Michael F. Bolin

The case involved a dispute over the apportionment of proceeds from county-wide ad valorem and other taxes levied to fund public education between the Gulf Shores City Board of Education and the Baldwin County Board of Education. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and mandamus relief against state and local officials to enforce the distribution formula set out in statutes such as § 16-13-31(b) and § 40-12-4, which direct that tax collections be allocated based on each local board's calculated costs under the Foundation Program. The Montgomery Circuit Court dismissed the complaint, leading to an appeal that raised questions of statutory interpretation concerning the scope of education-taxing authority and the proper recipients of the resulting revenue.

taxesprocedure

This case arose from a business dispute between Communications Unlimited Contracting Services, Inc. (CUI) and Steve Clanton over a 2019 purchase agreement involving Clanton's restoration services company, SCI, after the parties abandoned plans for a joint venture. Following arbitration before JAMS that addressed only monetary claims and awarded damages to each side without resolving ownership interests in SCI, Clanton moved the circuit court to remand the award for clarification on additional issues. The circuit court granted the motion, but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motion was an untimely request for modification under the Federal Arbitration Act and that the award was unambiguous on its face regarding the monetary relief resolved. The court reasoned that the arbitrator had clearly limited the proceedings to monetary claims, with no ambiguity in the amounts, recipients, or scope that would justify remand, and directed the trial court to proceed with confirmation instead.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute between the Alabama Department of Corrections and several current or former inmates over the department's authority under § 14-8-6 to withhold up to 40% of work-release earnings for confinement costs, as well as charges for transportation, laundry, toiletries, medical co-pays, and drug testing. The trial court issued rulings on the legality of these practices and certified parts of its judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., even though claims for monetary refunds remained unresolved. The Court of Civil Appeals reviewed the merits, but the Alabama Supreme Court held that the certification was invalid because a judgment addressing only liability in an action seeking damages is not final until damages are determined. The court therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment, without reaching issues of subject-matter jurisdiction or the underlying statutory interpretations.

criminal lawprocedure

This case arose from a 2005 motor-vehicle accident in which Gilbert Lee Littrell sued Doris Thrasher, as parent of the minor driver, and RLI Insurance Company, the underinsured-motorist carrier for Littrell's employer. RLI exercised its right under Alabama precedent to opt out of active participation in the trial while agreeing to be bound by the verdict on liability and damages. After RLI's counsel, Bert Taylor, later entered an appearance as co-counsel for Thrasher, Littrell moved to bar Taylor's participation and to enforce RLI's opt-out election; the trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court of Alabama granted Littrell's petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that permitting the insurer's former counsel to represent the defendant would undermine the procedural framework established in Lowe v. Nationwide Insurance Co. and allow the carrier to retain an undisclosed presence in the litigation.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a medical malpractice action brought by Anna Breland, a minor born prematurely, through her mother against ophthalmologist Dr. Leonard Rich and his professional corporation. Anna alleged that Dr. Rich negligently recorded in the NICU's eye-exam book that no further retinopathy of prematurity screening was needed after her June 2003 examination, contrary to his eye form notation, resulting in missed follow-up exams and subsequent injury. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants. On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court examined whether the plaintiffs' expert testimony created genuine issues of material fact regarding the standard of care, causation, and the role of the eye-exam book versus individual charts or nurse notes in triggering examinations, while addressing related evidentiary and procedural points such as the weight of expert opinions and the statute of limitations.

healthcaretorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved attorney Joseph Hutchinson's appeal of a trial court's reduction of his fee declarations for representing an indigent defendant in a capital-murder prosecution that ultimately resolved with a misdemeanor plea. After the original trial judge retired, a successor judge reduced Hutchinson's claimed out-of-court and overhead expenses for both trial and appellate work, prompting Hutchinson to challenge the award on appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals transferred the matter to the Alabama Supreme Court, which first addressed its own jurisdiction over fee disputes arising from criminal cases. The court held that such orders are appealable to the Court of Criminal Appeals because its statutory jurisdiction over criminal matters necessarily encompasses related post-judgment proceedings like attorney-fee awards under the indigent-defense statutes. The decision relied on precedent distinguishing these claims from ordinary civil actions and on the practical need for a single appellate path in criminal matters.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a declaratory judgment action filed by William and Judy Buxton against the law firm that drafted a 2003 deed conveying them real property in Morgan County, Alabama. The deed's granting clause stated the property was conveyed to the Buxtons 'for and during their life and upon their death, then to their heirs in fee simple,' and the Buxtons sought a ruling that this language created a fee simple estate with right of survivorship. The trial court granted summary judgment in their favor, applying a statutory presumption favoring fee simple estates. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the granting clause unambiguously created a life estate with remainder to the heirs, making the presumption inapplicable, and that any ambiguities in the warranty clause could not override the clear terms of the granting clause.

property

In Lowengart v. Lowengart, Gloria Lowengart, an Alabama resident, sued her son Sanford and his California-based investment firm in Alabama circuit court, alleging fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violations of the Alabama Securities Act arising from over $750,000 in losses on her brokerage account after he recommended and executed trades under a limited power of attorney. Sanford moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing insufficient contacts with Alabama, and alternatively sought to compel arbitration. The trial court declined to rule on the motion without allowing discovery into Sanford's jurisdictional contacts. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Sanford's petition for a writ of mandamus, concluding that he had not demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal at that stage of the proceedings because the record did not establish that further discovery on personal jurisdiction was unwarranted.

procedure

This case involved the State of Alabama seeking to collect an unpaid criminal fine from Gary Michael Coker by filing a writ of execution against his real property, which had been the subject of a prior civil forfeiture action tied to his methamphetamine trafficking charges. In the forfeiture case, the parties entered a consent order that denied forfeiture of the property, stated that Coker would retain full title and possession, and provided that the State relinquished all claim to the property while requiring Coker to clear the lis pendens. The trial court quashed the writ, interpreting the consent order as barring the State's later effort to seize the property for the fine. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the consent order was unambiguous and applied only to the specific forfeiture claims in that action, not to future claims such as execution to satisfy the criminal judgment. The case was remanded for consideration of Coker's alternative arguments, including his homestead exemption claim.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

The case involved multiple nonprofit organizations challenging the constitutionality of the Jefferson County Bingo Act (Act No. 80-609, as amended), which permits and regulates bingo games in the county under Amendment No. 386 to the Alabama Constitution. The plaintiffs appealed a trial court ruling that upheld the Act and related sheriff regulations against their claims that it conflicted with the state constitution's general ban on lotteries. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the Jefferson County sheriff authority to issue permits and promulgate rules for bingo operations. The core reasoning was that Amendment No. 386 exclusively vests regulatory power over bingo with county or municipal governing bodies, and the legislature cannot enact statutes that conflict with this constitutional allocation by extending such authority to the sheriff.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Graybar Electric Company's claim against surety Safeco Insurance and general contractor Johnson Controls for unpaid electrical materials supplied to subcontractor TDC on a public airport renovation project in Birmingham, Alabama. Graybar provided notice under Alabama's little Miller Act (§ 39-1-1) and sued after the claim was denied for alleged deficiencies in proof that the materials were used on the project. The trial court granted summary judgment to Graybar, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the statutory notice was adequate, affidavits and invoices sufficiently established use on the project, the later settlement with TDC did not operate as a novation releasing the bond obligors, and attorney fees were recoverable under the statute.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved an interpleader action filed by Nationwide Retirement Solutions, Inc., depositing funds from a state employees' deferred compensation plan into court amid competing claims by the Alabama State Personnel Board, ASEA, and PEBCO, including allegations of improper kickback payments and related claims of breach of fiduciary duty and fraud. The trial court appointed a special master to hear all pending motions and matters and make recommended orders. The Alabama Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the appointment order. The Court held that Alabama Rule of Civil Procedure 53 permits appointment of a special master only as an exception, not the rule, and that the broad reference here improperly delegated core judicial functions on liability and other basic issues.

procedure

This case concerned a dispute between J.L. Loper Construction Co. and Findout Partnership over alleged defects, incomplete work, and billing issues arising from a 2005 construction contract to build a house, which contained an arbitration clause under the Alabama Arbitration Act. After the project ended, the parties executed amendments and a second amendment that included a release of claims and payment in full, but Findout later demanded arbitration while Loper refused, asserting that a mutual release barred any claims and filing a declaratory-judgment action to that effect. The trial court dismissed Loper's declaratory action and compelled arbitration, then later set aside an arbitration award in Findout's favor to permit additional testimony. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the order setting aside the award, reasoning that the executed release and payment provisions did not eliminate the contractual obligation to arbitrate disputes and that the trial court lacked authority to reopen the arbitration proceeding in the manner ordered.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved Donald McInish's claim for workers' compensation benefits from his employer KGS Steel, Inc., for a neck condition he alleged resulted from cumulative trauma caused by workplace vibrations. The trial court awarded benefits after finding clear and convincing evidence of medical causation, but the Court of Civil Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court of Alabama denied McInish's petition for a writ of certiorari without an opinion, leaving the reversal in place. A dissent maintained that the trial court properly resolved conflicting medical testimony in McInish's favor and that its judgment should have been reinstated.

labor & employment

The case involved Joel Don Miller, a longtime CSX Transportation employee who worked as a conductor, brakeman, and flagman, suing his employer under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for cumulative neck injuries caused by repeated exposure to vibration, jerking, and jolting on freight trains. Miller underwent cervical spine surgery in 2002 after symptoms developed gradually, but pain returned upon resuming work, leading him to retire early in 2003 despite being eligible for full retirement based on age and service; he sought damages for medical costs, pain, and lost future wages. A jury awarded Miller $450,000, and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that sufficient evidence supported the finding that workplace conditions caused or aggravated the injury and that the trial court properly handled issues of causation, apportionment of damages, and jury instructions under FELA standards.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityfederal power

The case involved claims by plaintiff Linda Sanders, on behalf of minor S.E., against several supervisory employees of the Alabama Department of Public Safety arising from alleged sexual misconduct by a state trooper during a traffic stop in 2008. The supervisors petitioned for a writ of mandamus after the trial court denied their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the individual-capacity claims on State-agent immunity grounds. The court denied the petition, holding that the complaint allegations, viewed in the plaintiff's favor, made it conceivable she could prove facts showing the supervisors failed to follow specific departmental rules or otherwise acted in a manner defeating immunity. The court noted that immunity defenses are typically addressed at summary judgment after discovery rather than on a motion to dismiss, and it declined to address the separate respondeat superior issue via mandamus.

proceduretorts & liabilitycriminal law

The case involved the City of Hoover suing an adult retail business, Love Stuff, for operating within 1,000 feet of churches, schools, and other protected locations in violation of Alabama's Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act, specifically § 13A-12-200.5(4), and for seeking a sign permit while in violation. Love Stuff counterclaimed that the Act's location restrictions and its ban on the sale of sexual devices under § 13A-12-200.2 were unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and violated privacy and due process rights under the U.S. and Alabama Constitutions, citing Lawrence v. Texas. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the statutes were constitutional because they regulated only commercial activity rather than private consensual conduct, did not target a discrete class for discrimination, and did not implicate a fundamental liberty interest in the sale of sexual aids.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatorycivil rights

In Stover v. Synagro-WWT, Inc., plaintiffs filed a statewide class action and a related individual action in Franklin Circuit Court alleging that defendants negligently released PFOA, PFOS, and other perfluorochemicals onto properties in Franklin County and elsewhere in Alabama. The trial court consolidated the cases, determined that venue was proper in Franklin County, but then deconsolidated them and transferred the class action to Lawrence County on forum non conveniens grounds while retaining the individual action in Franklin County. On petitions for writs of mandamus, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered the class action transferred to Morgan County, where the defendants' manufacturing facilities, principal places of business, witnesses, and documents are located, while concluding that venue for the individual action remains proper in Franklin County because the alleged injury occurred there.

proceduretorts & liabilityenvironment

The case involved Huey Lee Brannon petitioning the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari review of a Court of Criminal Appeals decision in his criminal matter against the State of Alabama. The Supreme Court denied the writ without issuing an opinion. The denial was based on the petitioner's failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 39(a)(1)(D) and Rule 39(d)(3) of the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by R.J.G. to the Alabama Supreme Court, seeking review of a decision by the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals in a matter styled R.J.G. v. S.S.W. The Supreme Court denied the petition. In its brief opinion, the court stated that the denial should not be understood as approving all the language, reasons, or statements of law contained in the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion.

family lawprocedure