John Pelander

In this case, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed certified questions from a federal district court regarding an insurer's denial of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Sabine Sharp was injured in a motorcycle accident while riding as a passenger with her husband and sought UIM benefits under her separate auto insurance policy with American Family after recovering liability limits from her husband's motorcycle policy with the same insurer. The court held that A.R.S. § 20-259.01(G) requires the insurer to provide UIM coverage under the auto policy to all insured persons, and that subsection (H)'s anti-stacking provision does not permit denial of the claim based on recovery under a different policy. The reasoning focused on the statutory mandate for broad UIM coverage and the principle that only exceptions explicitly allowed by the Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Act are valid.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned the Arizona Governor's removal of Colleen Mathis as chairperson of the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, an independent body responsible for drawing congressional and state legislative districts. The Arizona Supreme Court accepted special action jurisdiction and granted relief by ordering Mathis's reinstatement. The court held that the Governor's stated grounds for removal—Mathis's role in hiring a mapping consultant by majority vote and alleged procedural issues in adjusting draft maps—did not amount to substantial neglect of duty or gross misconduct under Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(10) of the Arizona Constitution. The opinion emphasized that compliance with constitutional map-drawing criteria is properly evaluated only after final maps are adopted, not during the ongoing draft stage.

electionsprocedure

This case involved a wrongful death lawsuit brought by the surviving wife and four adult children of Jerome Walsh against Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered, alleging medical negligence in failing to diagnose and treat an infection after heart surgery, which led to his death. The jury found for the plaintiffs and awarded $1 million to the wife but zero damages to each of the children, despite their uncontroverted testimony about their losses. The children moved for a new trial on damages under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), but the trial court denied it on waiver grounds under Rule 49(c) based on prior precedent. The Arizona Supreme Court held that a jury may award zero damages if it finds the award fair and just, that no automatic new trial is required, and that waiver under Rule 49(c) does not apply because the verdict was not defective or inconsistent in the relevant sense. The court overruled two prior appellate decisions, vacated the court of appeals opinion, reversed the trial court's denial, and remanded for the trial court to consider the new trial motion on its merits under Rule 59(a).

torts & liabilityprocedure

In State v. Wallace, James Granvil Wallace was convicted of murdering his girlfriend's two children after pleading guilty and received death sentences based solely on the aggravating circumstance that the murders were especially heinous or depraved under A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6). On its fourth review of the case, the Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent review of the death sentences imposed after a 2009 jury trial. The court determined that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wallace inflicted gratuitous violence, as required by narrowing constructions from prior precedent such as Bocharski, because the evidence did not show he knew he had delivered fatal blows before stopping his attacks. The court therefore vacated the death sentences and imposed consecutive life terms of imprisonment.

criminal law

This case involved Arizona Supreme Court review of disciplinary proceedings against Tucson Municipal Court Magistrate Theodore Abrams, who had an undisclosed consensual sexual relationship with one attorney who appeared before him and repeatedly made unwanted sexual advances, explicit comments, and physical contact toward another attorney who regularly appeared in his courtroom. Abrams stipulated to removal from the bench based on violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The court approved the stipulation, censured Abrams, permanently barred him from serving as a judicial officer in Arizona, and imposed a two-year suspension from the practice of law, reasoning that his conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice, undermined public confidence in the judiciary, and warranted significant sanctions to protect the public and deter similar misconduct.

civil rightsprocedure

In State v. West, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed charges of child abuse against foster parents Randall and Penny West after an infant in their care died from head trauma. The trial court denied the defendants' pre-verdict motions for judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 but later granted their post-verdict motions under Rule 20(b), finding insufficient evidence to identify which defendant caused or permitted the injury. The court of appeals reversed, relying on language from State ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Court that limited post-verdict reconsideration. The Supreme Court held that the same standard—no substantial evidence to warrant a conviction—governs both pre- and post-verdict Rule 20 motions, disapproved contrary dicta in Hyder, and remanded for the court of appeals to apply that standard to the sufficiency of the evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Wayne Benoit Prince, who was convicted of first-degree murder of his stepdaughter and attempted first-degree murder of his wife after a domestic dispute in which he shot both. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's Ring v. Arizona decision, his initial death sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing by a jury, which found two aggravating factors; when the first penalty-phase jury could not agree on a sentence, a second jury was impaneled under A.R.S. § 13-752(K) and imposed death. On automatic appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence, rejecting Prince's ex post facto challenge to the second penalty jury (citing its prior decision in State v. Cropper) along with numerous other constitutional claims regarding sentencing procedures, mitigation, and the death penalty statute. The court held that the resentencing process complied with applicable law and did not violate the defendant's rights.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned the applicability of Arizona's family purpose doctrine to hold parents vicariously liable for their minor son's negligent driving of a vehicle they had furnished to him for family use. The son had been instructed not to transport friends but violated that restriction, resulting in an accident that seriously injured Amy Young, who then sued the parents. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's partial summary judgment in Young's favor, holding that the doctrine remains valid and was properly applied because the vehicle was provided for the son's general use and the specific deviation did not negate liability. The court rejected arguments that the Legislature had abrogated the doctrine or that it should be judicially abolished, concluding that the facts fell within its scope.

torts & liabilityfamily law

This case addressed whether the Arizona Legislature violated separation of powers by enacting SB 1449 in 2009, which made retroactive a 2006 amendment (SB 1145) to the self-defense justification statute that shifted the burden to the state to disprove justification. Cesar Montes was tried and convicted in 2008 under the prior version of the law for offenses committed in 2005, after the court in Garcia v. Browning had ruled that SB 1145 did not apply retroactively. The Arizona Supreme Court held that SB 1449 was a valid exercise of legislative authority, reversed Montes' convictions and sentences, vacated the court of appeals' opinion, and remanded the case. The court's reasoning centered on the Legislature's power to retroactively grant new rights to criminal defendants through an operative statutory provision, finding that a non-operative section expressing purpose did not usurp judicial authority.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves disciplinary proceedings against Jeffrey Phillips, managing attorney of a large Phoenix law firm handling high volumes of criminal defense, bankruptcy, and personal injury matters, for alleged violations of Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct ERs 5.1(a) and 5.3(a) on supervision of lawyers and nonlawyers. The Arizona Supreme Court granted review to assess whether the Hearing Officer applied an improper vicarious liability standard in finding violations and whether a six-month-and-one-day suspension was warranted, following Phillips's prior 2002 discipline and probation terms addressing firm intake, billing, accounting, and ethics practices. The court accepted the violations but reduced the suspension to six months, emphasizing Phillips's responsibilities in setting firm policies and overseeing delegated divisions. The opinion details the firm's structure, prior probation conditions, and evidence of supervisory shortcomings without imposing new sanctions beyond the adjusted suspension.

procedure

In State v. Bowsher, the defendant pleaded guilty to two unrelated theft felonies charged in separate indictments and was sentenced by the trial court to two consecutive four-year terms of probation. Bowsher sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the court lacked authority to impose consecutive probation terms under prior precedent like State v. Pakula. The Arizona Supreme Court held that A.R.S. § 13-903(A), which states that a probation period commences on the day imposed or as designated by the court, authorizes consecutive terms because the disjunctive language permits a later start date for the second term. The court distinguished Pakula as limited to multiple counts in a single indictment, found the statutory text and legislative history consistent with allowing consecutive probation, and rejected due-process arguments against retroactive application. It therefore vacated the court of appeals opinion and affirmed the trial court's denial of relief.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Snelling, Gary Wayne Snelling was convicted of first-degree murder for strangling Adele Curtis during a 1996 home invasion and sentenced to death based on the (F)(6) aggravator that the murder was especially cruel. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding sufficient evidence from DNA, fingerprints, and a jailhouse confession to support the jury's verdict. On independent review of the death sentence, however, the court vacated it after concluding that the record did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Curtis had consciously experienced sufficient mental anguish or physical pain. Snelling was resentenced to natural life imprisonment under the applicable 1993 statute.

