Thomas L. Kilbride

This case concerns a petition for leave to appeal from an appellate decision in a dispute between the County of Lake and Campus Investments, Inc. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the petition but exercised its supervisory authority to direct the Appellate Court, Second District, to vacate its published judgment and its order granting a motion to publish. The appellate court was further ordered to deny the motion to publish and reinstate its earlier unpublished Rule 23 order from August 10, 2011. No explanation for the supervisory directions was provided in the order. One justice took no part in the decision.

procedure

The case concerned a petition for mandamus filed by the Will County State's Attorney against a circuit judge who had granted a defendant's motion to strike a prior uncounseled Bureau County misdemeanor DUI conviction and imposed a probationary sentence for the current aggravated DUI charge. The Illinois Supreme Court granted mandamus, directing the judge to vacate the order striking the conviction, vacate the sentence, deny the motion, and resentence the defendant under the enhancement provisions of the Vehicle Code that make a fourth DUI a nonprobationable Class 2 felony. The court reasoned that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Nichols v. United States, which overruled Baldasar v. Illinois, permits use of a valid uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to enhance punishment for a later offense, including by imposing mandatory imprisonment, and that the appellate precedent in Finley relied entirely on the overruled Baldasar holding.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerned whether a school finance authority created under the Downstate School Finance Authority for Elementary Districts Law could cancel a school district's leases for portable classrooms without paying the early termination fees specified in those contracts. Innovative Modular Solutions sued Hazel Crest School District 152.5 and the Authority after the Authority terminated the leases early but refused to authorize payment of the contractual penalties. The trial court ruled that the Authority had to comply with the lease terms for cancellation and that the District was excused from paying the fees due to legal impossibility. The appellate court affirmed the ruling for the District and found the declaratory judgment moot. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act allows the Authority to cancel contracts only if done consistently with their existing terms, so the Authority must pay the fees; the doctrine of legal impossibility did not apply because the statute requires adherence to the contract provisions.

business & regulatory

The case consolidated appeals from two firefighters, Gaffney and Lemmenes, who suffered career-ending injuries during live-fire training exercises and sought continued health insurance coverage under section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act. The Act mandates that employers pay premiums for a firefighter and dependents if the firefighter incurs a catastrophic injury while responding to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court rulings in both matters, interpreting the statutory term 'emergency' according to its plain meaning to require an actual circumstance posing imminent danger that demands an urgent response, rather than a planned training drill. The court concluded that neither injury qualified for the benefits because the firefighters knew they were participating in controlled exercises, not responding to real emergencies.

labor & employmenthealthcare

In this criminal case, defendant Tyron L. Patrick was convicted of reckless homicide and related charges after a jury trial involving a fatal car collision. Following the verdict, he filed pro se posttrial motions alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but the trial court refused to consider them on the ground that they were filed more than 30 days after the verdict in violation of section 116-1(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the trial court must still conduct a preliminary inquiry under the Krankel procedure into the factual basis of any pro se ineffective-assistance claims raised before a notice of appeal is filed. The court reasoned that the common-law Krankel process serves the narrow purpose of addressing such claims in the trial court and is not limited by the statutory deadline that applies to other posttrial motions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the appellate court's remand for that preliminary examination.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the termination of a father's parental rights to his two minor children in Illinois juvenile court proceedings after the State served notice by publication. The father later challenged the termination via a section 2-1401 petition, arguing that the State failed to perform the diligent inquiry required under the Juvenile Court Act to ascertain his address before relying on publication service, thus depriving the trial court of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the State's searches (including one using a misspelled name) and failure to follow up on addresses known from related child support proceedings were inadequate. The court therefore reversed the appellate court's affirmance, vacated the termination order, and remanded for further proceedings.

