Charles E. Jones

The case involved Tammie Bennett's challenge to a Yavapai County ordinance requiring that major commercial events on the Courthouse Plaza be sponsored by a recognized non-profit organization. Bennett, who had organized an annual arts and crafts festival on the Plaza for years, alleged that the ordinance violated her First Amendment free speech rights after her 2001 permit application was denied in favor of a competing non-profit sponsor. The Arizona Supreme Court held that Bennett lacked standing to bring the claim. The court reasoned that standing requires a showing of particularized injury to the plaintiff, but Bennett's application listed a qualifying non-profit sponsor and the denial was based on a preference for the prior sponsor rather than the non-profit requirement itself, so she suffered no personal harm from the challenged provision.

free speechprocedurecivil rights

The case involved Robert Louis Cromwell, who was convicted by a Maricopa County jury of first-degree murder, sexual assault, and two counts of aggravated assault arising from the October 2001 killing of eleven-year-old Stephanie Shortt, along with assaults on her mother and a friend. The trial court imposed a death sentence for the murder, life imprisonment without release for thirty-five years for the sexual assault, and ten-year prison terms for each aggravated assault. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed all convictions and sentences, holding that the trial evidence supported the verdicts and that Arizona's death penalty statute complied with the state and federal constitutions by adequately guiding sentencing discretion and allocating burdens of proof.

criminal law

The case involved two Casa Grande residents challenging a city ordinance rezoning property for a Wal-Mart development, alleging the city failed to provide required notices for public hearings under city code and state statutes before the city council approved it. After opponents gathered signatures, voters upheld the ordinance in a May 2002 referendum by a narrow margin. More than three months later, the plaintiffs filed suit seeking to invalidate the ordinance and referendum on notice grounds. The Arizona Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of the city and Wal-Mart, holding that the plaintiffs' post-referendum filing was untimely and that they had waived any challenge by allowing the election to proceed without objection. The core reasoning rested on principles of waiver and estoppel by laches, as parties cannot contest procedural defects in an election only after unfavorable results.

propertyprocedureelectionsbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether, under the U.S. and Arizona Constitutions and following Apprendi v. New Jersey and Ring v. Arizona, aggravating factors under A.R.S. § 13-703(F) must be specifically alleged in the indictment and supported by a grand jury's probable cause finding before the state can seek the death penalty. Petitioner McKaney, charged with first-degree murder and other offenses, moved to dismiss the state's notice of intent to seek death and its notice of three aggravating factors, arguing they were essential elements requiring such charging and probable cause support; the trial court denied the motion. The Arizona Supreme Court accepted special action jurisdiction and held that the aggravating factors need not be alleged in the charging document or supported by grand jury probable cause. The court reasoned that due process notice requirements are satisfied by other procedures and that Arizona rules, including Rule 13.5(c), provide an adequate pre-trial mechanism for a neutral magistrate to assess the legal sufficiency and probable cause basis of any alleged aggravators.

criminal lawprocedure

This disciplinary case concerned Arizona prosecutor Thomas J. Zawada's conduct during the 1994 trial of Alex Hughes for murder and related charges, where Hughes raised insanity and self-defense claims supported by multiple mental health experts. The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the matter sua sponte after the Disciplinary Commission recommended censure and probation, holding that Zawada committed knowing and intentional misconduct by making fear-based appeals to the jury, harassing experts on cross-examination, and arguing without evidence that defense experts fabricated diagnoses for payment. These actions violated ethical rules on competence, good-faith assertions, trial tactics, and conduct prejudicial to justice, leading to reversal of Hughes' convictions on appeal and dismissal of charges on double-jeopardy grounds. The court determined the recommended sanctions were inadequate given aggravating factors including prior similar misconduct, and imposed a six-month-and-one-day suspension, one-year probation, referral to a member assistance program, and fifteen hours of continuing education on psychiatric testimony before handling mental-health cases.

criminal law

The case involved James Edward Davolt II, who was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder (one based on felony murder and the other on both felony murder and premeditation), first-degree burglary, theft, arson of an occupied structure, and theft of means of transportation after the deaths of an elderly couple in their Arizona home. The trial court imposed death sentences for the murders and consecutive prison terms for the remaining offenses. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed all convictions but remanded the death sentences for a determination of whether Davolt, who was a juvenile at the time of the offenses, possessed sufficient maturity and moral responsibility to be eligible for capital punishment. The court also remanded the non-capital sentences because the trial court failed to consider Davolt's age as a statutory mitigating factor as required by Arizona law.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Arizona legislators challenging Governor Napolitano's item vetoes of eleven provisions in the fiscal year 2004 budget package, including lump-sum reductions and other funding offsets in the general appropriations bill and omnibus reconciliation bills, on grounds that the vetoes exceeded her authority under the Arizona Constitution. The Supreme Court of Arizona accepted special action jurisdiction but denied relief. It held that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the vetoes. The court reasoned that the dispute involved mutual accountability issues on both branches, including the legislature's failure to attempt an override, unconventional budget structuring, and apparent single-subject rule violations in the bills, warranting judicial restraint and abstention from reaching the merits.

procedure

In this case, Mary Virginia Swanson sued her former employer, The Image Bank, Inc., and related entity after termination without cause, alleging breach of an employment contract that included severance pay provisions and seeking treble damages under A.R.S. § 23-355 for unpaid wages. The employment agreement, negotiated by counsel, contained an express choice-of-law clause selecting Texas substantive law to govern disputes. The trial court awarded severance pay and trebled the damages, finding Arizona's wage statute reflected a fundamental public policy that overrode the choice-of-law provision; the court of appeals affirmed. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the treble damages award, holding that sophisticated parties may validly agree to apply another state's law, which governs available remedies and effectively waives the Arizona statutory treble damages claim. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with Texas law.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

Martha Duncan sued Scottsdale Medical Imaging after a nurse administered fentanyl for sedation during an MRI despite her repeated explicit instructions to use only demerol or morphine, leading to severe complications. She asserted claims including battery based on the unauthorized administration of medication without consent. The trial court and court of appeals dismissed the battery claim, treating it as subject to Arizona’s Medical Malpractice Act which bars such actions. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Duncan stated a valid common law battery claim and that the Act’s prohibition of battery claims violates Article 18, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution by abrogating the right of action.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned Andre Minnitt, who was charged with three counts of first-degree murder and seven counts of armed robbery, aggravated robbery, and burglary arising from a 1992 incident at the El Grande Market in Tucson. Minnitt was convicted in a 1993 trial that was later reversed on appeal, faced a mistrial in 1997, and was convicted again in 1999, resulting in death sentences for the murders. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court held that principles of double jeopardy under the Arizona Constitution barred the 1999 retrial. The court's reasoning was that the prosecutor had engaged in extreme, intentional misconduct in the prior trials by introducing false testimony with knowledge of its impropriety and with indifference to the risk of mistrial or reversal, thereby prejudicing the defendant and undermining the integrity of the proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Lemuel Prion, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder of Diana Vicari, as well as kidnapping and aggravated assault of Tabitha Armenta, resulting in a death sentence for the murder. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed claims of trial error, including the exclusion of evidence pointing to third-party culpability and the joinder of the two sets of charges. The court held that the trial court erred by excluding third-party culpability evidence regarding John Mazure and by denying severance of the Armenta counts from the Vicari murder, as the evidence of the Armenta crimes was not cross-admissible under Arizona Rule of Evidence 404 to show propensity or character. These errors were deemed reversible, leading the court to vacate all convictions and sentences and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Alex Gonzales, a pawn shop manager, who was charged with trafficking in stolen property and theft after police investigated his handling of a set of golf clubs offered by a customer with a prior record of selling stolen goods; the charges were later dismissed, leading Gonzales to sue the City of Phoenix and Detective James Finnerty for malicious prosecution. A jury awarded Gonzales $1.4 million, and the trial court denied the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was sufficient for the jury to find that the defendants lacked probable cause to prosecute Gonzales. The court rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that probable cause existed as a matter of law, emphasizing disputed facts about Gonzales's knowledge and actions during the transaction and hold period.

criminal lawtorts & liability

The case concerned whether candidate John Carpenter remained eligible for the primary election ballot for constable after 71 signers withdrew their names from his nominating petitions following the statutory filing deadline. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that the withdrawals were timely and valid because they occurred before the end of the ten-day challenge period, rendering Carpenter ineligible to appear on the ballot. The court reasoned that Arizona recognizes a common-law right allowing electors to withdraw signatures from nominating petitions before election officials take formal action placing a candidate on the ballot, drawing on prior precedent for the timing rule. It separately affirmed the trial court's finding that Carpenter's earlier removal from a judicial office did not disqualify him from running for constable.

elections

The case involved a wrongful termination claim by employees B.J. and Nancy Logan against their employer, Rex Maughan and related entities, alleging they were fired after refusing to sell their personal property to Maughan at a below-market price he demanded. The trial court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim under the Arizona Employment Protection Act (AEPA), and the court of appeals affirmed in a memorandum decision. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision, reversed the dismissal, and remanded the case, holding that the AEPA does not eliminate common-law tort claims for discharges that violate public policy. The court reasoned that the alleged facts, if true, described an egregious misuse of employer power to coerce a property sale, which contravenes Arizona constitutional protections and longstanding public policy against such retaliatory terminations.

labor & employmentpropertytorts & liability

This case involves a certified question from a U.S. bankruptcy court regarding the effect of a subordination agreement on lien priorities for real property in Arizona. The property was subject to a first-priority deed of trust held by a Canadian lender, a second-priority mechanic's lien held by Decca Design Build, Inc., and a third-priority deed of trust also held by the Canadian lender; the first- and third-priority holders entered a subordination agreement without Decca's involvement. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the agreement effected only a partial subordination, leaving Decca's second-priority position undisturbed relative to both the original first lien and the subordinated third lien. The court's reasoning was that interpreting the agreement as complete subordination would improperly alter the rights of a non-party lienholder and confer an unintended windfall, consistent with the principle that subordination agreements affect only the parties to them.

property

This case arose from a triparty agreement in which Wells Fargo Bank provided interim construction financing for a developer's project, with union pension funds obligated to provide permanent take-out financing subject to conditions including review of the developer's financial status. After the developer's separate loans defaulted amid a declining real estate market, the funds alleged that the bank and developer engaged in actions to conceal the financial problems, preventing the funds from exercising their right to refuse the permanent loan. The Arizona Supreme Court clarified the distinctions among fraudulent misrepresentation under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525, nondisclosure under § 551, and fraudulent concealment under § 550, holding that concealment involves an intentional act equivalent to misrepresentation and does not require proof of a duty to disclose. The court further ruled that claims for fraudulent concealment and civil conspiracy to commit fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved defendant Arturo Anda Cañez, who was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, first-degree burglary, and two counts of armed robbery arising from the killing of 77-year-old Franklin Joseph Hale during a robbery at Hale's home. The trial court imposed the death penalty for the murder conviction, prompting this direct appeal. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the murder, burglary, and one armed robbery convictions along with the death sentence, but reversed one armed robbery conviction due to insufficient evidence. The court rejected numerous constitutional challenges to Arizona's death penalty scheme and sentencing procedures, finding that the evidence supported the remaining convictions and that the trial court properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors.

criminal lawprocedure

In State v. Spreitz, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed whether a defendant who raised one claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal had waived additional such claims in a subsequent Rule 32 post-conviction relief petition. The trial court had found the new claims waived under Rule 32.2 but alternatively denied them on the merits. The Supreme Court clarified that ineffective assistance claims must be brought in Rule 32 proceedings rather than on direct appeal, and that merely raising them on appeal has no preclusive effect on later Rule 32 claims. It reversed the trial court's waiver ruling but affirmed the denial of relief on the substantive findings, modifying prior precedent to reflect this procedural rule.

criminal lawprocedure

The case consolidated two appeals involving convictions for drug possession and drug paraphernalia possession under Arizona's Proposition 200, which mandates probation and treatment for first- and second-time nonviolent drug offenders. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the statute's probation eligibility provisions apply to paraphernalia convictions when the paraphernalia is associated solely with personal drug use by defendants who were or could have been charged with personal possession or use. The court reasoned that a contrary interpretation would create an absurd result by allowing imprisonment for possessing paraphernalia while prohibiting it for the drugs themselves, contrary to the voters' intent to divert drug users to treatment rather than prison. The decision was limited to cases involving actual drug possession and did not address standalone paraphernalia charges.

criminal law

This case is an interpleader action over life insurance proceeds from policies held by William Craig, who died in a car accident along with his wife Diane, the designated beneficiary, with no clear evidence of who survived whom. The certified question from federal court asked which of two conflicting Arizona statutes controls the survival rule for the beneficiary: A.R.S. § 20-1127 in the insurance code or A.R.S. § 14-2702 in the probate code, both modeled on the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. Diane's estate claimed the proceeds under the insurance statute's rule treating the insured as surviving, while William's estate invoked the probate statute's 120-hour survival requirement, which applies to governing instruments including insurance policies. The court analyzed the statutes' texts, locations in the code, and legislative history to determine the applicable rule for distribution to the estates or surviving child.

propertyprocedure