Ernest C. Torres

The case involved Felipe Arias, who was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Arias moved to suppress the firearm that police seized from the vehicle in which he was a passenger during a traffic stop in Providence. After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the motion to suppress. The court reasoned that a traffic stop is a Fourth Amendment seizure requiring either reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause of a traffic violation, but the government failed to show that the officer had either, as the officer's account of the stop did not establish objective grounds and appeared pretextual.

criminal lawprocedureguns

This case involved consolidated actions by automobile manufacturers, manufacturers' associations, and Rhode Island dealers seeking a declaratory judgment that a Rhode Island regulation setting greenhouse gas emissions standards for new vehicles was invalid because it was preempted by the federal Energy Policy and Conservation Act and Clean Air Act. The Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the preemption claims were barred by issue preclusion due to prior rulings in similar cases from Vermont and California district courts. The court granted the motion as to the manufacturers and associations, finding that those parties had already litigated and lost the identical preemption issues in the earlier cases. However, the court denied the motion as to the dealers, holding that they were not parties to the prior litigation and that no exception for nonparty preclusion applied. The decision rested on principles of collateral estoppel, including the requirements of privity and adequate representation.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

Gordon Ondis filed a qui tam lawsuit under the False Claims Act against the City of Woonsocket and its mayor, claiming they submitted false statements to HUD about supporting affordable housing in order to obtain federal grants. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing the claims relied on information that had already been publicly disclosed. The court granted the motion after finding that nearly all the underlying incidents and statements had appeared in local newspapers or been revealed in a prior state court case. It further held that Ondis was not an original source because his knowledge came second-hand from employees who reviewed public records and interviewed others, without any direct or specialized insight that would qualify under the statute.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure

David Campbell, a former inmate at the privately operated Wyatt Detention Facility, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (treated as a Bivens action) alleging that the facility's refusal to provide a vegetarian diet required by his Rastafarian religious beliefs violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights, and that the destruction of his legal papers from pending lawsuits also violated his First Amendment rights. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court denied Campbell's motion, granted the defendants' motion on the Eighth Amendment diet claim and the First Amendment claim regarding destruction of legal papers because no tangible injury resulted, and denied the defendants' motion on the First Amendment religious diet claim due to a genuine issue of material fact regarding the burden on Campbell's religious exercise. The ruling turned on whether the evidence showed a substantial burden on religious practice, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, or actual harm from loss of documents in the underlying cases.

criminal lawreligious libertycivil rightsprocedure

Legion Insurance brought a declaratory judgment action against its insured Family Service, Inc., seeking a ruling that its liability policy provided no coverage for an employment discrimination lawsuit filed by a former employee. After the parties entered a Global Settlement Agreement requiring Legion to contribute to the settlement and pay Family Service's defense costs, Legion failed to pay and later entered liquidation proceedings. Family Service counterclaimed against Legion for breach of the policy and settlement agreement and filed a third-party claim against the Rhode Island Insurers’ Insolvency Fund. The court granted Family Service summary judgment on its counterclaim, finding that the settlement agreement was binding under Rhode Island law based on confirming documents, and denied the Fund’s motion to dismiss, holding that the attorneys’ fees claim qualified as a covered claim under the state insolvency statute because it arose from the policy coverage.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

Cynthia Dixon filed a putative class action against Calusa Investments alleging that the company violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by obtaining her credit information without consent and mailing her solicitations for a debt consolidation loan that did not qualify as a 'firm offer of credit' under the statute. The mailers stated that any loan would depend on meeting pre-selection criteria and required collateral in the form of real estate but did not specify interest rates or other loan terms. The court granted Calusa's motion to dismiss, overruling Dixon's objections to the magistrate's recommendation. Relying on the First Circuit's intervening decision in Sullivan v. Greenwood Credit Union, the court held that a firm offer of credit under FCRA need not include additional material terms beyond the pre-selection criteria and that the mailers satisfied the statutory definition because credit would be extended if those criteria were met.

