Richard Lesley Voorhees

This ERISA case involves plaintiff Robert Reininger, a former employee, challenging the AZDEL, Inc. Retirement Plan's application of a 2006 amendment that retroactively recalculated and reduced his monthly pension benefits, leading to a demand for repayment of alleged overpayments and an actual reduction in benefits starting in 2008. Reininger filed suit under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), including a breach of fiduciary duty claim in Count II alleging the Plan provided incorrect information about his benefits. The court granted the defendant's partial motion to dismiss Count II, holding that the retirement plan is not a fiduciary under ERISA because it does not qualify as a 'person' under the statutory definition in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A), which requires discretionary authority over plan administration or assets. The decision relied on the plain language of the statute and prior case law establishing that plans themselves cannot be sued for breach of fiduciary duty.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case involved a minor child who received Medicaid benefits and later obtained a settlement in a personal injury lawsuit. The plaintiffs sought to prevent the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services from asserting a lien on the settlement proceeds beyond the portion allocated to medical expenses, arguing that state statutes allowing such recovery violated federal Medicaid law and the Equal Protection Clause. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the North Carolina statutes are consistent with federal law as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ahlborn. The reasoning relied on the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Andrews v. Haygood, which upheld a statutory formula for reimbursement when no specific allocation is made in the settlement.

healthcarecivil rightsfederal power

In Parks v. United States, the petitioner, who had pleaded guilty to federal drug conspiracy charges involving cocaine base, filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 360-month sentence, alleging ineffective assistance by trial counsel in failing to advise him about a plea offer and by appellate counsel in not challenging drug quantity findings. The district court considered cross-motions for summary judgment, a discovery motion, and the underlying claims under the Strickland v. Washington standard requiring deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The court granted the motions for summary judgment and the § 2255 motion in part, vacating the sentence on certain ineffective assistance grounds related to plea negotiations and sentence exposure advice, while denying relief on claims already addressed on direct appeal or lacking prejudice, and it denied discovery. The core reasoning turned on whether counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and whether there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for those errors.

criminal lawprocedure

In United States v. Dedrick, licensed firearms dealer Daniel Dedrick and his business Assault Technologies were convicted after a jury trial on multiple counts including conspiracy and making false statements in required firearms records under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A), as well as other violations. The defendants moved for a determination that they should have been charged only under the misdemeanor penalties of § 924(a)(3) rather than the felony provisions of § 924(a)(1). The court granted the motion in part, converting the convictions on Counts One, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight to misdemeanors while leaving Count Nine as a felony. The core reasoning was that the plain language of § 924(a)(1) expressly excepts situations where a more specific provision like § 924(a)(3) applies to licensed dealers, and principles of statutory construction require the specific misdemeanor provision to control over the general felony provision for knowing record-keeping violations by such dealers.

gunscriminal lawbusiness & regulatory

This case involves a dispute over a claimed real estate sales commission. Plaintiff John McAlister, acting as broker of record for auctioneer Sheldon Good, sought a 3% commission from the sellers of a North Carolina mountain property under a Commission Agreement allegedly entered into with Defendants Eric and Jocelyn Hunter and their LLC, Phoenix Colvard Mountain, LLC, separate from the 6% paid to Sheldon Good. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court denied the motions of Plaintiff, Jocelyn Hunter, and Phoenix Colvard Mountain, LLC, but granted summary judgment to Eric Hunter, finding that Jocelyn Hunter did not sign the agreement as his agent and that the record showed no basis to hold him individually liable.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves a contract or quasi-contract dispute in which Plaintiff Industrial Fuel Company (later represented by its bankruptcy trustee Ward) sought to recover $850,706.42 plus interest from Defendant INVISTA for natural gas delivered to INVISTA. INVISTA contended that National Gas Distributors (NGD), which had arranged the deliveries and was in bankruptcy proceedings in the Eastern District of North Carolina, was the liable party. The court granted INVISTA's motion to transfer venue to the Eastern District of North Carolina and denied the plaintiff's motion to refer the matter to the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The core reasoning was that the action directly affects claims against NGD's bankruptcy estate in the Eastern District, making transfer appropriate under the broad "related to" jurisdiction standard for bankruptcy matters and in the interest of justice amid competing bankruptcy proceedings, while the Western District proceeding was only indirectly affected.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Price, the defendant, charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and other drugs, appealed a magistrate judge's post-plea order revoking her pretrial bond under the Bail Reform Act. After pleading guilty, the magistrate determined that 18 U.S.C. § 3143 required detention absent exceptional reasons under § 3145(c), but stayed the order for district court review; the government later consented to continued release. The district court allowed the defendant to remain on bond pending sentencing, reasoning that it had authority to apply the exceptional reasons provision and that the defendant's pregnancy, due date of December 19, 2007, placenta previa condition, and likely need for a C-section constituted such reasons justifying release.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves plaintiff Ramsey Reed's claims against Buckeye Fire Equipment Co. and its owners after his termination as Head of Engineering, which followed a leave of absence due to injuries from a car accident. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that Reed received more than the 12 weeks of leave required under the FMLA and suffered no prejudice from any alleged notice deficiencies, while he failed to present evidence that he was meeting the employer's legitimate job expectations or that the termination was pretextual or otherwise unlawful.

