Nancy E. Rice

The case concerned whether police officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of Adolph E. Funez-Paiagua after observing him on the private property of a closed auto body shop at 1:15 a.m. in an area with recent increases in crime; when approached, he moved away, a loud crash was heard, and he was seen carrying bags. The officers stopped him, identified him, discovered outstanding warrants, arrested him, and found a gun in his bag, leading to a charge of possession of a weapon by a previous offender. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the gun, ruling that the stop lacked reasonable suspicion based on the facts known at the time of initial contact. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the totality of the circumstances—including the time, location, recent criminal activity, and the defendant's flight with the accompanying crash—provided reasonable suspicion justifying the stop under the Fourth Amendment and Colorado Constitution. The court emphasized that only the existence of reasonable suspicion was disputed and that the stop's purpose and scope were not at issue.

criminal lawprocedure

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Crossgrove, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed a negligence claim where plaintiff Larry Crossgrove was injured by a falling garage door at a Wal-Mart store, incurring medical expenses billed at nearly $250,000 but paid only $40,000 by his insurer. The trial court had admitted evidence of the $40,000 payment to help determine the reasonable value of medical services, leading to a reduced damages award after applying the collateral source statute. The Supreme Court held that the trial court should have excluded this evidence under the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the common law collateral source doctrine, which bars admission of payments from collateral sources like insurance. The court reasoned that this rule prevents juries from considering such payments when assessing damages, affirming the court of appeals' reversal and remand for a new trial.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case arose from a negligence action filed by Donald Francis Smith against Michael D. Jeppsen following an automobile accident, in which Smith sought damages including past and future medical expenses. The parties disputed whether evidence of amounts paid by Smith's insurance company for medical services could be admitted at trial to determine the reasonable value of those services. The Colorado Supreme Court held that section 10-1-135, C.R.S. (2011), applies prospectively to actions with pending recovery as of its effective date of August 11, 2010, and that subsection 10-1-135(10)(a) codifies the pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule, requiring exclusion of such collateral source payment evidence. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court's order barring admission of the insurance payments and discharged the rule to show cause.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a challenge by the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel to the Public Utilities Commission's decision raising the maximum allowable rates for basic local exchange telephone services from the prior statutory cap of $14.88 per month. The district court reversed the PUC, finding that it had failed to make adequate findings on all statutorily required factors and that its order lacked sufficient evidentiary support. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the district court, holding that the PUC had regularly pursued its authority by considering the changes in nationwide average prices, cost increases, and other mandated factors, and that substantial evidence in the record supported the PUC's phased rate increases to $16.52 and then $17.00. The Court concluded that the PUC properly applied the governing statute by treating the nationwide price data as one factor rather than a strict ceiling and by rejecting certain cost evidence as unreliable while still finding some cost growth beyond the 11 percent national average.

business & regulatory

The case involved a challenge to the Colorado Ballot Title Setting Board's determination that proposed Initiative 2011-2012 No. 45, which sought to amend the state constitution to expand public control over waters, satisfied the single-subject requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed the Board's decision, holding that the initiative and its titles addressed only the single subject of "public control of waters." The core reasoning was that all provisions of the initiative necessarily and properly related to this subject, including expanding the scope of appropriable water, requiring return of water unimpaired, and establishing state stewardship, and that the titles fairly and clearly expressed this subject.

electionsenvironmentproperty

The case involved a challenge to the Ballot Title Setting Board's approval of Initiative 2011-2012 No. 3, which aimed to establish a public trust doctrine for Colorado's natural stream waters, including subordinating water rights and allowing public access to stream banks. Petitioner argued that the initiative and its titles violated the single-subject requirement of the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the Title Board's decision, holding that both the initiative and titles properly relate to the single subject of "the public's rights in the waters of natural streams."

electionsenvironmentproperty

This case involved a discovery dispute arising from consolidated civil lawsuits in which plaintiffs alleged legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty against a law firm and its attorneys stemming from their representation in a real estate transaction. During discovery, the plaintiffs sought documents detailing one attorney's compensation from the firm and the methodology used to determine it, which the defendants resisted. The Colorado Supreme Court held that litigants possess a personal privacy right in such financial records and that disclosure may be compelled only if the requesting party establishes relevance to the case, a compelling need, that the information is unavailable from other sources, and that the least intrusive means are being used. The Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply this test and instead placing the burden on the defendants, and it therefore made the rule absolute, reversed the order compelling discovery and awarding fees, and remanded for further proceedings.

proceduretorts & liability

In Townsend v. People, the petitioner was convicted of class 3 felony escape after failing to report to his parole office or designated homeless shelter upon release from jail while subject to an intensive supervision program (ISP) as a condition of his parole. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment upholding the conviction. The court held that the trial court's jury instructions correctly set forth the elements of escape by combining the general escape statute with the ISP provision that deems failure to remain within extended limits of confinement as escape, that the ISP escape statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Townsend, and that his separation of powers and nondelegation challenges were waived. The core reasoning focused on the plain language of the statutes, the sufficiency of notice provided to Townsend through his parole agreements, and application of waiver and invited-error doctrines to the jury-instruction claims.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved bonding agents Jason Oram and Devon Weinstein who entered a Denver residence they believed to be the home of a bonded individual who had failed to appear in court, leading to their convictions for second degree burglary and felony menacing. The Colorado Supreme Court examined whether a common law bonding agent's privilege existed in the state that would justify such an entry and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the burglary charges. The court held that the common law bonding agent's privilege does not exist in Colorado. It further determined there was sufficient evidence that Oram and Weinstein knew their entry was unlawful, thereby sustaining the burglary convictions, and affirmed the court of appeals.

criminal law

This case involved bonding agents Devon Scott Weinstein and his partner who were charged with second degree burglary and felony menacing after entering a private residence to search for a bonded individual. The defendants relied on a claimed common law bonding agent's privilege to justify the entry, argued that they lacked the required knowledge that the entry was unlawful, and challenged the trial court's rejection of their proposed jury instruction on consent. The court held that the common law bonding agent's privilege does not exist in Colorado, that the tendered jury instructions were proper, that sufficient evidence supported the knowingly element of the burglary charge, and that the consent instruction was correctly denied. The court therefore affirmed the court of appeals.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a defendant charged with second degree kidnapping and sexual assault who sought to introduce evidence of the victim's five prior arrests for soliciting prostitution from undercover officers, none involving actual sexual contact, to support a consent defense. The Colorado Supreme Court held that evidence of past solicitations of prostitution qualifies as "sexual conduct" protected by the Rape Shield Statute, section 18-3-407, even absent sexual contact or intercourse. The court reasoned that the statute's broad term "sexual conduct" encompasses more behaviors than narrower statutory definitions like "sexual contact" or "sexual intercourse" used elsewhere in the criminal code, creating a presumption of inadmissibility subject to specific exceptions and procedures. As a result, the trial court was required to conduct an in-camera evidentiary hearing under section 18-3-407(2) to determine relevance to a material issue before any admission, rather than directly allowing the evidence under CRE 404(b). The court made the rule absolute and remanded for that hearing.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a medical malpractice claim by the Estate of Catherine Ford against Dr. Danny Eicher and his practice, alleging that the obstetrician caused permanent brachial plexus injury to the newborn during delivery involving shoulder dystocia. The trial court excluded expert testimony from Drs. Cooper and Ouzounian supporting the intrauterine contraction theory of causation after applying a reasonable medical probability threshold and finding the theory unreliable under a Shreck analysis. The court of appeals reversed, holding the testimony admissible under CRE 702. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court used an incorrect preliminary legal standard, that the experts' opinions were reliable and relevant based on scientific methods and supporting authorities, and that exclusion was error.

