Steven H. David

In Berry v. State, the defendant was convicted after a bench trial of assaulting a man with a hammer at a renovation site; he raised an insanity defense, arguing that his long-term alcohol abuse had caused a mental disease or defect known as settled insanity that prevented him from appreciating the wrongfulness of his conduct. The trial court rejected the defense, finding that Berry's actions resulted from voluntary intoxication rather than a qualifying mental illness, based in part on expert testimony regarding malingering and embellished symptoms. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Indiana Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's ruling. The core reasoning was that credible expert evidence supported the conclusion that Berry's behavior stemmed from voluntary alcohol abuse and not from a mental disease or defect under Indiana's insanity statute, making it unnecessary to address whether he could appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions.

criminal law

This case involved Rodney Nicholson’s conviction for stalking under Indiana Code section 35-45-10-5(a) based on hundreds of graphic, harassing phone calls to a family over six months in 2006 followed by one similar call in 2008 after his release from prison. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and reversed the Court of Appeals, which had held that the twenty-two-month gap between contacts could not constitute repeated or continuing harassment. The court reasoned that the statutory definition of stalking requires no fixed timeframe, that the gap resulted largely from Nicholson’s incarceration for the 2006 conduct, and that the calls formed a single course of conduct that caused the victims terror. The court also held that evidence of Nicholson’s 2006 voyeurism conviction was admissible because it was inextricably linked to the 2008 call.

criminal law

In White v. State, the defendant was convicted of theft and receiving stolen property after taking a cash register from a restaurant and was also found to be a habitual offender based on two prior out-of-state felony convictions from when he was fifteen. The trial court had allowed a late filing of the habitual-offender charge, and the jury determined the prior convictions supported the enhancement, leading to a sentence that included a four-and-a-half-year increase. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to preserve his challenge to the late habitual-offender filing by not moving for a continuance. The court also ruled that the authenticated and certified documents from the prior cases were sufficient evidence for the jury to find two unrelated adult felony convictions. The court vacated the receiving-stolen-property conviction on double-jeopardy grounds but upheld the habitual-offender enhancement and remanded accordingly.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over life insurance proceeds from a federal employee benefit plan after the insured's death. Following his first divorce, a court decree required Carlos Hardy to maintain his FEGLI policy with his ex-wife Phyllis and their grandchildren as equal beneficiaries, but he later designated his second wife Mary Jo as the sole beneficiary and increased coverage. After Carlos's death, Phyllis and the grandchildren sued for the proceeds via equitable claims, but the trial court granted summary judgment to Mary Jo on grounds of federal preemption. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act does not preempt state equitable claims and that the divorce decree entitled Phyllis and the grandchildren to a constructive trust over at least the portion of proceeds corresponding to the original policy terms. The court remanded for determination of the exact amount under the original coverage option and any remaining balance.

family lawpropertyfederal power

This case concerned a CHINS (Child in Need of Services) proceeding in which the mother admitted the allegations regarding her child T.N., but the father objected and requested a contested fact-finding hearing to challenge the adjudication. The trial court accepted the mother's admission, found T.N. to be a CHINS, and instead provided the father only a contested dispositional hearing to dispute any resulting services. The Indiana Supreme Court held that this procedure violated the father's due process rights, ruling that when one parent admits and the other denies the child is in need of services, the court must conduct a fact-finding hearing on the entire matter under Indiana Code sections 31-34-10-8 and 31-34-11-1. The decision emphasized that the dispositional hearing did not substitute for the required fact-finding hearing, and remanded for such a hearing.

family lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Antoine Hill, who pleaded guilty to attempted murder and battery charges resulting in a 52-year sentence but failed to file a timely direct appeal. His counsel filed a petition under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 2 seeking permission for a belated appeal, which the trial court denied, and then failed to timely appeal that denial. Hill subsequently filed a petition under Post-Conviction Rule 1 alleging ineffective assistance by his Rule 2 counsel. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the Baum v. State standard governs claims of ineffective assistance in Post-Conviction Rule 2 proceedings and concluded that counsel's performance satisfied this standard because it occurred in a procedurally fair setting that produced a court judgment, leading the court to affirm the denial of relief.

