John Daniel Tinder

Dunnet Bay Construction Company, owned by two white males, sued the Illinois Department of Transportation and its officials, alleging that IDOT's Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program for federally assisted highway contracts discriminates on the basis of race in violation of equal protection. The program requires bidders to meet goals for participation by businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, with a rebuttable presumption that women and racial minorities qualify, and allows contract awards based on demonstrated good-faith efforts to meet those goals. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Dunnet Bay lacked standing to bring the equal protection challenge and that the program complied with constitutional and regulatory requirements. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment, upholding the standing determination and the conclusion that the DBE program survived the challenges.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatory

This case involved contribution claims under CERCLA for costs to clean up polychlorinated biphenyls and other hazardous waste in Sauget Area 1 along Dead Creek in Illinois. Rogers Cartage Company, after settling related claims with other potentially responsible parties including Monsanto and Solutia, filed a new third-party complaint seeking further contribution, which the district court dismissed as barred by the prior settlement agreement. The court also imposed sanctions on Rogers Cartage for filing the precluded claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding the settlement unambiguous, and upheld the sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 after determining substantial compliance with its safe-harbor requirements. The court rejected reliance on inherent authority or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for the sanctions order.

environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory

Earl Sidney Davis, a civil detainee under Illinois's Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act at a high-security facility, sued security guards Seth Wessel and George Lay under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. He alleged that the guards refused to remove his hand restraints in a courthouse restroom despite a judicial order, forced him to struggle to use the toilet while they watched and laughed, and caused him physical pain, humiliation, and the need to hold his need to defecate for hours. A jury awarded Davis $1,000 in compensatory damages, but the guards appealed the denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law and challenged the jury instructions on the applicable constitutional standard. The Seventh Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the guards violated clearly established law by using restraints for punitive or humiliating purposes without penological justification, but it vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial because the district court's jury instructions were erroneous.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a former Des Plaines police officer, Dick Lalowski, who was discharged after two confrontations with abortion clinic demonstrators on May 20, 2006—one while on duty and one shortly after his shift ended—leading the police chief to bring charges before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, which sustained the charges and terminated his employment. Lalowski sued the city, the board, and the chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation for protected speech, and separately sought judicial review of the termination under Illinois administrative law. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the First Amendment claim, holding that the record did not support a retaliation finding, but vacated the judgment on the state-law administrative review claim because the district court had improperly granted summary judgment without prior notice or an opportunity for the parties to brief the issue as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), and remanded for further proceedings.

free speechcivil rightsprocedure

In United States v. Srinivasa Erramilli, the defendant was convicted of abusive sexual contact for touching a woman's thigh on an airplane, with the government introducing evidence of two prior similar incidents under Federal Rule of Evidence 413. Erramilli appealed, arguing that the prior acts evidence should have been excluded and that the jury instruction on its use was improper. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, reasoning that Rule 413 allows prior sexual assault evidence to be considered on any relevant matter and that the district court's instruction identifying specific purposes such as motive, intent, and propensity did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

