Clarence Thomas

Alan Dershowitz sued Cable News Network for defamation after its reporting about him. As a public figure, he was required under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and later cases to prove not only ordinary defamation elements but also that the network acted with “actual malice.” Dershowitz lost in the lower courts and asked the Supreme Court to overrule the actual-malice requirement for public figures. The Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. In a dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, argued that the standard has no grounding in the Constitution’s text, history, or structure and that the Court should have taken the case to reconsider it.

free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure

The Supreme Court case concerned whether the Immigration and Nationality Act requires border officers to possess clear and convincing evidence that a lawful permanent resident has committed a crime involving moral turpitude before treating the resident as an applicant for admission rather than as already admitted. Respondent Muk Choi Lau, a Chinese citizen admitted as a lawful permanent resident in 2007, faced a 2012 New Jersey trademark counterfeiting charge; after briefly leaving the country, a border officer paroled him upon return, and after his guilty plea the government initiated removal proceedings charging him as inadmissible. The Court held that the INA imposes no such evidentiary requirement on border officers, vacated the Second Circuit’s judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. The statute permits the government to regard a lawful permanent resident as seeking admission upon commission of an offense listed in 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2), with conviction needed only later to establish inadmissibility; any clear-and-convincing-evidence obligation arises only at the removal hearing itself, not at the border.

immigration

The Supreme Court denied Florida’s motion for leave to file a complaint against California and Washington. Florida sought to sue the two states for allegedly violating federal commercial driver’s license standards by issuing CDLs to non-English-speaking illegal immigrants, which Florida claimed created a public nuisance and contributed to fatal truck accidents, including one on the Florida Turnpike. The Court provided no explanation for the denial. In dissent, Justice Thomas argued that Article III and 28 U.S.C. §1251(a) give the Court exclusive original jurisdiction over suits between states, that the Court lacks discretion to refuse such cases, and that Florida’s claims met the Court’s discretionary criteria because they involved serious interstate interests with no alternative forum available.

immigrationfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

In 1996, Congress enacted Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act to impose liability on entities that knowingly traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government after 1959, creating a private right of action for U.S. nationals holding claims to such property. Havana Docks Corporation sued four cruise lines (Royal Caribbean, Norwegian, Carnival, and MSC) after they used docks in Havana—built and operated by Havana Docks under a concession expiring in 2004—that the Cuban government seized without compensation in 1960; the cruise lines had transported nearly a million passengers using those docks between 2016 and 2019. The district court granted summary judgment to Havana Docks and awarded over $100 million against each defendant, but a divided Eleventh Circuit panel reversed, holding that liability required showing the cruise lines would have interfered with Havana Docks’ property interest in a counterfactual scenario without the confiscation. The Supreme Court vacated that decision, ruling that Title III liability attaches when defendants use the physical confiscated property itself (here, the docks) to which the plaintiff owns a certified claim, without needing to prove interference with the original time-limited interest. The Court reasoned that the Act’s plain text defines “property which was confiscated” to include both physical assets and interests therein, treating confiscated property as tainted and imposing liability on unauthorized commercial use to support the Cuban regime.

propertybusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The Supreme Court case involved Winston Hencely, a U.S. soldier injured while stopping a suicide bombing at a U.S. base in Afghanistan by Ahmad Nayeb, an Afghan employee hired by military contractor Fluor Corp. under the Army’s “Afghan First” program. Hencely sued Fluor in federal court under South Carolina tort law for negligent supervision, entrustment, and retention, based on an Army investigation that found Fluor primarily at fault for failing to follow base procedures. The district court granted summary judgment to Fluor, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the ground that state-law claims against contractors arising from combatant activities are preempted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the claims are not preempted because the government neither ordered nor authorized the specific conduct at issue. The Court reasoned that neither the Constitution, any federal statute (including the FTCA’s combatant-activities exception), nor the principles of Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. support displacing state law absent a significant conflict with an identifiable federal policy or a government-directed action.