criminal lawprocedure

In this medical malpractice case, plaintiff Shella Moore, as estate representative, alleged that defendants Dr. Keith Ramsey and Methodist Hospitals caused a patient's death following a stillbirth, filing her complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance in 2006. After a medical review panel was formed, Moore missed the panel chair's deadline for submitting her case and the statutory 180-day deadline for a panel opinion, prompting the defendants to file motions in the trial court for a preliminary determination seeking dismissal of the complaint. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss (while granting summary judgment on one related claim), and the defendants appealed. The Indiana Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court's order was not a final appealable judgment under Appellate Rule 2(H) because it did not dispose of all claims as to all parties and lacked proper Trial Rule 54(B) certification for the denial portion.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned the State of Indiana's effort to enforce the live-operator requirement in the Autodialer Law (Ind. Code § 24-5-14-5(b)) against FreeEats.com and the Economic Freedom Fund, which used an automated intelligent calling system to deliver prerecorded interactive political messages and polls to Indiana residents. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction after finding the defendants had a reasonable likelihood of success on their claim that the requirement violated Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed that determination on interlocutory appeal, holding that the defendants' federal First Amendment claim would likely fail and that they had no reasonable likelihood of success on the state constitutional claim because the content-neutral live-operator rule did not materially burden political speech. The Court reasoned that the law left open ample alternative channels for political communication and served the state's interest in protecting privacy without suppressing speech based on content.

free speechelections

This case concerned whether an Indiana police officer had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory traffic stop based on an identified citizen's 911 tip reporting a possibly intoxicated driver operating a blue Volkswagen erratically at 1 a.m. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained after the stop, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed. The majority held that the caller's self-identification, specific details about the vehicle's location and driving, and the officer's rapid corroboration by locating the matching car at the described gas station within 90 seconds established reasonable suspicion for the stop. A dissent argued that the limited police corroboration was insufficient under prior precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, a juvenile court adjudicated D.C. delinquent for an act that would constitute Class A felony burglary if committed by an adult after he and others broke into an elderly woman's home. At disposition, the court ordered both a determinate two-year commitment to the Department of Correction and a subsequent indeterminate commitment until age 21. D.C. appealed, arguing the two commitment statutes could not both apply. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the relevant determinate and indeterminate commitment statutes are mutually exclusive based on their plain language, so only one type of commitment may be imposed. The court reversed the dispositional order and remanded for the juvenile court to exercise its discretion in selecting which commitment to apply.

criminal lawfamily law

This case involved the Marion County Department of Child Services seeking involuntary termination of the parental rights of Z.G. (Mother) to her child C.G. after Mother left the child with acquaintances, was arrested in Utah, and the child was found to have been sexually abused while in others' care. The trial court adjudicated the child a Child in Need of Services and terminated Mother's rights, determining that the child had bonded with foster parents willing to adopt and that termination served the child's best interests. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the termination, concluding that DCS errors regarding service of process, Mother's location while incarcerated, and her participation in proceedings did not violate due process. The Court also established factors for lower courts to use in deciding whether to allow an incarcerated parent to attend termination hearings.

family lawprocedure

Richard Barnes was convicted by a jury of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest after physically confronting officers who responded to a domestic violence call at his home and sought entry at his wife's request. On rehearing, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that neither the common-law castle doctrine nor the statutory defense authorizing reasonable force to prevent unlawful entry of a dwelling permits battery or other violent acts against law enforcement officers engaged in their official duties. The court reasoned that such encounters require split-second decisions best evaluated case-by-case for safety, that the legislature sets statutory defenses to crimes like battery on officers, and that the ruling does not change existing constitutional limits on home entries or searches.

criminal law

In this mortgage foreclosure case, U.S. Bank sued the Lucases to foreclose on their residential property after they allegedly fell behind on payments and fees, prompting the borrowers to raise multiple affirmative defenses, counterclaims, and a third-party complaint against the bank and loan servicer Litton for statutory and common-law violations, along with a demand for a jury trial on all legal issues. The trial court struck the jury request, ruling that the foreclosure action is equitable and draws the related legal claims into equity. On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the borrowers' claims and defenses must be tried in equity because their core questions—whether the Lucases were in default and the amount of any debt—are significantly intertwined with the subject matter of the foreclosure action under the equitable clean-up doctrine. The Court reasoned that this approach allows for more final and effectual relief without severing the intertwined issues. A dissent argued that the legal claims were distinct and severable enough to preserve the right to a jury trial under prior precedent.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned a juvenile delinquency proceeding involving A.B., a minor found delinquent for criminal mischief, and a dispute over his out-of-state residential placement at Canyon State Academy in Arizona versus in-state options proposed by the Department of Child Services (DCS). The trial court declared three Indiana statutes unconstitutional under the separation of powers doctrine and the single-subject rule. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, holding the statutes constitutional, determining that DCS's in-state placement requirement was arbitrary and capricious, upholding the out-of-state placement, and ordering DCS to cover the costs. The court reasoned that the statutes did not improperly delegate judicial authority or violate constitutional procedural requirements for legislation.

