Paul E. Danielson

The case concerned Michael Burgess's appeal from the denial of jail-time credit against his 36-month prison sentence imposed after revocation of his probation on felony terroristic threatening charges. Burgess argued he was entitled to credit for 120 days of confinement previously served as a condition of his original probation, citing Arkansas Code Annotated sections 5-4-404 and 16-93-309(c). The circuit court awarded only 31 days of credit for time between arrest and the final hearing, rejecting credit for the earlier probation-related confinement. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statutes provide credit for pretrial incarceration or post-revocation custody but not for confinement imposed as a condition of probation. A dissent contended that the plain language of section 5-4-404 entitled Burgess to the credit because the time was spent in custody for the underlying conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerns a certified question from a federal district court regarding the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute that limits the use of evidence about a plaintiff's failure to wear a seatbelt in civil lawsuits. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-37-703 violates the separation-of-powers doctrine under the state constitution because it improperly dictates rules of evidence, which fall under the judicial branch's authority per Amendment 80. The underlying dispute arose from a car accident where the plaintiff sought damages for injuries, and the defendants sought to introduce evidence of her not wearing a seatbelt as part of a comparative fault defense. The court reasoned that the legislature cannot enact procedural rules like evidentiary restrictions without encroaching on judicial powers.

proceduretorts & liability

In Johnson v. State, an Arkansas inmate serving a life sentence was convicted by a jury of capital murder after stabbing and killing a correctional officer who attempted to confiscate what the inmate claimed were his personal shoes, and he was sentenced to death. The defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have given a jury instruction on the extreme-emotional-disturbance form of manslaughter and should have ordered disclosure of certain prison records to support claims about the conditions of confinement. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding that the evidence did not provide a rational basis for the manslaughter instruction because the alleged provocations did not constitute a reasonable excuse under the statute, and that the requested records were not relevant or material to the defense under the applicable discovery rule. The court also conducted the mandatory review required in death-penalty cases and found no reversible error.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by Linda Wright against police officer Travis Trammell alleging the state-law torts of false arrest and false imprisonment after he arrested her based on an ACIC database warrant that matched her name and photo but belonged to a different person with different identifying details. Trammell moved for summary judgment on grounds of immunity under Arkansas Code Annotated section 21-9-301, but the circuit court denied the motion, finding a factual issue on due diligence. On interlocutory appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that undisputed facts showed no intent to commit an intentional tort and that the statute provided immunity from suit for any resulting negligence in reliance on the database. The core reasoning addressed the scope of statutory immunity for officers acting on law-enforcement records and the absence of proof of bad faith or malice.

criminal lawproceduretorts & liability

The case involved Southwest Power Pool challenging a suburban water improvement district's 2013 reassessment of benefits on its property, which raised the annual tax levy from about $3,500 to over $60,000 after the company built a commercial facility connected to the City of Little Rock's water system rather than the district's lines. The district had constructed water lines in 2006, conveyed them to Central Arkansas Water, and later reassessed the property based on the new development. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the district, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Arkansas Code section 14-92-225(c)(2) exempts from assessment any improvement attached to an adjacent city's waterworks system and that the district's contrary interpretation did not align with the statute's plain language.

taxespropertyprocedure

In Van Winkle v. State, the appellant challenged his convictions for kidnapping, aggravated residential burglary, first-degree stalking, third-degree battery, first-degree assault, and first-degree terroristic threatening, along with a firearm enhancement, by appealing the circuit court's denial of his Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 petition for postconviction relief without a hearing. He argued that trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting an actual innocence defense based on his physical disabilities and an alternative theory that the victim and others had robbed and framed him, for not seeking a change of venue, and for not challenging the firearm sentence as structural error, while also claiming error in the denial of an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the denial, holding that Van Winkle's allegations were largely conclusory and failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed with different counsel actions, and that the record supported the circuit court's decision without needing further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Thomas Lagios's appeal from a Columbia County Circuit Court decree granting the adoption of his biological daughter M. to Kenneth and Deanne Goldman after the child's mother died and the initial caregiver could not continue care. Lagios argued that the court lacked jurisdiction due to statutory noncompliance, that his consent was improperly dispensed with, that the record was improperly reopened, and that the adoption was not in the child's best interest. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the decree, holding that jurisdiction was proper, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion on consent or the record, and evidence supported the best-interest determination based on the father's limited prior relationship and the petitioners' ability to provide care. The decision vacated the court of appeals opinion that had also affirmed.

