William Byrd Traxler jr

This case involved abortion providers in South Carolina challenging the constitutionality of a state regulation, S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 61-12, that imposed licensure and operational requirements on physicians' offices and clinics performing five or more first-trimester abortions per month. The court held that the regulation was facially invalid under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. It determined that the regulation imposed numerous unnecessary requirements that unduly burdened the constitutional right to abortion, despite evidence that the clinics had operated safely for over two decades. The court also found no rational basis for the regulation's differential treatment of abortion providers compared to other medical practices performing similar procedures, and concluded that the pervasive issues prevented severing invalid provisions to save the regulation.

abortionhealthcarecivil rights

This case arose from a lease-purchase agreement for a sandwich production business between Carriage Town and LandCo, which included a non-compete clause that became unenforceable upon Carriage Town's uncured default. After Carriage Town missed a payment, LandCo violated the clause by hiring employees and competing, leading Carriage Town to obtain a preliminary injunction backed by a $250,000 surety bond from Reliance; the parties later settled, amended the lease terms including a liquidated damages provision, and obtained a consent permanent injunction that continued the bond without notifying Reliance. LandCo then sought $100,000 in liquidated damages from the bond proceeds after another default, along with repossession of equipment. The court denied the bond payment request but granted the unopposed repossession motion. It reasoned that the unnotified amendments materially increased Reliance's risk and that the claimed damages fell outside the scope of the original preliminary injunction bond, discharging the surety.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

The case involved a lawsuit by Lisa Ann Phillips on behalf of her minor son, James Kinley, against Anderson County School District Five, claiming that school officials conspired to violate Kinley's constitutional rights by prohibiting him from wearing a jacket resembling the Confederate Battle Flag to Lakeside Middle School and suspending him for refusing to remove it. The court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment, holding that the suspension did not violate Kinley's rights. The decision rested on evidence of prior racial tensions and disruptions at the school linked to Confederate Flag garments, including altercations and fights in 1991-1995, which provided a reasonable basis for officials to anticipate substantial interference with the educational process. The court also found no due process violations in the suspension procedures or review process.

free speechcivil rights

Polly Hindman sued Greenville Hospital Systems and Greenville Memorial Hospital under Title VII and the ADA, claiming retaliation for filing administrative complaints with the SCHAC and EEOC, as well as disability discrimination and failure to accommodate her depression and post-traumatic stress disorder; she also brought a state-law claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which the court granted. The court held that judicial estoppel prevented Hindman from establishing a prima facie case on her federal claims because her sworn statements to the SSA that she was totally disabled and unable to work as of July 1994 contradicted the requirement that she be a qualified individual, and alternatively that she could not prove causation on the retaliation claim. On the state claim, the court concluded that no such covenant is recognized under South Carolina law for at-will employees, and Hindman had no employment contract altering that status.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this case, Trident Regional Health System sued Candace Polin in state court to recover $82,638.45 in unpaid medical expenses from services rendered under her employee health plan. Polin filed a third-party claim against her employer Life Cycle Engineering, the ERISA plan fiduciary and administrator, seeking payment of those expenses; Life Cycle removed the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment, arguing that Polin had breached the plan's subrogation and notification provisions by settling a related tort claim without notice or approval and refusing to execute required repayment agreements. The court granted summary judgment to Life Cycle, holding that the plan's plain language permitted the administrator to withhold benefits until Polin complied with those terms and that Life Cycle's interpretation was reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious under ERISA standards. The decision rested on undisputed facts that Polin had failed to notify the plan or obtain approval before settling and had declined to sign subrogation instruments despite the plan's explicit requirements. No material facts were in dispute, and the court declined to impose additional federal common-law "made whole" rules beyond the plan's terms.

labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure

This case involved a contract dispute between Laidlaw Environmental Services and Honeywell over the purchase of a computer control system for a hazardous waste facility, after Laidlaw experienced operational issues leading to EPA penalties and other losses. The court granted Honeywell's motion for summary judgment on all claims. It held that the parties' negotiated written contract, rather than Laidlaw's earlier purchase order, governed the transaction, and that the contract's terms validly disclaimed warranties and limited Laidlaw's remedies to repair or replacement. The court further reasoned that the limited remedy did not fail of its essential purpose, that the contract exclusively governed the parties' duties so as to bar negligence claims, and that indemnification was unavailable for Laidlaw's direct losses.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved William Mincey, a former rural mail carrier for the U.S. Postal Service, who resigned from his position in August 1992 after witnessing a crime scene and later attempted to rescind the resignation once suspects were apprehended. The Postal Service declined to allow withdrawal of the resignation after it had been processed, and the unions representing postal workers declined to file a grievance, concluding that the employer had not violated any rules. Mincey sued the Postal Service and the unions for wrongful discharge and breach of the duty of fair representation under federal labor law. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding no evidence that the unions acted arbitrarily or in bad faith by declining to pursue a grievance they viewed as meritless and no contractual or regulatory obligation requiring the Postal Service to permit rescission of an already effective resignation.