criminal lawfamily law

The case concerned homeowners who advertised and rented their single-family residence in a residential zoning district of Ogden Dunes for short periods (two to eleven days) on five occasions in 2007 after receiving a cease-and-desist letter from the town. The town sued for an injunction and fines, alleging violation of the zoning ordinance that limits residential districts to single-family dwelling use and bars commercial or profit-making activities. The trial court granted summary judgment to the town and imposed a $40,000 fine plus injunctive relief. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the town, holding that the rentals constituted an impermissible activity conducted for profit or gain in a residential district, but ruled that the fine could not exceed $32,500 under state law and remanded for entry of judgment in that amount.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case involved Douglas Denzel, charged with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement and Class B misdemeanor public intoxication, who was repeatedly found incompetent to stand trial due to paranoid schizophrenia and committed for treatment. Denzel moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the time he had already been committed exceeded the maximum possible sentence and violated due process under State v. Davis. The trial court denied the motion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Indiana Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that there was no due process violation because psychiatric reports indicated Denzel could be restored to competency and the record suggested he had intentionally decompensated by cheeking his medication. The Court clarified that the standard from prior cases was too rigid and that due process claims must be evaluated based on all relevant facts and interests, but Denzel's circumstances did not establish a fundamental fairness violation.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involves Alva Curtis, a man with developmental disabilities charged in 2007 with residential entry, battery, and criminal mischief in Marion Superior Court. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the pending charges did not violate Curtis's due process rights because the trial court had neither involuntarily committed him nor made a proper finding that he would never regain competency, and that he had forfeited his constitutional speedy-trial claims. The court further ruled that the trial court should have granted Curtis's motion to dismiss under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) based on the delay in the proceedings. The core reasoning focused on the statutory procedures for competency evaluations under Indiana Code section 35-36-3-1, the requirements for involuntary commitment, and the absence of circumstances triggering a fundamental fairness violation.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Sloan v. State, the defendant was convicted of Class A felony child molesting and Class C felony child molesting based on acts committed against his step-niece from when she was six until age thirteen in 1991; the victim reported the crimes in 2008 after learning Sloan was dating a woman with young daughters. The trial court denied motions to dismiss the Class C charge on statute-of-limitations grounds and to vacate one conviction on double-jeopardy grounds, sentencing Sloan to consecutive terms of forty and six years. The Indiana Supreme Court held that concealment under Indiana Code section 35-41-4-2(h) tolls the limitations period until a prosecuting authority becomes aware or reasonably should become aware of sufficient evidence to charge the defendant, and that the two convictions rested on distinct facts so double jeopardy was not violated. The Court therefore affirmed both convictions.

criminal lawprocedure

In 1999, Charles Boyle pleaded guilty to a Class D felony for operating a motor vehicle as a habitual traffic offender under a plea agreement that left open the possibility of an alternate misdemeanor sentence. Several years later, the trial court granted Boyle's petition to modify his conviction to a Class A misdemeanor, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed this decision on appeal. The Court held that the relevant statutes, Indiana Code sections 35-50-2-7(b) and 35-38-1-1.5, only permitted such modifications at the time of initial sentencing or within three years with prosecutorial consent, neither of which applied here. The Court therefore ordered the original felony conviction reinstated, finding the trial court's action exceeded its statutory authority.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Brunner, the defendant pleaded guilty in 2000 to operating while intoxicated as a Class D felony and later sought to have the conviction modified to a Class A misdemeanor years afterward for employment reasons. The trial court granted the modification after the defendant completed a substance abuse assessment, but the Indiana Supreme Court reversed that order. The Court held that the trial court lacked statutory authority under Indiana Code sections 35-50-2-7(b) and 35-38-1-1.5 to alter the conviction after the plea agreement was accepted and more than three years had passed since sentencing. It emphasized that the original plea terms bound the court and that no provision allowed post-sentencing conviction reductions based on good behavior outside the statutory window. The case was remanded with instructions to reinstate the original Class D felony conviction.

criminal lawprocedure