criminal lawprocedure

Myron Mintz, an African American manufacturing engineer at Caterpillar Inc., sued his employer alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII after receiving negative performance evaluations and other adverse actions related to his handling of production issues like grief and change orders. The district court granted Caterpillar's motion for summary judgment after Mintz failed to file a timely response, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed that judgment on appeal. The court held that Mintz failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not show he was meeting legitimate job expectations or that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably, and he offered no evidence of pretext. For the retaliation claim, the court found no causal connection between Mintz's protected activity and the adverse actions, citing the nine-month gap in timing and lack of corroborating evidence under both direct and indirect methods of proof.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved Dr. Michael Stern, Chief Psychologist at St. Anthony’s Health Center, who was terminated after a neutral evaluation found his short-term memory deficiencies made him unfit for duty. Stern sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging the employer failed to engage in the required interactive process to identify reasonable accommodations. The district court granted summary judgment to the employer, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that even though the employer had short-circuited the interactive process, Stern failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether he could perform the essential functions of his supervisory, administrative, and clinical roles with or without accommodation. The decision rested on the lack of evidence that any proposed accommodation would enable him to safely handle patient care and department responsibilities.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves Tommy R. Pruitt's appeal from the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his Indiana state conviction for murdering a deputy sheriff during a traffic stop and his resulting death sentence. Pruitt claimed he is intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for the death penalty, and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence of his schizophrenia at the penalty phase. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Pruitt had established his intellectual disability, rendering him categorically ineligible for capital punishment, and that counsel's deficient performance regarding mental health evidence prejudiced the outcome under Strickland v. Washington. The court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to grant a conditional writ vacating the death sentence for a new penalty-phase proceeding.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved Adrian Ruiz, who was charged with possession with intent to distribute heroin after law enforcement officers, acting on surveillance of suspected drug activity, stopped his vehicle, obtained his consent to search, and discovered hidden compartments containing the drugs. Ruiz moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop, that the encounter became a de facto arrest, that he was in custody without Miranda warnings, and that his consent to proceed to the station and open the traps was involuntary. The district court denied the motion, Ruiz pleaded guilty while preserving his right to appeal, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial. The court reasoned that the officers had reasonable suspicion based on observed behavior consistent with drug trafficking and trap compartments, that the stop did not ripen into an arrest, that Ruiz was not in custody, and that his consent was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Stephanie Miller's attempt to obtain city approvals for a condominium development project in Monona, Wisconsin, during which she faced delays, inspections, citations, and other regulatory hurdles from city officials. Miller sued the city and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation of her equal protection rights under a class-of-one theory, alleging she was singled out for unfavorable treatment without rational basis. The district court dismissed this claim for failure to identify similarly situated projects treated more favorably, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Miller had not excluded possible rational explanations for the city's actions, such as the condition of her property, and that the class-of-one doctrine has limited application in land-use contexts.

civil rightspropertybusiness & regulatory

In United States v. Jason Procknow, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of theft of government money under 18 U.S.C. § 641 and one count of aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) for filing fraudulent tax returns claiming refunds, but reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Procknow sought to suppress evidence obtained after police officers' warrantless entry into his hotel room following his arrest in the lobby and evidence obtained via grand jury subpoenas after the IRS withdrew administrative summonses for the same information. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress. The court reasoned that the warrantless entry did not violate constitutional rights and that the grand jury subpoenas were independent of the withdrawn summonses with no demonstrated taint, supported by prior probable cause from other lawfully obtained evidence.

criminal lawproceduretaxes

The case involved multi-employer health benefit funds suing Abbott Laboratories and AbbVie under the civil RICO statute, alleging that the companies engaged in a long-running scheme from 1998 to 2012 to illegally promote the drug Depakote for unapproved off-label uses, including through misrepresentations, kickbacks, and concealment, which caused the funds to pay for ineffective and unsafe prescriptions. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice, holding that the four-year RICO statute of limitations began running in 1998 when the funds first reimbursed an off-label Depakote prescription. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal and remanded, reasoning that it was premature to resolve the limitations issue at the pleadings stage because factual questions remained about when a reasonable plaintiff would have discovered its injury and the wrongdoer's identity, and the complaint did not establish on its face that the claims were untimely.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryhealthcare

The case involved Jane Doe, a minor, who sued police officer Mark Del Boccio and the Village of Arlington Heights after Del Boccio responded to a 911 call about underage drinking at an apartment complex but left Doe with three intoxicated males, after which she was sexually assaulted. The district court dismissed all claims, including federal §1983 claims against the officer and village as well as state-law tort claims for negligence and willful misconduct, and denied leave to amend or alter the judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the officer had qualified immunity because there was no constitutional duty to protect Doe from private violence, the village faced no municipal liability, and Illinois tort immunity statutes barred the state claims.

civil rightscriminal lawtorts & liability

This case consolidated three appeals from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois involving defendants Parrish Kappes, David L. Crisp Jr., and Jeffrey J. Jurgens, each challenging certain conditions of supervised release imposed as part of their federal sentences. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the supervised-release framework established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which replaced parole and requires conditions to serve purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation, and public protection. The court held that several discretionary conditions lacked proper advance notice, adequate supporting findings by the sentencing judges, or sufficient tailoring to the individual defendants and statutory goals. It therefore vacated the sentences in all three cases and remanded for full resentencing, noting that adjustments to supervised-release conditions could warrant corresponding changes to the custodial terms. The opinion also reiterated general principles for imposing supervised release and addressed one defendant's claim that a mitigation argument had been overlooked.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, Gary France was convicted of mail fraud and making a false declaration in bankruptcy proceedings stemming from a fraudulent billing scheme, and was ordered to pay $800,000 in restitution to victims. Years later, after France had paid only a small fraction of the amount, the government sought to garnish monthly payments from his privately purchased disability insurance policy under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. France and his ex-wife argued that portions of the payments were exempt from garnishment, including amounts allocated for child support, and that prior bankruptcy proceedings and settlements limited the government's reach. The district court permitted the government to garnish the full amount, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the MVRA allows enforcement of restitution judgments notwithstanding other federal laws or bankruptcy proceedings, and that equitable estoppel did not apply due to the separation between the bankruptcy trustee and criminal prosecutors.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved the convictions of Joshua Bowser, Christian Miller, and Frank Jordan, three members or associates of the Indianapolis chapter of the Outlaws Motorcycle Club, as part of a large-scale federal prosecution charging dozens of individuals with racketeering, drug distribution conspiracy, extortion, and related offenses under RICO and other statutes. Bowser pleaded guilty to most counts but entered a nolo contendere plea to the RICO charge and challenged the denial of a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility as well as a supervised release condition; Miller and Jordan were convicted after separate jury trials on racketeering and drug-related charges, respectively, and raised issues including the sufficiency of evidence for predicate acts and speedy trial rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences in all respects except for one, remanding Bowser's case for reconsideration of the supervised release term authorizing suspicionless searches because the district court did not adequately connect the condition to the offense and the government confessed error under circuit precedent. The core reasoning rested on the trial evidence supporting the jury findings, the district court's discretion in applying sentencing guidelines to nolo pleas without requiring additional admissions, and the lack of merit in the remaining appellate arguments.

criminal law

The case involved John Tomkins, who sent threatening letters to investment firms demanding stock purchases and mailed packages containing homemade pipe bomb devices to two managers, leading to charges of mailing threatening communications under 18 U.S.C. § 876(b), illegal firearm possession under 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and using a firearm in a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). After a jury trial, Tomkins was convicted and sentenced to 37 years in prison. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions, holding that the district court properly barred a hoax defense, that any error in admitting a late-disclosed x-ray was harmless, and that the search warrants for Tomkins's home and storage lockers were either valid or supported by the good-faith exception despite some overbreadth in financial record seizures. The court reasoned that the warrants were sufficiently particularized given the financial motive tied to stock manipulation and that officers reasonably relied on them.

criminal lawgunsprocedure

In United States v. Timmy Reichling, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a child under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) but appealed the denial of his motions to suppress evidence seized from his residences pursuant to search warrants. The warrants were based on an affidavit detailing an online relationship in which Reichling, posing as a minor, received explicit images from a 14-year-old victim, threatened her, and sent harassing messages; the affidavit also noted Reichling's prior sex offense conviction and linked his IP address and phone to the activity. Reichling argued that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause to seize storage devices beyond his cell phone, as there was no direct evidence of photo transfers to other media. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the motions, holding that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for probable cause as to both digital and non-digital storage devices given reasonable inferences about collection of such material, and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply even if probable cause were lacking.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, black physician Michael Simpson sued Beaver Dam Community Hospitals under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, claiming the hospital rejected his application for medical staff privileges on the basis of race after initially offering him employment. The district court granted summary judgment to the hospital, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that Simpson failed to establish discrimination under either the direct method, as no reasonable jury could infer race was the reason for the decision, or the indirect method, because the hospital offered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons—concerns about his qualifications including malpractice history, prior sanction, and other issues—and Simpson did not show those reasons were pretextual. The Credentials Committee and Board had authority under the bylaws to assess applicants' competence and character, and Simpson did not refute the underlying facts supporting the hospital's concerns.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involves the bankruptcy of Desa and Roger Rinaldi, who objected to a mortgage proof of claim filed by HSBC Bank USA and brought adversary claims alleging fraud and other violations related to the mortgage on their Wisconsin property. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings in favor of HSBC on the claim and dismissed the adversary claims as meritless, while also sanctioning the Rinaldis' attorney Wendy Nora for repeated frivolous and confusing filings after prior state court losses. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the Rinaldis failed to properly designate issues for review, their claims were without merit, and the appeal became moot due to their voluntary dismissal of the bankruptcy case in an apparent attempt to relitigate in state court. The court declined to vacate the lower decisions to avoid rewarding gamesmanship that would strip them of preclusive effect and upheld the sanctions against Nora for ignoring warnings about her conduct.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty