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Scherer v. TESTINO
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-05-07 · cited 3×
The case involved Joseph Testino filing a motion for contempt against his former wife Tanya Scherer for closing a business checking account associated with a company awarded to him in their 2008 divorce decree. The trial court held Scherer in both criminal and civil contempt, awarding damages and attorney fees to Testino. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, concluding that Scherer had complied with the plain terms of the divorce decree, amended settlement agreement, and asset transfer agreement, which only required her to maintain the account for a limited period that had long expired. The court determined that the trial court improperly modified the agreements by extending the maintenance requirement indefinitely based on convenience to the business.
family law
Jones v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-05-07 · cited 70×
In Jones v. State, Michael Jones was convicted of driving under the influence after a Georgia State Patrol trooper detained him in a parking lot during a roadblock operation. The trial court denied Jones's motion to suppress evidence from field sobriety tests, ruling the initial encounter consensual, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trooper's actions—blocking the exit with his patrol car and approaching Jones—constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. The court further reasoned that the trooper lacked specific, articulable facts establishing reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, as Jones made no evasive or illegal driving maneuver. As a result, the evidence obtained from the stop should have been suppressed.
criminal lawprocedurecivil rights
McRae v. Padgett
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-05-07 · cited 1×
Margie McRae petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel a magistrate judge to issue additional arrest warrants against a contractor she hired for property improvements, alleging that he misappropriated payments for materials, resulting in liens on her property and incomplete work. After a hearing where both parties presented evidence, the magistrate issued one warrant under OCGA § 16-8-15 but declined to issue others; the trial court granted summary judgment in the magistrate's favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that magistrates have discretion to determine probable cause for arrest warrants and that mandamus will not lie to compel issuance absent a showing of gross abuse of that discretion, which was not present here.
criminal lawpropertyprocedure
Jackson v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-05-07 · cited 5×
Joshua Jackson was convicted of malice murder after beating Okedas McClure to death with a baseball bat over a counterfeit $20 bill received in a drug transaction. Jackson appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a prior similar transaction in which he had struck a cousin in the head with a hammer two years earlier as a juvenile. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Jackson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the similar transaction evidence was properly admitted for the purposes of showing course of conduct and bent of mind because the incidents shared sufficient similarities, including arguments over minor matters and head injuries inflicted with objects, and that the fact the prior act occurred when Jackson was a juvenile did not render it inadmissible.
criminal law
Ortiz v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-04-24 · cited 14×
In Ortiz v. State, the appellant was convicted of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession after shooting and killing two victims during an argument at his home, with evidence including his confession and eyewitness accounts of multiple shots fired in succession. On appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, he challenged the jury instructions as an improper sequential charge that violated Edge v. State by requiring the jury to reject murder before considering voluntary manslaughter, and he argued that his aggravated assault convictions should have merged with the murder counts. The court affirmed the denial of a new trial, finding no plain error in the jury charge when viewed as a whole because the instructions and verdict form required simultaneous consideration of the offenses including any mitigating circumstances. However, it vacated one aggravated assault conviction, holding that the non-fatal shots created a completed offense but the subsequent close-succession shots to the head did not involve a deliberate interval and thus merged into the malice murder. The case was remanded for resentencing.
criminal lawprocedure
Ennis v. Ennis
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-04-24
In Ennis v. Ennis, a husband who had returned to Georgia filed for divorce, alimony, property division, and attorney fees against his wife, who had moved to Virginia after the couple's separation there; the wife sought dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction under Georgia's long-arm statute. The court held that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the wife because she had not maintained minimum contacts with Georgia since 2003, had not transacted business or owned property there, and the marriage's dissolution arose from events in Virginia, failing the three-part test from Smith v. Smith. However, the court ruled that the trial court could still exercise jurisdiction over the marriage itself to grant a divorce under OCGA § 19-5-2 based on the husband's six-month residency. It therefore affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss the divorce but reversed denial of the motion as to the other claims.
family lawprocedure
Haffner v. Davis
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-03-23 · cited 12×
The case concerned Micah Haffner's petition to quiet title to a parcel of land in Haralson County containing a house at 116 Golden Lane Road, which he claimed to have acquired from his mother's estate following his parents' 1994 divorce. The trial court granted summary judgment to James and Regina Davis and the bank, who held title to the tract through a 2004 foreclosure sale, and denied Haffner's motion. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, holding that Haffner could not establish title by adverse possession because he lacked the requisite 20 years of possession and his deed provided no color of title, and that he was not entitled to reformation of his 1997 deed because he failed to exercise reasonable diligence in reviewing the survey that correctly showed the house was located on the neighboring tract. The court further ruled that the divorce decree did not serve as a muniment of title enforceable by specific performance against subsequent bona fide purchasers without notice.