proceduretorts & liability

In Cropper v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of section 16-3-309(5), which permits forensic lab reports to be admitted without the analyst's live testimony unless a party notifies the prosecution at least ten days before trial to produce the analyst. After a jury convicted David Lee Cropper of second-degree burglary and theft based partly on a shoe-print report, he argued that admitting the report without the technician's testimony violated his confrontation rights because the technician was unavailable. The court held the statute constitutional as applied, ruling that Cropper waived his confrontation rights by failing to make a timely request under the statute's procedures. The decision relied on prior precedent establishing that such notice-and-demand requirements are valid and that inaction by defense counsel can constitute a waiver.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In People v. Rector, the defendant was convicted by a jury of felony child abuse after her foster child suffered severe head injuries while in her care. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, finding that the trial court failed to adequately assess the reliability of expert medical testimony and did not instruct the jury on the distinction between medical and legal definitions of child abuse. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert testimony because the defendant did not properly request a Shreck hearing or object to the specific testimony at trial, and the experts' qualifications were established without contradiction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a breach of contract claim by Ellen Yeiser against Ferrellgas after its failure to deliver propane caused frozen pipes and water damage to her home. Yeiser's insurer Farmers paid $212,071.94 for repairs and then settled its subrogation claim with Ferrellgas for $172,657.55; Yeiser later obtained a jury verdict of $314,823.21. The trial court set off the full $212,071.94 amount against the verdict, compared the reduced judgment to Ferrellgas's pretrial settlement offer when awarding costs, and calculated prejudgment interest in stages. The court of appeals reversed on the setoff amount and costs. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the full amount paid by Farmers must be set off because Ferrellgas had contributed to that payment, and remanded for recalculation of prejudgment interest on the post-setoff amount and redetermination of costs.

procedurepropertytorts & liability

The case concerns a dispute over attorney fees and costs in ongoing water rights litigation involving the Eureka Ditch among adjacent landowners Anderson, Sebesta, and Pursell, who hold shares in the water right under a Joint Water Use and Maintenance Agreement. The court affirmed the water court's award of fees to Pursell as the prevailing party under the Water Agreement for the Final Decree on Anderson's application, and to both Sebesta and Pursell for defending Anderson's Motion to Enforce, which lacked substantial justification under section 13-17-102. It reversed the award of fees related to defending Anderson's appeal and pursuing the underlying fee award, finding those not authorized. The core reasoning focused on the contractual prevailing-party provision applying only to the Final Decree stage, the statutory basis for fees on frivolous motions, and the limits on fee awards for appellate and fee-pursuit work.

propertyprocedure

In this case, defendant Darrell Lee Loper was charged with sexual assault in El Paso County District Court based largely on statements from the victim's mother, Ernestine Richardson, a probation officer in the same judicial district who had a strained relationship with Loper and allegedly influenced the charges and related events. Loper moved to disqualify the district attorney's office under C.R.S. section 20-1-107(2), arguing that Richardson's involvement created special circumstances making a fair trial unlikely, and the trial court granted the motion, citing factors like Richardson's role as the driving force behind the charges and the need to investigate her actions. On interlocutory appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that no such special circumstances existed because there was no evidence that Loper would not receive a fair trial even if Richardson influenced the prosecution, and that disqualifying a prosecutor is a drastic remedy that should be narrowly applied. The court emphasized the assumption that district attorneys act lawfully and warned against broadly allowing disqualification based on a victim's relation to judicial employees.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Ezamika Brown, who was convicted of attempted first degree murder after allegedly shooting his girlfriend three times. Brown maintained his innocence throughout trial, testifying he was not at the scene, but requested jury instructions on the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder and on voluntary intoxication as a partial defense. The trial court denied the requests on the ground that a defendant claiming innocence cannot seek inconsistent instructions. The court of appeals held that Colorado statute section 18-1-408(6) permits such inconsistent instructions when supported by a rational basis in the evidence, but concluded no such basis existed here, rendering the trial court's error harmless; the supreme court affirmed that judgment.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned a first-degree murder prosecution in which Jennifer Wend shot her roommate Michael Adamson and claimed self-defense at trial. The prosecutor repeatedly used the word "lie" and its variants in opening and closing statements to characterize Wend's statements to police during interrogations. The Colorado Supreme Court held that, under its precedent, such language is categorically improper, and that the repeated use here prejudiced the fundamental fairness of the trial because Wend's credibility was central to her defense. The court therefore found reversible plain error and reversed the conviction, remanding for a new trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a Colorado nonprofit organization suing a Rhode Island-based web designer and his company for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation after they disagreed over development of e-learning modules. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing all their work occurred outside Colorado. The trial court denied the motion, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Colorado through hundreds of email and telephone communications, contract negotiations involving the Colorado plaintiff, and alleged injury occurring in the state, thereby satisfying both Colorado's long-arm statute and constitutional due process requirements.

procedure