Barbara J. Pariente

In Smith v. State, a defendant sentenced to death appealed the summary denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, raising claims of newly discovered evidence from FBI letters on comparative bullet lead analysis and a Brady violation involving undisclosed information about witness Priscilla Walker. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the postconviction court's denial and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on those two claims, finding them sufficiently pleaded. The court also directed the lower court to consider six additional Brady claims identified by the Eleventh Circuit in a cumulative materiality analysis under Kyles v. Whitley, as those involved suppressed favorable evidence that required further review. A partial dissent argued that the Brady claim regarding Walker was procedurally barred for failing to allege due diligence within the one-year time limit.

criminal lawprocedure

In Harris v. State, the Florida Supreme Court considered whether a drug-detection dog's alert to the exterior of a vehicle supplies probable cause for a warrantless interior search, specifically examining the reliability of the dog Aldo after a traffic stop led to the discovery of pseudoephedrine pills. The court held that the State must establish the dog's reliability through a totality of the circumstances, requiring evidence beyond mere training and certification records, including field performance records, explanations of the certification process, the handler's training and experience, and any other objective indicators known to the officer. It quashed the First District Court of Appeal's decision affirming the search and disapproved contrary precedent from other districts while approving consistent rulings from the Second District. The reasoning centered on the lack of standardized training programs in Florida, the inability to cross-examine the dog, and the established burden on the State to prove probable cause for warrantless searches rather than shifting it to the defendant.

criminal lawcivil rights

In Delgado v. State, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the conviction of Rogelio Delgado for kidnapping after he stole a truck containing a sleeping two-year-old child in the backseat, along with related charges of burglary and auto theft. The Court quashed the Third District Court of Appeal's decision affirming the kidnapping conviction and granted judgment of acquittal on that count. The core reasoning was that Florida's kidnapping statute under section 787.01(1)(a)2 requires the defendant to have knowledge of the victim's presence before or during the underlying felony, which the State failed to prove, and that the three-part test from Faison v. State was misapplied as it does not substitute for the statutory elements or expand liability.

criminal law

The case Williams v. Buss involved a request for relief that came before the Florida Supreme Court. The court dismissed the case after determining that relief was not authorized under existing law. It cited the precedent in Baker v. State, 878 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 2004), as the basis for this conclusion. All additional motions or requests for relief were also denied as part of the order. The decision was joined by five justices without noted dissent.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved whether the parents of a severely brain-damaged infant born after a placental abruption and cesarean section could sue healthcare providers for medical malpractice in court or were limited to the no-fault administrative remedies under Florida's Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (NICA Plan). The Florida Supreme Court quashed the First District Court of Appeal's decision that had required the parents to pursue NICA compensation, holding instead that the infant did not suffer a "birth-related neurological injury" as defined by statute because the injury did not occur during labor, delivery, or immediate postdelivery resuscitation in the hospital. The court's reasoning centered on a narrow interpretation of the statutory phrase "immediate postdelivery period in a hospital" as modifying only the resuscitation period, rejecting an expansive view that would cover extended monitoring, and noting that the rebuttable presumption of NICA coverage did not apply since the parents were not seeking NICA benefits.

healthcareproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Gregory Ponton challenging his designation as a habitual violent felony offender (HVFO) under Florida law, arguing that his prior convictions from the same day did not qualify as sequential for the HVFO sentencing enhancement. The Florida Supreme Court held that the HVFO statute requires only one qualifying prior felony conviction separate from the current offense, and multiple prior felonies adjudicated on the same day can still serve as predicates. The court reasoned from the plain language of section 775.084, Florida Statutes (1993), which does not impose a sequential conviction requirement for HVFO designations. Accordingly, the court approved the Third District Court of Appeal's affirmance of Ponton's sentence and disapproved the conflicting Second District decision in Rutherford v. State.

criminal law

The case concerned a dispute over death benefits from a deferred compensation fund after the divorce of Linda Crawford and Manuel Crawford, where the mediated marital settlement agreement stated that the husband would retain the fund but did not address beneficiary rights or name a beneficiary. The Florida Supreme Court held that such general language does not override the existing beneficiary designation naming the ex-wife, so the benefits go to Linda Crawford as the named beneficiary. The core reasoning was that courts should rely on the plain terms of the separate beneficiary document unless the agreement specifically provides who is or is not to receive the death benefits, allowing the owning spouse to change the designation if desired but leaving the original one in place if unchanged. The Court quashed the Third District's contrary decision and approved the Fifth District's ruling in a conflicting case.

