Monica Marquez

In Wood v. People, David Wood was convicted of manslaughter after a jury trial for fatally shooting a person during a drug transaction in his apartment; he had sought pretrial dismissal based on immunity under Colorado's "make-my-day" statute, section 18-1-704.5, but the trial court denied the motion and Wood did not seek immediate review. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' ruling that a pretrial denial of immunity under the statute is not reviewable on direct appeal after trial. The court reasoned that the statute creates conditional pretrial immunity rather than affecting subject matter jurisdiction, that the jury's verdict subsumes any pretrial ruling on the same factual conditions, and that the proper mechanism for challenging such a pretrial order is an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21 to avoid the burden of an unnecessary trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether Colorado's Uninsured Motorist Act required Allstate to offer UM/UIM coverage when issuing a personal umbrella policy that provided excess liability coverage for occurrences involving land vehicles. After an accident involving an underinsured driver, the insureds sued to have UM/UIM coverage judicially added to their umbrella policy because Allstate had not separately offered it. The trial court dismissed the claim, the court of appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed as well. The Court held that an umbrella policy is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy" under section 10-4-609(1)(a), so the statutory offer requirement did not apply. The decision rested on the statute's plain language and Colorado's minimum-recovery insurance framework, which distinguishes primary auto policies linked to specific vehicles from broad excess-liability umbrella policies.

business & regulatory

In People v. Hernandez, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed whether a driver involved in an accident causing injury could be convicted of leaving the scene under sections 42-4-1601(1) and 42-4-1603(1) solely for failing to affirmatively identify himself as the driver at the scene. The defendant remained at the accident but did not state he was driving; instead, his girlfriend provided his name and address while claiming she had been the driver. The trial court convicted him, but the court of appeals reversed, interpreting the statutes as not requiring explicit self-identification as the driver if other identifying information is supplied. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the statutes mandate the driver to identify himself as such when that role is not reasonably apparent from the circumstances, based on the plain statutory language emphasizing the "driver's" name and address and the provisions' purpose of ensuring accountability.

criminal law

The case involved well owners in Colorado challenging cease-and-desist orders from the State Engineer that barred them from pumping tributary groundwater from their decreed irrigation wells (with appropriation dates from 1945-1966) until they obtained a court-approved plan for augmentation. The well owners sued in inverse condemnation, claiming the orders amounted to an unconstitutional taking of their vested property rights under the Colorado Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the claims, first holding that the dispute concerned the right to use water and thus fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the water court. On the merits, the court held there was no taking because the owners possessed only a priority date subject to the prior appropriation system and senior rights; the orders merely enforced that system by curtailing out-of-priority diversions.

propertyenvironment

The case involved landowners who owned irrigation wells with decreed water rights challenging the Colorado State Engineer's cease and desist orders that prohibited them from pumping water until they obtained a plan for augmentation. The well owners argued that the orders constituted an unconstitutional taking of their vested property rights under the Colorado and U.S. Constitutions, entitling them to compensation. The water court dismissed the claims, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claims were water matters within the water court's exclusive jurisdiction and that no taking occurred because the owners' water rights were always subject to the prior appropriation system and senior rights holders. The court reasoned that the owners possessed only a priority date for beneficial use, not an unlimited right to water, and the orders merely enforced existing legal limitations by curtailing out-of-priority diversions.

propertyenvironmentprocedure

In this case, Arapahoe County prosecutors charged defendant David Shackley with voting twice in the 2009 election by casting mail-in ballots in both Arapahoe and Adams Counties after changing his registration. Shackley moved to transfer venue, arguing it was proper only in Adams County where he cast the second ballot, and the trial court granted the transfer. On interlocutory appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that venue was proper in Arapahoe County under section 18-1-202(1), which allows trial in any county where an act in furtherance of the offense occurred. The court reasoned that Shackley's first vote in Arapahoe County constituted such an act because it was necessary to and closely related to the offense of voting twice. The case was remanded with directions to return it to Arapahoe County.

criminal lawelections