torts & liabilityfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana parishes sued oil companies in state court under a 1978 coastal resources law, alleging that certain pre-1980 crude oil production activities in the coastal zone, including Chevron’s wartime operations, lacked required permits and caused environmental harm. Chevron removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §1442(a)(1), arguing that the suit related to its wartime contracts to refine crude oil into aviation gasoline for the U.S. military. The district court and Fifth Circuit ordered remand, finding that while Chevron acted under federal authority as a military contractor, the challenged production activities were not sufficiently connected to those refining duties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Chevron had plausibly shown a close, non-tenuous relationship because its crude oil production supplied essential feedstock for the avgas contracts, the government had directed increased output, and the specific production methods at issue (such as vertical drilling and earthen pits) were used to meet wartime demands and conserve materials. The Court concluded that this connection satisfied the statute’s broad “relating to” requirement for removal.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case involved Sony Music and other copyright owners suing Cox Communications, an internet service provider, for contributory copyright infringement. Sony alleged that Cox was secondarily liable because it continued supplying internet access to subscribers after receiving over 160,000 notices from a monitoring service identifying their IP addresses in connection with unauthorized uploading or downloading of copyrighted music. A jury found Cox contributorily liable and awarded $1 billion in damages; the Fourth Circuit affirmed that portion of the verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a service provider is contributorily liable only if it intended its service to be used for infringement, which requires either actively inducing the infringement or offering a service specially tailored to it. Cox neither induced infringement through promotional acts nor provided a service incapable of substantial lawful uses, and its receipt of infringement notices did not establish the requisite intent given the limits of its knowledge about individual users on shared connections.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

In Postal Service v. Konan, respondent Lebene Konan sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for state-law tort claims, alleging that Postal Service employees in Texas intentionally withheld mail delivery to two rental properties she owned after an extended dispute. The district court dismissed the suit under the FTCA’s postal exception, 28 U.S.C. §2680(b), which preserves sovereign immunity for claims “arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter,” but the Fifth Circuit reversed, creating a circuit split with the First and Second Circuits. The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and held that the United States retains sovereign immunity because the terms “miscarriage” and “loss” encompass the intentional nondelivery of mail. The Court reached this conclusion by applying the ordinary meanings of those terms at the time of the FTCA’s enactment in 1946, under which a miscarriage occurs whenever mail fails to reach its intended destination and a loss occurs through any deprivation of the mail, regardless of whether the underlying conduct was intentional. This reading treats the exception as covering specified harms rather than only particular forms of employee misconduct.

torts & liabilityfederal power

Kari MacRae sued Hanover Public Schools and two officials after they fired her for six pre-employment TikTok posts and reposts expressing views on immigration enforcement, biological sex, and color-blindness, claiming the termination retaliated against her First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the school district, the First Circuit affirmed under the Pickering-Garcetti public-employee speech framework, and the Supreme Court denied MacRae’s petition for certiorari. Justice Thomas issued a statement respecting the denial, agreeing that the petition did not squarely challenge the First Circuit’s application of the balancing test that weighs an employee’s interest in speech on matters of public concern against the employer’s interest in avoiding disruption. He noted that the lower courts had discounted the posts’ value partly due to their tone and had credited the district’s predictions of workplace issues based on public attention and perceived conflicts with school values, but emphasized that the petition’s narrow focus on pre-employment speech meant the case did not warrant review. Thomas added that lower courts remain bound to apply the existing framework unless the Supreme Court revisits it.

free speechlabor & employmentimmigrationcivil rights

In GHP Management Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, landlords sued the city over a COVID-19 eviction moratorium that barred evictions for nonpayment of rent, arguing that it amounted to a physical taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, leaving in place the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the policy did not effect a taking because the landlords had voluntarily opened their properties to tenants. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented from the denial, contending that an acknowledged circuit split exists between the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Yee v. Escondido and the Eighth and Federal Circuits' application of Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, that the question is important and recurring, and that the precedents create confusion warranting Supreme Court review.

