Robert Leon Wilkins

This case involves claims by Lynn M. Johnson against BAE Systems, Inc. and Thomas Schiller arising from alleged sexual harassment and misconduct while working together on an intelligence team in Iraq. Johnson asserted tort claims including negligent supervision, sexual battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation, alleging that Schiller's actions caused her health problems and led to retaliation. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the claims for negligence, battery, and defamation, finding no reasonable jury could rule in her favor, but allowed the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to proceed. Additionally, due to Johnson's destruction of potentially relevant evidence on her computer, the court imposed sanctions including an adverse inference instruction but declined to dismiss the case entirely.

torts & liabilityprocedurelabor & employmentcivil rights

In this patent infringement dispute, Bell Helicopter Textron sued Airbus Helicopters over helicopter gear technology, leading to rulings on infringement, damages, and injunctive relief, followed by Airbus's bill of costs for an injunction hearing. The district court denied the request, holding that Airbus was not the prevailing party under Federal Circuit precedent because Bell obtained greater relief on the merits by securing a declaratory judgment of noninfringement for the currently used modified gear and avoiding any damages obligation, while Airbus's injunction applied only to a discontinued original gear. Even if Airbus qualified as prevailing, the highly mixed outcome—with each side succeeding on some contested issues—provided grounds to exercise discretion under Rule 54(d) and require the parties to bear their own costs rather than award them to one side.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a D.C. prisoner who sued the U.S. Parole Commission, claiming that its use of 2000 parole guidelines at his 2011 hearing violated the Constitution's ex post facto clause and seeking application of the 1987 guidelines or immediate release. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. It reasoned that the Commission had in fact applied the 1987 guidelines to the plaintiff's hearing, eliminating any ex post facto issue, and that immediate release was not an available remedy in the action. The court declined to address other asserted grounds for dismissal such as lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved TriZetto seeking judicial review under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(4) of a Trademark Trial and Appeals Board order denying cancellation of Farmaco-Logica's trademark for non-use, with the action initially filed in the District of Columbia. TriZetto moved to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Virginia under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) after realizing the filing relied on an outdated version of the statute that had been amended in 2011 to designate the Eastern District of Virginia as the proper venue. The defendant opposed transfer, arguing lack of jurisdiction and that transfer would not serve the interests of justice. The court granted the motion, holding that it could resolve the transfer request without first addressing jurisdictional questions and that transfer was warranted because the initial filing was an inadvertent mistake and dismissal would likely bar review on limitations grounds.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

Larry Hodge sued the Invisible Empire (associated with the Ku Klux Klan) and other defendants in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. After the court dismissed his amended complaint for failing to meet the minimal pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), Hodge moved for reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(1), citing mistake or excusable neglect due to personal obligations that prevented him from submitting supporting documents. The court denied the motion, explaining that Hodge had already received two opportunities to correct the deficiencies and that a litigant's failure to present all known facts does not provide grounds for relief under the rule. The court further noted that Hodge had still not offered any relevant evidence to support the basis of his claim, rendering any relief futile.

procedurecivil rights

In this case, plaintiff Patricia Thyer sued the Department of Justice under FOIA seeking records about herself from the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, the Office of Information Policy, and the Department of Homeland Security. The underlying facts involved Thyer's 2005 guilty plea to murder-for-hire and related firearm charges, which included a broad waiver of her rights to obtain federal records about the investigation and prosecution via FOIA or the Privacy Act. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The court held that the plea agreement's explicit waiver barred her FOIA claims and, alternatively, that she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies because she did not properly appeal the agencies' responses to her requests.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

Professor Richard Soland sued The George Washington University under ERISA sections 502(a)(3) and 502(a)(1)(B), claiming the university failed to disclose a more generous voluntary separation incentive program (VSIP) when he inquired about retirement in 2008 and later improperly denied him participation in the VSIP announced in 2009. He also added a common-law negligent misrepresentation claim in an amended complaint. The district court granted in part and denied in part the university's motion to dismiss and granted its motion for summary judgment, holding that Soland was ineligible for the VSIP under its terms, that his ERISA claim for benefits failed, and that the state-law misrepresentation claim was preempted by ERISA. The court rejected reliance on contrary precedent regarding preemption and found no genuine issues of material fact on the remaining claims.

labor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a medical malpractice claim brought by Houston Bigelow, individually and as representative of Mary Bigelow's estate, against Washington Hospital Center and two doctors for treatment Mary received in 2008; the wrongful death claim was later dropped. After Bigelow settled with the hospital, the remaining doctor defendants sought a judicial determination of the hospital's negligence as a joint tortfeasor to preserve a potential pro rata credit against any judgment against them, and moved to amend their answer accordingly. The hospital moved to dismiss itself from the case. The court granted the doctors' motions, holding that under D.C. law non-settling defendants may request a jury determination of a settling defendant's negligence without filing a cross-claim, and denied the hospital's dismissal motion without prejudice to allow the parties to stipulate to dismissal.

proceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

The case involves Petitioner CODACSA seeking to confirm an arbitral award against the Dominican Republic under the New York Convention, as implemented in the Federal Arbitration Act. The underlying dispute arose from a 2001 concession contract for highway development, which the Dominican Republic allegedly breached, leading to ICC arbitration proceedings that resulted in an award of over $42 million in damages, interest, fees, and expenses. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted CODACSA's motion for default judgment after the Dominican Republic failed to appear, confirming the award because the petitioner presented satisfactory evidence and no grounds for refusal under the Convention existed.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case was a medical malpractice suit brought by Rosa Alba Flores-Hernandez against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, claiming that her primary care physician at a federally funded clinic breached the standard of care by failing to refer her for timely gynecological testing after she reported irregular bleeding in 2007, allegedly allowing her cervical cancer to progress to Stage IVA. After a bench trial, the court found that the physician did violate the standard of care by not referring the plaintiff to a specialist in November or December 2007. However, the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that this breach proximately caused any delay in her eventual diagnosis or treatment, as the medical evidence indicated the cancer had likely advanced beyond an early stage by the time of the missed referral. The court therefore entered judgment for the United States and awarded no damages.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involves a medical malpractice claim brought by Larry Hagan and his minor son L.C.H. against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that inadequate medical care after the child's premature birth in 2007 led to a stroke and hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs filed it more than two years after the claim accrued. The core reasoning was that the injury occurred and the parents were informed of the stroke in September 2007, starting the FTCA's two-year statute of limitations, even though the full extent of the neurologic damage was not diagnosed until 2009.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a pro se plaintiff, Larry Hodge, filing a civil complaint against the Invisible Empire and other defendants associated with the Ku Klux Klan in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The court reviewed the complaint and an amended version, finding both failed to meet the basic requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which demands a short and plain statement of jurisdiction, claims, and relief sought. As a result, the court dismissed the case, noting that while pro se complaints receive some leniency, they must still comply with procedural rules, and the filings here were too vague and conclusory to proceed.

civil rightsprocedure

In this habeas corpus case, petitioner Keith Rogers, convicted in D.C. Superior Court of murder and related offenses, claimed that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion to dismiss, finding that federal review was barred by the independent and adequate state ground doctrine. The D.C. Court of Appeals had denied Rogers's motion to recall its 1999 mandate as untimely under D.C. App. R. 41(f), a state procedural rule that the district court deemed independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment. The court noted that Rogers had previously pursued direct appeal, a D.C. Code § 23-110 motion, and an earlier federal habeas petition, all without success. It therefore declined to reach the merits of the ineffective assistance claim.

criminal lawprocedure

Selena Hancock, a former Medical Assistant at Washington Hospital Center, sued her employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act after developing Polyradiculopathy and Polyneuropathy that limited her ability to walk and lift, alleging failure to accommodate her disability, disability discrimination, and intentional infliction of emotional distress following her termination. The district court addressed the hospital's motion for summary judgment on these claims. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding genuine disputes of material fact on the ADA claims that precluded summary judgment but granting judgment on the emotional distress claim. The court further ordered the defendant to show cause regarding potential sanctions for filing the motion despite clear factual disputes, such as the disputed date of termination.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a pro se plaintiff's complaint against Janet Napolitano that was deemed insufficient under federal pleading rules. The court dismissed the case with prejudice after finding that the plaintiff's response to an order to show cause still failed to meet the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the allegations were broad, conclusory, and incoherent. Although pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards, the court reasoned that even such litigants must comply with the Federal Rules, and noted the similarity to a prior related case that was also dismissed on similar grounds.

procedure

The case involved NACA's challenge to a final rule issued by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (after settling with HUD) implementing the SAFE Act's mortgage loan originator licensing standards. NACA alleged the rule was designed to target it due to its advocacy activities, raising claims under the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee (as a 'class of one') and the Administrative Procedure Act that the rule was arbitrary and capricious. The court denied in part and granted in part the Bureau's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and denied NACA's cross-motion for summary judgment. It held that the rule was not arbitrary and capricious under the APA because the agency provided a rational basis for distinguishing between 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations, and the equal protection claim failed for the same reason as the record showed a rational basis for the classification.

business & regulatorycivil rights

This case involved plaintiffs challenging the structure of Prudential's employer-sponsored disability benefits plan, arguing that Prudential's role in both initial determinations and appeals violated due process under the Fifth Amendment and rendered ERISA provisions unconstitutional. The district court initially dismissed the consolidated complaints with prejudice, finding that Prudential was not a state actor subject to constitutional claims and that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing against the Secretary of Labor. Plaintiffs then sought to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), amend their complaints, and obtain relief under Rule 60, but the court denied all motions, holding that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or properly plead additional claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Rebecca Tressler, an Amtrak locomotive engineer, sued her employer for hostile work environment, retaliation, and constructive demotion under Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act, as well as for negligence under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, based on incidents involving a stalking passenger on her train route and an assault by a coworker that allegedly caused her physical injuries. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted Amtrak's motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims. The court reasoned that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of a severe or pervasive hostile environment, that Tressler failed to show a causal link for retaliation or that she suffered an adverse action amounting to constructive demotion, that certain claims were time-barred, and that Amtrak could not be held liable under FELA because the coworker's assault was not foreseeable. The court further found no genuine issues of material fact that would allow a reasonable jury to rule in Tressler's favor.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

Ella Ward, an attorney advisor at the Department of Veterans Affairs from 2001 to 2007, sued the Secretary of Veterans Affairs under the Rehabilitation Act alleging failure to accommodate her lymphedema disability and constructive discharge. The district court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and denied Ward's, finding no material facts in dispute. The court reasoned that the Department participated in good faith in the interactive process by seeking additional medical documentation on her work restrictions and limitations, but Ward did not demonstrate she could perform the essential functions of her position, such as meeting productivity goals. On the constructive discharge claim, the court found no evidence of intentional discrimination or deliberately intolerable working conditions that would force a reasonable employee to resign.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved five California hospitals challenging the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of Medicare reimbursements for certain "bad debts" from inpatient services provided to dually eligible Medicare and Medicaid patients between 1994 and 1998. The hospitals sought review under the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the denial lacked substantial evidence and was arbitrary and capricious. The district court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment and denied the hospitals' cross-motion, concluding that the decision was the product of reasoned decisionmaking and amply supported by the administrative record. The court upheld the Secretary's interpretation of Medicare regulations on reimbursement eligibility for these claims.

healthcarebusiness & regulatory