Allison H. Eid

The case concerned whether the University of Colorado Board of Regents' policy banning concealed handguns on campus (except by certified law enforcement) could stand against a challenge by students holding valid state concealed-carry permits. The students sued, claiming the policy violated the Colorado Concealed Carry Act (CCA) and the state constitutional right to bear arms; the district court dismissed the complaint, but the court of appeals reversed. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the students had stated a valid claim under the CCA. The Court reasoned that the statute's stated goal of creating uniform statewide standards, its authorization to carry "in all areas of the state" except those expressly listed, and its narrow exclusion only for K-12 schools (not universities) demonstrated the legislature's intent to occupy the field and divest the Board of authority to impose its own restrictions. Because the claim succeeded on statutory grounds, the Court did not reach the constitutional issue.

guns

The case involved a dispute over whether the Colorado Division of Employment and Training could combine the unemployment tax accounts of five related Accord Human Resources entities after one transferred hundreds of Colorado employees to another with a lower tax rate, thereby reducing the group's overall tax liability. The Division assessed over $500,000 in back taxes by treating the entities as a single employer under section 8-70-114(1), but a hearing officer ruled for Accord, the Industrial Claim Appeals Office reversed in favor of the Division, and the court of appeals reinstated the hearing officer's decision. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute does not authorize the Division to collapse separate employer accounts for tax assessment purposes. The Court reasoned that the plain language of section 8-70-114(1) merely deems individuals performing services for an employing unit with multiple establishments to be employed by a single unit, and it applies only to benefit determinations rather than employer tax accounts.

business & regulatorylabor & employmenttaxes

In an arbitration between Colorado Mills and SunOpta Grains & Foods over a joint venture dispute, an arbitrator issued subpoenas for business records to two nonparty companies, SK Food and Adams Vegetable Oil, located in California and North Dakota. SunOpta asked a Colorado district court to enforce the subpoenas after the companies refused to comply, and the court granted the request under Colorado’s version of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act and the long-arm statute. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the district court lacked authority to enforce the subpoenas. It reasoned that, as a matter of state sovereignty, Colorado courts have no power to compel out-of-state nonparties to respond to civil subpoenas, and any enforcement must instead come from the courts of the states where the discovery is located, consistent with long-standing precedent. The court therefore vacated the enforcement order.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, stepfather D.P.H. petitioned the juvenile court to adopt minor child A.B. without the consent of biological father J.L.B., alleging that the father had abandoned the child by having no contact for over twenty-one months before the filing. The juvenile court found abandonment and granted the petition, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the father's filing of parenting-time motions in the dissolution case precluded an abandonment finding and required the adoption proceeding to be stayed until those motions were resolved. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, ruling that abandonment under § 19-5-203(1)(d)(II) turns on whether the parent's intent during the twelve months preceding the adoption petition, viewed under the totality of circumstances, was to abandon the child—a factual determination for the trial court that cannot be barred as a matter of law by the mere filing of parenting-time motions. The Court further held that a juvenile court need not delay adoption proceedings to await resolution of related motions in dissolution court, provided it adequately considers those motions when assessing abandonment. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to apply the proper totality-of-circumstances analysis.

family law

The case involved the City and County of Broomfield's application for conditional appropriative rights of exchange on the South Platte River and Big Dry Creek, based on seventeen sources of substitute water supply, nine of which it owned or controlled and eight of which it did not. Opposers argued that the application should be treated as a proposed augmentation plan, which would require Broomfield to own or control all substitute sources at the time of the decree to prevent injury to other water rights. The water court instead classified the application as one for a conditional water right and applied the first-step and can-and-will doctrines developed for governmental entities, approving the nine owned sources plus two of the unowned sources where Broomfield showed progress toward acquisition. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, holding that such exchange applications are conditional water rights rather than augmentation plans and that the required analysis applies on a source-by-source basis without mandating full ownership upfront.

environmentproperty

In Pellman v. People, the defendant was convicted under Colorado law of sexual assault on a child aged fifteen to seventeen while in a position of trust, based on unlawful sexual contact with a fifteen-year-old victim over the summer of 2005. Pellman argued there was insufficient evidence he occupied a position of trust at the exact times of the contact because he was not performing a specific supervisory task then, claiming any such role was limited to discrete events like chaperoning a church trip. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the statute requires only that the defendant occupy a position of trust at the time of the unlawful act and that this can arise from an ongoing, continuous supervisory relationship rather than a momentary task. The court found sufficient evidence that Pellman had assumed such a continuous role through his activities as a church youth volunteer and family friend, which extended through the period of the contact until the victim disclosed the relationship to her parents.