family lawprocedure

The case involved James Masterson, who was committed as a sexually dangerous person under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA) after evaluations by two court-appointed psychiatrists found he suffered from pedophilia. Masterson argued that the SDPA violated equal protection by denying him the option to retain an independent psychiatrist, an option available under the related Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (SVPA). The circuit court rejected his motion for a third evaluator, declared him a sexually dangerous person, and ordered commitment; the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that individuals subject to the SDPA are not similarly situated to those under the SVPA because the statutes address different categories of offenders in distinct situations, with the SDPA applying to those who may not have convictions for the violent sex crimes required under the SVPA. Because the groups were not similarly situated, the court did not reach the rational basis test for the equal protection claim.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved a medical malpractice suit by Jane Studt and her husband against Sherman Hospital, alleging that emergency room physicians negligently failed to diagnose her appendicitis, leading to severe complications. The central issue on appeal was whether the circuit court erred by giving Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 105.01 (2006) on the standard of care for professional negligence claims, which the hospital contended inaccurately replaced the professional standard with a general "reasonably careful" standard and improperly allowed non-expert evidence such as bylaws or policies to establish negligence. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the instruction did not accurately reflect Illinois law but affirmed the jury verdict against the hospital, reasoning that only proper expert testimony had been presented on the standard of care and thus the instructional errors caused no prejudice. The court rejected the hospital's challenge to the verdict while clarifying the proper scope of evidence and the standard applicable in professional negligence cases.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

In People v. Alcozer, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether section 22-105 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which imposes fees and costs on prisoners whose postconviction petitions are summarily dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, violates due process or equal protection. The petitioner, convicted of first-degree murder, filed a pro se postconviction petition that the trial court dismissed as frivolous and ordered him to pay $359 in fees and costs; the appellate court affirmed the fees but reduced the amount. The court held the statute constitutional, reasoning that it applies only to prisoners filing frivolous pleadings and is rationally related to the legitimate legislative goal of deterring such filings while recouping systemic costs, without creating an impermissible classification. The court therefore affirmed the appellate court's judgment upholding the fees.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Gonzalez, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated kidnapping for taking an infant from her father in a hospital waiting room and carrying her to a nearby medical facility. The appellate court reversed the conviction, concluding that the State failed to prove the element of secret confinement beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the conviction, holding that secret confinement may be established by evidence that the defendant isolated the victim from meaningful public contact, even when the events occurred in public places, and that a reasonable jury could find this element satisfied here.

criminal law

The case concerned whether the 10-year limitation period for using a prior conviction to impose an extended-term sentence under Illinois law is tolled when a defendant violates bond and becomes a fugitive. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the limitation period is tolled during the time the defendant is a fugitive, reversing the appellate court's decision. The court reasoned that the legislature intended to impose harsher sentences on repeat offenders within the 10-year window and that allowing fugitives to avoid extended terms by delaying proceedings would contradict that intent and lead to absurd results. The rule of lenity does not override this legislative purpose.

criminal law

State Building Venture sued the Illinois Department of Central Management Services for a declaratory judgment interpreting a long-term lease for space in the James R. Thompson Center, specifically the tenant's renewal options and the Director's authority under the enabling statute to approve renewals in the state's best interest. This was the second lawsuit after an earlier complaint was dismissed as moot. The circuit court denied CMS's motion to dismiss the declaratory count and granted judgment on the pleadings for SBV, and the appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that sovereign immunity barred the action in circuit court because the claim was founded on a contract with the state and sought to determine the parties' rights under the lease, placing exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Claims.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, Carmecita Williams, a police dispatcher for the Village of Glenwood, was convicted of official misconduct after she made phone calls notifying Greg Stroud about nearby police activity, including a SERT team response. The appellate court reversed the conviction and entered a judgment of acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed that ruling. The court held that the department's internal confidentiality rules, adopted under an ordinance allowing the police chief to prescribe regulations, do not qualify as 'law' within the meaning of the official misconduct statute (720 ILCS 5/33-3(b)), because treating such rules as law would improperly allow felony prosecutions for violations of administrative directives rather than statutes or ordinances. The decision was based on the statutory text and concerns about overly broad construction, without addressing other potential charges.

