Sandra L. Townes

The case involved a mother suing a private high school on behalf of her learning-disabled son to obtain a court order compelling release of his academic transcript, which the school had withheld based on an alleged contract clause requiring repayment of scholarships if a student transferred before completing four years. Plaintiffs claimed federal jurisdiction under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, arguing that the school's policy discriminated against students with disabilities by preventing them from accessing education elsewhere. The court denied the request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the contract terms applied equally to all students who transferred without consent and did not constitute discrimination on the basis of disability, so plaintiffs could not show a likelihood of success on the merits of their federal claim. The court noted that any contractual disputes could be pursued in state court.

civil rightsprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Cheryl Follman brought a putative class action against World Financial Network National Bank alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act related to her Victoria's Secret credit card account. The defendant moved to stay the proceedings in favor of arbitration, relying on a new arbitration provision added to the cardholder agreement through a change-of-terms notice mailed to the plaintiff, which waived rights to court, jury trials, and class actions. The court denied the motion, holding that the original agreement's change-of-terms provision did not authorize adding the arbitration clause because it addressed substantive rights (such as dispute resolution) outside the scope of terms like fees and rates contemplated in the initial contract, and there was no meeting of the minds on arbitration at inception. The decision turned on contract interpretation under Ohio law and the Federal Arbitration Act, finding the arbitration amendment unenforceable against the plaintiff.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a products liability action brought by Vito Saladino and his wife against manufacturer Stewart & Stevenson Services, Inc. (S&S) for injuries Saladino sustained in 1999 when the unsecured hood of a baggage tractor sprung open and struck him, leaving him a quadriplegic; S&S impleaded Saladino's employer American Airlines (AA) as a third-party defendant alleging contributory negligence. Plaintiffs' failure-to-warn claims proceeded to a jury trial in 2008, which found Saladino not at fault, assigned 30% fault to S&S, and 70% fault to AA. The court denied S&S's motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict and AA's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court affirmed the verdict, concluding that trial evidence of the tractor's hood design, uninstalled safety modifications requested by AA, prior similar incidents known to the parties, absence of warnings or training, and the role of jet wash in the accident provided a sufficient basis for the jury's findings on negligence, causation, and allocation of fault.

torts & liability

This case is a products liability action in which plaintiff Michael Rupolo, a cement truck driver, alleges he was injured when his boot slipped from the top step of a ladder mounted on the front of a 1998 cement mixer truck manufactured by defendant Oshkosh Truck Corporation; his wife joins with derivative claims. After removal to federal court, the parties filed cross-motions to exclude each other's experts, the defendant moved for summary judgment on design-defect and causation grounds, and the plaintiffs sought leave to file a late jury demand under Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b). The court granted the late jury demand, finding the magistrate judge lacked an express referral and that the plaintiffs' counsel's excusable neglect justified relief; it accepted the magistrate's recommendation to deny both Daubert motions because the experts' opinions were sufficiently reliable and relevant; and it denied summary judgment, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed on whether the ladder's design was defective and a proximate cause of the fall.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Bower v. Walsh, petitioner Ronald Bower sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from his state convictions for two sexual assaults, arguing that the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose that another individual, police officer Michael Perez, had been arrested and prosecuted for similar attacks while Bower was incarcerated. The respondent moved to dismiss the petitions as barred by AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. The court granted the motions and dismissed the petitions with prejudice, finding them untimely and rejecting Bower's actual innocence claim as a gateway to excuse the delay because he presented no new reliable evidence that would make it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him, and some evidence even exculpated Perez.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a petition for habeas corpus by Ronald Alston challenging his 2000 conviction for two counts of first-degree robbery and two counts of second-degree robbery stemming from three incidents at a Rite-Aid pharmacy. The petitioner claimed that the trial court improperly granted the prosecutor's reverse Batson motion and denied his Batson motion, violating his constitutional rights, and that both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective. The court denied the petition, finding that the Batson claims lacked merit under applicable standards and that counsel's performance, including the choice of issues on appeal, did not fall below constitutional requirements for effective assistance.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

Rafael Urena was convicted in New York state court of second-degree sodomy, second-degree sexual abuse, and endangering the welfare of a child based on allegations that he sexually assaulted a thirteen-year-old student after an after-school program. After exhausting direct appeals, Urena filed a pro se federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction. The district court denied the petition and dismissed the action, finding that certain claims, such as prosecutorial misconduct, were procedurally barred under state law as an adequate and independent ground, while other claims lacked merit. The court also denied a certificate of appealability.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a pro se father's federal lawsuit against his daughter's mother, her attorneys, family court judges and staff, the child's court-appointed law guardians, a court-appointed evaluator and social worker, and maternal relatives, stemming from an ongoing child custody dispute transferred from Pennsylvania to New York Family Court. The plaintiff asserted 72 causes of action under federal civil rights statutes, constitutional amendments, the ADA, and state law, seeking damages and injunctive relief including declarations that certain New York Domestic Relations Law provisions are unconstitutional. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint in full under Rule 12(b)(6). Dismissal was based on failure to plead plausible claims, application of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction over custody matters, judicial and quasi-judicial immunity for court-related defendants, and Younger abstention given the pending state proceedings.

family lawcivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case involved pro se plaintiff Nativita St. Louis, who alleged she was sexually harassed, discriminated against based on gender, and terminated from her position as Assistant Director of Environmental Services at Woodhull Hospital in retaliation for her complaints. She brought claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law against the New York City Health & Hospitals Corporation and individual defendants. The defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The court granted the motion, dismissing the federal claims on the merits after reviewing the record, including employment evaluations, at-will status, and the sequence of events, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, which were dismissed without prejudice.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

In Evans v. Solomon, pro se plaintiff Jamal R. Evans sued U.S. Park Police officer Clyde Solomon and the United States under Bivens and the FTCA, asserting claims for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process stemming from a 2003 traffic stop in Brooklyn after the officer followed the plaintiff's vehicle and pulled him over for allegedly running a red light. The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The ruling rested on the determination that the officer had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for traffic infractions based on his refusal to provide license and registration, which justified a search incident to arrest, while addressing the remaining claims under the applicable constitutional and statutory standards.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

In this case, pro se plaintiff Bob Meadows, a former Planet Aid employee, sued the company and supervisors for age and race discrimination, Fair Labor Standards Act violations, New York State Human Rights Law claims, fraud, and other employment-related torts after alleging he was induced to prepare his van for work under false pretenses about job duties and longevity, then assigned unwanted tasks like evictions and pickups without proper protections or pay. Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the NYSHRL, intentional interference with advantageous relationship, Title VII retaliation, New York Labor Law § 740 whistleblower, and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress claims for failure to state a viable cause of action. It denied the motion as to the remaining claims, including fraud and misrepresentation, finding the allegations sufficient to proceed beyond the pleading stage.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In McClean v. Astrue, plaintiff Roseann McClean sued under the Social Security Act to reverse the Commissioner's denial of disability insurance benefits and SSI, alleging disability due to systemic lupus erythematosus beginning in April 1995. The ALJ had found she could perform light work and had failed to attend a required psychiatric exam, leading to denial of her claims. Both parties agreed the decision violated SSA regulations and case law. The court reversed the final decision and remanded the case to the Commissioner to calculate benefits for April 1995 through May 1999 and determine eligibility for the period after May 1999.

healthcareprocedure

The case involved homeowners Paul and Annette Fabozzi suing Lexington Insurance Company for breach of a homeowner's insurance policy by failing to cover structural damage to their Staten Island home discovered in 2002. Lexington moved for summary judgment, arguing the suit was filed in October 2004, more than two years after the date of loss, violating the policy's two-year limitation period. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that the action was time-barred because the policy required suits to be started within two years after the date of loss, and plaintiffs' arguments regarding conditions precedent and estoppel based on broker assurances were unavailing as the broker was not an agent of the insurer and the limitation period began at discovery of the loss.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case arose from U.S. Airways' two bankruptcies, during which the pilots' defined-benefit pension plan was terminated and replaced with less generous defined-contribution plans, prompting nearly 300 pilots to sue their union (ALPA), the airline, and RSA. The plaintiffs alleged that ALPA breached its duty of fair representation, violated the ADEA through age discrimination, and engaged in RICO violations, while also bringing ADEA, ERISA, and RICO claims against the other defendants. After the claims against U.S. Airways were voluntarily dismissed, the court granted ALPA's and RSA's motions to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint in full. The court reasoned that the union's actions during negotiations were not arbitrary or discriminatory, the ADEA claims lacked evidence of age-based animus, and the RICO claims failed to adequately plead an enterprise or predicate acts with particularity under the applicable pleading standards.