family lawproperty

The case involved a commercial dispute over timeshare agreements in which the trial court entered a final judgment awarding damages to Westgate but reserved jurisdiction to determine prejudgment interest separately. Under prior precedent in McGurn v. Scott, such a reservation was improper and could result in waiver of prejudgment interest once an appeal was taken. The Florida Supreme Court receded from McGurn and held that a trial court may reserve jurisdiction in a final judgment to award prejudgment interest, treating the issue similarly to attorneys’ fees and costs so that jurisdiction is retained after appeal. The court answered the rephrased certified question in the affirmative to promote judicial economy and prevent unfairness to the parties.

procedure

The case concerned a challenge by the Council for Secular Humanism to Florida statutes (sections 944.473 and 944.4731) that permit state contracts with religious or sectarian entities to provide social services, primarily in the corrections context. The First District Court of Appeal held that the no-aid provision in Article I, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution applies beyond schools to such social services contracts and remanded the case for further proceedings after the trial court had granted judgment on the pleadings against the challengers. The Florida Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the certified question of great public importance, concluding that the issue would be better resolved after the trial court applies the constitutional provision to the specific services at issue.

religious liberty

This case concerned whether, under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, a municipality must prove at an initial adversarial preliminary hearing that a property owner knew or should have known of criminal activity on the property before it can seize the property for possible forfeiture. The Florida Supreme Court held that the seizing agency is required only to establish probable cause that the property was used or likely to be used in criminal activity at the seizure stage; proof of the owner’s actual or constructive knowledge is not needed until the later forfeiture proceeding. The court reasoned that the statute’s plain language creates a two-stage process, with the first stage focused solely on the property’s connection to crime and the second stage addressing the owner’s culpability. It approved the Third District’s decision upholding the seizure and disapproved conflicting rulings from the First and Fifth Districts.

criminal lawproperty

The case involved whether a Washington resident who operated a website could be subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida for allegedly defamatory posts accusing a Florida-based company of criminal activity such as phishing and fraud. ISC sued Marshall in federal court in Florida for defamation, relying on the state's long-arm statute. The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question by holding that posting defamatory material on a website accessible in Florida does not by itself constitute a tortious act within the state under section 48.193(1)(b), but the material must also have been accessed in Florida. The court's reasoning focused on the statutory requirement that the defendant commit a tortious act within Florida, interpreting publication of defamation as occurring where the statements are both made available and viewed.

proceduretorts & liability

In Schlabach v. State, the Florida Supreme Court addressed whether a trial court retains jurisdiction under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c) to reduce or modify a sentence when a motion is timely filed within the 60-day window but not ruled upon until later. The case arose after Teresa Schlabach's probation was revoked and she received a five-year prison sentence; she filed her modification motion six days before the deadline, and the trial court granted it after a hearing outside the 60 days. The Fourth District had held that the court lost jurisdiction once the period expired without action, creating a conflict with the Second District's view in Childers v. State. The Supreme Court quashed the Fourth District's decision, ruling that jurisdiction is preserved if the motion is filed within 60 days and the court rules within a reasonable time, following its precedent in Abreu v. State. The Court directed further study of time limits by the rules committee.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves the interpretation of Florida law regarding third-party bad-faith claims against an indemnity insurer in the context of a wrongful death lawsuit. The Florida Supreme Court addressed a rephrased certified question from the Eleventh Circuit, asking whether such a claim can proceed when the insurer's actions neither caused the insured's damages nor resulted in exposure to liability exceeding policy limits. The court answered in the negative, concluding that although the jury found bad faith by USF&G in denying coverage and refusing to participate in settlement, the insured sustained no recoverable damages because the settlement was funded by other insurers without excess exposure to the insured. The reasoning focused on the specific facts showing that the insurer's conduct did not lead to the claimed harms, limiting the viability of the assigned bad-faith action.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved Cathy Menendez, who was injured in a 2001 car accident and sought personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from her insurer, Progressive Express Insurance Company. After the insurer failed to pay certain benefits, Menendez sued, but the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a judgment in her favor, holding that she had to comply with a presuit notice requirement enacted after her policy was issued. The Florida Supreme Court quashed that decision, ruling that the 2001 statutory amendment adding the presuit notice provision could not be applied retroactively to insurance policies issued before its effective date. The court reasoned that the amendment constituted a substantive change rather than a merely procedural one, as it altered the rights and obligations under existing insurance contracts.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a juvenile, J.A.B., adjudicated guilty of battery and placed on probation, with the trial court ordering restitution of about $1,479 to the victim and setting a payment schedule of $50 per month to begin after the juvenile gave birth. J.A.B. challenged the schedule on grounds that she was unemployed and could not afford payments, but the Second District upheld the order and certified conflict with a First District decision requiring that restitution commencement be conditioned on the juvenile obtaining employment. The Florida Supreme Court approved the Second District's holding that trial courts may set restitution amounts and payment schedules based on evidence of reasonably expected earnings and may set a start date allowing reasonable time to find work. The core reasoning was that this approach is consistent with the language and purpose of the applicable juvenile restitution statutes, which allow orders without a showing of present ability to pay.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether a trial court must strike as a nullity a represented defendant's pro se motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l) to withdraw a guilty plea when the motion alleges counsel misadvised or coerced the defendant but does not expressly request new counsel. The Florida Supreme Court resolved a conflict between the Second and Fourth District Courts of Appeal by holding that a limited exception applies in such circumstances. The Court decided that the trial court must conduct a limited inquiry into whether an adversarial relationship exists rather than automatically striking the motion. The core reasoning was that allegations of misadvice, misrepresentations, or coercion by counsel create a potential conflict requiring the court to assess whether defense counsel can continue to represent the defendant at a hearing on the motion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the Florida Supreme Court, exercising supervisory authority over The Florida Bar, should enjoin the Bar from allowing its voluntary Family Law Section to file an amicus brief in a pending Third District appeal challenging the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting adoption by homosexuals. Petitioners Liberty Counsel and two Bar members argued that the Bar's approval violated their First Amendment rights, exceeded the Bar's authority under its own policies, and created ethical issues for judicial members of the section. The court denied the petition for injunctive relief, holding that voluntary section membership and lack of compulsory dues funding avoided any First Amendment violation under Keller v. State Bar of California, that the Bar's actions were not ultra vires, and that the decision to permit the brief did not require court intervention beyond existing appellate rules. The opinion emphasized that the merits of the underlying adoption law were not at issue and that amicus filings ultimately depend on leave of the court where the case is pending.

free speechcivil rightsfamily law

This case concerned the procedures a Florida school board must follow when immediately terminating a charter school's contract under section 1002.33(8)(d) due to good cause or threats to student welfare, specifically whether the school board was required to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Fourth District Court of Appeal had held that the APA applied and that "immediately" meant any period shorter than ninety days. The Florida Supreme Court, reviewing the charter school statute and APA provisions, concluded that the Legislature did not intend APA procedures to govern immediate terminations, as the detailed statutory scheme for charter creation, operation, termination, and appeals provides its own process, including review by the Charter School Appeal Commission and State Board of Education. The Court quashed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings on unresolved issues such as due process claims.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case arose from a construction lien dispute where an insulation contractor recorded a lien for work performed, the homeowners offset damages from electrical repairs caused by the work, and after trial the contractor received a net judgment of $1,525 while the homeowners prevailed on most of their counterclaim. The trial court applied the significant issues test from Prosperi v. Code, Inc. to award fees to the homeowners under section 713.29, but the Fifth District held that any net judgment for the lienor automatically made it the prevailing party entitled to fees. The Florida Supreme Court rephrased and answered the certified question by holding that trial courts must apply the Prosperi significant issues test to determine the prevailing party for attorneys' fees in construction lien actions, even when the lienor obtains a judgment on the lien, and that equitable principles allow a court to find no prevailing party at all.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned whether dual convictions for discharging a firearm from a vehicle within 1000 feet of a person under section 790.15(2) and shooting into an occupied vehicle under section 790.19, both arising from the same shooting incident, violated double jeopardy protections. The Florida Supreme Court held that the convictions did not violate double jeopardy and approved the Third District Court of Appeal's decision while disapproving the conflicting Fifth District ruling. The court adopted a revised double jeopardy analysis based on the plain language of section 775.021(4)(b)(2), which bars separate punishments only when a statute defines an offense with multiple degrees, rather than the prior "primary evil" standard. Applying this test, the court found that the two statutes did not constitute degree variants of the same core offense. The facts involved the defendant firing shots from his vehicle at another occupied vehicle during a road rage dispute, resulting in injuries to a passenger.

criminal lawguns