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Brabson v. Floyd County Board of Education
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2011-07-13
The case involves a plaintiff injured after tripping on a raised gym floor during a cheerleading event at a public high school; the event was sponsored by a private company rather than the school board, though the board retained responsibility for the facility's condition. The Floyd County Board of Education moved to dismiss the tort suit on grounds of governmental immunity. The court denied the motion because it was not yet clear whether the board's action in permitting the private use qualified as a governmental function integral to state education or a proprietary function akin to a for-profit business. Further information on fees charged and the board's purpose was needed to resolve the immunity question under Kentucky precedent distinguishing the two categories of activity.
proceduretorts & liability
United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union v. Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2011-06-13 · cited 2×
The case arose after Kentucky West Virginia Gas Co. reorganized and dispersed employees from a union-represented bargaining unit into non-unionized subsidiaries, leading the union to file a grievance (08-28) alleging that the employer failed to properly terminate the collective bargaining agreement and promise good-faith negotiations for a new one. The union sued under § 301 of the LMRA to compel arbitration of the grievance. The court held that the dispute is primarily representational because resolving it would require an initial determination of whether the union remains the § 9(a) representative of an appropriate bargaining unit under the NLRA, a matter within the NLRB's exclusive jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court granted the employer's Rule 59(e) motion, vacated its prior order compelling arbitration, and entered judgment for the employer.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory
Martin County Coal Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2011-06-01 · cited 4×
The case concerned Martin County Coal's attempt to recover from Universal Underwriters, the insurer of its contractor CMS, for a $3.65 million settlement amount plus fees arising from a workplace injury lawsuit at a mine site. After an accident injuring CMS employee Phillip Crum, the parties settled with CMS assigning its claim against Universal to Martin County Coal, following Universal's refusal to defend CMS against Martin County Coal's indemnity counterclaim. The court had earlier ruled that Universal breached its duty to defend, but on summary judgment it held that the insurance policy limited coverage to situations of actual liability by the insured. Universal demonstrated through the record and case law that CMS would not have been liable at trial, while Martin County Coal provided no meaningful evidence in response, leading the court to grant summary judgment to Universal and dismiss the case.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Aspen Insurance UK Ltd. v. Murriel-Don Coal, Inc.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2011-05-27
This case arose from a 2008 car accident involving a tired mine employee, leading to state-court tort suits against Murriel-Don Coal that resulted in a $42 million judgment after coverage disputes with its insurer Aspen. Aspen filed a federal declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that its policy's automobile exclusion barred any duty to defend or indemnify Murriel-Don in the underlying state litigation. The district court granted motions to dismiss, declining to exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The court reasoned that the Declaratory Judgment Act confers substantial discretion to avoid gratuitous interference with parallel state proceedings, and that the five Grand Trunk factors—including the state court's superior ability to resolve the identical coverage issues and the risk of inconsistent judgments—strongly favored dismissal over federal adjudication.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Murriel-Don Coal Co., Inc. v. Aspen Ins. UK Ltd.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2011-05-20 · cited 52×
In this case, Murriel-Don Coal sued its insurer Aspen and its former attorneys Dunaway in Kentucky state court, asserting claims for breach of contract, failure to defend under an insurance policy, unfair claims practices, legal malpractice, and breach of fiduciary duty after a default judgment was entered against it in an underlying negligence action involving an employee car accident. Aspen removed the action to federal court on diversity grounds, contending that the non-diverse Kentucky defendants Dunaway had been fraudulently joined or misjoined solely to prevent removal. The court granted Murriel-Don's motion to remand, concluding that the claims against Dunaway were not so frivolous as to constitute fraudulent joinder and that all claims arose from the same series of transactions with common questions of fact, precluding application of the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine either.
proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory
Turner v. Astrue
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2011-04-13 · cited 1×
In Turner v. Astrue, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after a district court remand of his Social Security disability claim, though he had not yet received benefits and thus had no payment obligation under his contingency fee agreement with counsel. The court had previously denied the fee request, holding that no fees were "incurred" within the meaning of the EAJA, and now denies the plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion to vacate that order in light of the Fifth Circuit's contrary decision in Murkeldove v. Astrue. The court reasons that waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed, that the plaintiff's contingent obligation had not been triggered, and that the Fifth Circuit's analysis improperly relies on policy considerations and the absurdity doctrine rather than the statute's plain text. The court further notes that it lacks jurisdiction to grant relief while the appeal is pending but indicates it would not do so in any event.
