Scott Bales

This case involved a dispute over commercial property in Arizona subject to a deed of trust, where BT Capital claimed to be the winning bidder at a 2009 trustee's sale conducted by TD Service Company on behalf of beneficiary Point Center Financial, but the trustee rejected the bid due to a procedural mistake and later held another sale. BT sued for title to the property and damages, but the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding the sale void. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claims were mooted by a 2010 trustee's sale at which Point Center Financial acquired the property, and that Arizona statutes governing deeds of trust do not recognize a right to damages for BT in these circumstances. The Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion on the merits.

propertyprocedure

The case involved the Norcutts, who purchased a home in cash and used part of the proceeds to pay off an existing first mortgage on the property, unaware that Sourcecorp held a recorded judgment lien against the prior owners that exceeded the property's value. After Sourcecorp sought to foreclose its lien through a sheriff's sale, the Norcutts sued, claiming they should be equitably subrogated to the priority position of the satisfied mortgage. The trial court ruled against them, but the court of appeals reversed, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that equitable subrogation applied because the Norcutts were not mere volunteers and had paid the mortgage to protect their interest, preventing unjust enrichment of Sourcecorp; it limited the remedy to giving the Norcutts priority in sale proceeds up to the amount paid on the mortgage without allowing foreclosure rights. The decision rested on longstanding Arizona precedents like Mosher v. Conway and Restatement principles, applied to the specific facts without adopting bright-line rules.

property

The case concerned whether a 2009 Arizona statute (A.R.S. § 9-821.01) requiring nonpartisan elections and limiting primary voting to district residents applied to the City of Tucson, a charter city whose 1929 charter provided for partisan ward-based primaries followed by at-large general elections for city council. Tucson sued the State, arguing the law did not override its charter authority; the superior court ruled for the State, but the Arizona Supreme Court held that the statute does not displace the city's chosen election method. The Court reasoned that Article 13, Section 2 of the Arizona Constitution's home-rule provision empowers charter cities to determine the selection of their governing officers, including the structure of council elections, and that this local autonomy prevails over conflicting state legislation on the subject. The Court vacated the court of appeals decision and remanded for summary judgment in Tucson's favor.

elections

The case concerned whether Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.8, which authorizes sanctions for a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence at least thirty days before a plea offer lapses, applies when a prosecutor withdraws an open-ended plea offer that had no deadline. The Arizona Supreme Court held that Rule 15.8 does not apply in that situation because the rule requires the prosecutor to have imposed a deadline; instead, sanctions for untimely disclosures are governed by Rule 15.7. The Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion, which had treated the withdrawal as effectively imposing a deadline, and remanded the case to the superior court for further proceedings under the correct rule. The reasoning focused on the plain language of Rule 15.8 and the availability of Rule 15.7 to address disclosure violations.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is an automatic appeal by Scott Alan Lehr from his 2009 retrial convictions and death sentences for the first-degree murders of two women, M.M. and M.C., as well as related convictions for attempted murder, kidnapping, sexual assault, and other offenses stemming from a series of attacks on ten women in Phoenix in 1991-1992. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences after reviewing claims including the voluntariness of Lehr's waiver of his right to attend trial (which the court found was knowing and not coerced by restraint policies) and multiple constitutional challenges to Arizona's death penalty scheme, jury instructions, aggravating and mitigating factor findings, and sentencing procedures. The court applied de novo review to waiver issues, fundamental error review to unpreserved claims, and rejected the arguments by relying on prior precedents or finding no error in the trial court's handling of the case, while noting the life sentence imposed for a third murder count after the jury deadlocked. Core reasoning emphasized that the record supported the waiver, that constitutional claims had been resolved in earlier cases, and that independent review confirmed the death sentences were appropriate.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This special action challenged the qualifications of three nominees to the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission under the state constitution's requirements that commissioners not have held or sought 'any other public office' in the preceding three years, nor served as a political party officer or paid lobbyist. The Arizona Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and granted relief in part, disqualifying at least one nominee while allowing others to proceed. The core reasoning focused on the broad text of Article 4, Part 2, Section 1(3) of the Arizona Constitution, enacted by voter initiative, which the court interpreted as imposing categorical exclusions on eligibility without regard to the specific nature of the prior position or the candidate's personal integrity.

elections

The case involved whether crime victims have a constitutional right to attend an ex parte hearing regarding out-of-state summonses issued for a capital defendant's pretrial mitigation investigation. The Arizona Supreme Court held that victims are not entitled to attend such hearings because defendants themselves have no right to be present at purely procedural ex parte proceedings under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.9(b). The court reasoned that the Victims' Bill of Rights provision granting victims the right to be present at proceedings where the defendant has the right to be present does not apply here, while noting that other independent victim rights must yield if they conflict with a defendant's fair trial rights, and remanded the matter to the superior court.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a wrongful death, negligence, and elder abuse lawsuit filed by the personal representatives of William Everett Preston's estate against Kindred Hospitals West and related defendants after Preston died while a patient there. The superior court dismissed the complaint, finding that the bankruptcy trustee was the real party in interest due to Preston's prior bankruptcy and that the representatives had not shown an understandable mistake or difficulty in identifying the proper plaintiff. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) does not require such a showing and instead mandates only that a reasonable time be allowed for the real party in interest to ratify, join, or be substituted. The court reasoned from the rule's plain language that dismissal is not permitted until that opportunity is provided, and it affirmed the court of appeals on this point.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned whether the Cities of Peoria and Phoenix could impose transaction privilege taxes on Brink’s Home Security for monitoring services that transmit alarm signals from Arizona customers to an out-of-state facility in Texas, which then contacts customers or local responders. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals decision that had upheld the taxes on the ground that the communications formed an intrastate “transmission loop.” The court reasoned that the statute prohibiting municipal taxation of interstate telecommunications services, A.R.S. § 42-6004(A)(2), applies to the separate interstate transmissions involved and cannot be avoided by recharacterizing them as intrastate, and it remanded for the lower court to address whether the taxes instead apply only to the monitoring services themselves.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether the estate of a minor injured at a public high school could recover premajority medical expenses in a negligence action against the school district, or whether that claim was time-barred under Arizona's one-year statute of limitations for suits against public entities. The superior court had dismissed the medical-expenses portion of the complaint, relying on prior precedent that assigned the right to recover such expenses solely to the parents. The Arizona Supreme Court revised the common-law rule to allow both the injured minor and the parents to seek premajority medical expenses, provided no double recovery occurs, and overruled earlier decisions to the contrary. It reasoned that the prior approach encouraged piecemeal litigation and could bar meritorious claims for reasons unrelated to fault, while conflicting with legislative policies that toll limitations periods for minors until they reach eighteen. Because the minor's action was filed within one year after she turned eighteen, the court held it timely and reversed the dismissal.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a juvenile, Nickolas S., who was adjudicated delinquent under Arizona Revised Statutes section 15-507 for using profane and derogatory language toward a teacher during two classroom incidents. The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the adjudications, holding that the statute could constitutionally apply to pure speech only if limited to fighting words—those personally abusive epithets inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction from an ordinary citizen. The Court reasoned that Nickolas's statements, while offensive and disruptive, did not meet this standard because they were not likely to provoke the teacher to violence. Although the court of appeals had distinguished between the two incidents, the Supreme Court found neither qualified as fighting words under the First Amendment.

criminal lawfree speechfamily law

The case involved Mike Peter Gallardo's conviction for the first-degree murder, burglary, and kidnapping of Rudy Padilla, who was bound and shot in his parents' home in 2005. After a mistrial due to juror misconduct, a second jury found Gallardo guilty and determined that two aggravating factors—the prior conviction of a serious offense and the especially cruel nature of the murder—justified a death sentence. On mandatory appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, rejecting challenges related to the mistrial declaration, evidentiary issues, and multiple constitutional claims regarding the death penalty process. The court held that the trial court properly exercised discretion in declaring the mistrial for manifest necessity and that the remaining arguments were foreclosed by established precedent.

criminal law

In Griffith v. Baca, Gary Griffith challenged the eligibility of R. Rene Baca to run as a candidate for justice of the peace in Graham County Justice Precinct No. 1, claiming Baca was not a resident or qualified elector in that precinct at the time he filed his nomination papers. The superior court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Baca had moved to an address within the precinct and properly updated his voter registration form. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's judgment, reasoning that Baca had validly reregistered by correcting his address on the existing signed form in the presence of the recorder and that submitting an early ballot in another precinct did not bar him from reregistering before the election.

elections

The case concerned a lawsuit filed in Arizona superior court by the Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians against Arturo and Juan Jose Rojas Cardona and several related Mexican business entities over an investment in a casino project in Guadalupe, Mexico. The Tribe sought and obtained court approval for alternative service of process on the defendants via certified mail, email, and Federal Express, but the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that these methods violated the Hague Service Convention. The Arizona Supreme Court held that Mexico’s accession to the Convention, including its objections to alternative service under Articles 8 and 10, makes service through Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs the exclusive permissible method when the Convention applies. Because the Tribe had not attempted service through that channel, the Court vacated the superior court’s order denying the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process and remanded for further proceedings.

procedure

In this case, Aaron Brian Gunches pleaded guilty to kidnapping and first-degree murder after shooting and killing Ted Price in a desert area following an argument involving Price's ex-wife. The trial court imposed a presumptive sentence on the kidnapping count and, based on the jury's findings of aggravating factors including a prior serious offense conviction and that the murder was especially heinous or depraved, sentenced Gunches to death. On mandatory appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the kidnapping sentence but vacated the death sentence. The court reasoned that the jury's heinous-or-depraved finding under A.R.S. § 13-751(F)(6) was erroneous because the evidence did not establish that the victim was conscious during the attack or suffered prolonged pain, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt even though another aggravator was present, requiring remand for a new penalty-phase proceeding.

criminal law

The case concerned Arizona’s implied consent law, A.R.S. § 28-1321, which addresses whether a person arrested for driving under the influence must submit to a blood draw or other testing to determine alcohol or drug concentration. After Carrillo was arrested and taken to a DUI van, officers sought to perform a blood draw without a warrant; the issue was whether the statute permits testing absent the arrestee’s express agreement or requires a warrant if the person does not expressly agree. The Arizona Supreme Court held that the statute generally does not authorize warrantless testing unless the arrestee expressly agrees, interpreting subsection (B) to treat a failure to expressly agree as a refusal and subsection (D)(1) to prohibit the test without a warrant in that circumstance. The court vacated the court of appeals opinion and remanded the case to the municipal court to determine, under the correct standard, whether Carrillo had unequivocally manifested assent by words or conduct.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Alfredo Lucero Garcia, who was convicted of armed robbery and first-degree murder after he and an accomplice entered a bar, demanded money from the owner at gunpoint, and fatally shot him during the robbery. Following a jury trial and a second penalty-phase jury empaneled due to misconduct, Garcia was sentenced to death based on findings that he was a major participant in the felony murder, acted with reckless indifference, and that two aggravating factors applied: a prior serious offense conviction and commission of the murder for pecuniary gain. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence on mandatory appeal, holding that the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict supported the jury's determinations on guilt and aggravation, that mitigation was insufficient to call for leniency, and that numerous challenges to the trial procedures, jury instructions, and capital sentencing scheme lacked merit under prior precedent.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a property owner who, after settling claims with HUD over accessibility violations in low-income apartments, sued the architect for professional negligence in the design, seeking only economic damages. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and held that the economic loss doctrine bars such tort claims in construction defect cases, limiting the owner to contractual remedies when there is no physical injury to persons or other property. The court reasoned that the policies underlying the doctrine—such as preserving the distinction between contract and tort and encouraging parties to allocate risks in their agreements—apply equally to claims against architects and other design professionals, rejecting any exception based on the professional relationship.

torts & liabilitycivil rightsproperty

In State v. Maldonado, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed whether a criminal defendant's conviction for cocaine possession must be overturned because the State failed to file a formal information until after trial, conviction, and sentencing. The defendant argued that this omission deprived the superior court of subject matter jurisdiction under the Arizona Constitution's requirement that prosecutions proceed by information or indictment, relying on prior precedent. The court held that the constitutional right to an information is a personal one that can be waived or forfeited if not timely raised, and that post-trial review is limited to fundamental error analysis. It concluded there was no fundamental error because the defendant had notice of the charge through the complaint, preliminary hearing, and trial proceedings, and he suffered no prejudice. The court therefore affirmed the conviction and sentence while vacating the court of appeals opinion.

criminal lawprocedure

In Lake v. City of Phoenix, a police officer submitted a public records request to the City for metadata embedded in electronic notes kept by his supervisor regarding his work performance, after suspecting the notes had been backdated. The City denied the request, arguing that metadata did not qualify as a public record under existing precedent. The Arizona Supreme Court held that when a public entity maintains a record in electronic format, the electronic version including its embedded metadata is subject to disclosure under Arizona's public records statutes. The Court reasoned that providing the record in its native electronic format satisfies disclosure obligations without imposing undue burdens on agencies, and that requests can still be denied on grounds such as privacy or confidentiality. The Court vacated portions of the lower court decisions and remanded for further proceedings.

free speechprocedure