propertybusiness & regulatory

In Free Speech Coalition, Inc. v. Paxton, industry groups representing pornography websites challenged a 2023 Texas law (H.B. 1181) that requires commercial sites publishing sexually explicit material obscene to minors to verify that users are at least 18, with violations subject to injunctions and civil penalties. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement facially violates the First Amendment by burdening adults’ access to protected speech. The Supreme Court held that the law is subject to intermediate scrutiny because it only incidentally burdens adults’ protected speech, and it upheld the Fifth Circuit’s decision that the statute is likely constitutional. The Court reasoned that states have long had authority to shield minors from material obscene to them (even if protected for adults), that age verification is a traditional and necessary means of enforcing such limits, and that adults have no First Amendment right to avoid providing proof of age when accessing such content.

free speech

The case Louisiana v. Callais involves a constitutional challenge to Louisiana’s congressional redistricting map (SB8), which created two majority-Black districts after a prior lower-court ruling under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. A three-judge district court held that the map amounted to an unconstitutional racial gerrymander violating the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined its use. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court restored the consolidated cases to the calendar for reargument rather than issuing a decision. Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that Congress mandates prompt Supreme Court resolution of such redistricting challenges and that the cases present an unavoidable conflict between the Court’s Section 2 precedents and the Constitution’s equal-protection guarantee.

electionscivil rights

The case concerned a challenge by representatives of the pornography industry to Texas H.B. 1181, which requires commercial websites publishing sexually explicit material obscene to minors to verify that visitors are at least 18 years old, with violations subject to injunctions and civil penalties. The Supreme Court held that the law is subject to intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment and survives that review, so the Fifth Circuit correctly denied a preliminary injunction. The Court reasoned that states have long had authority to bar minors from accessing speech obscene to them, a power that includes requiring age verification as an ordinary enforcement method; because adults have no First Amendment right to access such material without submitting proof of age, any resulting burden on adults is only incidental rather than a direct regulation of protected speech. The majority therefore rejected the argument that strict scrutiny must apply.

free speech

The case concerned whether challenges to the EPA’s 2022 denials of 105 small-refinery exemption petitions under the Clean Air Act’s renewable fuel program belonged in regional circuits or exclusively in the D.C. Circuit. The Supreme Court held that the denials were “locally or regionally applicable” actions that nevertheless fell within the statutory exception for actions “based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect,” requiring review in the D.C. Circuit. The Court reasoned that each petition denial is a distinct “action,” that the EPA applied uniform statutory interpretations and an economic methodology (RIN cost pass-through) across all petitions, and that the agency expressly found and published that these common determinations had nationwide scope or effect, thereby triggering the venue exception in 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned whether challenges to the EPA’s disapprovals of Oklahoma’s and Utah’s state implementation plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor provision must be heard in the D.C. Circuit or in a regional circuit. The EPA had rejected the SIPs (along with those of 19 other states) in a single Federal Register notice after applying a uniform four-step framework, and it argued that the action was nationally applicable or had nationwide scope or effect, making the D.C. Circuit the proper venue; the Tenth Circuit agreed and transferred the cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that each SIP disapproval is a separate, locally or regionally applicable action reviewable only in the appropriate regional circuit. It reasoned that the Clean Air Act treats individual SIP approvals and disapprovals as distinct actions tied to specific states, and that the EPA’s use of a common analytical method did not make the disapprovals “based on” a determination of nationwide scope or effect within the meaning of the statute’s venue exception. The Court therefore remanded the cases for proceedings in the regional circuits.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether challenges to the EPA’s disapprovals of Oklahoma’s and Utah’s state implementation plans (SIPs) under the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor provision must be heard in the D.C. Circuit or in regional circuits. The EPA had disapproved multiple states’ SIPs for failing to address interstate ozone pollution, packaged the decisions in a single Federal Register notice using a uniform four-step framework, and argued the actions were nationally applicable or fell within the “nationwide scope or effect” exception, requiring D.C. Circuit review; the Tenth Circuit agreed and transferred the cases. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the disapprovals are locally or regionally applicable actions reviewable in regional circuits. It reasoned that each SIP disapproval constitutes a separate “action” under the statute because it applies only to the proposing state and is the opposite of an individual SIP approval, which the Act expressly lists as locally or regionally applicable; packaging decisions together or applying consistent methods does not convert them into a single nationally applicable action, and the nationwide exception did not apply because the specific state determinations were not driven primarily by a nationwide finding.

environmentfederal powerprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case concerned whether challenges to the EPA’s 2022 denials of 105 small-refinery exemption petitions under the Clean Air Act’s renewable-fuel program belonged in the D.C. Circuit or in regional circuits. The Supreme Court held that venue lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the denials, though locally applicable to individual refineries, were based on determinations of nationwide scope or effect. The Court reasoned that EPA relied on two uniform, nationally applied positions—that “disproportionate economic hardship” must be caused directly by program compliance and that RIN costs are fully passed through to consumers—while using refinery-specific facts only for confirmatory review. Under 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), this combination triggers the statutory exception requiring D.C. Circuit review.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Soto v. United States, a Marine Corps veteran and class of similarly situated retirees sued after the Navy limited retroactive Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) payments under 10 U.S.C. § 1413a to six years, invoking the Barring Act’s default six-year limitations period for claims against the government (31 U.S.C. § 3702). The Supreme Court held that the CRSC statute displaces the Barring Act’s settlement procedures and limitations period. The Court reasoned that the statute vests the Secretary concerned with authority both to determine claimants’ eligibility—thereby establishing claim validity—and to calculate the specific monthly amount due, creating a comprehensive, self-contained compensation scheme. It rejected the Federal Circuit’s requirement for explicit “settlement” language or a separate limitations period, explaining that Congress need not use particular words so long as the statute’s text, context, and structure confer the requisite powers. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded.

federal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether the Barring Act’s six-year limitations period on claims against the government applies to applications for combat-related special compensation (CRSC) under 10 U.S.C. §1413a, or whether the CRSC statute instead provides its own settlement mechanism that displaces the Barring Act. Petitioner Simon Soto, a Marine Corps veteran awarded CRSC, challenged the Navy’s refusal to pay benefits for periods more than six years before his application. The Supreme Court held that the CRSC statute confers settlement authority on the Secretary concerned and therefore displaces the Barring Act’s procedures and limitations period. The Court reasoned that the statute vests the Secretary with power to determine both a claimant’s eligibility (i.e., claim validity) and the monthly amount due, creating a comprehensive, self-contained compensation scheme that qualifies as “another law” under the Barring Act exception. It rejected requirements for explicit “magic words” or a specific limitations period in the displacing statute.

federal powerprocedure

In BLOM Bank SAL v. Honickman, victims and families of victims of Hamas terrorist attacks sued a Lebanese bank under the Anti-Terrorism Act, alleging that its financial services to certain customers aided the attacks. After the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and the Second Circuit affirmed (while clarifying the pleading standard for aiding-and-abetting liability), the plaintiffs sought to reopen the final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) so they could file an amended complaint. The Supreme Court held that Rule 60(b)(6) relief requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances that is not relaxed or balanced against Rule 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy when a party seeks to reopen a case solely to amend its pleadings. The Court reasoned that Rule 60(b)(6) is a narrow catchall provision whose text, structure, and precedents demand strict adherence to protect the finality of judgments, and that any application of Rule 15(a) can occur only after the Rule 60(b)(6) threshold is met. It therefore reversed the Second Circuit’s decision, which had required district courts to weigh finality interests against amendment policy.

procedurecriminal lawtorts & liability