J. Daniel Breen

The case involved plaintiff Kelley Stone's claims against the City of Grand Junction, Tennessee, its police chief Pat Ryan, and Susan Tice for alleged violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with state law claims including malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, and false arrest arising from a personal dispute that led to police involvement and warnings. The court considered the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment and their objections to certain affidavits submitted by the plaintiff in opposition. The court granted in part the objections, excluding hearsay statements from the affidavits as inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, while denying others as moot, and applied the standard for summary judgment requiring no genuine dispute of material fact.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

In Moling v. O'Reilly Automotive, Inc., the plaintiff, a former store manager, sued her employer under the Tennessee Human Rights Act alleging sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation after interactions with a regional loss prevention auditor and her store manager, including alleged inappropriate comments and subsequent work assignments and termination. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing there were no genuine issues of material fact. The court granted the motion, holding that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in her favor on any claim, as the conduct did not create a hostile work environment, no adverse actions were linked to protected activity, and she did not establish the essential elements of her claims under the applicable legal standards. The court construed all facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff but found her evidence amounted to no more than a mere scintilla insufficient to survive summary judgment.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved an employee with Type I diabetes who sued his employer after being terminated, alleging violations of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act and Americans with Disabilities Act as well as state-law claims for retaliatory discharge and disability discrimination under the Tennessee Disability Act and Tennessee Human Rights Act. The employer moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, finding that the employee had not shown he was substantially limited in any major life activity such as working, sleeping, or eating and therefore had not established a qualifying disability under the ADA or TDA; the employee also failed to present evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on his other claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Joe B. Cooper, a white male licensed clinical social worker employed by Pathways of Tennessee (a subsidiary of defendant Jackson-Madison County General Hospital District), who alleged that his African-American female supervisor in the Brownsville office created a hostile work environment through condescending behavior, interference with patient care, extra work assignments, and racial comments such as calling him "whitey" or "white boy," ultimately leading to his resignation. Cooper sued under Title VII claiming reverse race, color, and sex discrimination, hostile work environment, and constructive discharge. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that Cooper failed to establish a prima facie case of reverse discrimination because he could not show an inference of discrimination or that similarly situated employees were treated differently, that the supervisor's conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment, and that the constructive discharge claim necessarily failed without a viable hostile environment claim.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Knittel v. Internal Revenue Service, plaintiff Edward Knittel sued the IRS under the Freedom of Information Act after the agency denied his requests for employee identification documents, pocket commissions, IDRS account forms, and delegation of authority orders; he also alleged due process violations in the agency's administrative proceedings. The court had previously dismissed all claims except the FOIA requests from July 2007. On the remaining claims, the IRS moved for summary judgment, arguing it had produced all relevant documents and the action was moot. The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issue of material fact because the plaintiff failed to comply with local rules requiring specific evidentiary responses, adopted the IRS's undisputed facts, and concluded the FOIA requests were satisfied. The court dismissed the case and certified that any appeal would not be taken in good faith.

federal powertaxesprocedurecivil rights

The case involved plaintiff Lindsey Whitney, a City of Milan employee, who sued Mayor Chris Crider alleging First Amendment retaliation and violations of her freedom of assembly after she provided deposition testimony in a separate matter, which she claimed led to changes in her work schedule, transfer to another department, and restrictions on access to City Hall. Crider moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 and to dismiss the assembly claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted both motions, finding no genuine dispute of material fact because Whitney did not suffer an adverse employment action, as any schedule adjustments were corrective and her pay remained unchanged, and the assembly claim failed to state a plausible basis for relief. The decision rested on established standards requiring specific facts showing a triable issue and well-pleaded facts supporting a plausible claim, which were not met here.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In Holt v. Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc., plaintiffs Cynthia and Timothy Holt sued Macy's and its credit card issuer after Cynthia purchased over $112,000 in jewelry using a Macy's credit card, encountering disputes over returns of certain items due to a 30-day jewelry exception to the standard 180-day policy, alleged unauthorized conversion of the card to a joint account, forged signatures, and an in-store incident involving gift cards received during a promotion. The plaintiffs asserted claims including breach of contract, fraud, violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, trespass to chattels, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent hiring. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact and determining that the plaintiffs failed to establish viable claims under any theory, such as inadequate evidence of policy nondisclosure, lack of private rights of action for cited criminal statutes, and insufficient support for tort or statutory violations.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

