Cites Tulare Water Co. v. State Water Commission — APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco. George E. Crothers, Judge. Reversed and affirmed.
The case concerned Bernard P. Calhoun, who was indicted by a grand jury on three counts of conspiracy involving the solicitation of campaign contributions from liquor licensees for the reelection of Board of Equalization member William G. Bonelli, as well as agreements to use official position for private gain and to prepare false records. Calhoun petitioned the Supreme Court of California for a writ of prohibition to bar the superior court from proceeding to trial on the indictment. The court reviewed the evidence presented to the grand jury, which detailed a coordinated effort in multiple counties to collect funds from retail and wholesale licensees through lists, scripted solicitations, and payments directed to designated entities rather than official campaign funds. Applying standards from prior cases on the sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy charges, the opinion analyzed whether the facts supported the specific offenses alleged under the Penal Code and Elections Code.
This case involves a dispute among three brothers over the dissolution and winding up of their citrus ranch partnership, originally formed in 1944. After a prior appeal established that Charles Vangel wrongfully caused the dissolution effective June 15, 1950, and that his brothers could purchase his interest, the trial court on retrial determined the value of each partner's share at 23.96 percent for Charles and apportioned post-dissolution profits accordingly while denying him compensation for services. On appeal, the court affirmed the valuation of partnership interests, the total profits to be distributed, and the allocation of audit costs, but reversed the profit division because it failed to account for profits attributable to Charles's services and his share of the assets. The judgment was reversed with directions to reapportion profits equitably and affirmed in all other respects.
The case involved a lumber company whose employees had declined union representation; the defendant unions picketed and threatened the company's customers to force execution of a closed-shop agreement that would require union membership as a condition of employment. The trial court found the conduct violated state law, awarded $1,000 in damages, and issued a broad injunction. The California Supreme Court held that the challenged activity constituted an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act, that the NLRB possessed exclusive primary jurisdiction over such conduct, and that state courts therefore lacked authority to enjoin the activity or award damages even though the Board had declined to exercise jurisdiction. The court reasoned that federal preemption principles, as articulated in cases such as Garner and Weber, barred state remedies when the conduct fell within the federal regulatory scheme.
The case involved Charles H. Benton, Inc., a company in the paint and roofing businesses, facing picketing and work stoppages by painters', truck drivers', and roofers' unions aimed at compelling execution of a closed-shop contract without employee designation of the unions as bargaining agents. The trial court enjoined the unions' activities and awarded damages to the employer. The California Supreme Court reversed the judgment against the painters' and truck drivers' unions on the ground that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction over the paint business, which affected interstate commerce, but affirmed the judgment against the roofers' union because the roofing business did not affect interstate commerce, the existing collective bargaining agreement was enforceable under state law, and the union had breached its no-strike and arbitration provisions.
The case involved an insurance company and its sole shareholder who filed an action in superior court for declaratory relief and an injunction to stop the state Insurance Commissioner from seizing the company's assets under Insurance Code sections 1011 and 1013, claiming the seizure would be unauthorized and unconstitutional. The superior court declined to act, ruling it lacked jurisdiction until the commissioner filed a formal application or took possession. The company then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandate to compel the superior court to hear the case on the merits. The court denied the writ, holding that an appeal or post-seizure challenge under section 1012 provided an adequate remedy and that courts lack authority to enjoin the commissioner from exercising statutory duties before he acts. The core reasoning centered on the limited availability of mandamus when a trial court has ruled on jurisdiction and on the statutory scheme giving the commissioner initial discretion in insurance oversight.
This case involves a dispute over alimony following a partial reversal by the California Supreme Court of an interlocutory divorce decree that had awarded support payments to Gertrude Hall. After the reversal, the trial court set aside a final judgment and denied Peirson Hall's motions to fix the amount of permanent alimony without conducting a retrial, leading him to petition for a writ of mandate to compel the court to determine alimony based on the prior record. The court denied the petition, holding that an unqualified partial reversal remands the cause for a new trial on the affected issues, placing the parties in the same position as if the matter had not been tried, subject to following the appellate opinion. It reasoned that alimony must be determined based on circumstances at the time of the original decree, with any modifications requiring a showing of changed circumstances thereafter, and that the trial court could not properly fix the award solely on the old record without the parties' consent.