's aggregate liability is limited to the MMA's $250,000 statutory cap, which includes both the jury's damage verdict and a portion of the attorney fees and expenses. The decision applied principles from a companion case and statutory interpretation of the AWDS's "include but are not limited to" language alongside the MMA's damage and fee limitations.

torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare

This case involved the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund appealing a judgment awarding damages to the estate of a deceased adult woman in a medical malpractice wrongful death action. The plaintiff sought recovery under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute for expenses of administration, contingent attorney fees, and loss of services after settling with medical providers. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that these damages are recoverable because they constitute compensatory pecuniary losses under the statute, consistent with prior rulings allowing attorney fees and litigation expenses.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involved Brenda Moore's conviction for public intoxication as a class B misdemeanor after she was found intoxicated as a passenger in a vehicle stopped on a public roadway in Indianapolis. Moore conceded she was intoxicated in a public place under existing law but argued for reversal on grounds that the conviction violated the policy and spirit of the public intoxication statute, as she had chosen not to drive, and infringed her constitutional rights to liberty and pursuit of happiness under the Indiana Constitution by punishing her choice of beverage. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, relying on longstanding precedent that a person in a vehicle on a public highway is in a public place for purposes of the statute. The court held that any policy-based exceptions to the statute's application were matters for the legislature to address, not the judiciary, and rejected the constitutional claim as unsupported.

criminal law

This case involved two clients who sued their former attorney for professional malpractice after he failed to file or pursue their claims, leading to dismissal or expiration of their cases; the attorney was later disbarred for abandoning his practice. The clients sought coverage under the attorney's claims-made professional liability policy from The Bar Plan Mutual Insurance Company, which had initially acknowledged the claims but later denied coverage due to the attorney's failure to notify the insurer as required. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy provided no coverage as a matter of law because it contained a condition precedent requiring the insured attorney to provide written notice of claims within twenty days, which was not satisfied. However, the court found genuine issues of material fact remained on whether the insurer was estopped from denying coverage based on its earlier representations that may have caused detrimental reliance by the clients.

torts & liabilityprocedure