Mary Ann G. McMorrow

The case involved a medical malpractice claim by Dr. James York against Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center after he suffered permanent spinal injury during knee surgery due to improper placement of anesthesia needles by anesthesiologist Dr. El-Ganzouri. York sued the anesthesiologist, his employer, and Rush on the theory that the anesthesiologist acted as Rush's apparent agent. After a jury found all defendants liable and awarded over $12 million in damages, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the judgment against Rush, holding that the evidence supported the apparent agency claim because Rush held out the anesthesiologist as its employee and York reasonably relied on Rush for his care without knowledge of the independent contractor status. The court reasoned that factual disputes regarding York's knowledge and reliance were properly resolved by the jury in his favor based on the consent form, hospital representations, and circumstances of his admission.

healthcaretorts & liability

The case concerned landowners whose properties were included in a map recorded by the Illinois Department of Transportation under section 4-510 of the Illinois Highway Code for a proposed highway right-of-way; the statute requires landowners to notify the Department before developing the land and gives the Department time to decide whether to acquire it by purchase or eminent domain. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the statute was facially unconstitutional as a violation of due process and an improper regulatory taking. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, the appellate court reversed on standing but upheld the statute, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. The court reasoned that the statute provides explicit public notice of a potential future acquisition rather than imposing restrictions as a hidden means to depress property values, distinguishing it from earlier precedent such as Galt v. County of Cook, and therefore does not facially violate due process or effect a taking.

propertyprocedure

In this case, defendant Craig Waid faced multiple misdemeanor charges for drug- and alcohol-related offenses in Pike County. After he was found mentally unfit to stand trial with no substantial probability of attaining fitness within a year, the State requested a discharge hearing under the Code of Criminal Procedure to assess the sufficiency of the evidence and moved to admit certain hearsay and affidavit evidence such as inventory logs, receipts, and lab reports pursuant to section 104-25(a). The circuit court denied the motion, ruling the statute unconstitutional on confrontation clause grounds, and certified the question for appeal. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that a discharge hearing is not a criminal prosecution, so the Sixth Amendment confrontation right does not apply, and the statute's allowance of reliable hearsay evidence does not violate due process because defendants at such hearings receive fewer protections than at a full trial. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned defendant Richard Morris, who was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death; while his direct appeal was pending, Governor George Ryan issued a clemency order commuting the sentence to natural life imprisonment without parole. After this court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, the State announced it would again seek the death penalty if Morris were reconvicted. The circuit court granted Morris's motion to bar the State from pursuing capital punishment, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that order on direct appeal. The court reasoned that the governor's clemency authority under the Illinois Constitution was broad enough to convert the death sentence into a fixed life term that remained effective even after the underlying conviction was set aside, thereby precluding a new capital sentencing proceeding.

criminal law

The case involved defendant Marian Kolton, who was charged with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child based on an alleged act of sexual penetration with a 12-year-old victim. Following a bench trial, the court found insufficient evidence of penetration but convicted the defendant of the lesser-included offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and imposed a sentence of 90 days' incarceration plus probation. The defendant appealed, arguing that aggravated criminal sexual abuse was not a lesser-included offense of the charged crime under the indictment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the charging instrument approach established the lesser offense was included in the indictment and that trial evidence supported a finding of sexual conduct with a minor under 13 for purposes of sexual gratification.

criminal law

The case involved defendant James S. Johnson, who was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of alcohol after being stopped by police and failing field sobriety tests, in part based on his refusal to take a breath test. During trial, the prosecutor argued in opening and closing that the defendant had failed to prove to the officer that he was not guilty by refusing the breath test. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that while the prosecutor's comments were improper because they conflicted with the constitutional presumption of innocence and the state's burden of proof, the error did not rise to the level of plain error requiring reversal since no objection was made at trial and the evidence was not so closely balanced as to undermine the verdict.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved the Southern Illinoisan newspaper's FOIA request to the Illinois Department of Public Health for Cancer Registry data on neuroblastoma cases, formatted by zip code and diagnosis date, without patient names or addresses. The Department denied the request, citing exemptions under the Medical Studies Act and Registry Act to protect privacy. After multiple proceedings, the circuit court ordered disclosure, the appellate court affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that judgment, ruling that the Department had not met its burden to prove the data would tend to identify specific individuals and that state policy favors broad public disclosure of such information.