property
Davis v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-03-23 · cited 55×
Davis was convicted of felony murder based on his participation in a marijuana drug transaction during which his brother shot and killed the victim, along with attempted violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred by refusing a special jury instruction allowing self-defense as justification for felony murder and by overruling an objection to the prosecutor's closing argument suggesting automatic guilt for the murder if the drug count was proven. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, reasoning that self-defense is unavailable under OCGA § 16-3-21(b)(2) when the defendant is actively committing a felony such as the drug deal, unlike mere status offenses, and that the closing argument fell within permissible latitude with any potential error cured by the trial court's instructions and response to the jury's question. The court also upheld the sufficiency of the evidence and rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
criminal lawprocedure
Allen v. SEA GARDENS SEAFOOD, INC.
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-03-19 · cited 11×
This case involved a dispute between adjoining property owners over title to waterfront land and an adjacent dock in McIntosh County, Georgia, which led to a quiet title action and a declaratory judgment action. After more than four years of litigation, the parties reached a settlement during a pretrial conference that was outlined in a handwritten document signed by all and presented to the trial court; the outline divided the property and dock but conditioned the entire agreement on obtaining necessary permits. When the parties could not agree on the language of a formal consent judgment, the trial court adopted Sea Gardens' version and entered it as a consent judgment, even though Allen and Littlefield had not signed it. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the judgment and remanded the case, holding that a consent judgment is valid only if all parties agree to its terms and that the trial court had improperly modified the settlement by changing the permit provision from a condition precedent to the agreement itself into a mere term of performance.
propertyprocedure
Sanders v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-01-09 · cited 33×
The case involved Richard Sanders' conviction for the murder of Demetrius Pearson in a drive-by shooting, based on eyewitness testimony identifying Sanders as the shooter. Sanders appealed, claiming the trial court unfairly restricted his cross-examination of the key eyewitness about the witness's first offender plea to show bias and that the prosecutor improperly introduced evidence of his character. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination because Sanders failed to proffer evidence of actual bias or motive and that any character evidence issues did not warrant a mistrial. The court further reasoned that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict under the Jackson v. Virginia standard and that an Allen charge given to the jury was not coercive under the totality of the circumstances.
criminal lawprocedure
Guajardo v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-11-21 · cited 47×
Nelson Guajardo was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession charges arising from the shooting death of Derek King following a drug-related dispute and altercation at an apartment party. He appealed the trial court's denial of his motion for a new trial, arguing that the verdicts were inconsistent because the jury acquitted him of malice murder on self-defense grounds while convicting him on the other counts, and that the trial court gave erroneous jury instructions on self-defense. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. It reaffirmed that inconsistent verdicts are permissible in Georgia and found that the jury's questions did not make its rationale transparent enough to trigger the narrow exception to that rule. The court also concluded there was no plain error in the self-defense instructions because any error did not affect the outcome of the trial.
criminal lawprocedure
Novare Group, Inc. v. Sarif
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-11-21 · cited 84×
This case involved condominium purchasers who sued developers and brokers for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligent supervision, and violation of the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, claiming they were misled about future development that blocked their south-facing views. The purchasers had signed contracts containing disclaimers required by the Georgia Condominium Act, merger clauses, and statements that oral representations could not be relied upon. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly granted judgment on the pleadings to the defendants, reversing the Court of Appeals. The court reasoned that the purchasers failed to properly elect rescission by tendering it before filing suit and could not claim fraud based on oral representations that contradicted the written contract terms they had the opportunity to read. It further found the negligent supervision claims insufficiently supported by specific factual allegations.
propertybusiness & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
State v. Kelly
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-11-07 · cited 546×
In State v. Kelly, the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the State's appeal from a trial court's grant of a new trial to defendant Lonnie Kelly after his 2007 convictions for felony murder and related charges arising from a 2003 death caused while driving a stolen vehicle. The trial court had found plain error in the jury instructions for failing to explicitly require the jury to determine whether the predicate felony of theft by receiving stolen property was dangerous per se or created a foreseeable risk of death. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although appellate review for plain error was available under OCGA § 17-8-58 despite the lack of objection at trial, the omission did not constitute plain error because the indictment, other charges, and instructions on reckless driving and proximate cause adequately informed the jury of the dangerousness element. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion on the proper application of the plain error standard.
