Ronald A. White

The case involves a Medicare-certified hospice provider challenging the validity of a federal regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b), used by the Department of Health and Human Services to calculate annual aggregate caps on Medicare reimbursements for hospice services. The provider sought expedited judicial review after the Provider Reimbursement Review Board determined it lacked authority to resolve the legal question, following demands for repayment based on the regulation for fiscal years 2005 through 2007. The court first rejected the government's arguments on standing and exhaustion of remedies, finding that the plaintiff had standing as a directly regulated entity and that expedited review permitted the court to address the merits. On the merits, the court held the regulation invalid because it conflicts with the plain language of the governing statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(i)(2)(C), by using a different calculation method, and accordingly entered judgment for the plaintiff with an injunction against the regulation's use.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

In this case, the plaintiff sued her insurer after a motor vehicle accident, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and bad faith for an initial denial of uninsured motorist coverage and a six-month delay in paying policy limits. The defendant moved to dismiss the negligence and breach of contract claims. The court granted dismissal of the negligence claim, holding that Oklahoma law recognizes only contract and bad faith tort claims arising from insurance policies, not a separate negligence action based solely on contractual duties. The court denied dismissal of the breach of contract claim, finding that payment of policy limits before suit does not necessarily preclude recovery of interest or other damages under the contract.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a plaintiff who sued her insurer in Oklahoma state court for breach of contract, negligence, and bad faith arising from an automobile accident, seeking damages in excess of $10,000 per claim. The defendant removed the action to federal court under diversity jurisdiction after the plaintiff denied in discovery responses that her total damages did not exceed $75,000, and after noting that her medical bills exceeded that threshold. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that neither the petition nor the notice of removal sufficiently established the amount in controversy and that removal was untimely. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff's denial in her response to the request for admission constituted an "other paper" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) that first made removability ascertainable, rendering the notice timely, and that the amount in controversy was established by a preponderance of the evidence including the denial and medical bills. The court further noted that evasive answers on the amount of damages would be construed against the responding party.

procedure

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Patrick Dwayne Murphy, who was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Murphy raised claims that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction because the crime occurred in Indian country, that his mental retardation claim received unequal treatment violating equal protection and other constitutional rights, and that the state's lethal injection protocol constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The district court reviewed the full state court records, transcripts, and prior appellate decisions, adopted the historical facts found by the state courts, and concluded that no additional evidentiary hearing was required to resolve the petition.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a plaintiff who sued a shopping center operator under the Americans with Disabilities Act alleging multiple accessibility violations at the property, including inadequate parking signage and slopes, improper door handles, and obstructed public telephones. After the parties reached a settlement and filed a joint notice of dismissal, the court considered the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees, expert fees, and costs as the prevailing party. The court granted the motion in part under 42 U.S.C. § 12205, applying the lodestar method to calculate reasonable fees while making specific reductions for excessive hours, unreasonable rates, block billing, and other deficiencies, resulting in a total award of $6,616.89. The decision rested on the determination that the settlement materially altered the legal relationship between the parties in the plaintiff's favor, entitling him to recover reasonable fees and expenses despite objections from the defendant.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned a lawsuit brought by James W. Green and the ACLU of Oklahoma against the Haskell County Board of Commissioners seeking removal of a Ten Commandments monument from the front lawn of the county courthouse in Stigler, Oklahoma. The court held a trial to examine the monument's history, its placement among other privately donated monuments on public property, and the county's unwritten policy for approving such displays. The core reasoning involved assessing whether the display had a primarily secular purpose and effect under Establishment Clause precedents such as McCreary County v. ACLU, reviewing the context of the monument's addition, the county's knowledge and approval process, and the absence of excessive government entanglement with religion.

religious libertycivil rights

The case involved plaintiffs who filed state tort claims against Quinton Public Schools and employee J. David Smith after serving a notice of claim on January 28, 2005. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, ruling that the claims were time-barred under Oklahoma’s Governmental Tort Claims Act because the 90-day period for deemed denial was not tolled or extended by the school district's request for more information or settlement negotiations, as the district had expressly preserved the statutory deadlines. Plaintiffs therefore had until October 25, 2005, to file suit, but failed to do so. The claims against Smith were also dismissed because the Act prohibits naming employees acting within the scope of their employment as defendants. The court held it lacked authority to extend the statutory filing deadlines.

proceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a state court insurance dispute filed in 2003 by a single plaintiff alleging breach of contract over the undervaluation of a totaled vehicle using the defendants' CCC computer program. After CAFA's 2005 enactment, the plaintiff amended the petition to add thousands of new plaintiffs, fraud and bad faith claims, and a class action request, prompting removal to federal court; the plaintiff then moved to remand, arguing CAFA did not apply retroactively and the amendments related back to the original filing. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that the amended petition's addition of new parties and claims was tantamount to commencing a new action after CAFA's effective date. It further found the defendants satisfied the $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement under CAFA based on the expanded class allegations.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a Batson challenge raised by the defendant during jury selection in a federal death penalty prosecution for first-degree murder, where the government used a peremptory strike to remove the only African-American juror from the pool. The court assumed without deciding that a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been shown but upheld the strike after finding the government's explanations race-neutral. Those explanations included the juror's strong personality, his reported prior negative experience with law enforcement, and his inconsistent questionnaire responses about the death penalty. The court concluded that the defendant had not carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination, allowing the peremptory challenge to stand.

criminal lawcivil rights

Following the death of Bobby Masters, whose estate included cash and marijuana seized by police, Lisa Smith was appointed personal representative in state probate court; the United States intervened to seek her removal and then removed the probate proceeding to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1442, and 1446. The court held that removal was improper and ordered the case remanded to state court. It reasoned that no federal statute conferred original jurisdiction, as the matter involved neither diversity nor a federal question, was not a claim against the United States, and did not satisfy the requirements of the probate exception or any other basis for federal involvement. The court further noted that federal jurisdiction does not extend to interfering with ongoing state probate proceedings merely because related forfeiture litigation exists in federal court.

procedurefederal powerpropertycriminal law

In Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the court considered defendants' motion to exclude expert testimony on punitive damages in what appears to be a personal injury case against the retailer. Plaintiffs sought to introduce economist Will Clark's opinion that an award equal to or less than Wal-Mart's annual dividends would punish the company without causing irreparable harm, based on his review of financial reports. The court granted the motion and excluded the testimony, reasoning that the expert report was conclusory and inadequate under Rule 26(a)(2)(B), failed Daubert reliability standards under Rule 702 because it was untested speculation without peer review or methodology, and would improperly invade the jury's role rather than assist the trier of fact.

proceduretorts & liability