criminal law

The case involved Derek Don Chappell, who was convicted of first-degree murder and child abuse for choking and later drowning his fiancée's two-year-old son, Devon. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence on automatic appeal. The court upheld the jury's findings of aggravating circumstances, including a prior serious offense and the murder being especially cruel, and rejected multiple constitutional challenges to the death penalty and trial procedures based on established precedents.

criminal law

This case was a wrongful death action in which the plaintiff alleged that the State of Arizona negligently designed and maintained a highway intersection where her husband died in a collision with a dump truck. The plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence that the State had installed warning signs after the accident, but the trial court excluded it under Arizona Rule of Evidence 407. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the State, holding that Rule 407 bars evidence of subsequent measures taken after an event to prove negligence even if the party was unaware of the prior incident when making the changes. The court reasoned that the rule's policy of encouraging safety improvements applies based on the timing of the measures and that the evidence was not admissible for another purpose such as impeachment or proving knowledge, as that would undermine the rule.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves the approval of a settlement agreement resolving water rights claims by the Gila River Indian Community in the ongoing Gila River System adjudication. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication court's approval of the settlement, which grants the Community 653,500 acre-feet of water per year in exchange for waivers of additional claims. The court reasoned that the settlement satisfied the Special Procedural Order's requirements, including that the allocated water rights were no greater than could be proven at trial, objectors' rights were not materially injured, and the agreement was made in good faith. Objections from other tribes and water users were rejected as they did not meet the criteria for invalidating the settlement.

propertyenvironmentfederal powerprocedure

The case involved Angel Diaz, who was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree burglary, attempted armed robbery, and aggravated assault. On appeal, he argued that his right to a twelve-person jury was violated because the transcript showed only eleven jurors were polled after the verdicts. The Arizona Supreme Court held that Diaz failed to establish any legal error, as the record did not show that fewer than twelve jurors participated, and thus affirmed the convictions while vacating the court of appeals' decision.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Freeney, the defendant was indicted for aggravated assault based on placing the victim in reasonable apprehension of injury using a dangerous instrument, but on the first day of trial the state moved to amend the charge to instead allege that the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused physical injury to the victim. The trial court allowed the amendment over the defendant's objection, and the jury convicted him. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the amendment violated Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.5(b) because it changed the nature of the offense by altering its elements, but concluded that such violations are subject to harmless-error review rather than automatic reversal. The Court found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the defendant had adequate notice of the victim's injuries from the original indictment, pretrial disclosures, and other filings, and therefore affirmed the conviction.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute between property owner Jeffrey Andrews and lessee Leslie Blake over Blake's attempt to exercise a contractual option to purchase the leased land for $300,000. The lease and a later addendum set deadlines and notice requirements for exercising the option, but the parties disagreed on whether Blake had timely and properly communicated his intent to purchase, including via telephone and letter. The trial court granted summary judgment to Blake, the court of appeals reversed and ordered judgment for Andrews, and the Arizona Supreme Court vacated those rulings, holding that disputed factual issues existed on timeliness of notice, receipt of communications, and potential equitable relief for any late exercise. The court remanded for further proceedings, including possible application of a balancing test if Blake's delay was due to mistake rather than negligence.

property

This case involves the determination of which underground waters qualify as "subflow" of the Gila River system, thereby making them subject to surface water appropriation laws rather than groundwater rules in Arizona. The trial court defined subflow as the saturated floodplain Holocene alluvium based on extensive expert testimony and geological evidence. The appellate court affirmed this definition, finding it supported by the record, consistent with prior precedents like Gila River II and Southwest Cotton, and aligned with current hydrological understanding. The ruling clarifies the boundary between appropriable surface water and non-appropriable percolating groundwater to protect surface water rights.

environmentproperty