criminal law

In People v. Amigon, the defendant, already serving sentences for a 1994 gang-related shooting that left victim Alfonso Ruiz quadriplegic, was charged with Ruiz's 1999 murder after Ruiz died from pneumonia at age 22. The State introduced the defendant's 1995 custodial statement and testimony from a medical examiner linking the gunshot injury to the victim's weakened condition and death. The trial court admitted the statement despite a challenge under the electronic recording statute, the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder, and he received a mandatory life sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence sufficiently proved causation beyond a reasonable doubt and that the recording requirement did not apply retroactively to statements made years before the statute's effective date.

criminal lawprocedure

In People v. Thompson, the defendant was convicted by a jury of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and sentenced to one year in prison. The appellate court reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court violated Supreme Court Rule 431(b) by failing to ask prospective jurors whether they understood and accepted certain principles, including the presumption of innocence, the state's burden of proof, the defendant's right not to present evidence, and that his failure to testify could not be held against him. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and reinstated the conviction, holding that a violation of Rule 431(b) does not constitute per se reversible error and is subject to harmless-error review under prior precedent. The court reasoned that adherence to the rule, while mandatory, is not essential to the fairness of the trial itself.

criminal lawprocedure

In JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Earth Foods, Inc., the bank sued a company for defaulting on a line of credit and its three co-owners personally as guarantors on the loan. One guarantor invoked section 1 of the Sureties Act as an affirmative defense, claiming it discharged his obligation because he had notified the bank of inventory depletion serving as collateral. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the bank on the ground that the Act applies only to sureties, not guarantors, but the appellate court reversed, interpreting the statutory term "surety" to encompass guarantors. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the parties' intent must be determined from the agreement language and surrounding circumstances and that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved defendant James T. Johnson, who was convicted of criminal sexual abuse after a jury trial in which the trial judge received a jury note indicating an 11-1 split and responded ex parte by instructing the jury to continue deliberating, without notifying the defendant or his counsel. Defendant did not object at trial or in his posttrial motion but later argued on appeal that the ex parte communication violated his rights to be present and to counsel. The appellate court reversed the conviction under the second prong of plain-error review, finding the error denied defendant a fair trial. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that forfeiture of the claim was not excused because the communication did not constitute a structural error or sufficiently serious violation affecting the trial's fairness under plain-error analysis.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved defendant Craven F. Phipps, who was initially charged with reckless homicide after causing a fatal car accident while driving under the influence of alcohol. He entered a guilty plea to that charge but later had it vacated by agreement of the parties, after which he pled guilty to aggravated driving under the influence and received a 12-year prison sentence. The appellate court reversed the conviction, finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to seek dismissal on speedy-trial grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate decision and affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant had not established ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reasoned that appointed counsel's decision not to raise the speedy-trial issue was presumed competent, and the defendant provided no basis to overcome that presumption or show the claim would have succeeded.

criminal lawprocedure

In this consolidated case, two defendants under age 21 were placed on court supervision after pleading guilty to unlawful alcohol consumption, triggering mandatory three-month driver's license suspensions under section 6-206(a)(43) of the Illinois Vehicle Code. The trial court ruled the statute unconstitutional on due process grounds, relying on prior precedent that required a direct connection between the offense and vehicle operation. On direct appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding the provision constitutional because it is rationally related to the state's legitimate interests in promoting highway safety and deterring underage drinking. The court emphasized that statutes carry a presumption of constitutionality and that the legislature may use license suspensions to advance broader public safety goals beyond offenses involving actual driving.

criminal law

The case involved the State's petition to civilly commit respondent Tommy O. Hardin as a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act following his convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. The trial court found no probable cause to support the commitment, but the appellate court reversed that finding. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the appellate court had jurisdiction over orders finding no probable cause in such proceedings. The court adopted an evidentiary standard for probable cause hearings requiring the State to present evidence showing a substantial probability that the respondent has a mental disorder making reoffense likely, based on practical probabilities rather than a full credibility assessment. The court concluded that the expert testimony presented by the State satisfied this standard and affirmed the appellate court's reversal, remanding for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights