George H. Wu

In Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., plaintiffs challenged Kraft's food product labeling as misleading under state law, focusing on claims about ingredients like trans fats, sugars, and additives in items such as Teddy Grahams, as well as general healthfulness representations. Defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing express preemption by the FDCA and NLEA, which bar state requirements on food labeling topics that are not identical to federal standards. The court denied the motion without prejudice, holding that while specific claims like "no cholesterol" and quantified "whole grain" statements were preempted, more general health-related representations were not, and the presence of trans fat or other ingredients did not automatically trigger preemption for all claims. The ruling relied on the limited scope of express preemption under 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a), the NLEA's rule of construction excluding implied preemption, and distinctions from cases like In re PepsiCo.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

In Kenny v. Sanders, a federal prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the Bureau of Prisons' refusal to award presentence credit against his federal sentence for time spent in federal custody from April to November 2005 under a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum while serving a state parole violation sentence. The court denied the petition and dismissed the action with prejudice. The core reasoning was that 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) prohibits double credit for time already credited against another sentence, the state retained primary jurisdiction during the federal transfer, and the writ did not alter that custody status.

criminal law

The case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Caylie Ryan Wilson, who was convicted in California state court of attempted murder, attempted carjacking, and possession of a short-barreled rifle, along with firearm discharge enhancements, resulting in a sentence of 34 years and eight months to life in prison. The district court reviewed the petition, the attached Report and Recommendation from the magistrate judge, and related filings under 28 U.S.C. § 636, making a de novo determination. The court approved and adopted the Report and Recommendation in full, entered judgment denying the habeas petition, and dismissed the action with prejudice. The underlying state convictions stemmed from an incident where the victim was shot during what appeared to be an attempted carjacking, with supporting evidence including witness identifications and recovery of the weapon. Core reasoning centered on the lack of merit in the petitioner's claims challenging his trial, evidence, and sentencing under applicable federal standards.

criminal lawprocedure

This case is a citizen suit under Section 304 of the Clean Air Act brought by environmental organizations against the South Coast Air Quality Management District and related defendants, challenging the validity of the district's use of certain internal offsets (including priority reserve allocations held in an internal bank) as part of its new source review permitting program for nonattainment areas under the Act's offset requirements. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief after providing required notice, alleging issues with how the offsets ensure compliance with emissions reduction mandates in the applicable State Implementation Plan. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), concluding that the claims do not allege violations of an enforceable emission standard or limitation subject to citizen suit enforcement in district court. The core reasoning was that challenges to the adequacy of the offset tracking system or related SIP elements must instead be pursued under Section 307 in the Court of Appeals, as the district court lacks jurisdiction over such matters.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Matthew Robert Collett, who had pleaded guilty in 2003 to manufacturing methamphetamine, causing a fire with great bodily injury, and voluntary manslaughter, resulting in a 14-year prison sentence. Collett did not appeal his conviction or sentence, and his federal petition, filed in 2008 and relying on the Supreme Court's Cunningham decision, challenged aspects of his sentence. The district court dismissed the petition and action as untimely under the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations, which began running in November 2003 and expired in November 2004. The court reasoned that Collett's 2007 state habeas petitions were filed after the limitations period had already expired and thus did not toll or revive it, and no grounds for equitable tolling or application of a newly recognized retroactive right applied.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Eileen Cavanaugh, a certified registered nurse anesthetist employed by Southern California Permanente Medical Group, who was terminated after appearing inebriated at work and then failing to complete a required chemical dependency rehabilitation program under a Last Chance Agreement. Represented by her union, which filed but did not arbitrate a grievance, Cavanaugh sued for violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act, breach of employment contract and the implied covenant of good faith, breach of the union's duty of fair representation, and improper wage deductions under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's, concluding there were no triable issues of fact on any claim. Core reasoning included that the employer was not obligated to offer further accommodation after the last-chance agreement, the union had no duty to arbitrate, and the plaintiff qualified for the professional exemption from FLSA overtime requirements.

labor & employment

The case arose from a personal injury lawsuit filed by a train conductor against railroad companies after a tree fell on his locomotive; one defendant, Singh, filed a cross-complaint against the United States seeking equitable indemnity, contribution, and related claims, alleging the tree was on Navy-leased property at Camp Pendleton. The United States removed the action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 but then moved to dismiss the cross-claim under Rule 12(b)(1), contending the state court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the FTCA and Tucker Act require such claims against the United States to be brought in federal court, and that the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction therefore barred federal jurisdiction as well. The court granted the motion, holding that derivative jurisdiction remains applicable to § 1442 removals (in contrast to the 2002 amendment to § 1441(f)), dismissed the cross-claim, and remanded the remaining action to state court.

procedurefederal powertorts & liability

The case involved a federal habeas corpus petition filed by James Leo Lawless III challenging his 2002 state court convictions for murder and firearm possession on grounds that he did not receive a fair competency hearing. The court dismissed the petition as untimely under the one-year statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The judgment became final in October 2002, making the deadline October 2003, and the petitioner's later state habeas filings did not toll the expired limitations period. The California Supreme Court's denial of his petition with a citation to In re Robbins indicated it was rejected as untimely, further supporting the dismissal.

criminal lawprocedure