Peter T. Zarella

The case involves a breach of contract action brought by plastic surgeon Charles D. Gianetti against Norwalk Hospital after the hospital failed to renew his clinical privileges for 1984 without following the procedural requirements in its bylaws. The trial court found the hospital liable and, following a hearing in damages, awarded the plaintiff compensation as a lost volume seller based on his lost income from hospital services without requiring mitigation from his other work. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the lost volume seller determination, the sufficiency of evidence for damages from 1984 through 1988, the exclusion of certain evidence, and the denial of prejudgment interest and attorney's fees. The court rejected the hospital's challenges to the damages calculation and the plaintiff's claims seeking additional relief.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In State v. Sheriff, bail bondsman Flavio Bail Bonds sought release from its obligation on $125,000 in surety bonds after criminal defendant David Sheriff, a Jamaican national, failed to appear for trial and fled to Jamaica. The trial court forfeited the bonds and denied Flavio's petition under Practice Book § 38-23, finding no good cause to relieve the surety. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the common-law standard from Taylor v. Taintor applies, under which a surety is released only if performance is rendered impossible by an act of God, the obligee, or the law; the state's decision not to pursue extradition did not meet this test, and the court lacked authority to compromise the bond amount rather than release the obligation entirely. The writ of error was dismissed.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a plaintiff suing Singer Asset Finance Company for allegedly aiding and abetting codefendant attorneys in breaching their fiduciary duties, along with related claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The Appellate Court had ruled that the allegations were insufficient to toll the statute of limitations via the continuous course of conduct doctrine and that CUTPA's three-year limitations period could not be tolled. The Connecticut Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal but limited review to those two specific issues regarding tolling and the statutes of limitations.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved disputes over the management of a family partnership and trusts, with claims including breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and unfair trade practices. The central issue was whether the plaintiffs' attorney had apparent authority to make and bind the plaintiffs to a global settlement offer during negotiations. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found that the attorney had such authority based on the plaintiffs' conduct and the attorney's assurances to opposing counsel, enforcing the agreement. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous and that the plaintiffs had no constitutional right to a jury trial on the equitable motions to enforce the settlement.

procedurefamily lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute among three brothers over their late father's estate and assets, in which the plaintiffs alleged that their brother (as trustee, executor, and general partner) had improperly transferred most of the assets into a limited partnership he controlled, breaching fiduciary duties and engaging in statutory theft under General Statutes § 52-564, among other claims. The trial court and Appellate Court applied the clear and convincing evidence standard to the statutory theft claim, but the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard governs such claims. The court reasoned from prior precedent, including Kilduff v. Adams, Inc. and Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., that civil actions for multiple damages under theft statutes do not carry the heightened burden traditionally applied to common-law fraud, and that the statute's text and policy support the lower standard.

criminal lawfamily lawpropertyprocedure

The case Maturo v. Maturo concerned the dissolution of a long marriage between Laura E. Maturo and Frank A. Maturo, parents of twin minor children, and the trial court's financial orders including alimony, child support, and division of nearly $18 million in marital assets. The defendant appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the plaintiff a fixed percentage of his annual net cash bonus as child support, a percentage of tax refunds as additional alimony and child support, and an unequal division of assets. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed in part the trial court's judgment, holding that the percentage-based child support order was improper because it failed to follow statutory guidelines when the defendant's income exceeded the schedule range, while also considering factors such as the children's best interests under General Statutes §§ 46b-84 and 46b-56.

family law

The case concerned a dispute arising from a public works contract for masonry work on a correctional facility, where Bacon Construction Company sought damages for project delays attributed to the Department of Public Works and its construction manager. After the department authorized change orders but failed to make final payments including retainage, Bacon submitted a claim under General Statutes § 4-61 and obtained a favorable arbitration award. The trial court confirmed the award and denied the department's motions to vacate and dismiss, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The court reasoned that the department had submitted the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator without objection, that the parties had agreed to arbitrate issues including sovereign immunity, and that the award therefore conformed to the submission.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, Coldwell Banker sued Computer Sciences Corporation over a disputed real estate commission arising from a lease transaction in which the parties had agreed to split fees with another broker, Cushman & Wakefield. After Coldwell Banker's request for arbitration through the Greater Hartford Association of Realtors was dismissed as untimely under the association's 180-day rule, the trial court treated the dismissal as an arbitration award, confirmed it under General Statutes § 52-417, and stayed the court proceedings. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the judgment, concluding that the association's dismissal of the arbitration request as untimely did not constitute an award subject to confirmation. The court also addressed related claims regarding the enforceability of arbitration provisions against a non-member third-party beneficiary but did not reach them after determining the dismissal issue was dispositive.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute between real estate brokerage firms over a commission from a lease transaction with Computer Sciences Corporation, where Coldwell Banker alleged that Cushman & Wakefield and its agents made false representations about exclusive contracts, leading Coldwell Banker to agree to a reduced share of the commission; Coldwell Banker filed claims for fraud, breach of contract, CUTPA violations, and related torts. After the defendants moved to compel arbitration under Greater Hartford Association of Realtors rules, the association dismissed Coldwell Banker's arbitration request as untimely, and the trial court treated that dismissal as an arbitration award, confirmed it under General Statutes § 52-417, and dismissed the court action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the association's timeliness dismissal did not qualify as an arbitration award subject to judicial confirmation because it was not a decision on the merits of the claims. The court further rejected arguments that the arbitration request was unrestricted or encompassed claims against the individual defendants and non-contract theories.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute between Envirotest Systems Corporation and the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles over the operation of vehicle emissions testing facilities, where Envirotest sought to compel arbitration for approximately $9 million in claimed damages due to the state's alleged failure to enforce compliance programs. The commissioner moved to dismiss the application to proceed with arbitration, arguing that sovereign immunity barred the suit. The trial court denied the motion, finding that General Statutes § 14-164c(e) impliedly authorized the commissioner to waive immunity in such negotiated agreements. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute's plain language does not waive the state's sovereign immunity from suit by necessary implication, as required for such waivers. The court emphasized strict statutory construction and declined to consider extratextual evidence or contract provisions when the text was unambiguous.

business & regulatoryprocedureenvironment

The case involved two sisters who signed a written agreement in 1995 to share equally any winnings from legal gambling activities such as slot machines, cards, and lottery tickets. After one sister received half of a $500,000 Powerball prize and refused to share it, the other sued for breach of contract seeking half the winnings. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant, ruling the agreement void under General Statutes § 52-553, which voids certain wagering contracts. The Appellate Court reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that § 52-553 does not apply because the agreement was not a wagering contract induced by consideration of money won at a game but instead rested on mutual promises to share winnings from legalized gambling.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

In State v. Singleton, the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree after stabbing the victim during a fight that began over a drug debt, and he raised a self-defense claim at trial. The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on whether the defendant used deadly or nondeadly force during the altercation. The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court and reinstated the conviction, concluding that the jury instructions on self-defense were proper because the defendant's justification claim turned on whether his use of deadly force (the fatal knife wound) was reasonable, rendering any dispute over nondeadly force during the preceding struggle irrelevant. The court also rejected the defendant's alternative arguments regarding instructions on the initial aggressor exception and manslaughter.

criminal law

The case concerned petitioner Lloyd G. Morgan, Jr., who filed a petition seeking certification to appeal a decision of the Connecticut Appellate Court in a matter against the Commissioner of Correction. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the petition for certification to appeal. The court's order provided no further explanation or analysis of the underlying claims. Justice Zarella did not participate in the consideration or decision.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a state employee who filed suit against the attorney general's office and two supervisors alleging age, sex, and disability discrimination in a denied promotion and hostile work environment under Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act, specifically §§ 46a-60(a)(1) and 46a-70(a). After a federal district court dismissed her related federal claims on summary judgment, finding no discrimination and that the failure-to-promote claim was time-barred, the state trial court dismissed the remaining state claims on grounds of sovereign immunity and collateral estoppel. The Appellate Court affirmed, but the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the claims were barred by collateral estoppel due to the federal court's prior findings on the same facts and issues, while clarifying that the Appellate Court had misinterpreted the sovereign immunity provisions of § 46a-60. The court therefore affirmed the judgment in part and reversed it in part.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In State v. Marquez, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of felony murder, two counts of first-degree robbery, and attempted first-degree robbery arising from a December 2003 home invasion and shooting in Hartford. He appealed on due-process grounds, arguing that the trial court should have suppressed two eyewitness identifications because the police used an unnecessarily suggestive photographic procedure and the identifications were unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the convictions on the alternative ground that the identification procedures were not unnecessarily suggestive, so the due-process analysis did not require suppression. The court reached this conclusion after reviewing the trial court's factual findings regarding the lighting, proximity, and opportunities for the witnesses to observe the perpetrators during the crime.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case concerned whether St. Joseph's Living Center, a nonprofit skilled nursing facility affiliated with the Roman Catholic Diocese, qualified for a property tax exemption under Connecticut General Statutes § 12-81(7) and related provisions for the 2003-2005 tax years after the town assessor denied its application on the grounds that it was not used exclusively for charitable purposes and provided no free care. The trial court upheld the denial, finding the Center was not a charity and distinguishing it from prior tax-exempt cases based on eleven factual characteristics. On appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that numerous trial court factual findings were clearly erroneous and that its legal framework was incomplete, resulting in a flawed application of the law to the facts regarding charitable purpose, organization, and operation. The court also addressed related claims concerning the facility's chapel under § 12-81(13) but focused its reversal on the main exemption analysis.

taxesreligious libertyhealthcareproperty

In State v. Bonner, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of murder as a principal or accessory, carrying a pistol without a permit, and criminal possession of a pistol, based on evidence that he and another man fired at a drug transaction victim in Hartford in 2002, killing him. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his speedy trial motion, excluding him from discussions about potential conflicts of interest in the public defender's office, and admitting the murder weapon along with related chain-of-custody testimony. The court affirmed the convictions, concluding that the speedy trial motion was properly denied due to excludable time periods, that any absence from chambers conferences did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights given the record and lack of demonstrated prejudice, and that the evidentiary rulings were correct under standards of relevance and hearsay. The opinion addresses procedural and evidentiary issues arising in the criminal prosecution but finds no reversible error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether the trial court plainly erred by sentencing defendant Kenneth Myers as a repeat offender under General Statutes § 21a-277(a) without first obtaining a plea or conducting a trial on the prior conviction as required by Practice Book § 42-2. The defendant had been convicted after a jury trial on narcotics charges and a hearing on a probation violation; the state presented a certified copy of his 2003 conviction for the same offense, which the defense did not contest, and the trial court proceeded to enhanced sentencing. The Appellate Court vacated the sentence, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the omission did not constitute plain error because the prior conviction was undisputed, supported by unchallenged evidence including judicial notice, and did not deprive the defendant of any constitutional rights.

criminal lawprocedure

This case was a collection action by Connecticut Light and Power Company against Bess P. Gilmore and related parties for unpaid electric utility bills exceeding $21,000 at a residence also used for business purposes. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff following a jury trial on the remaining claims after directing verdicts on others. The defendant appealed on multiple grounds including references to excluded evidence, juror nondisclosure of relationships, admission of business records, jury instructions regarding billing rates, and the award of offer of judgment interest. The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the judgment, finding no reversible error in the trial court's evidentiary rulings, instructions, or other procedural decisions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned whether the Connecticut Supreme Court's 2004 interpretation of General Statutes § 18-98d in the Hunter, Cox, and Harris decisions—holding that presentence confinement credit applies only once to concurrent sentences imposed on different days—could be applied retroactively to recalculate the release date of a prisoner already in custody. The petitioner, who had received such credit on multiple concurrent sentences from separate dockets, challenged the recalculation on grounds that it violated his statutory right to credit, operated as an ex post facto law under due process, infringed double jeopardy protections, delegated sentencing authority improperly, and resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the habeas court's denial of relief, concluding that the statute mandates single application of credit regardless of the timing of sentencing, that retroactive application did not enlarge punishment or punish twice for the same offense, and that no improper delegation or ineffective assistance occurred.

criminal lawprocedure