labor & employmentcivil rightsbusiness & regulatorycriminal law

This case involves defendant Target Stores' motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement reached at a May 2007 conference, under which plaintiff Miok Min would dismiss her lawsuit in exchange for $40,000. The court reviewed and adopted the magistrate judge's report recommending denial of the motion. The core reasoning was that Target failed to show the parties had reached a binding agreement under New York contract law, because Mrs. Min's assent was undermined by inadequate translations (by counsel and an untrained friend) and her sworn statements of physical impairment during the conference. The court found these factors prevented a voluntary and informed agreement, regardless of disputes over specific findings about her statements or counsel's conduct.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved trustees of a multi-employer Taft-Hartley welfare fund and a fund participant suing insurer Group Health Inc. under ERISA for denying medical benefits coverage to the participant after he went on disability leave and retired, with claims that the denial violated HIPAA's nondiscrimination rules and breached the group insurance policy. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the second and third causes of action and granted the defendant's cross-motion to dismiss those claims. The court reasoned that GHI's eligibility criteria, which limited coverage to actively employed full-time workers and treated cessation of work due to disability as ending eligibility, did not violate HIPAA because they constituted a bona fide classification based on employment status rather than health factors. The court further held that the participant failed to exhaust required administrative remedies under the plan before bringing suit.

healthcarelabor & employmentfederal power

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by John Lau challenging his New York state convictions for two counts of first-degree murder to prevent witness testimony. Petitioner contended that the trial court's supplemental jury charge, given after the jury returned an inconsistent verdict acquitting on some murder counts while convicting on others, coerced a guilty verdict by improperly directing reconsideration of lesser-included offenses. The magistrate judge recommended denial of the petition, which the district court adopted in full after reviewing objections, finding no constitutional violation because the supplemental instruction merely clarified that the jury need not consider lesser offenses once it had convicted on the greater ones and was not coercive. The court therefore denied habeas relief and closed the case.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a §1983 civil rights action brought by plaintiff James Maloney against Nassau County police officers, state officials, and others, alleging violations arising from an August 2000 incident in which officers responded to a complaint that he had threatened a telephone worker with a rifle, leading to a twelve-hour standoff, his surrender and arrest, a search of his home and seizure of items, a mental health evaluation, criminal charges resolved by a guilty plea to disorderly conduct, and an OCFS child abuse investigation that resulted in an 'indicated' finding without a promised fair hearing. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' dispositive motions, dismissed the fourth cause of action against state defendants Peters and Johnson (finding no viable claims under the First, Second, Sixth, or Eighth Amendments and only a possible procedural due process issue), denied without prejudice defendant Seiden's motions to amend his answer and for Rule 11 sanctions, and scheduled further proceedings including a conference and discovery. The reasoning focused on the absence of alleged facts supporting most constitutional violations, the legal standards for the various motions, and the need to clarify remaining issues for discovery.

civil rightscriminal lawfamily lawprocedure

Singh, an undocumented immigrant and U.S. Army veteran who served in Kosovo, sued under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) for de novo review after CIS denied his naturalization application under INA § 329, which allows naturalization for noncitizens who served honorably during periods designated by presidential executive order for armed conflict with a hostile foreign force. CIS had rejected the application because Executive Order 13,119 designated specific geographic areas rather than time periods, and Singh's service fell outside previously designated conflicts such as post-9/11 or Desert Storm. The court granted CIS's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that INA § 329 authorizes the President to designate only time periods—not geographic locations—and that Executive Order 13,119 was therefore invalid for naturalization purposes under the reasoning of In re Reyes, which emphasized Congress's intent to focus on periods of potential reassignment to war zones. Accordingly, the court denied Singh's naturalization application.

immigrationfederal power

This ERISA case involves plaintiff Harvey Katzenberg, a former company executive, suing First Fortis Life Insurance Company for denying long-term disability benefits under a group policy after he developed psychological issues following his daughter's death and later polycythemia vera, a blood disorder treated with periodic phlebotomies. The policy limited benefits to 24 months for mental or nervous disorders, and the insurer had attempted to add a discretionary authority clause via amendment. Defendant moved for judgment on the administrative record or summary judgment, arguing for arbitrary-and-capricious review and that its denial was reasonable. The court construed the motion as one for summary judgment and denied it, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the discretionary clause was validly added (affecting the standard of review) and whether plaintiff's physical condition independently caused ongoing disability beyond the mental-disorder limit.

labor & employmenthealthcare