Larry Marshall, former EMS Director at Decatur County General Hospital, sued the hospital and Mayor Jason Scott after his 2008 termination, alleging First Amendment retaliation under Section 1983 for his public criticisms of county officials, including Scott's appointment decisions, as well as a state-law claim for intentional interference with employment. The court granted summary judgment to both defendants on the federal claim, finding no evidence that the hospital administrator who fired Marshall knew of his protected speech or that it caused the termination, which defendants attributed to performance and operational issues. The court dismissed the remaining state-law claim without prejudice after declining supplemental jurisdiction once the federal claim was resolved.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

In Taylor v. AutoZoners, LLC, plaintiff Karen Taylor sued her former employer alleging interference with rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) after she took time off for a back injury sustained at work, along with a state-law retaliation claim tied to her workers' compensation filing. The district court granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion, finding no genuine dispute of material fact. The court reasoned that Taylor's condition did not qualify as a "serious health condition" under the FMLA because her medical evidence showed only short-term restrictions and normal diagnostic tests, without the required period of incapacity or regimen of continuing treatment. As a result, Taylor was not entitled to FMLA leave or protections, defeating both the interference and retaliation claims under the statute. With all federal claims dismissed, the court declined supplemental jurisdiction and dismissed the remaining state-law claim without prejudice.

labor & employment

In Canal Insurance v. Axley, an insurer filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that its automobile liability policy issued to a trucking company did not obligate it to defend or indemnify the company or its driver in a related tort suit brought by a picketer injured during a confrontation at a delivery site. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment. The decision rested on the policy's definition of a covered "occurrence" as an accident neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured; the driver's voluntary exit from the truck and use of a wooden club to assault the plaintiff were deemed intentional acts falling outside that definition, so no contractual duty to provide coverage arose.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

Maria Maldanado sued The Pictsweet Co. under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), alleging that the company interfered with her entitlement to intermittent unpaid leave to care for her daughter’s serious health condition. The court granted her motion for partial summary judgment on the FMLA interference claim. The parties did not dispute that Maldanado was an eligible employee of a covered employer who was entitled to FMLA leave and had provided the required medical certification. The court determined that her telephone call to her supervisor on February 2, 2009, satisfied the notice requirement because the company handbook’s policy allowing notice to a supervisor or human resources took precedence over a conflicting attendance guideline, and the employer denied benefits by issuing attendance points and terminating her employment.

labor & employmentfamily law

Keri Williams, who had served as the appointed City Recorder for Milan, Tennessee since 1991 and was elected to the separate position of Municipal Court Clerk in 2007, sued the City and Mayor Chris Crider after her termination from the Recorder role in September 2008. She alleged that the termination violated her First Amendment rights, along with various state-law claims including under the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the First Amendment claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a plausible claim, applying the standard from Garcetti v. Ceballos and related precedents on public-employee speech and political patronage. It then dismissed all remaining state claims without prejudice due to lack of supplemental jurisdiction after the federal claim was eliminated.

free speechlabor & employmentcivil rights

The case involves a plaintiff suing a judicial district drug task force, its members, a county, and a sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments arising from a traffic stop. The court considered a motion for judgment on the pleadings by the task force and two individual defendants, applying the Rule 12(c) standard equivalent to Rule 12(b)(6) and the two-pronged plausibility analysis from Ashcroft v. Iqbal. It dismissed all claims against the task force, ruling it a state entity that is neither a "person" under § 1983 nor subject to suit due to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which Tennessee has not waived. For the individual defendants in their official capacities, the court held that claims for retroactive monetary relief or reimbursement are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, while noting that some prospective injunctive relief might proceed under the Ex Parte Young exception if properly pleaded.