criminal lawprocedure
VANDALL v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-11-07 · cited 1×
The case involved Bryan Vandall's conviction for the malice murder of his girlfriend's thirteen-month-old child, whom he was caring for when the child suffered fatal internal injuries from a broken back. Vandall appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly interfered with his cross-examination of the lead investigator and erred in denying a mistrial after the prosecution referenced his outstanding warrants in violation of a pretrial order. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that Vandall was not deprived of a thorough cross-examination because he was able to question the witness at length and the court's interventions did not express an opinion on the evidence. The Court further concluded that the trial court's immediate curative instruction to the jury regarding the improper warrant reference was sufficient to remedy any prejudice, consistent with prior precedent on such matters.
criminal lawprocedure
Wilder v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-11-07 · cited 24×
This case involved the conviction of James Glenn Wilder for multiple counts of child molestation, sexual exploitation of a child, aggravated child molestation, and statutory rape based on sexual acts with a 15-year-old victim. The key dispute on appeal concerned the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained from Wilder's locked briefcase, which police had seized without a warrant from a third party's home before obtaining a valid search warrant to examine its contents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, applying the independent source doctrine to admit the evidence because the warrant relied on information independent of the seizure. The Supreme Court held that the independent source doctrine did not apply under these facts, reversed the Court of Appeals' ruling on the suppression issue, and remanded for further proceedings on questions such as third-party consent and inevitable discovery.
criminal lawprocedure
Brown v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-11-07 · cited 9×
Michael Anthony Brown petitioned for habeas corpus relief, arguing that his 1993 guilty plea to financial transaction card fraud was invalid because the record did not show he was informed of and waived his Boykin rights against self-incrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront witnesses. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition. The court reasoned that although the trial court did not explicitly advise Brown of all Boykin rights during the hearing, the signed waiver of rights form, the attorney's certificate confirming review with Brown, and Brown's acknowledgments at the hearing provided sufficient affirmative evidence that he understood and waived those rights.
criminal lawprocedure
Bowling v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-10-17 · cited 20×
Larry Bowling was convicted by a jury of felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the shooting death of Melody Harrell following an incident at a bar and a subsequent vehicle crash. Bowling appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that a search warrant for his medical records violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Georgia Constitution, that his custodial statements should not have been admitted, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and rejected each of Bowling's claims, affirming the judgment. The core reasoning addressed the constitutionality of the warrant for medical records obtained pursuant to due process, the voluntariness and admissibility of statements made at the scene and hospital, and the lack of merit in the ineffective assistance allegations.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Sigal v. Sigal
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-10-03 · cited 4×
In Sigal v. Sigal, a divorce proceeding, the parties disputed post-divorce visitation for their two children after the mother had obtained a prior separate maintenance decree requiring supervised visitation due to the father's substance abuse issues. The trial court orally announced a three-month transition period from supervised to unsupervised visitation to address the children's welfare but later entered the final divorce decree nunc pro tunc to the hearing date, which caused the transition period to expire before entry. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed that portion of the decree, ruling that the nunc pro tunc provision was an abuse of discretion because it failed to conform the judgment to the trial court's original intent and instead eliminated a safeguard designed for the children's best interests. The court noted that nunc pro tunc entries may properly relate a judgment back to an earlier date but cannot be used to nullify substantive provisions meant to protect third parties such as the children.
family lawprocedure
Williams v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-09-12 · cited 12×
Kelvin Williams was convicted of two counts of malice murder and related crimes arising from a plan to sell fake cocaine to victims Brian Kyle Stringer and Myron Long, Jr., during which the victims were shot and killed. On appeal from the denial of his motion for new trial, Williams argued that the evidence was insufficient because it rested on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on hearsay grounds to a witness's prior statements to police, and that statements by a co-defendant were improperly admitted. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions, holding that the witness was not an accomplice, that the prior statements were admissible as consistent statements after the witness's credibility was challenged, and that the co-conspirator statements were admissible during the concealment phase of the conspiracy. The court further found the evidence sufficient to support the verdicts under the Jackson v. Virginia standard and that counsel's performance was not deficient.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Clements
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2011-09-12 · cited 28×
In State v. Clements, the defendant was tried in 1999 for the 1997 shooting death of Tanika Stevenson and was acquitted of malice murder but convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, kidnapping with bodily injury, and related firearm and theft charges. A successor judge later granted a motion for new trial after concluding that the original trial judge abused discretion by refusing to dismiss a seated juror whose husband had coached the defendant and had expressed job-related concerns about the trial outcome. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed that grant, ruling that the juror had repeatedly confirmed under questioning that she could remain fair and impartial, that no outside influence had occurred, and that the original judge's decision to retain her was not a manifest abuse of discretion. The court also affirmed the trial court's denial of the remaining grounds raised in the cross-appeal.
criminal lawprocedure