This case concerns the St. Bernard Port's effort to expropriate approximately 70 acres of riverfront property owned by Violet Dock Port under Louisiana law for public port expansion and economic recovery purposes. Violet had used the property to provide layberth services to U.S. Navy vessels under a federal contract and removed the expropriation action to federal court. The district court granted the Port's motion to remand, holding that Violet failed to establish any valid basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the underlying dispute arose under state eminent domain statutes without a federal question or other jurisdictional hook, despite the property's connection to a national defense contract. The court denied the Port's request for attorneys' fees and costs.
Tameka Blackstone sued Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. and related entities after her home flooded during Hurricane Katrina, claiming that Chase breached the mortgage contract by failing to maintain flood insurance through escrow payments and that she detrimentally relied on representations about the insurance. The court granted Chase's motion to dismiss the claims for breach of contract and detrimental reliance. The reasoning was that Blackstone did not allege any specific contractual provision requiring flood insurance or Chase to pay the premiums, and did not identify any representation by Chase that the property required flood insurance on which she could have relied. The court allowed her to amend the complaint within twenty days.
In this case, satellite television technicians sued DirecTV and a related Home Service Provider under the Fair Labor Standards Act and Louisiana Wage Payment Act, alleging they were employees who were denied proper wages, overtime, and other compensation through practices like unrecorded work time and charge-backs. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs were independent contractors rather than employees. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact on the employment status question. The core reasoning centered on disputed evidence about the defendants' control over the technicians' work schedules, methods, and pay, which is relevant to both the FLSA economic realities test and the LWPA right-to-control analysis.
This case involved a worker, Michael Williams, who was injured while performing sandblasting and painting on offshore oil platforms and sued his employer Danos & Curole and the platform owner ERT under the Jones Act and maritime law, claiming seaman status. The court granted summary judgment to both defendants, finding that Williams did not qualify as a Jones Act seaman because the vast majority of his work time was spent on the platforms rather than on a vessel. The court also held that ERT was not liable for the independent contractor's alleged negligence because ERT did not retain operational control over the work.
The case involved a dispute over insurance coverage for fire damage to a store operated by Wessam, LLC, which was the named insured under a commercial property policy issued by Axis Surplus Insurance Company. Following the appointment of Third Millennium as receiver for the LLC in a separate dissolution proceeding, Axis filed suit seeking a declaration of no coverage based on allegations that LLC members Hamed and Hussein caused the fire, while Hamed filed a counterclaim seeking policy proceeds. The court granted Axis's motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the counterclaim, ruling that under Louisiana law only the named insured, additional insureds, or third-party beneficiaries may enforce an insurance policy, and that Hamed and Hussein, as individual members of the LLC, did not qualify.
In this employment discrimination case, African-American plaintiff David Soublet alleged that the Louisiana Tax Commission failed to promote him to Tax Supervisor because of his race and later retaliated against him after he challenged the decision through civil service and EEOC channels. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the failure-to-promote claim, while Soublet cross-moved on both that claim and his retaliation claim. The court denied all motions, finding genuine issues of material fact on whether the employer's stated reasons for selecting another candidate were pretextual and on whether the alleged adverse actions were causally linked to Soublet's protected activity. The decision rests on the summary-judgment standard requiring that factual disputes be resolved by a jury rather than resolved on the existing record.
This case arose from a 2009 collision between two vessels, after which crew members filed personal injury claims against the owners, the vessels, and G & M Marine, Inc., asserting that G & M was liable as an insurer under a protection and indemnity policy. G & M moved for summary judgment, contending that the policy language barred any claims against it. The court granted the motion, holding that the policy's express disclaimer unambiguously established G & M as a non-insurer with no liability for coverage-related claims. The decision rested on the clear contractual terms identifying only the listed subscriber insurers as responsible parties, without need for extrinsic evidence.
In Carriere v. Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Inc., the plaintiff filed a class action alleging that the defendants, a tax preparation company and its franchisee, acted as unlicensed loan brokers when arranging refund anticipation loans and similar products for Louisiana customers, violating state loan broker statutes and Civil Code provisions by failing to obtain licenses, make required disclosures, and properly handle fees. The defendants moved to dismiss on multiple state law grounds, including that they did not qualify as loan brokers under the statutes and that certain claims were time-barred. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the statutory claims and the claim for payment of a thing not owed after analyzing the differing statutory definitions of loan broker and finding no applicable violations or private rights of action, while allowing the rescission claim to proceed.
This case concerns a third-party indemnification claim by Triumph against Marlin arising from Noel Butcher's workplace injury on a vessel chartered by Marlin. Butcher, employed by Superior Offshore, was allegedly injured by a crane on the vessel while performing work ultimately contracted through CW Technical Services. Triumph sought defense, indemnification, and additional insured status from Marlin under a Master Time Charter Agreement between Marlin and the vessel's owner. The court granted Marlin's motion for summary judgment, holding that Triumph failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on whether Superior qualified as Marlin's representative or whether Butcher was Marlin's borrowed employee under the contract. The decision rested on the absence of evidence that Marlin exercised control over the relevant contractors or workers as defined in the governing agreements.
In Kast v. Greater New Orleans Expressway Commission, plaintiff Michael Kast, a police lieutenant, sued his employer and supervisors after being fired, alleging retaliation for his statements refusing to participate in any cover-up of a traffic stop of a local mayor and his intent to follow the law. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the claims. The court reasoned that Kast's statements did not constitute protected speech under the First Amendment because they were made pursuant to his official duties rather than as a citizen on a matter of public concern, and the state law whistleblower claims similarly failed to meet the required elements for relief.
In this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana law, plaintiff Albert Besson sued Lafourche Parish Sheriff Deputy Ronald Macomber and others, alleging that officers used excessive force and unlawfully arrested him during an encounter at a hardware store shortly after Hurricane Gustav. Besson claimed the officers grabbed him, threw him to the ground, struck him, and tased him without probable cause or resistance on his part. Macomber moved for summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity under federal law and related state-law immunity. The court denied the motion, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Macomber's conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would have known, and that state-law immunity did not apply to the intentional misconduct alleged.
In Lang v. DirecTV, Inc., satellite television technicians filed suit in Louisiana state court alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act for unpaid wages, overtime, and improper deductions, along with related claims under Louisiana wage laws and state tort theories such as negligence and fraud. Defendants removed the case to federal court, prompting plaintiffs to seek remand of the state-law claims, while defendants moved to dismiss certain claims and strike the class allegations. The court denied remand, holding that the state claims were not separate and independent from the FLSA claims and that supplemental jurisdiction was appropriate because the claims arose from the same nationwide scheme and facts. It granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, denied the motion to strike the class claims, and granted leave to amend the complaint.
This case concerns Louisiana's statutory scheme requiring that criminal defendants found incompetent to stand trial and in need of inpatient treatment be committed to the Feliciana Forensic Facility, which is the state's only such facility. Because Feliciana is at capacity and must refuse new admissions under state law, many such pretrial detainees remain in parish jails for months without receiving restorative treatment or further court action. Plaintiffs, including an advocacy organization and one affected detainee, sued state health officials claiming violations of due process rights. The court granted in part and denied in part the motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering injunctive relief to address the prolonged detention without treatment. The core reasoning centered on the constitutional prohibition against punishing unconvicted detainees and the state's obligations regarding competency restoration for those held pretrial.
This case involves plaintiffs, including an advocacy organization for the disabled and an individual detainee, suing the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals and state officials. They allege that Louisiana's requirement to transfer criminal defendants found incompetent to stand trial to a specific mental health facility (Feliciana) is not being met because the facility is at capacity, resulting in prolonged detention in parish jails without treatment or conviction. The defendants moved to dismiss on grounds including Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, lack of standing, insufficient pleading, and improper venue. The court denied the motion, finding that it had subject-matter jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs could pursue their claims, and that the complaint was adequately pleaded under federal standards.
This case involves a dispute over a bareboat charter agreement for a quarters barge between KAI Enterprises and Boh Bros. Construction. KAI sued for breach of contract claiming unpaid charter hire after the barge was returned damaged and later sank, arguing the charter continued until payment or repair. Boh Bros. sought summary judgment asserting the charter terminated upon return or sinking. The court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding the vessel's condition, cause of damage, ownership, and whether doctrines like frustration or impossibility applied to terminate the charter.
This case involved a borrower's claims that Wells Fargo improperly charged an inflated $125 Broker Price Opinion fee on her mortgage account, allegedly violating the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) by including amounts not for services actually performed, as well as Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices Act and fiduciary duty rules. The court granted Wells Fargo's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismissed those claims. It reasoned that a BPO conducted in anticipation of foreclosure is not a "settlement service" covered by RESPA section 2607(b), that Louisiana law exempts federally regulated banks from the unfair trade practices statute, and that banks owe no fiduciary duties to borrowers absent a specific written agreement.
Jerry Moore, a former maintenance mechanic for the U.S. Coast Guard, challenged his 1995 termination through the Merit Systems Protection Board, claiming the removal did not promote the efficiency of the service after a non-work-related back injury left him unable to perform all duties. The district court addressed cross-motions concerning review of the MSPB’s nondiscrimination rulings. The court denied Moore’s motion to set aside the MSPB decision and granted the Department of Homeland Security’s motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the MSPB’s determination was not arbitrary, capricious, unsupported by substantial evidence, or contrary to law. The core reasoning relied on medical evidence establishing permanent restrictions on tower climbing and heavy lifting, evidence that Moore could not fulfill the full requirements of his position, and the absence of any available lighter-duty role that would allow him to return to regular duties.
This case involves cross-appeals from a bankruptcy court order that limited creditor PMAC Ltd.’s claim against debtor Babcock & Wilcox Co. to $147,203.99. The underlying dispute concerns the allocation of environmental liabilities for hazardous waste at the Koppel steel plant under a 1990 purchase and sale agreement, including provisions for pre-closing audits, identified actions, assumed remediation liabilities, and post-closing cost-sharing. The district court vacated the bankruptcy court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss PMAC’s claim entirely. The court’s reasoning centered on interpreting the PSA’s “as is, where is” structure, Sections 3.03, 3.04, and 6.08, which assigned specific pre-closing liabilities to PMAC if B&W declined them and left post-five-year liabilities unallocated to B&W.
The case involved plaintiff James Murungi suing Sallie Mae and Texas Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation over a consolidated federal student loan obtained in 1994 that entered default status, leading to collection efforts including wage garnishment; Murungi alleged violations of the Higher Education Act, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and state-law claims for fraud, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment on all remaining claims. It reasoned that the HEA provides no private right of action, that Guaranteed qualified for the FDCPA's fiduciary exception as a guarantor under the Federal Family Education Loan Program and thus was not a debt collector, that the fraud claims lacked the required particularity under Rule 9(b), and that Murungi failed to raise genuine issues of material fact supporting the defamation or IIED claims.
This case involves plaintiff Antoinette Anderson, who sued her former attorneys (the Shorty defendants) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they deprived her of constitutional rights through negligent handling of her state-court divorce and personal injury lawsuits; prior state and federal courts had dismissed her related claims on grounds including failure to state a cause of action and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The magistrate judge's report and recommendation, adopted by the district court, addressed cross-motions for Rule 11 sanctions, with defendants seeking fees for defending what they called frivolous litigation and plaintiff seeking sanctions against them. The court recommended denying both motions, reasoning that the record did not support sanctions against the plaintiff given the absence of rulings on res judicata or collateral estoppel, that pro se status does not immunize meritless filings but did not warrant sanctions here, and that the plaintiff's motion lacked sufficient basis after review of the filings and procedural history.