labor & employmentprocedure

In Gary v. Freightliner, plaintiff Jerome Gary, an African-American former employee, sued his employer alleging wrongful discharge and retaliation on the basis of race in violation of Title VII and Section 1981 after he was terminated for insubordination while serving as a union representative; he abandoned his separate age discrimination claim. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court reasoned that the employer had provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination—Gary's refusal to obey direct supervisory orders, which violated company policy and the collective bargaining agreement—and that Gary failed to show this reason was pretextual, as no similarly situated comparators existed and the union grievance and arbitration process had upheld the discharge solely on insubordination grounds.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Toney v. United States, a retired Marine Corps member sued the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that the Marine Corps negligently enrolled him in the Survivor Benefit Plan without providing an election certificate, resulting in unauthorized deductions from his retirement pay totaling over $22,000, plus additional damages. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the case. The core reasoning was that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), as the plaintiff had known of the injury and its cause since at least 1996, but did not file his administrative claim until 2002.

proceduretorts & liability

This case concerned whether workers employed by Christmas tree growers under the H2A visa program qualify as "employed in agriculture," thereby exempting the employers from FLSA overtime wage requirements. The district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment, analyzing the FLSA's definition of agriculture to determine if Christmas tree farming and harvesting activities fall within the exemption. The court reviewed the primary meaning of farming and the secondary meaning for practices on a farm incidental to farming operations, including forestry, while noting the seasonal nature of the work and differences from H2B non-agricultural labor programs. It emphasized that the exemption applies only if the activities meet the statutory criteria under 29 U.S.C. § 203(f).

labor & employmentimmigrationbusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff MC Contractors filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against debtors Robert and Mary Fink, seeking to prevent discharge of certain debts based on fraud claims, and then moved under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) to withdraw the reference to the district court. The court denied the motion for withdrawal of reference. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial in the dischargeability proceeding, as such actions are equitable in nature under the two-prong Granfinanciera analysis (historical equivalence and nature of the remedy), with the equitable character of the bankruptcy court's discharge powers being decisive; without a jury trial right, there was no cause for withdrawal despite the lack of consent to a bankruptcy court jury trial.

procedurefederal power

The case involved pro se petitioners who were denied North Carolina driver's licenses after refusing to provide their Social Security numbers, claiming this violated the Privacy Act of 1974, the First Amendment, and due process rights under the Constitution. The court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss, finding that the petitioners failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the requirement did not violate the Privacy Act, no First Amendment rights were implicated, and there was no protected property interest in a driver's license or infringement on the right to travel since the license is a privilege subject to conditions set by the state.

