This case involved a shareholder class action brought by the City of Miami General Employees' & Sanitation Employees' Retirement Trust challenging disclosures in proxy materials related to a corporate transaction involving Nabors Industries Ltd. The suit alleged that certain omitted details about a go-shop process and a bid received during that process rendered the proxy materially misleading. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment in favor of the defendants. The court reasoned that even with sharpened arguments on appeal, the plaintiff failed to plead facts supporting an inference that the omitted information was material, given the broad outreach in the go-shop, the investment bank's incentives, and the lack of evidence that the bid was financially superior or would have led to a better deal.
The case was an appeal by employee Victoria Fountain against employer McDonald's from a Superior Court of Delaware ruling in a dispute between the parties. The Delaware Supreme Court considered the matter on the parties' briefs and determined that the lower court's final judgment should stand. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's decision solely on the basis of the reasoning set forth in that court's June 30, 2016 opinion. The order was issued on March 22, 2017, with a shortened period for any reargument motions.
This case involved a debt collection action by a nursing home against a former patient, Rhonda Daniel, and her husband, Joseph Poli. After Joseph filed an answer on Rhonda's behalf along with a durable power of attorney and affidavit, the Superior Court entered a default judgment against Rhonda for failing to appear and then granted summary judgment against Joseph based on that judgment. Joseph moved to vacate the default under Rule 60(b), but the Superior Court denied relief. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that Joseph's responsive filing with the POA qualified as an appearance under the court rules, making entry of the default a mistake that warranted vacating the judgments and remanding for further proceedings.
This case involved an appeal by Mary Street from a Delaware Family Court order addressing cross-petitions for contempt filed by Street and Charles Butler. The Family Court had ruled in Butler's favor on the contempt issues and determined he was entitled to attorney fees, but had not yet set the amount of those fees. The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory because the Family Court order was not final, and Street had not followed the procedures in Supreme Court Rule 42 for seeking review of a non-final judgment. The Court explained that its jurisdiction is generally limited to final orders absent compliance with Rule 42, and the dismissal was without prejudice to refiling once a final judgment is entered.
In this case, Paul Brunhammer was indicted in Delaware in 2010 on charges of rape and sexual solicitation of a child while he was serving a sentence in New Jersey. After moving to dismiss the indictment in 2015 on speedy trial grounds (which was denied) and being returned to Delaware in 2016, he pled guilty to a lesser charge of third-degree rape; he was sentenced to ten years in prison. On direct appeal, Brunhammer challenged the indictment and sentence based on the alleged speedy trial violation, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment, holding that Brunhammer's knowing and voluntary guilty plea waived his right to raise pre-plea constitutional claims such as the speedy trial issue, as confirmed by the plea colloquy and forms. The court declined to consider the ineffective counsel claim for the first time on appeal and granted the State's motion to affirm.
This case involved Freddy L. Flonnory's appeal from a Superior Court order that summarily dismissed his fourth motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The court reasoned that the 2014 amendments to Rule 61, which added requirements for second or subsequent motions under subsection (d)(2), applied because Flonnory's motion was filed in June 2016 after the amendments' effective date. The motion failed to plead with particularity either new evidence creating a strong inference of actual innocence or a new retroactive rule of constitutional law, making it procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(2).