free speechhealthcare

The case involved the Illinois Department of Public Health suing Dr. Thelma Wiley for violating scholarship agreements under the Family Practice Residency Act by failing to practice in designated shortage areas after receiving funds for medical school. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Department, which the appellate court affirmed, and the supreme court upheld this decision. The court reasoned that the Act requires service in areas specifically designated by the Department as having health manpower shortages, not merely in any low-income or underserved neighborhood, and Wiley's positions were not in such designated areas, triggering the treble damages penalty.

healthcare

The case involved First Midwest Bank seeking recovery from Stewart Title Guaranty Company for economic losses on loans made to borrowers after a restrictive covenant (undisclosed in the title commitment and policy) prevented the intended residential and business use of the property, leading to default and foreclosure shortfalls. The bank alleged negligent misrepresentation in the issuance of the title commitment and policy. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the claim with prejudice, holding that title insurers are not in the business of supplying information when issuing commitments or policies, so the negligent misrepresentation exception to the Moorman economic loss doctrine did not apply and any liability was instead defined by contract.

propertytorts & liability

The case involved defendant Ronald Whitfield, who entered a negotiated guilty plea to first-degree murder and armed robbery in exchange for concurrent prison sentences of 25 and 6 years. The trial court accepted the plea without advising him that a three-year term of mandatory supervised release would be added by statute to his murder sentence. Whitfield later filed a postconviction petition arguing that the undisclosed MSR term made his sentence more onerous than the bargain he struck, violating his due process rights. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Whitfield had established a substantial constitutional violation because he was denied the benefit of his plea agreement and remanded the matter for further proceedings to provide an appropriate remedy.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In this case, the defendant was charged by indictment with first-degree murder of his infant son but was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The trial court enhanced the conviction from a Class 3 to a Class 2 felony and imposed a 10-year sentence based on a finding that the victim was a family or household member, even though that fact was not alleged in the indictment. On appeal, the defendant argued for the first time that the omission violated his right to due process. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that because the challenge was raised for the first time on appeal, the defendant was required to demonstrate prejudice in the preparation of his defense, which he failed to do since the familial relationship was undisputed at trial and he was informed of the enhanced penalties before electing the lesser-included offense instruction.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Ricky A. Patterson, who was convicted after a jury trial of first degree murder, concealment of a homicidal death, and arson in connection with the death of Derrick Prout during a drug transaction and the burning of Patterson's residence. On appeal, Patterson challenged the admission of grand jury testimony from his girlfriend Migdalia Rivera, who declined to testify at trial. The appellate court held that this admission violated Patterson's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights under Crawford v. Washington but concluded the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and it affirmed the convictions and 55-year sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, agreeing that any confrontation clause violation was harmless and finding no abuse of discretion in sentencing, including the imposition of consecutive sentences as statutorily required.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a challenge to a tax deed issued after Apex Tax Investments purchased Mary Lowe's home at a Cook County tax sale for unpaid 1991 taxes. The Cook County public guardian, acting for Lowe's estate, petitioned under section 2-1401 and the Property Tax Code to set aside the deed, claiming Apex failed to provide adequate notice because Lowe was hospitalized for schizophrenia and notices were returned undelivered. The circuit court denied the petition, the appellate court affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed. The court held that Apex had strictly complied with the statutory notice provisions of the Property Tax Code through attempts at personal service and mailing, satisfying due process requirements without needing additional inquiries into the owner's mental condition.

propertyproceduretaxescivil rights

The case involved a breach of contract suit by Chatham Foot Specialists, P.C., a professional podiatry corporation, against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to recover fees for services provided under a participating provider agreement. The circuit and appellate courts granted summary judgment to Blue Cross, holding that the plaintiff's failure to obtain a required certificate of registration from the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation under the Professional Service Corporation Act rendered the contract void and barred recovery under any theory. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the lack of registration did not violate public policy or preclude the action because all of the plaintiff's podiatrists were properly licensed, the corporation was owned and operated solely by licensed professionals with no lay control, and the registration requirement served only as an administrative confirmation of licensing rather than a substantive bar like unlicensed practice.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case involved whether a petition filed by the State under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act to detain Harold Powell after his criminal convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated kidnapping was timely. Powell had been scheduled for release onto mandatory supervised release on September 30, 2000, and the State filed its petition on September 25, 2000, but Powell refused to sign his release conditions, delaying his actual entry into supervised release until 2001. The circuit court denied Powell's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely, but the appellate court held that the filing violated the statutory 90-day window before entry into release. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, ruling that when an inmate's refusal delays actual entry into mandatory supervised release, the timeliness of the petition is measured from the anticipated release date rather than the actual date, making the petition timely and upholding the circuit court's denial of the motion to dismiss.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Christopher Henderson, who was convicted after a bench trial in Cook County of two counts each of robbery and aggravated battery on a public way, and sentenced to concurrent extended-term prison sentences. On appeal, Henderson argued that the trial court failed to properly admonish him under Supreme Court Rule 605(a) regarding his rights to appeal and the requirement to file a written motion to reconsider sentence within 30 days to preserve issues for review. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment upholding the convictions and sentences. The court's core reasoning was that the plain language of Rule 605(a) requires the trial court to advise defendants found guilty after trial of their appeal rights, but the admonishments provided here were sufficient to satisfy the rule without necessitating remand.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a class action lawsuit brought by State Farm auto insurance policyholders against the company, alleging breach of contract and violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. The plaintiffs claimed that State Farm failed to honor policy promises to use parts of "like kind and quality" when repairing vehicles with non-original equipment manufacturer (non-OEM) crash parts, which they said were inferior and did not restore cars to pre-loss condition. After a jury trial on the contract claim and a bench trial on the fraud claim, the circuit court awarded over a billion dollars in damages to the class, which the appellate court largely upheld. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the class failed to prove a uniform breach across policies or actual damages required for consumer fraud liability, and that individual issues predominated over common ones. The core reasoning focused on the lack of evidence that non-OEM parts caused harm in every case and on the proper interpretation of policy language regarding repair quality.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned Ryan Gumma's petition to rescind the summary suspension of his driver's license under Illinois' zero-tolerance law after a breath-analysis test registered an alcohol concentration above zero. The municipal court dismissed related ordinance violations and ruled the test results inadmissible due to the police department's failure to maintain required instrument records, and Gumma relied on that ruling in his administrative challenge before the Secretary of State. The circuit court found the Secretary's denial of rescission against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the appellate court affirmed on collateral estoppel grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel did not prevent the Secretary from using the breath-test results in the administrative proceeding but nevertheless affirmed the judgment rescinding the suspension.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, defendant Daniel Shellstrom pleaded guilty to home invasion and aggravated criminal sexual assault charges arising from a 1994 incident and was sentenced to consecutive prison terms plus a three-year mandatory supervised release period. Years later, he filed a pro se motion seeking to reduce his sentence or compel compliance with his plea agreement, claiming he had not been informed of the MSR term. The circuit court recharacterized the filing as a postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act and summarily dismissed it as meritless. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal but held that when a court intends to treat a pro se pleading as a first postconviction petition, it must provide the defendant notice of the recharacterization, warn of successive-petition restrictions, and offer an opportunity to withdraw or amend the pleading. The court therefore vacated the dismissal and remanded for that procedural step.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned breach of contract claims by PHL, Inc. and another plaintiff against the Illinois State Treasurer and Pullman Bank as trustee, arising from unclosed agreements to purchase loans made under the state's Mortgage Program trust. The circuit court dismissed the action on sovereign immunity grounds, the appellate court reversed that dismissal, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court. The Court held that the claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Claims under section 8(b) of the Court of Claims Act because they were founded on contracts with the State and sought relief that would operate against the State. The core reasoning was that the Treasurer was acting in her official capacity as the state official directing the trust, which was funded solely with state money and owned by the State, so any judgment would control the State's actions and affect its funds.

procedurebusiness & regulatory