civil rightsfree speechprocedure

This case concerns a products liability claim by plaintiff Rita Smith against Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, alleging that her intermittent use of the diet drug fenfluramine (Fen-Phen) caused her primary pulmonary hypertension (PPH). The court ruled on cross-motions to exclude expert testimony under the Daubert standard regarding both general and specific causation between the drug and the disease. The court found that general causation was established by the IPPHS epidemiological study showing elevated odds ratios, FDA withdrawal of the drug, and WHO statements, while assessing the reliability of individual experts' methods such as statistical analysis of past exposures and differential diagnosis to rule out other causes. The core reasoning applied Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert factors including testability, peer review, error rates, and professional acceptance to determine admissibility of the testimony.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Lederer, an at-will employee and member of the North Carolina National Guard, alleged he was terminated after taking required active duty days, asserting claims under the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act and North Carolina common law wrongful discharge. Defendant Hargraves Technology Corp. moved to dismiss the state-law count, contending that N.C.G.S. § 127A-202.1 supplies the exclusive remedy for National Guard-related employment discrimination and thereby bars a common-law tort action. The court first declined to consider the plaintiff's untimely opposition brief, finding the delay inexcusable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) and the Pioneer factors. On the merits, the court granted the motion, holding that the North Carolina legislature intended the statutory scheme to preclude common-law wrongful-discharge claims arising from the same conduct.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose when investors initiated NASD arbitration against securities firm Washington Square Securities for losses on certain investments sold by a former representative, prompting the firm to seek a declaratory judgment that no valid arbitration agreement existed because the defendants were not its customers and the transactions fell outside its business. The court addressed a motion for reconsideration of an order granting expedited discovery on arbitrability, along with related motions for a preliminary injunction and to compel arbitration. It decided to vacate the discovery order, holding that the federal presumption favoring arbitration does not apply to the threshold question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate at all. The reasoning relied on Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent requiring courts to first determine the existence of an agreement under applicable state contract law before any presumption arises, and concluded that no discovery was needed for that determination here.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved two blasting companies challenging Wilkes County's Permitting Ordinance and Regulatory Ordinance, which required permits for handling explosives and imposed storage and use restrictions, along with a Fire Marshal's directive limiting transport hours on certain roads during school times. The companies argued the measures lacked statutory authority, violated the North Carolina Constitution as improper local laws, and were preempted by federal regulations. The court granted summary judgment to the county on the ordinances, finding they were authorized by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 153A-128, did not constitute prohibited local acts under Article II, § 24, and were not federally preempted. It denied relief on the ordinances but ruled the directive preempted by federal hazardous materials routing standards under 49 C.F.R. § 397, enjoining its enforcement. The decision rested on de novo review of statutory text, constitutional limits on local legislation, and federal preemption criteria for conflicting state or local rules.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a female employee's claims against her employer, Freightliner Corporation, alleging sexual harassment by a group leader under Title VII as well as state-law assault and battery. The district court reviewed objections to a magistrate judge's recommendation on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, applying the standards from Burlington Industries v. Ellerth and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton for imputing liability in cases without tangible employment action. The court denied summary judgment on the Title VII claim, finding a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer's corrective actions were reasonable, since the alleged harassment subsided temporarily after complaints but then resumed. The court granted summary judgment on the assault and battery claim and dismissed it with prejudice.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a physician who sued the Department of Veterans Affairs after his employment was not renewed, claiming discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin under Title VII; the parties settled with an agreement for reinstatement to a permanent position, but the VA then required him to complete a new two-year probationary period under 38 U.S.C. § 7403. The plaintiff moved to enforce the settlement by ordering removal of the probation requirement, arguing that his prior successive temporary appointments under the same statutory chapter already satisfied the probationary period. The court denied the motion, holding that the VA did not violate the settlement. The core reasoning was that § 7403's probationary period applies only to permanent appointments, as temporary appointments are at-will with no equivalent protections or intent for probation under the statute's purpose and legislative history; a literal reading allowing probation during temporary service would lead to absurd results, consistent with the statutory scheme distinguishing employee categories.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves the Commodity Futures Trading Commission bringing a civil enforcement action against defendants alleged to have fraudulently telemarketed illegal off-exchange futures contracts in precious metals and other commodities, in violation of Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act. The Commission sought a preliminary injunction, a statutory restraining order, and disgorgement of funds held by relief defendants. The court granted the preliminary injunction against both the defendants and relief defendants after reviewing affidavits, exhibits, and hearing testimony, finding sufficient evidence of material misrepresentations and illegal contract offerings. It denied the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, as well as the relief defendants' motions to vacate the restraining order and dismiss for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction, determining that the relief defendants had adequate notice and that the funds at issue were traceable to the alleged violations.

business & regulatoryprocedure