civil rightsfederal power

In Baker v. Windsor Republic Doors, plaintiff Douglas Baker sued his former employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Tennessee Handicap Act, and Tennessee Human Rights Act, claiming disability discrimination and retaliation after he engaged in protected activity. Following a jury trial, the jury found the defendant liable on both claims and awarded back pay plus $29,500 in compensatory damages. The court granted judgment as a matter of law to the defendant on the discrimination claim but upheld the retaliation verdict and compensatory award. The core reasoning was that the ADA's anti-retaliation provision incorporates remedies from Title I of the ADA via cross-reference to 42 U.S.C. § 12117, which in turn allows compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a despite the lack of an explicit mention of retaliation claims in that statute.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved a lawsuit by homeowner Kimberly Snead against Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company after the insurer denied her claim for fire damage to her Tennessee residence. Snead alleged breach of contract and violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, but the court found that her insurance application contained misrepresentations about the home's heating system (claiming a thermostat-controlled central unit when it used space heaters) and prior losses (omitting a tornado/wind damage claim). Applying Tennessee Code Annotated § 56-7-103, the court held that these misrepresentations increased the insurer's risk of loss as a matter of law, allowing denial of coverage regardless of intent. It also dismissed the TCPA claim because the denial rested on substantial legal grounds. The court granted Nationwide's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Conner v. City of Jackson, Tenn., a Black firefighter sued the city and its mayor, alleging race-based discrimination under Title VII, the THRA, Section 1981, and Tennessee common law after his 2007 demotion for failing required certification tests, along with related retaliation and failure-to-promote claims. The defendants moved to dismiss several claims under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted dismissal of the THRA wrongful-demotion claim as untimely under the one-year limitations period, dismissed the common-law intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress and outrageous-conduct claims for lack of a statutory basis under the THRA, and dismissed the Title VII hostile-work-environment claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because the EEOC charges did not reasonably encompass such a claim. The motion to dismiss the Title VII retaliation claim was denied as moot.

civil rightslabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

This case arose from defaulted mortgage loans made by BancorpSouth Bank to family members of defendant Justin Herter, with the bank alleging that the relatives acted as straw borrowers for Herter and his company, Capitol Management, Inc., making them jointly liable. After a bench trial, the court found that neither Herter nor CM was liable for the loans. The core reasoning was that the family members were the actual borrowers who signed the documents and understood their obligations, there was insufficient evidence of a conspiracy or alter ego relationship to impose liability on Herter or CM, and the bank failed to prove its claims despite issues with spoliation of evidence by Herter. The court imposed a $5,000 monetary sanction on Herter for destroying documents but denied an adverse inference.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The plaintiff, an African American firefighter, sued the City of Jackson, Tennessee, alleging that his 2007 suspension and demotion were due to race discrimination in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act and Title VII. The defendant moved to dismiss the THRA claim. The court converted the motion to one for summary judgment after considering materials outside the pleadings and granted it, dismissing the THRA claim. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to file a timely direct action in court within the THRA's one-year statute of limitations, which is not tolled by pending administrative charges with the THRC or EEOC, and the plaintiff did not properly respond or present controlling authority to the contrary.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a defendant indicted in 2008 for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326 by being found in the United States after a prior deportation in 2000. The defendant argued that the charge was barred by the five-year statute of limitations and moved to dismiss the indictment. The court granted the motion, holding that the limitations period began when the defendant was found in the country shortly after his 2000 reentry and had long since expired. The core reasoning was that the statutory language making it unlawful to be "at any time found in" the United States starts the clock upon discovery of the alien's presence, rather than creating a continuing offense or resetting upon later encounters with authorities.

immigrationcriminal law

In this case, defendant Jerry L. Miller was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) for being a felon in possession of a firearm after police found a rifle at his residence. Miller moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense in the home, as well as due process and equal protection, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in District of Columbia v. Heller. The court denied the motion. It reasoned that Heller expressly stated that nothing in its opinion cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on firearm possession by felons, and that this language was not mere nonbinding dicta but directly refuted the defendant's constitutional challenge.

gunscriminal lawcivil rights