labor & employment

The case involved claims by the Richland-Lexington Airport District (RLAD) against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) arising from alleged contamination of RLAD's property during an EPA-led cleanup of a neighboring hazardous waste site operated by Carolina Chemicals. Cross-claims for indemnity and breach of contract were also asserted against the EPA by Westinghouse Remediation Services (WRS) and Carolina. The court granted the EPA's motions to dismiss the FTCA claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, dismissed the CERCLA claims and cross-claims for failure to state a claim, dismissed the contract claim for lack of jurisdiction, and granted WRS's motion for summary judgment against RLAD. The core reasoning centered on sovereign immunity protections, including the government contractor defense shielding the EPA and its contractors from liability for actions taken pursuant to federal environmental cleanup mandates, combined with procedural deficiencies in notice and pleading.

environmentproceduretorts & liabilityfederal power

This case involves a dispute over liability for damages from a 1981 fuel spill at a U.S. Air Force base caused by the rupture of an air eliminator component supplied by Emerson Electric and installed by Myrtle Beach Pipeline Corp. under a contract with the government. Myrtle Beach sued Emerson for common law negligence and breach of implied warranty of merchantability under South Carolina's UCC, seeking recovery for cleanup costs and related expenses after settling with the government. Emerson moved for partial summary judgment, arguing the claims were barred by the contract's terms, which disclaimed implied warranties, limited remedies to repair or replacement, and excluded consequential damages. The court granted Emerson's motion and denied Myrtle Beach's, holding that South Carolina law precludes a negligence claim in this contractual setting and that the warranty's exclusive limited remedy applies. The decision rests on the principle that the parties' agreement controls the remedies available for the defective product.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned a dispute between sharecroppers who insured their tobacco crop and American National Fire Insurance Company over the proper calculation of indemnity payments for 38 acres destroyed by hail under a multiple peril crop insurance policy regulated by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. The plaintiffs and defendant disagreed on the treatment of appraised production for unharvested acres and the overall method for determining loss amounts and premiums due. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the policy language was unambiguous and supported the defendant's calculation approach, which deducted 35% of the production guarantee for unharvested acreage and produced a net indemnity of $37,309 after premiums.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a public school teacher, Margaret Hall, who was involuntarily transferred and later terminated by the Marion School District after she wrote letters to local newspapers criticizing school board spending and alleged budget mismanagement. Hall sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the actions violated her First Amendment free speech rights and deprived her of a property interest without due process. The court held that the district's transfer and discharge of Hall violated her constitutional rights under the First Amendment. The core reasoning was that Hall's public statements addressed matters of public concern and were protected speech, that district officials retaliated against her for exercising that right, and that the pre-termination hearing did not resolve the free speech issues in a way that would preclude federal review.

free speechcivil rights

In Wingard v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., seven Exxon franchise dealers operating service stations in South Carolina sued Exxon over lease provisions requiring 24-hour, seven-days-a-week operation, claiming the terms violated state blue laws limiting Sunday business activity and federal rules under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act governing franchise renewals and modifications. The U.S. District Court granted Exxon's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all causes of action. The court applied the Rule 56 standard, found no genuine disputes of material fact, and concluded that Exxon had proposed the uniform operating requirements in good faith during the normal course of business without an intent to prevent renewal, that each station met the traffic-based criteria for the policy, and that the dealers failed to show any statutory violation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved former wastewater treatment operator Sharpe suing the Town of Swansea after his termination, alleging federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, along with state law claims, stemming from his communications with state environmental regulators about town water systems. The court granted the town's motion for summary judgment on all federal claims, finding that Sharpe's speech addressed only personal employment matters rather than issues of public concern, that he failed to allege a cognizable conspiracy or protected class under § 1985(3), and that the § 1986 claim was time-barred. The remaining state claims were dismissed without prejudice. The decision rested on undisputed facts showing Sharpe's dual employment and the limited scope of his regulatory contacts, applying established standards for summary judgment and First Amendment protections for public employees.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfree speech

This case involves landowners suing Darlington County, South Carolina, for costs related to alleged groundwater contamination from the county's landfill under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), along with related state law claims including negligence, nuisance, trespass, and inverse condemnation. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the federal claims, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish the necessary elements for recovery under CERCLA, particularly that their response costs were consistent with the National Contingency Plan. As a result, the court dismissed the remaining state law claims without prejudice due to lack of federal jurisdiction. The decision turned on the plaintiffs not demonstrating that any release or threatened release caused their response costs in a manner consistent with statutory requirements.

environmentprocedurepropertytorts & liability

In this case, plaintiff Tolleson sued the Educational Testing Service (ETS) and the South Carolina Department of Education, claiming that ETS's invalidation of his National Teachers Examination score—due to evidence of copying from a neighboring examinee—violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and blocked his teacher certification. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that ETS was not a state actor, as there was insufficient nexus or joint action with the state under the relevant tests from Supreme Court precedent, so its score cancellation did not implicate constitutional due process protections.

civil rights