family law

This case is a companion to Crenshaw v. McFalls and involves Riley Vernon McFalls and Linda Sue McFalls seeking to set aside a circuit court judgment against them individually for breach of a real-estate sales contract, filed as an independent action under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 60(k). The McFallses argued that they were sued and served only in their capacities as trustees and that the court erred by entering judgment against them personally. The White County Circuit Court denied the petition to set aside the judgment, and the court of appeals dismissed the subsequent appeal as moot because the underlying issue had been resolved in the companion case. The Arkansas Supreme Court granted review but ultimately denied the petition for review, holding that it was improvidently granted for the same reasons stated in the companion case, leaving the court of appeals decision in place.

procedureproperty

This case involved a class-action lawsuit by Craig and Tabitha Harris against Lambert and Lambert Investors, Inc., and Glendon Lambert, alleging that Lambert charged usurious interest rates exceeding Arkansas constitutional limits and engaged in deceptive trade practices in contracts for the sale of real property. The Harrises sought class certification under Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of Arkansas citizens who entered similar contracts with Lambert in the preceding five years. The circuit court granted certification, finding that the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority were met. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Lambert's common course of conduct in negotiating and financing the contracts supported the class claims under the same legal theories, without requiring individualized inquiries that would defeat predominance or superiority. The court focused on the defendant's uniform practices rather than varying facts among class members.

propertyprocedure

In MacKintrush v. State, the defendant was convicted of drug possession and paraphernalia charges after police conducted a traffic stop, waited 34 minutes for a canine unit, and searched his vehicle following a positive alert, leading to the discovery of marijuana, hydrocodone, and related items. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded the case, holding that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to suppress because the prolonged detention after the traffic stop's purpose ended violated the Fourth Amendment and Arkansas rules. The core reasoning was that the facts, including the package's odor, mismatched addresses, and the defendant's use of another name, did not collectively establish reasonable suspicion to extend the stop for the dog sniff. The court noted that prior cases like Sims and Lilley found similar or stronger indicators insufficient to justify such delays.

criminal law

In Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Goodner, the Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed a dispute over an insurance claim for storm damage to the Goodners' mobile home under a policy that paid actual cash value, defined as total restoration cost less depreciation, with depreciation explicitly including labor costs. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Goodners, ruling that deducting depreciation for labor violated Arkansas public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, relying on its prior decision in Adams v. Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. that labor costs may not be depreciated when calculating actual cash value under indemnity policies. The court held that this rule applies even when the policy attempts to define actual cash value to permit such depreciation, as the practice conflicts with state public policy.

business & regulatoryproperty

Charles Philyaw appealed the Pulaski County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus after his 1981 conviction for aggravated robbery in Miller County, for which he received a life sentence. He claimed the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the sentence was based on an uncharged attempted capital murder, that the charging information waived a life sentence, and that the punishment was cruel and unusual. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that the judgment-and-commitment order was valid on its face, the charging document did not affect the legality of the sentence within the statutory range for aggravated robbery, and a maximum sentence authorized by statute does not violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment absent facial invalidity or jurisdictional defects.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Duit Construction Company appealing the dismissal of its claims against the Arkansas State Claims Commission, legislative committees, and highway agencies stemming from the denial of a breach-of-contract claim related to an Interstate 30 improvement project. Duit challenged the state's claims-resolution procedures as violating due process by lacking an impartial decision-maker and equal protection by discriminating against out-of-state contractors. Following a prior appeal that reversed the equal-protection ruling and dismissed the due-process cross-appeal, the circuit court dismissed all remaining claims on remand based on sovereign immunity. The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the current appeal, holding it lacked jurisdiction over the due-process claim without a Rule 54(b) certification and that the equal-protection claim was barred by the law of the case.

civil rightsprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, grandparents Raymond and Patricia Edwards intervened in dependency-neglect proceedings brought by the Arkansas Department of Human Services concerning their granddaughter M.A.E. and sought custody of her after other siblings had been placed with them. The circuit court denied their custody motion, dismissed them from the case, and included a Rule 54(b) certificate purporting to make the order final. The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the order was not final and appealable because it did not resolve all claims or parties in the ongoing dependency-neglect action and the certificate failed to provide sufficient factual findings or justification for an immediate appeal under the rule. The court vacated the court of appeals' prior opinion affirming the dismissal on timeliness grounds.

family lawprocedure

The case involved Deonte Edison's appeal from his convictions for capital murder, attempted capital murder, and two counts of aggravated robbery, each enhanced by firearm use, arising from a 2013 armed robbery and shooting at a Sbarro restaurant in Little Rock that killed one employee and injured another. Edison challenged three evidentiary rulings by the circuit court: limits on cross-examining a surviving victim about a potential civil lawsuit for bias, restrictions on questioning her medical records, and admission of her statements to police under the dying-declaration hearsay exception. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the bias inquiry had already been sufficiently explored without prejudice, that the hearsay evidence was cumulative of other unobjected-to testimony identifying Edison, and thus any error was harmless. The court reviewed the full record under its rules and found no prejudicial error.

criminal lawprocedure

Taylor appealed the denial of his Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37 petition, which claimed that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge on direct appeal the trial court's ruling limiting cross-examination of the victims about any uncharged marijuana possession or immunity deals. The Pulaski County Circuit Court had convicted Taylor of aggravated robbery and related offenses arising from a drug-related robbery and shooting, and the Arkansas Court of Appeals had affirmed those convictions. The circuit court denied the petition after dismissing the first-degree battery conviction on double-jeopardy grounds, reasoning that Taylor could not show prejudice from the cross-examination limitation because the jury already heard facts about the victims' drug activity. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed, holding that the bias and Confrontation Clause arguments were never presented to the trial court, which had ruled solely on relevance grounds, so appellate counsel was not deficient for omitting an unpreserved issue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Edward Thompson III's appeal of his convictions for first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, felony theft, and misdemeanor theft arising from a fatal shooting during a robbery attempt outside a nightclub. Thompson challenged the denial of his motion to suppress an out-of-court photographic identification and the lack of a hearing on an ex parte juror communication. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, finding the identification issues either unpreserved or not clearly erroneous under the totality of circumstances, and no reversible error on the juror matter. However, it reversed and remanded on sentencing because the underlying felony for the first-degree murder conviction was robbery, not aggravated robbery, consistent with state statutes authorizing separate sentences for the murder and its underlying felony.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Payton, the State of Arkansas appealed a circuit court order suppressing a statement given by defendant Mark Payton, who was charged with fourth-degree sexual assault, on the ground that he had not received Miranda warnings before an interview conducted by a state police sergeant at a hospital. The circuit court had ruled that the interview had shifted from investigatory to accusatory, requiring warnings, and rejected the State's motion for reconsideration on the custody issue. The Arkansas Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that it did not meet the requirements for a State appeal under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Criminal 3 because it did not present an issue involving the correct and uniform administration of the law that warranted review. The majority distinguished the case from prior appeals involving Fourth Amendment issues like pretextual stops, concluding the Miranda custody question did not similarly qualify.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved an appeal from the denial of a motion to intervene in a class-action lawsuit filed by purchasers of surplus-lines insurance against Arkansas-licensed brokers. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment allowing them to void insurance contracts placed with unapproved out-of-state insurers between 2005 and 2011, along with restitution of premiums paid. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, who had subscribed to many of the policies at issue, moved to intervene as defendants to protect their interests in the contracts. The circuit court denied the motion, finding the Underwriters too amorphous to participate, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Underwriters had a right to intervene under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure–Civil 2(a)(2) because they possessed protectable contractual and financial interests that could be impaired by the litigation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Beverage v. State, the appellant challenged the circuit court's denial without a hearing of his Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel after his guilty plea to first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, and other charges stemming from an escape and related incidents. The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the denial in part, finding no merit or cognizable claims on issues like venue, speedy trial, and sufficiency challenges, but reversed and remanded in part for an evidentiary hearing on the claims that counsel failed to obtain an additional mental-health evaluation or adequately challenge the murder victim's cause of death. The core reasoning was that the record did not conclusively demonstrate the appellant was entitled to no relief on those two allegations, requiring further factual development, while other claims were either waived, contradicted by the plea transcript, or not properly preserved.

criminal lawprocedure