procedurefederal power
Bio-Medical Applications of Kentucky, Inc. v. Coal Exclusive Co.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2011-03-02 · cited 3×
The case involved Bio-Medical Applications of Kentucky, a healthcare provider, seeking full reimbursement from Coal Exclusive Benefits (an employee welfare benefit plan) and its third-party administrator for dialysis treatments provided to a plan beneficiary with end-stage renal disease under an ERISA-covered group health plan. The plan had denied full payment on the grounds that the provider's charges exceeded usual, customary, and reasonable rates, after engaging repricing services, and had upheld that denial on appeal. The court reviewed the plan administrator's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard because the plan documents conferred interpretive discretion on the administrator. Finding the decision arbitrary and capricious due to an inadequate administrative record that failed to clearly document or explain the basis for the benefit calculations, repricing methodology, or appeals process, the court remanded the action to the plan administrator for further proceedings.
healthcarelabor & employment
Low v. Lowe's Home Centers, Inc.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2011-02-14 · cited 8×
This case involves a plaintiff injured while using a miter saw purchased from the defendants, who alleged that the saw had a manufacturing defect causing the blade guard's linkage to bind and stick open, allowing his hand to contact the blade. The defendants moved for summary judgment on claims including design defect, manufacturing defect, failure to warn, negligence, and breach of warranty. The court granted summary judgment on the design defect claim, finding no evidence that the product's overall design was unreasonably dangerous or that a safer feasible alternative existed, and on the failure-to-warn claim, finding no evidence of inadequate warnings about inherent or foreseeable dangers. It denied summary judgment on the manufacturing defect claim, holding that evidence of improper assembly creating the binding issue raised a jury question on whether the defect was a substantial factor in the injury, and allowed the negligence and warranty claims to proceed on that basis.
torts & liabilityprocedure
McKinstry v. Sergent
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2011-01-12 · cited 14×
The case involves a trustee of an unsecured creditors' trust pursuing claims against former executives and advisors of Black Diamond coal company for mismanagement that allegedly led to the company's bankruptcy. The defendants removed the case from state court to federal district court, and the plaintiff moved to remand. The court determined it had jurisdiction over the claims because they relate to the underlying bankruptcy proceedings and referred the case to the bankruptcy court for further handling, including potential abstention issues.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Solis v. Freedom Energy Mining Co.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-12-22
The case involved the Secretary of Labor suing mine operators under the Mine Safety and Health Act, alleging repeated violations of safety standards like roof support, ventilation, and equipment maintenance that formed a pattern creating a continuing hazard to miners. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the Secretary could seek injunctive relief in court under 30 U.S.C. § 818(a)(2) without first exhausting administrative remedies under § 814(e). The reasoning rested on the statute's plain text, which authorizes court action "whenever" the Secretary "believes" a pattern exists that in her "judgment" poses a hazard, rather than requiring a prior formal agency determination of a pattern of violations.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power
May v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-11-17 · cited 23×
In this case, plaintiff Norma May sued Wal-Mart in Kentucky state court after slipping and falling in a store, alleging injuries but without specifying damages beyond the state jurisdictional minimum. Wal-Mart removed the action to federal court under diversity jurisdiction less than three weeks after service, asserting that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000, but provided no supporting evidence at the time of removal. The court held that a defendant must demonstrate federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence at the moment of removal and declined to permit post-removal jurisdictional discovery, finding such discovery incompatible with the limited scope of federal jurisdiction and the need to respect state court authority. Accordingly, the court denied the discovery request and remanded the case to state court.
proceduretorts & liability
Jack Henry & Associates, Inc. v. BSC, INC.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-11-10 · cited 17×
In this diversity contract dispute, Jack Henry moved to amend the judgment to add postjudgment interest at the 18% contractual rate from the EFT Agreement, sought attorney's fees, and requested adjustment of the supersedeas bond. The court granted postjudgment interest only at the federal statutory rate of 0.22% under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, denied attorney's fees, and set the supersedeas bond at $2,366,382.50 covering damages, prejudgment interest, and one year of postjudgment interest. The core reasoning was that federal law governs postjudgment interest in diversity cases, parties may contract around § 1961 if they do so clearly and unequivocally, and the agreement here did not meet that standard, while the bond amount was calculated to include all components of the judgment.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Total Renal Care, Inc. v. CHILDERS OIL COMPANY
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-09-28 · cited 17×
This case involves a federal lawsuit by Total Renal Care (TRC), operator of a dialysis clinic, against Childers Oil Company and Mountain Rail Properties for negligence causing two oil spills that contaminated the local water supply, forcing the clinic to close temporarily and incur cleaning costs. The defendants moved to dismiss, seeking abstention under Colorado River due to parallel state court actions from the same incidents and arguing failure to state a claim based on the economic loss rule. The court denied the motion, holding that abstention was not warranted because federal courts have a strong obligation to exercise jurisdiction and the circumstances did not justify it, and that the economic loss rule does not apply absent a contractual relationship between the parties, allowing TRC's tort claims to proceed.
environmenttorts & liabilityprocedure
Turner v. Astrue
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-09-14 · cited 2×
In Turner v. Astrue, the plaintiff sought attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after the court reversed a Social Security Administration denial of disability benefits and remanded the case. The court denied the motion for fees because Turner had not incurred any attorney fees within the meaning of the EAJA. Under his contingency fee agreements, no fees were owed unless the case was won and past-due benefits were awarded, and none had been awarded at the time of the motion. The core reasoning focused on the EAJA's explicit requirement that a prevailing party must have incurred fees, which was not satisfied by the contingent arrangement tied to benefits recovery under the Social Security Act.
procedurehealthcare
Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-07-28 · cited 28×
This case involves a dispute between Unarco and Lexington Insurance Company over whether Unarco qualifies as an additional insured under a policy issued to Atlas for work at a Wal-Mart facility in Kentucky, following a settlement of tort claims by workers exposed to harmful conditions. The court addressed a choice-of-law issue to determine whether Kentucky or Illinois law governs the interpretation of the insurance contract. The court decided that Kentucky law applies, based on Kentucky's strong presumption in favor of applying its own law in the absence of overwhelming contrary interests from another state.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Rich & Rich Partnership v. Poetman Records USA, Inc.
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-05-17 · cited 5×
This case centers on a dispute between Rich & Rich Partnership and Poetman Records USA, Inc. and Michael Johnathon over two University of Kentucky basketball-themed music albums with overlapping songs and artwork; Rich & Rich alleged copyright infringement, breach of contract, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and related claims after Poetman released its album years after the marketing contract ended. The court denied Rich & Rich's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Poetman's motion for summary judgment in part while denying it in part. It dismissed the copyright infringement claim due to an invalid registration that omitted preexisting material in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), dismissed time-barred claims including breach of fiduciary duty and conversion under Kentucky statutes of limitations, dismissed punitive damages claims tied to breach of contract per Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.184(4), but allowed certain fraud claims and associated punitive damages to survive. The reasoning focused on the statutory prerequisites for copyright actions, application of limitations periods to the tort claims, and the explicit bar on punitive damages in contract cases.
business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability
Baze v. Parker
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-05-06
The case involved Ralph Baze, a death-sentenced inmate who had exhausted his federal habeas review, seeking a federal court order compelling the Kentucky Department of Corrections to allow his counsel to interview prison officers for information to support a clemency petition to the state governor. The court denied the motion, concluding it lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. The decision reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 3599 authorizes federal funding for counsel in state clemency proceedings but does not confer authority on federal courts to issue such orders or oversee state clemency processes, which remain within the governor's discretion under principles of federalism and comity.
criminal lawfederal power
United States v. Banks
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-04-30
In United States v. Banks, the defendant moved to dismiss a superseding indictment charging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1383a(a)(3)(A) and § 1383a(a)(2) for concealing information about living arrangements and income that affected her eligibility for Social Security benefits, arguing that the charges were barred by the five-year statute of limitations. The court denied both motions to dismiss. It held that Count 1 alleged a continuing offense because the nature of the statute, which imposes an ongoing duty to disclose events affecting the continued right to benefits, showed Congress intended the offense to be treated as continuing under the test from Toussie v. United States. Count 2 was timely because it was based on a statement made in 2007, within the limitations period before the 2009 indictment.
criminal lawprocedure
United States v. Rice
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-04-07
In United States v. Rice, the defendant moved to suppress evidence, including firearms, seized during a search of his residence pursuant to a warrant based on an affidavit alleging he had sold elk antlers without a permit. Both parties agreed the warrant lacked probable cause because the affidavit provided no information connecting the alleged illegal activity to the specific address searched or establishing it as the defendant's home. The court granted the motion, holding that the good-faith exception from United States v. Leon did not apply, as the affidavit contained no indicia linking the premises to the crime and the analysis was limited to the four corners of the affidavit.
criminal lawprocedure
Francis v. Marshall
District Court, E.D. Kentucky · 2010-02-02 · cited 2×
The case involves Nello Francis, a Floyd County park worker whose position was eliminated by newly elected County Judge Executive Robert Marshall after Francis supported his son's unsuccessful campaign for state representative. Francis sued Marshall and the Floyd County Fiscal Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged unlawful political patronage violating the First Amendment, plus a § 1985 conspiracy claim and state-law claims including age discrimination and wrongful discharge. The court denied Francis's cross-motion for partial summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the defendants' summary judgment motion. It ruled that Francis could not assert a new Fourteenth Amendment due process claim at the summary judgment stage without having amended his complaint under Rule 15(a), as the original pleading only raised First Amendment and state-law allegations.
civil rightselectionslabor & employmentprocedure