Joseph Louis Tauro

This case involves a Methuen police sergeant who sued the city and various officers, alleging retaliation—including suspension, internal investigations, harassment, and defamation—after he reported suspected corruption involving the police chief and testified before a federal grand jury. The plaintiff claimed violations of his federal and state constitutional rights, primarily through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against individual defendants and the municipality. The court allowed the defendants' motions to dismiss the federal claims, finding the allegations insufficient under pleading standards to establish liability or a municipal policy or custom, and dismissed the remaining state-law claims without prejudice due to the early stage of the proceedings and lack of supplemental jurisdiction. The decision rested on precedents like Twombly, Iqbal, and Monell requiring plausible factual support rather than conclusory statements.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

The case concerned an Egyptian corporation that licensed a music television channel to a New Jersey company under agreements providing for payments and U.S. broadcasting rights; the licensee allegedly failed to pay fees, leading the licensor to sue both the licensee and Dish Network entities (which broadcast the channel) for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and related claims in federal court in Massachusetts. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction over them and improper venue, while the plaintiff sought leave for jurisdictional discovery. The court allowed the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part, denied the discovery motion without prejudice, and addressed related issues of forum non conveniens and transfer, relying on analysis of the defendants' contacts with Massachusetts, the parties' forum-selection clause, and standards for personal jurisdiction and venue under federal law.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns disputes over reinsurance obligations stemming from insurance policies issued in the early 1980s by affiliated Commercial Union entities, now OneBeacon and Aviva, for coverage of Harrisons U.S. operations. The court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment and motions to strike affidavits and evidence. It allowed the defendant's motion to strike, partially allowed the plaintiffs' motion to strike, denied the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, and granted the defendant's summary judgment motion. The core reasoning was that the sole reinsurance contract between the parties, the Facultative Certificate, covered only the 1980 policy and did not extend to the 1981 or 1982 policies, which lacked the required reinsurance endorsement, had different terms, and included exclusions removing the relevant insureds from coverage.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case was a commercial dispute between two competing at-home carpet and flooring companies, Empire Today and National Floors Direct (NFD), involving claims of tortious interference with contracts and business relations, Lanham Act violations for trademark infringement and false advertising, alter ego liability, defamation, and abuse of process, along with related claims under Massachusetts Chapter 93A. After a thirteen-day jury trial excluding the 93A claims, the jury rejected all of Empire's claims and found for NFD only on its abuse of process counterclaim, awarding $500,000 in damages. Empire then moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), while both parties filed cross-motions seeking judgments on their respective Chapter 93A claims and related requests for attorneys' fees under state and federal law. The court denied all post-trial motions, leaving the jury verdict intact and declining to award additional relief or fees on the 93A claims or Lanham Act issues.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned the enforceability of a 2006 mortgage on plaintiff's property after plaintiff attempted to rescind 2007 refinancing mortgages under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), which had been intended to pay off the earlier loan. The district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on Chase's counterclaim seeking to enforce the 2006 mortgage. The court allowed Chase's motion in part and denied plaintiff's cross-motion, holding that the 2006 mortgage remained valid and enforceable. The reasoning relied on TILA and Regulation Z, which limit rescission in refinancings to only the new funds advanced and do not affect prior obligations, so plaintiff's tender of the 2006 mortgage was ineffective and the discharge was erroneous.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case arose under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) as a challenge to the Social Security Administration's denial of Disability Insurance Benefits to a Portuguese immigrant with a fourth-grade education who claimed inability to work due to a left shoulder injury and back pain from a 2004 industrial accident. The ALJ found at step five of the five-step evaluation process that the claimant retained the residual functional capacity for light work and that jobs existed in significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform, leading to denial of benefits. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion to reverse and granted the Commissioner's motion to affirm, holding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence and that the plaintiff had not shown any legal error or ignored evidence. The court noted that an ALJ need not specifically discuss every piece of evidence, including vocational assessments from non-medical sources.

labor & employmenthealthcarefederal power

Plaintiffs Carl R. Reetz and Gurry Investments sued Bio-Fertilis and related defendants over alleged misuse of intellectual property and trade secrets tied to an organic fertilizer process, following failed 2009 negotiations to acquire their Mississippi-based company HCA and subsequent business dealings by defendants including a contract in China. The court allowed defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. The decision rested on the absence of personal jurisdiction: no general jurisdiction existed due to lack of continuous and systematic activity by defendants in Massachusetts, and no specific jurisdiction under the state long-arm statute because no relevant acts or contracts occurred in the commonwealth and the governing letter of intent concerned a Mississippi entity.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryproperty

Plaintiffs, majority shareholders in a bankrupt company, sued the City of East Providence and several individuals for tortious interference with contractual relations and civil conspiracy, alleging a course of conduct that caused the company's failure; they invoked federal diversity jurisdiction. The court discovered that one defendant shared citizenship with at least one plaintiff in Massachusetts, destroying complete diversity. Although Rule 21 permits dropping a non-diverse party in some circumstances, the court determined that the defendant was indispensable under Rule 19(b) because he was alleged to be a joint tortfeasor in a conspiracy, and dismissing him would risk inconsistent judgments and prejudice the parties. Finding no basis for subject-matter jurisdiction, the court dismissed the action without addressing the merits or other motions.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Sebastian M., a young man with developmental disabilities, and his parents suing the King Philip Regional School District and the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education for allegedly failing to provide him with a free appropriate public education through his individualized education programs. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the school district's cross-motion. It reasoned that the evidence showed Sebastian made progress under the IEPs, which his parents had accepted, and that the programs were appropriate based on evaluations and reports, without requiring the district to meet every parental expectation.

civil rights

This case involves securities fraud claims brought by investment funds that purchased stock in American Dental Partners, Inc. (ADPI) between 2004 and 2007. The plaintiffs alleged that ADPI and its officers made false or misleading public statements about the company's earnings, compliance with a key service agreement, and pending litigation, in violation of Sections 10(b), 18, and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The statements concerned ADPI's improper diversion of over $15 million from a dental practice partner and related cost-cutting measures. The court denied the motion to dismiss the Section 10(b) and Section 20(a) claims, finding the pleadings adequate to state a claim, but granted the motion as to the Section 18 claim on the ground that it was time-barred and not subject to class-action tolling.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved Thomas Mason, a former employee of the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), who alleged that the DEP and several individual supervisors violated his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by failing to notify him of his FMLA rights, denying his requests for medical leave related to conditions including asthma, hypertension, and depression, and terminating him after he sought such leave. Mason also raised other claims in his complaint against the defendants. On motions to dismiss, the court allowed the DEP's motion in full and allowed the individual defendants' motion in part while denying it in part. The reasoning centered on sovereign immunity barring claims against the state agency, the sufficiency of allegations against individuals for FMLA interference and retaliation, and qualified immunity analysis for the individual defendants under the statute.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves a prisoner at MCI-Cedar Junction who sued a corrections officer and two UMCH medical staff members under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff claimed that after knee surgery for a torn patellar tendon, defendants prematurely removed or failed to ensure he retained crutches, leading to a fall and further injury. The court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, granting summary judgment to defendant Waitkevich but denying it to defendants Berry and Kearnan. The core reasoning was that factual disputes existed as to whether Berry and Kearnan acted with deliberate indifference based on their knowledge of the plaintiff's medical needs and actions regarding the crutches, while no such triable issues were found regarding Waitkevich.

criminal lawcivil rightshealthcare

This case involved a bankruptcy debtor's appeal of a bankruptcy court's denial of his motion to reconsider an order granting a mortgage lender relief from the automatic stay to foreclose on his home. After the property was foreclosed upon and sold to a third party, the district court addressed the debtor's renewed motion for a stay pending appeal and the lender's motion to dismiss the appeal. The court denied the stay motion as moot and dismissed the appeal, holding that the sale of the property rendered the appeal moot because no effective remedy was available and that a higher court had already resolved the issues. The court reasoned that the purpose of the stay was to prevent foreclosure, which had already occurred, and that courts generally do not disturb valid third-party sales.

propertyprocedure

This case involves a union's attempt to intervene in long-closed litigation (the Ricci cases) concerning Massachusetts' provision of services to intellectually disabled individuals under a 1993 Disengagement Order that ended the court's active oversight. The union sought to reopen the cases, claiming proposed state budget cuts and resulting layoffs of Human Service Coordinators would cause systemic failures in Individual Service Plans, violating the order. The court denied the motion for permissive intervention, holding that the union lacked third-party standing because no hindrance prevented the original plaintiffs or class representatives from protecting their interests, and that the Disengagement Order expressly limited enforcement actions to the original plaintiffs. The court further concluded it lacked jurisdiction to reassert authority absent a showing by the Ricci plaintiffs that one of the order's specific conditions for reopening had been met.

civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

The case involves a habeas corpus petition filed by state prisoner Ernest Mack under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 2006 Massachusetts convictions based on guilty pleas to armed assault, assault and battery, and witness intimidation charges. The respondent moved to dismiss the petition as untimely under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, arguing that the judgment became final upon acceptance of the guilty pleas in September 2006, while the petitioner contended that finality occurred only after the denial of his motion for a new trial and subsequent state appeals concluded in September 2009. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the petition was not time-barred. The reasoning centered on Massachusetts law treating a motion for new trial as the primary vehicle to challenge a guilty plea and recent Supreme Court guidance in Wall v. Kholi on what constitutes direct or collateral review for purposes of finality under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

criminal lawprocedure

Akamai Technologies, Inc. and Akamai Securities Corporation sued Deutsche Bank AG, alleging that its subsidiary Deutsche Bank Securities wrongfully invested over $217 million in auction-rate securities that became illiquid after the market collapsed in 2008. The plaintiffs claimed that the subsidiary made material misrepresentations and omissions about the safety and liquidity of the securities, in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and that Deutsche Bank AG was liable as a control person under section 20(a) of the Act and related Massachusetts law. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b) and the PSLRA, ruling that the complaint sufficiently alleged the elements of an underlying securities fraud claim—including material omissions, scienter, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation—as well as the defendant's control over the subsidiary. The plaintiffs' separate motion for specific discovery was denied as moot.

business & regulatory

The case involved a federal inmate at FMC Devens challenging the Bureau of Prisons' denial of eligibility for the Elderly Offender Home Detention Pilot Program under 42 U.S.C. § 17541(g), which allows certain offenders age 65 or older to serve the end of their sentences in home detention if they have served the greater of 10 years or 75% of their term of imprisonment. Petitioner, serving a 40-year sentence imposed in 1984, argued that good conduct time credits under repealed statutes should reduce the sentence for purposes of the 75% calculation so that he would qualify based on his projected mandatory release date. The court accepted and adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granted the warden's motion to dismiss the § 2241 petition, and closed the case. The reasoning was that the statutory phrase "term of imprisonment to which the offender was sentenced" refers to the full sentence imposed by the court, not the amount of time actually anticipated to be served after good conduct credits.

criminal lawfederal power

This case involves a challenge by pro-life counselors to a Massachusetts law creating a 35-foot fixed buffer zone around entrances and driveways of reproductive health care facilities. Plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of free speech, due process, equal protection, and related rights, proceeding first on facial challenges and later on as-applied claims. The court denied plaintiffs' motion to argue facial invalidity anew, granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the as-applied claims in counts two through eight, and allowed in part the motion to amend the complaint. The core reasoning rested on the law of the case doctrine, under which prior rulings upholding the statute against facial attack were binding absent a dramatic change in controlling authority, significant new evidence, or blatant error causing injustice; the court found none of these exceptions applied and that the as-applied allegations failed to state viable claims.

free speechabortioncivil rights

This case concerns a dispute between Rohm & Haas Electronic Materials, LLC and its former distributor Electronic Circuits Supplies, Inc. over an amendment to their distributorship agreement. The plaintiff alleged fraud and deceit because the defendant inserted language removing a non-competition provision from a draft amendment before signing and returning it, and also claimed misappropriation of goodwill and confidential information by the defendant after termination of the agreement. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to bar the defendant from selling competing products to its customers for one year. The court denied the motion, holding that the signed amendment validly rescinded the non-competition clause, that the plaintiff had not shown a likelihood of success on its fraud or misappropriation claims, and that any harm was not irreparable and could be addressed through damages. The decision rested on the fact that both parties were sophisticated, the amendment was executed without concealment of the change, and Massachusetts law governed the agreement.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves Chevron Corporation's request under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for discovery from Jonathan S. Shefftz, an expert who submitted a report on unjust enrichment damages in the Lago Agrio Litigation, an environmental lawsuit in Ecuador alleging pollution from oil operations by Chevron's predecessor. The underlying dispute stems from claims of environmental harm in the Oriente region, with Chevron alleging that Shefftz's report improperly relied on a purportedly fraudulent global damages assessment by another expert. The court allowed Chevron's ex parte application in part and denied it in part, permitting limited discovery for use in the foreign proceedings while restricting its scope based on relevance and statutory requirements. The reasoning centered on the statutory criteria for § 1782 discovery, including whether the requested information would be used in foreign tribunals, and considerations of privilege and waiver in the context of the expert's role.

environmentprocedurebusiness & regulatory