criminal law

This case involved Lucht's Concrete Pumping seeking to enforce a noncompetition agreement against its former at-will employee Tracy Horner, who had signed the agreement after beginning work without receiving any pay increase, promotion, or other new benefits, and later joined a competitor. The trial court granted summary judgment to Horner on the breach of contract claims, finding the agreement unenforceable for lack of consideration, and the court of appeals affirmed on that ground. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that an employer's forbearance from terminating an existing at-will employee constitutes adequate consideration because it involves relinquishing a legal right, consistent with prior precedent on at-will employment benefits. The court remanded for assessment of whether the agreement was reasonable under the circumstances.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenged a Denver District Court order suppressing statements made by defendant Cirilo Gonzalez-Zamora to Florida police after his arrest on an open container violation and discovery of a Colorado murder warrant. The trial court had suppressed the statements, finding the Miranda waiver and subsequent statements involuntary based on factors including a poor-quality audio recording, lack of verbal responses or video evidence, rapid start of questioning after signing the waiver form, and an abrupt end to the recording. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the waiver and statements were voluntary because the prosecution met its burden to show no coercive government conduct overbore the defendant's will, as the interview was conducted calmly and professionally in Spanish with explanations provided for any apparent confusion, and the cited factors did not indicate involuntariness. The court emphasized that the totality of circumstances showed the defendant understood his rights and made the statements freely.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a quiet title dispute over a small parcel of land between the Munozes and Measners, which led to additional claims by the Munozes for trespass, nuisance, outrageous conduct, and slander of title. After the trial court dismissed some claims on summary judgment and others for failure to prosecute, the Measners sought attorney fees under Colorado statute, arguing the claims lacked substantial justification; the trial court denied the request after finding the Munozes had attempted to present evidence in good faith. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to analyze each claim individually under the factors in section 13-17-103(1). The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, ruling that the plain language of section 13-17-103(1) requires specific findings on the statutory factors only when granting fees, not when denying them, and that the trial court's denial was supported by sufficient findings allowing for appellate review.

propertyprocedure

This case concerned whether criminal charges against defendant Corey Hills for battery, criminal mischief, and false imprisonment must be dismissed for violation of Colorado's 90-day statutory speedy trial rule in municipal court. The trial court had continued the June 8, 2007 trial date on its own motion due to docket congestion and offered July 6 (within the deadline) as a new date, but defense counsel rejected it due to a scheduling conflict and proposed later dates, resulting in an August 3 trial. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' ruling that the delay was attributable to the defendant and thus excludable from the speedy trial calculation. The court reasoned that when a trial court makes a reasonable effort to reschedule within the deadline but defense counsel's unavailability forces the trial beyond it, the resulting delay does not require dismissal under C.M.C.R. 248(b).

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the prosecution's interlocutory appeal from a trial court's suppression order in a DUI case against defendant Ivan Zhuk. The district court dismissed the appeal as untimely under Crim. P. 37.1, interpreting the ten-day filing period as calendar days. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that Crim. P. 37.1(g) requires the time period to be calculated under C.A.R. 26(a), which excludes intervening Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays for periods of less than eleven days. The court reasoned that no specific computation rule is prescribed in Crim. P. 37.1 itself, so the appellate rules govern, making the People's filing timely. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the appeal.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved whether a trial court could impose contempt sanctions on a bankruptcy debtor for failing to pay credit card debts as required by a divorce decree, after the debtor filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the automatic stay in bankruptcy barred the contempt proceedings because they did not fall within the exceptions for domestic support obligations from non-estate property or for criminal actions. The court reasoned that there was no showing the obligation could be paid from non-estate property, as the debtor lacked funds at the time, and the contempt was civil in nature since it could be purged by payment, aimed to benefit a third party, and lacked a required finding of ability to pay. Accordingly, the trial court's contempt sanction was vacated.

family lawcriminal lawprocedure

This case involves the dissolution of a twenty-seven-year marriage between Antoinette and Chuck Thornhill, focusing on the award of temporary maintenance to the wife and the valuation of the husband's interest in his closely held oil and gas company, NRG Services, LLC, for purposes of dividing marital property. The trial court awarded temporary maintenance and enforced a separation agreement applying a thirty-three percent marketability discount to the business interest, but the court of appeals reversed the maintenance award and addressed the discount issue. The Colorado Supreme Court held that trial courts have discretion under the equitable distribution statute to apply marketability discounts when valuing ownership interests in closely held corporations in divorce proceedings, as the considerations from prior minority shareholder cases do not apply here. It further held that the parties' standard of living during the marriage may be considered in determining a spouse's threshold entitlement to temporary maintenance under the relevant statute, which requires assessing whether the spouse lacks sufficient property for reasonable needs and cannot support themselves through appropriate employment. The court affirmed the lack of a per se rule against marketability discounts but reversed the reversal of the maintenance award, remanding for further proceedings.

