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Dunlap v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-05-07 · cited 15×
Robert Dunlap was convicted of felony murder after he and accomplices robbed and fatally shot Tial Ceu during a planned robbery at a DeKalb County apartment complex in 2008. On appeal, Dunlap argued that his in-custody statement to police should have been suppressed because he had invoked his right to counsel, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have voir dire and opening and closing statements transcribed. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. It ruled that Dunlap's pre-interrogation question about counsel was equivocal, so police were not required to cease questioning after he received and waived his Miranda rights. The court also found that trial counsel's decision not to transcribe non-mandatory portions of the trial fell within the range of reasonable professional conduct and caused no prejudice, as no specific errors were shown.
criminal lawprocedure
Williams v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-04-24 · cited 14×
In Williams v. State, Michael Eugene Williams, then age 20, pled guilty to malice murder and firearm possession after fatally shooting a restaurant owner during an attempted armed robbery; he challenged his resulting sentence of life without parole under OCGA § 16-5-1(d) as unconstitutional. Williams argued that the statute violated due process by failing to provide any mechanism or guidance for considering mitigating evidence, allowing arbitrary application, and that the sentence amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because of his youth. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence. It reasoned that legislatures have wide latitude to define crimes and set punishment ranges, with no federal or state constitutional requirement for individualized mitigation findings in non-capital cases, and that existing precedent barring life without parole for juveniles in non-homicide cases does not apply to adult defendants convicted of murder.
criminal lawcivil rights
White v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-04-24 · cited 59×
In White v. State, Darryl John White was convicted of felony murder based on aggravated assault and possession of a knife during a felony after an eyewitness identified him as the person who stabbed Ronald Price in the chest; the victim died two months later from a blood clot caused by his immobilization. White admitted the stabbing but claimed it was justified self-defense because the victim and others had “tortured” him by blowing cigarette smoke in his face. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s findings. It also ruled there was no plain error in omitting a “no duty to retreat” instruction because the evidence did not raise the issue of retreat, and no error in accepting the felony-murder verdict because the jury had been properly instructed to consider voluntary manslaughter before returning a felony-murder guilty verdict.
criminal law
Viskup v. Viskup
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-04-24 · cited 73×
In Viskup v. Viskup, a father appealed a trial court’s rulings in a child custody modification case after the mother filed a petition in Cherokee County seeking primary physical custody and support of their son, who had been placed with the father following the parties’ 2006 divorce. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the father’s motion to dismiss or transfer for improper venue, its award of primary custody and support to the mother, and its grant of attorney fees to the mother. On venue, the court held that evidence supported the finding that the father was a resident of Cherokee County when the petition was filed in October 2008, as his move back to Cobb County occurred later. On custody, the court upheld the determination of a material change in circumstances—primarily the mother’s improved stability and the child’s better emotional and social development under temporary custody with her—warranting modification in the child’s best interests. Attorney fees were properly awarded under OCGA § 19-9-3(g), which applies to custody modification actions and does not require consideration of the parties’ financial circumstances.
family law
Cox v. Howerton
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-03-19 · cited 4×
In Cox v. Howerton, Holly Cox petitioned for habeas corpus relief after her 1998 guilty pleas to aggravated child molestation and related charges, claiming ineffective assistance because her trial counsel and the court had advised her she would be parole-eligible after ten years, when Georgia law in fact required her to serve the full thirty-year maximum sentence without any parole or early release. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the habeas court's denial of relief, concluding that Cox had not satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reasoned that, despite deficient performance in the parole advice, Cox had not shown a reasonable probability she would have rejected the plea and gone to trial, citing the overwhelming evidence of guilt (including her confession) and the lack of special circumstances indicating she placed particular emphasis on parole eligibility.
criminal lawprocedure
Davis v. State
Supreme Court of Georgia · 2012-02-27 · cited 34×
In Davis v. State, appellant Mark Davis was convicted of felony murder after stabbing and killing Roy Robinson during a drunken fight at an apartment on Thanksgiving 2008; Davis claimed self-defense, testifying that Robinson attacked him with broken glass after striking him with a drinking glass, but two eyewitnesses described Davis chasing and stabbing the unarmed victim. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and denial of a new trial, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to reject self-defense and find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that trial counsel's decisions not to call a defense expert on wound causation and to introduce a police interrogation video were reasonable strategic choices within professional norms. It also held that Davis waived any objection to the trial court's handling of a juror's medical emergency by failing to raise concerns at the time. The judgment was affirmed.
criminal lawprocedure