business & regulatory

More than 120 residents of Tiverton, Rhode Island sued New England Gas Company, alleging that their properties were contaminated by hazardous coal gasification wastes from a nearby facility operated by the defendant, seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief to abate the nuisance. The defendant moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the court should not grant injunctive relief requiring remediation because the Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management has primary authority over such matters and that the court should defer under doctrines of abstention or primary jurisdiction. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the complaints sought relief that could be satisfied by the defendant paying into a remediation fund rather than performing the work itself, and that even if specific injunctive relief were sought, the motion was premature given the undeveloped factual record regarding the contamination and ongoing agency proceedings.

environmentpropertyproceduretorts & liability

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company brought this declaratory judgment action against IDC Properties, Inc., seeking a ruling that an owner's title insurance policy provided no coverage for IDC's loss of development rights in the Goat Island Condominium because IDC failed to disclose threats of litigation from other condominium owners contesting those rights. IDC filed a counterclaim asserting that the policy did cover the loss and seeking damages for bad-faith denial of coverage. After a three-day bench trial, the court entered judgment for Commonwealth on both the complaint and the counterclaim, declaring the policy null and void. The court reasoned that the undisclosed information about threatened litigation was material and that Commonwealth would not have issued the policy if the disclosure had been made.

property

Narragansett Jewelry Co. brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that its insurer, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., had a duty to defend and indemnify it against claims by Slane & Slane for defective jewelry manufacturing, late deliveries, and related contract, warranty, and negligence allegations. St. Paul moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims fell outside the comprehensive general liability policy. The court granted the motion, holding that the policy covers only property damage to others and excludes damage to property in the insured's care, custody, or control; the underlying complaint's allegations either failed to describe covered property damage or were subject to the exclusion, creating no potential for coverage. The court applied the pleadings test under Rhode Island law and found the factual allegations inconsistent with any reasonable interpretation that would trigger a duty to defend.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved the IRS's petition to enforce an administrative summons against Textron seeking its tax accrual workpapers for the 2001 tax year, prepared in connection with an audit of tax years 1998-2001 and focusing on certain transactions the IRS viewed as tax avoidance. Textron resisted production, arguing the summons lacked a legitimate purpose and that the materials were privileged. The court denied enforcement, holding that the workpapers—consisting of spreadsheets and attorney notes listing uncertain tax positions, estimated litigation success percentages, and related reserve amounts—were protected by the work product doctrine because they were prepared in anticipation of potential disputes or litigation with the IRS. The core reasoning was that the documents reflected counsel's mental impressions and legal analyses, and compelled disclosure would unfairly advantage the IRS in any future controversy while providing little relevant factual information beyond what the IRS could obtain through other means.

taxesfederal power

Rhode Island Hospital appealed a decision by the Secretary of Health and Human Services excluding time residents spent on research when calculating full-time equivalent residents for Indirect Medical Education adjustments in 1996, which reduced the hospital's payments for graduate medical education costs. The court granted summary judgment to the hospital and denied the Secretary's cross-motion. The ruling rested on the determination that the Secretary's interpretation was inconsistent with the plain language of 42 C.F.R. § 412.105(g), which bases full-time equivalent status on the total time to fill a residency slot, and with Congress's purpose in providing IME payments to account for teaching hospitals' additional costs.

healthcarefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment under NEPA and the APA to enjoin Brown University from building a life sciences building and to overturn NASA and DOE's finding of no significant environmental impact. The plaintiffs argued that the roughly $10.25 million in federal grants, covering about 11% of project costs, made the construction a major federal action requiring a full environmental impact statement. The court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the project was not a major federal action due to the limited federal funding and involvement relative to the total cost and Brown's primary control over the project. The reasoning centered on NEPA's statutory and regulatory definitions, CEQ guidelines for categorical exclusions or environmental assessments, and the absence of sufficient federal control or funding to trigger EIS obligations.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

Plaintiffs living near Lawn Terrace Apartments sued New England Gas Company and Clean Harbors for mercury contamination after two individuals stole mercury from an NE Gas facility and spilled it in the apartment parking lot, tracking it into residences. The suit, originally filed in state court, was removed to federal court on diversity grounds, prompting plaintiffs to move for remand because two defendants were Rhode Island residents. The court denied remand, finding that the non-diverse defendants had been fraudulently joined because the nuisance and hazardous waste claims against them lacked any reasonable possibility of success: the contamination was not widespread enough to qualify as a public nuisance, and plaintiffs could not show special damages distinct from those to the general public. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, the court dropped the two individuals as parties, preserving diversity jurisdiction over the remaining defendants.

proceduretorts & liabilityenvironment

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company sued for a declaratory judgment that its title insurance policy provided no coverage for IDC Properties' loss of development rights in the Goat Island South Condominium, citing exclusions for matters known to the insured but not disclosed. IDC counterclaimed for bad faith and brought third-party claims against its former attorneys for negligence in obtaining the policy and failing to make required disclosures about unit owner disputes. The court denied Commonwealth's motion to sever the third-party claims, finding that the claims shared key factual and legal issues, particularly regarding what disclosures were made, and that separate trials would risk inconsistent verdicts and inefficient duplication of evidence. The decision applied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b), weighing factors like judicial economy, prejudice, and jury trial rights against any benefits of severance.

propertyprocedure

The case involved defendants Urciuoli and Driscoll who were charged with mail fraud in connection with an alleged scheme to bribe State Senator John Celona by employing him as a consultant to an entity affiliated with Roger Williams Medical Center. Shortly before trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that prosecutors and agents engaged in egregious misconduct by withholding and concealing exculpatory information in violation of their Brady obligations. The court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment. It found that the defendants' allegations of deliberate concealment and manipulation were unsupported, that their claims were exaggerated or based on an overly broad view of Brady material, and that the government had not failed to provide any materially exculpatory evidence or caused prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves appeals by landlords 1500 Mineral Spring Associates, LP, 1800 Smith Street Associates, LP, and Jason’s Realty Corp. from Bankruptcy Court orders in the Chapter 11 case of debtor Louis A. Gencarelli, Sr., who had guaranteed debts of his company Bess Eaton Donut Flour Company, Inc. The appeals challenged the denial of a motion to dismiss Gencarelli’s petition for lack of good faith, the application of the 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) cap to limit the landlords’ claims for unpaid and future rent under commercial leases, and an order authorizing a $2.5 million interim distribution to Gencarelli. The district court vacated the orders denying dismissal and capping the rent claims, remanding those issues for further proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court, while affirming the distribution order. The court reasoned that the bankruptcy court had not properly addressed whether the petition was filed in good faith or correctly calculated the landlords’ recoverable claims under the statutory cap, but the distribution caused no prejudice because sufficient estate funds remained to cover all disputed creditor claims.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In this case, property owners in Tiverton, Rhode Island sued New England Gas Company and its parent company, alleging that hazardous coal gasification waste deposited on or near their land decades earlier by a predecessor company caused contamination and related harms. The plaintiffs asserted multiple claims including negligence, gross negligence, strict liability, private and public nuisance, infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the Rhode Island Hazardous Waste Management Act, seeking damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the gross negligence, private nuisance, emotional distress, and HWMA claims but denied it as to the negligence, strict liability, public nuisance, and punitive damages claims. Dismissal turned on whether the complaints sufficiently pleaded facts to support each cause of action under Rule 12(b)(6) standards, particularly regarding duty, foreseeability, the elements of nuisance and strict liability for historical waste disposal, and the degree of culpability needed for punitive damages.

environmentpropertytorts & liability

The case involved ACORN challenging a Town of East Greenwich ordinance that required a permit for door-to-door solicitation of funds and prohibited such activity after 7:00 p.m., claiming violations of First Amendment free expression rights. The court denied ACORN's motion for a preliminary injunction. It reasoned that both the permit requirement and the time restriction were content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations that served significant government interests in preventing fraud and protecting residential privacy, were narrowly tailored with minimal burdens on speech, and left open ample alternative channels for communication such as daytime solicitation, phone, mail, and public places.

free speech