family lawproperty

This case involved a dispute over ownership of land in Weld County, Colorado, where petitioners Lake Canal Reservoir Company, Alden Hill, and Ann Deseran sued to quiet title and invalidate a 1997 tax deed conveying a reservoir tract to respondents Douglas and Terese Beethe, alleging defects in the tax sale process. The trial court ruled the deed void due to inadequate notice, improper tax assessment on the reservoir property, and inaccurate property description, allowing the suit to proceed despite the five-year statute of limitations under § 39-12-101. The court of appeals reversed, finding the deed voidable rather than void because it was not invalid on its face. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that a tax deed is void (and thus exempt from the statute of limitations) only if the taxing entity lacked jurisdiction or authority to issue it, and that the alleged defects here did not meet that standard. The case was remanded for further proceedings applying the statute of limitations to the voidable deed.

propertytaxesprocedure

Adams County sued the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment after it issued a radioactive materials license and hazardous waste permit to Clean Harbors Deer Trail without first requiring the company to obtain a Certificate of Designation from the County. The trial courts dismissed the suits for lack of standing, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County satisfied the Wimberly standing test by alleging an injury in fact to its statutory authority to approve or deny the Certificate of Designation under the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Act and the Hazardous Waste Siting Act. The Court further found that the County was not acting as a subordinate state agency in this context and therefore met additional prudential standing requirements.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved two married couples who purchased property as tenants in common and donated a conservation easement valued at $154,700, each claiming a $77,350 state income tax credit under the 1999 Conservation Easement Tax Credit Act. The Colorado Department of Revenue issued notices of deficiency, determining that the couples had exceeded the statutory $100,000 credit limit per donation. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed the court of appeals, holding that while the statute permits a credit to each taxpayer who donates all or part of an easement's value, it expressly limits the total credit amount to $100,000 per donation, so the claimed credits were improper.

taxespropertyenvironment

In this interlocutory appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed a trial court order disqualifying the entire Eighteenth Judicial District Attorney's Office from prosecuting defendant Alejandro Perez, an inmate charged with first-degree murder of another inmate at Limon Correctional Facility, where the prosecution sought the death penalty. The trial court had found special circumstances under section 20-1-107(2) based on two prosecutors' prior private representations of Perez and a potential witness/alternate suspect, an allegedly inadequate witness list, and an improper funding arrangement with the Department of Corrections. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that disqualification of an entire office requires a showing that confidential information from prior representations was or could have been passed within the office, which was absent here, and that the other cited issues did not constitute special circumstances rendering a fair trial unlikely. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Bruce Platt was convicted of sexual assault under Colorado statute section 18-3-402(1)(b) after digitally penetrating a victim who was asleep or in a state of partial sleep. Platt argued on appeal that because the victim was asleep, the charge should have been brought under the more specific subsection (h) for physically helpless victims, which would have allowed him to raise a consent defense and seek a related jury instruction. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The Court held that when conduct reasonably falls under two overlapping statutes, the prosecution has discretion to choose which one to pursue, and here the evidence was sufficient to support conviction under subsection (b) because the sleeping victim could not appraise the nature of the conduct. It further reasoned that, per precedent, the elements of subsection (b) necessarily negate consent, so no separate consent defense or instruction was required.

criminal lawprocedure

In this breach of contract action, Denny Construction sued the City and County of Denver's Board of Water Commissioners after the Board declared Denny in default on a construction project, which caused Denny's surety to reduce and then eliminate its bonding capacity, preventing Denny from bidding on public works contracts that made up roughly half its business. A jury found that the Board had breached the contract and awarded Denny $845,000 in lost profits attributable to the impaired bonding capacity. The court of appeals reversed, holding that such lost profits were speculative as a matter of law and were not reasonably foreseeable because the Board lacked actual knowledge of the specific loss. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, concluding that lost profits from impaired bonding capacity are not speculative per se but must be proven with reasonable certainty, and that the proper foreseeability test is whether the Board knew or should have known that such loss would probably occur, then remanded the case.

business & regulatory

In this case, a driver was stopped for a cracked windshield, and after the trooper issued a warning and returned his documents, the driver consented to a search of his vehicle that uncovered marijuana hidden in the spare tire. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, ruling that the continued encounter amounted to an unconstitutional detention without reasonable suspicion and that the consent was its tainted fruit. On interlocutory appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the stop had become a consensual encounter once the driver's documents were returned and he agreed to further questioning and the search. The court reasoned that the brief additional questions about weapons or narcotics, the absence of coercive tactics, and the driver's voluntary consent meant no seizure occurred under the Fourth Amendment, so reasonable suspicion was not required. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure