William Burnham Woods

The case concerned whether the Quebec Bank of Toronto acquired title to an accommodation promissory note made by Weyand & Jung and given to Bacon & Co. for the purpose of reducing Bacon & Co.'s existing debt to the bank. The court assumed the note had been manually delivered to the bank's agent but held that delivery was conditional on the bank crediting the note or its proceeds against the debt; because that condition was never performed and the bank retained the original draft and note instead, no title passed. As the dispute was between the original parties and the bank was not a bona fide holder, it could not enforce the note against Hellman, the assignee of Bacon & Co. for creditors, and the lower court's dismissal of the bank's bill was affirmed.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned whether the United States could withhold payment to the Central Pacific Railroad Company for transportation services performed over sections of its rail lines that had not received federal construction aid, relying on section 2 of the Thurman Act of 1878. The railroad sued in the Court of Claims for compensation on its unaided mileage, the government demurred, and judgment was entered for the company; the United States appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 1862 and 1864 statutes created a contract under which the government could retain compensation only for services on aided roads, and that the later Thurman Act must be read consistently with that limitation to avoid altering the original bargain. The Court reasoned that the statutory language referring to “compensation for services rendered for the government” had already been construed by prior decisions to cover only aided portions, and a broader reading would impair vested contractual rights.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved a dispute over land conveyances and mortgages in Michigan, where plaintiff David Oliver transferred property via quitclaim deeds and bills of sale to defendant Cunningham in 1868 amid financial troubles and creditor pressures, allegedly to hold title in trust, pay debts, and reconvey surplus; this led to the Buffalo agreement selling portions to Haines, Ranney, and Robinson, with Hunt and Eschleman holding a mortgage interest. Oliver sued claiming the transfers created a trust violated by the defendants and that Hunt and Eschleman were partners in the resulting firm. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's decree against Hunt and Eschleman, directing dismissal of the bill as to them, because the evidence showed no partnership or unauthorized actions by them, the assignment of mortgage interest caused no harm, and the Buffalo agreement had been performed to Oliver's benefit with lands reconveyed or available.

propertybusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether Du Pont's small steam-powered boat, used to transport himself, his superintendent, and occasionally workers across the Delaware River, was subject to federal inspection requirements under Title 52 of the Revised Statutes regulating steam vessels. Du Pont paid a $500 penalty under protest after the vessel was seized for operating without inspection papers and a licensed engineer and pilot, then sued the customs collector to recover the amount. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment for Du Pont, holding that the boat was a steam vessel navigating waters that are common highways of commerce and qualified as "other small craft of like character" under §4426, making it liable for inspection to ensure safety. The Court reasoned that the statutory language and purpose of protecting life and property from boiler explosions applied to this vessel despite its modest size and private use.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a challenge by the widow and heirs of Allison Nailor to four deeds he executed conveying real property in Washington, D.C., and Maryland to his mistress, Catharine Conley, and their two young children. The plaintiffs alleged the deeds were invalid due to the grantor's insanity, illegal consideration based on their concubinage, and undue influence or fraud by Conley. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decree voiding the deeds and directed dismissal of the bill. The Court found the evidence showed Nailor was of sound mind when executing the deeds, that there was no proof of threats, persuasion, or other undue influence by Conley, and that the conveyances reflected Nailor's own long-held intention to provide for the children.

family lawproperty

The case involved William J. Landram, collector of internal revenue for Kentucky's eighth district, who sued the United States in the Court of Claims to recover commissions of one-half of one percent on taxes collected from distilled spirits through the sale of tax-paid stamps during fiscal years 1879-1884, after the Treasury had denied the claims on top of his graduated salary. The lower court awarded him $4,724.78 (subject to the $4,500 annual net compensation cap), and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the 1879 act, by re-enacting without change the prior language of Revised Statutes § 3314, preserved the commission entitlement alongside the salary provisions in § 2 of the same act; applying the rule that statutes must be construed to give effect to all parts, the opinion concluded that Congress intended collectors to receive the commissions within the overall compensation limit. It rejected the argument that the salary provisions impliedly repealed the commission right, noting both the explicit re-enactment and a later 1880 confirmatory statute covering most of the period.

taxes

This case was a patent infringement suit in equity brought by Wallick against Cantrell and Petty over a 1875 patent for an apparatus to enamel mouldings used in picture frames and similar items. The Supreme Court affirmed the decree finding infringement and rejecting the defendants' invalidity defense. The core reasoning applied the doctrine of equivalents, concluding that the accused device performed substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the same result as the patented invention. The court also held that the defendants failed to carry their burden of proving prior use by Werner, as the weight of the evidence showed the earlier device was merely the old Marcher box without the distinctive features of Wallick's patent.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved plaintiffs who, as judgment creditors of Lancaster, attached and later purchased at sheriff's sale certain Missouri lands that Lancaster had conveyed by absolute deed to Wells as security for a note, with a verbal agreement allowing Wells to sell the land if the note went unpaid. Wells sold the lands to Tallman (defendants' predecessor) after default, and plaintiffs sued to redeem the lands as purchasers of Lancaster's equity of redemption, tendering the amount due on the note. The court affirmed dismissal of the bill, holding that the deed was a mortgage but that Wells' authorized sale upon default was valid and extinguished any remaining rights of Lancaster or the plaintiffs. The core reasoning was that the sale power was an integral part of the mortgage condition, the attachment was subject to it, and the fair sale cut off redemption rights just as a foreclosure would, whether or not the buyer had notice of the verbal terms.

propertyprocedure

The case was a patent infringement suit concerning the validity of the first claim in the Rosner patent for a permutation lock, which used bolts and a key inserted through the wheels to change the combination without removing the wheels from the lock. The court held that the patent claim was invalid and reversed the lower court's decree in favor of the patent holder. It reasoned that the invention had been anticipated by an 1852 application from Rickards and locks manufactured by Evans & Watson in 1853, which used substantially the same arrangement of rims, hubs, bolts, and a key to allow combination changes without wheel removal; any asserted differences, such as the key fitting snugly in the wheel holes, were either outside the claim language or obvious modifications that did not amount to patentable invention.

business & regulatory

This case involved a dispute over funds collected from a U.S. government contract judgment awarded to the estate of a deceased partner in a three-person partnership formed to supply wood. Two partners had contributed all the capital and performed all the work under an agreement to share profits and losses proportionally, while the third contributed nothing. The Circuit Court decreed that the collected funds were partnership assets belonging to the contributing partners after repayment of their advances, with no outstanding partnership debts, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court reasoned that the partnership agreement did not constitute a prohibited assignment of a claim against the United States under Rev. Stat. §§ 3477 and 3737, as no claim existed when the partnership was formed, and the funds represented the contributing partners' own property rather than an interest transferred from the non-contributing partner. Additional challenges regarding estoppel and compensation for the defendant's recovery efforts were rejected, as the defendant provided no services benefiting the plaintiffs and acted adversely to their interests.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a lawsuit by Milton Courtright against James N. Burnes to collect on a promissory note dated October 10, 1872, for $7,333, which Burnes had executed in connection with the distribution of partnership assets from a railroad construction contract involving Burnes, Courtright, Winston (the original payee), and Campbell. Burnes raised defenses including that the note was merely a non-binding memorandum of estimated partnership shares rather than an enforceable obligation, that it lacked consideration due to unsettled partnership accounts, and that the suit was barred by a champertous fee agreement under which Courtright's attorney would receive 40% of any recovery. The trial court excluded evidence offered to support the partnership-related defenses on grounds that it would contradict the written note and entered judgment for the plaintiff; on the champerty issue, it held that such an agreement did not disqualify the plaintiff from pursuing his claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that parol evidence could not vary the terms of the note and that, under prevailing authority, a champertous arrangement with counsel does not forfeit or bar enforcement of the plaintiff's underlying right to recover.

procedure

The case involved a dispute over title to land in Virginia between the heirs of John Holmes, who claimed under an 1819 deed from Samuel C. Young, and defendants asserting ownership through alleged forfeiture for unpaid taxes. The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the ancient deed was properly admitted without proof of execution or possession, and that its recitals regarding the death of the original patentee Samuel Young and the heirship of Samuel C. Young were admissible under the hearsay exception for pedigree declarations. The court further reasoned that the defendants failed to establish forfeiture under Virginia statutes, as the land had been entered on tax books, taxes paid or released, and the state had assessed taxes on the property for decades without claiming forfeiture.

propertyproceduretaxes

This case concerned a dispute over title to land in Kentucky, where the plaintiffs sought to introduce two original deeds from the early 19th century as evidence of their chain of title. The Circuit Court had excluded the deeds, leading to a judgment against the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court held that the deeds qualified as ancient documents and should have been admitted because they were at least 30 years old, found in proper custody among court records from a related 1816 suit, bore apparently genuine recording endorsements from 1816, and were supported by other corroborative evidence of authenticity. The Court also upheld the validity of a prior attachment judgment and resulting land sale, applying a presumption that a court of general jurisdiction had properly effected substituted service on non-residents even if proof of notice did not appear on the record. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a dispute over grain futures contracts executed by commission merchants (plaintiffs) on behalf of the defendant, where the defendant advanced funds but later sought recovery via counterclaim, alleging the deals were illegal options contracts under Illinois law. The court held that the contracts violated the statute banning future commodity options as gambling and were void, and that the plaintiffs failed to properly substitute new enforceable contracts under Board of Trade rules after offsetting the originals. Although the plaintiffs may have intended lawful transactions, the defendant's admitted purpose to engage in the prohibited venture meant he could not recover the advanced money, as courts will not assist recovery on illegal acts. The judgment for the defendant on his counterclaim was reversed with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs, while the judgment on the plaintiffs' original claim was affirmed.

business & regulatorycriminal law

The case concerned whether a creditor's attachment on the assets of a dissolved Louisiana partnership (A. Carriere & Sons) was dissolved by the surviving partners' cession of property under the state's insolvency law after one partner's death. The court held that the attachment was properly dissolved and affirmed the judgment below. Although the surviving partners lacked authority to surrender the deceased partner's share absent the heirs' consent, the insolvency court's acceptance of the cession and appointment of a syndic could not be attacked collaterally in this proceeding. The Louisiana insolvent law was also valid and operative after the repeal of the federal bankruptcy act, as it predated that act and was merely suspended during its enforcement.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case was a patent infringement suit in which the administrator of Helen M. Macdonald sued Shepard and others for selling skirt protectors alleged to copy her 1874 patent for an “improvement in dress protectors.” The patent claimed a skirt protector made with a fluted or plaited border of waterproof material. The circuit court found infringement and awarded damages, but the Supreme Court reversed and ordered dismissal of the suit. The Court held that the fluted or plaited border was an essential element of the claim because Macdonald had narrowed her application during prosecution to overcome rejection, and the defendants’ products—made under a later patent—lacked any fluted or plaited border, so they did not infringe.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case concerned a contract dispute in which the plaintiffs and defendant Woolfolk jointly borrowed money to settle a debt of the insolvent Park Ditch Company, with Woolfolk agreeing in writing to repay the note using any net collections from the company's pledged assets or resources after deducting costs. The plaintiffs alleged that Woolfolk had collected sufficient funds from the Chessman note, a Poznainsky claim, and water sales but failed to reimburse them as promised. After the plaintiffs presented evidence at trial, the district court granted a nonsuit for the defendant, which the Montana Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the judgment, holding that the evidence did not establish any receipt of net proceeds by Woolfolk that triggered his reimbursement obligation under the contract.

business & regulatory

The case involved a dispute over an alleged oral agreement in which the plaintiff promised to acquire title to land and convey an undivided one-third interest to the defendant in exchange for payment of one-third of the purchase price and related expenses. The defendant sought to enforce this agreement through a cross-action after the plaintiff refused to accept a deed and pay. The Supreme Court held that the contract was unenforceable because it fell squarely within Montana's statute of frauds (sections 160 and 162 of the 1879 Revised Statutes), which requires contracts for the sale of land to be in writing signed by the vendor. The Court rejected arguments based on implied contract, part performance, or equitable relief, noting that the suit rested on the void express contract, no payment or possession had occurred, and mere breach of an oral promise did not constitute fraud justifying equitable intervention. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed.

property

In Presser v. Illinois, the plaintiff challenged his conviction under sections of the Illinois Military Code that prohibited unauthorized private military organizations from drilling or parading with arms, arguing that the state law was preempted by federal militia statutes, violated the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms, and infringed due process and other constitutional protections. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and the validity of the state law. It reasoned that Congress's authority to organize and arm the militia does not preclude states from regulating or prohibiting voluntary, unauthorized armed associations, that the Illinois provisions could be construed to avoid any conflict with federal law, and that the remaining constitutional claims presented no federal question or were clearly without merit.

gunscriminal lawfederal power

The case concerned bonds validly issued by the City of Mobile, which carried a contractual obligation to levy a special annual tax for their repayment, after the state legislature annulled the city's charter, dissolved the corporation, transferred most of its assets and territory to the newly created Port of Mobile, and made no adequate provision for the bondholders. The court held that the Port of Mobile was the legal successor to the City of Mobile and therefore liable for the bonds, affirming both a money judgment against the Port and a writ of mandamus compelling it and the Mobile Police Board to levy and collect the required taxes. The core reasoning was that the two entities encompassed substantially the same population, taxable property, and governmental purposes, with public property transferred without consideration, making the successor bound by the predecessor's valid contracts; subsequent state laws that stripped the power to tax and pay were invalid and could not impair those obligations.

taxesproperty